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There is a deeply ingrained tradition in Scotland that we will not finally judge 
one another by material standards. A country as poor as we have been for so 
long has at least learnt that there are more important measures of a human being 
than the financial - more significant assessments of the state of a nation than the 
stock market. We have a humane tradition to uphold second to that of no other 
nation. 
If we wish to remain Scottish, we will honour that tradition. 
William Mcllvanney, Surviving The Shipwreck 
In all his life, he had never seen an English-Canadian and a French-Canadian 
hostile to each other face to face. When they disliked, they disliked entirely in 
the group. And the result of these two group-legends was a Canada oddly naive, 
so far without any real villains, without overt cruelty or criminal memories, a 
country strangely innocent in its groping individual common sense, intent on 
doing the right thing in the way some children are, tongue-tied because it felt 
others would not be interested in what it had to say; loyal, skilled and proud, 
race-memories lonely in great spaces. 
Hugh MacLennan, Two Solitudes 
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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the political communications strategies of the Scottish National 
Party and the Bloc Quebecois during the 1997 national elections in the UK and 
Canada and how these two political parties have promoted their nationalist 
message, as well as their relationship with the journalists who deliver it. 
It challenges the consensus that the quality of a party's political communication is 
the main determinant of its electoral success, and looks at the role of other factors, 
such as historical, political, cultural and social conditions, and how such factors 
influence the role of journalists in promulgating nationalism. This is done through an 
examination of nationalism and cultural identity as well as political journalism in 
Britain, Scotland, Canada and Quebec; an analysis of the histories of the Scottish 
National Party and the Bloc Quebecois; data from interviews with journalists and 
party strategists; an analysis of the political communications strategies of the two 
parties before 1997; and case studies of the SNP and the Bloc during the 1997 
elections in Canada and the UK, which include data from media coverage and party 
political documents. 
The author concludes that it is these other factors that have had more of an influence 
on the electoral outcomes of the Scottish National Party and the Bloc Quebecois 
rather than their political communication, and which have also determined the 
sometimes adversarial nature of the relationship that political journalists in Scotland 
and Quebec have had with these nationalist parties. 
vii 
CHAPTER ONE 
Getting The Message Across: 
The Scottish National Party and the Bloc Quebecois 
We live in an age of territorial take-backs [Jacobs, 1994, p. 107]. Since Norway's 
secession from Sweden in 1905, the number of sovereign states in the world has 
more than quadrupled, now numbering close to 200 [Cohen, 1994, p. 201]. 
Nationalist movements are on the rise everywhere, from Kosovo to Iraq and 
Northern Ireland to Spain. This thesis addresses the case of two nationalist 
parties: the Bloc Quebecois, formed in 1991, and the Scottish National Party, 
established in 1934, by looking in particular at their political communications 
strategies during the 1997 national elections in Britain and Canada. It also 
examines how these two political parties have promoted their nationalist 
message, and their relationship with the journalists who deliver it, for the 
following reasons. 
First, and most importantly, I wanted to challenge the common view 
expressed by academics and journalists that the quality of a party's political 
communications was the determining factor in electoral success. This thesis 
argues that the reasons for specific campaign outcomes are much more complex 
than that and relate to the historical, cultural and political milieu in which a 
political party operates. In examining two nationalist political parties who 
demonstrated entirely different approaches to political communication in their 
national elections, and whose nationalist ethos was also fundamentally different, 
I hoped to test that argument. 
Second, I also wanted to investigate the role of journalists in the 
promotion of nationalism, because in many of the historical accounts of the rise 
of nationalism, particularly in 19th-century Europe, they were so often cited as 
being influential members of nationalist movements. Given my own background 
as a journalist, and my understanding of how journalists do their work, 
particularly with regards to the modern constraints of objectivity, I felt that the 
attitudes of political journalists in Scotland and Quebec towards the nationalist 
parties they reported on needed to be examined as part of this communication 
process. How these journalists responded to nationalism could possibly 
influence the nature of coverage, the amount of bias in their reports, and indeed, 
the general political environment. 
Third, as a former journalist and as a community activist with a long 
history of involvement in politics, I wanted to know why some groups or political 
organizations were able to get their message across and capture the public 
imagination despite all the odds against them, while others, with an equally good 
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or better programme or cause, were unsuccessful. How is it that organizations 
such as Greenpeace, for example, can win so much world-wide media attention, 
despite some questionable tactics on their part, while in Canada, the ploddingly 
honest, left-of-centre New Democratic Party finds it almost impossible to garner 
column inches or television sound-bites in the national media? 
Finally, as an anglophone Canadian born in Quebec, I am concerned with 
issues of national and cultural identity, and in particular, the rapid rise of the 
Bloc Quebecois. Quebec's nationalist dreams have permeated Canadian political 
debate almost since the time of Confederation in 1867 [Trofimenkoff, 1983], and 
are continuing to have profound effects on its present political climate. The future 
of Canada very much depends on whether Quebec stays or goes: if that province 
ever achieved its territorial take-back, it is doubtful whether Canada would 
survive as a nation. 
The Scottish National Party and the Bloc Quebecois 
An initial comparison of the Scottish National Party with the Bloc Quebecois 
presents striking contrasts in their performance at the polls. Ten years ago the 
Bloc Quebecois did not exist, and its first leader, the charismatic Lucien 
Bouchard, was a cabinet minister in the federal Progressive Conservative 
government. The rise of the Bloc was meteoric; established June 15,1991, it 
contested its first election in October of 1993, winning 54 out of 75 seats in 
Quebec and becoming the official opposition in the Canadian House of 
Commons. This would be the equivalent, in British terms, of Alex Salmond and 
the Scottish National Party replacing William Hague, head of the Conservatives, 
as leader of the Official Opposition in the British House of Commons. 
The electoral success of the Bloc was followed by that of the provincial 
separatist party, the Parti Quebecois, which defeated the ruling Liberals in 
September, 1994, and pledged to hold a referendum on Quebec independence 
within a year. The results of that referendum on October 30 took many by 
surprise, including Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien, a native Quebecer. 
With more than a 93 per cent voter turn-out, the vote was 50.56 per cent against 
to 49.44 per cent in favour. The percentage of spoiled ballots - 1.82 - was greater 
than the margin of victory. 
Scotland and Quebec are also of interest because they present a striking 
contrast in the forms of their nationalism. In Scotland, language does not have 
the same central importance as it does in Quebec, where it "is not only a cultural 
marker for Quebecois society, but is also a key institution of civil society through 
which most other things are translated and given meaning. " [McCrone, 1998, p. 
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135} Scotland is trying to pursue a civic form of nationalism, not based on 
ethnicity or culture, while in Quebec, ethnicity and culture is the raison d'etre of 
the sovereigntist movement. One only has to look at the language of their 
respective political manifestos to see this. The Declaration of Sovereignty issued 
by the Quebec government for the referendum on separation begins with these 
words, italicized for emphasis in the original: 
The time has come to reap the fields of history. The time has 
come at last to harvest what has been sown for us by four 
hundred years of men and women and courage, rooted in the 
soil and now returned to it. 
The time has come for us, tomorrow's ancestors, to make ready 
for our descendants harvests that are worthy of the labours of 
the past. 
May our toil be worthy of them, may they gather us together at 
last. 
These are the opening words of the 1992 Manifesto of the Scottish National 
Party: 
SCOTLAND is a living, breathing, exciting country. Its resources 
are vast and varied, its people skilled and dynamic, its name and 
history respected throughout the world. 
By rights, we should be a confident, open people, enjoying living 
in one of the wealthiest nations in Europe. 
Instead, we are forced to devote all our resources and energy to 
resisting the policies of a London government we neither voted 
for nor believe in. 
It's time to put these wasted, futile years behind us and be a 
nation again. 
One is not excited by reading these words. They remind this writer of Arnold 
Toynbee's utilitarian view of a nation: "A national state is not a God. It is a 
public utility, like a gas works. " [As cited in Gibson, 1994, p. 89] 
However, there is danger in Quebec's approach, for it can lead to racism. 
As Philip Schlesinger states in his discussion of modern-day racism and anti- 
semitism in Europe [Schlesinger, 1992, p. 21]: 
Ethnos threatens demos. Whatever the distinctive motivations 
and causes within each national context, the demand for pure 
identities within the major western nation-states would seem to 
manifest a desire for a simple, more orderly, world, one that is 
purged of ambiguity - and therefore of the wrong kinds of 
people. 
Quebec's nationalism is also strikingly different from that of the rest of 
Canada (or ROC, as it is colloquially known), which sees itself as multi-cultural, 
multi-ethnic and multilingual -a veritable post-modern state. The two visions 
are incompatible, particularly since Quebec has difficulty acknowledging the 
claims to nationhood and sovereignty of the First Nations peoples within its 
own borders [Roth, 1991, p. 153]. 
Quebec's move toward independence has aroused immense hostility in 
English Canada. Reaction in the English-language media has been uniformly 
critical. Business leaders have warned of dire economic consequences: for 
example, the $20-billion-worth of trade between the neighbouring province of 
Ontario and Quebec would be seriously threatened [Gibson, 1994, p. 133]. 
French-speaking Canadians outside of Quebec have expressed concerns that they 
will lose their language rights. People in the Atlantic provinces of Nova Scotia, 
New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island and Newfoundland are worried that they 
will be cut off from the rest of Canada. Aboriginal peoples in Quebec, who are 
fighting land claims within the province, are angry that they could be forced to 
separate from Canada, despite their voting 96 per cent against separation in a 
referendum of their own held four days before the Quebec vote. Finally, removing 
75 MPs, 24 senators, 7.25 million people and 1,667,926 square kilometres from 
Canada would have enormous consequences for the political and economic 
balance of power in the country. 
The Scottish National Party's goal of an independent Scotland in Europe 
has seemed relatively placid and unthreatening by comparison. Although 
independence has long been a topic of much interest and debate north of the 
border, it has not seemed to arouse the same kind of antagonism - or even 
interest - in the national, London-based media until very recently. It does not 
apparently threaten the economy of Britain. It does not have to contend with the 
special needs of an ethnocultural group within its borders that has claim to its 
territory, as do Canada's aboriginal peoples within Quebec. The SNP's 
leadership has been careful to stress the inclusivity of the party's vision of an 
independent Scotland, and with its call for independence within Europe, seems 
more in tune with our post-modern times in which nations have "limited 
sovereignty in an interdependent world" [McCrone, 1992, p. 219] than does 
Quebec and its appeal to emotion and historical memory. Finally, if Scotland 
leaves the United Kingdom, it will not isolate any region: before 1707 and the 
Act of Union, Scotland was an independent nation, not the remnant of a 
conquered one, as is Quebec. 
However, the Scottish National Party's record of electoral success has 
been nowhere near that of the Bloc Quebecois. The SNP, now at age 66 a 
political senior citizen compared to the fledgling BQ, won only three out of 72 
seats in Scotland during the 1992 national elections in Britain, and this after an 
4 
ICM Research poll (commissioned by the Scotsman and Independent Television 
News) showed Scots support for independence at 50 per cent. Although these 
results were thought at the time to be caused by a "rogue" poll, when the 
Scotsman's then political editor, Peter Jones, asked that they be checked, the 
results came back the same: "support for independence, either outside both the 
UK and the EC or inside the EC, had reached 50 per cent" [Marr, 1995, p. 212]. 
But this was certainly not reflected in the election three months later, where just 
over a fifth of the electorate voted for the SNP [Marr, 1995, p. 230]. 
The Scottish National Party enjoyed a brief surge of popularity to 30 per 
cent in the fall of 1995 following their "Braveheart" campaign, in which SNP 
supporters distributed leaflets outside cinemas showing the Mel Gibson film on 
the life of legendary Scots hero and freedom-fighter William Wallace. However, 
it did not maintain that level of support in the national election of 1997, and was 
as far away from victory as ever. Why did the SNP not have the same success as 
the Bloc Quebecois, despite the fact that independence for Scotland appeared to 
be far less contentious and less problematic than it was for Quebec? Was it a 
measure of the effectiveness of their political communication strategies, or was 
this the result of the differences in the relationship between political journalists 
and the nationalist parties in the two regions? Or was it due to more subtle 
factors, based in their history and culture? These were the questions that I 
wanted to answer in this thesis. 
The Effectiveness of Political Communications 
Part of the difficulty in answering these questions is that there is no clear 
consensus on the effects of political communications, at least not among 
academics (politicians and journalists seem much more inclined to believe that 
spin is all you need to win an election. ) Some of the same doubts expressed 
about the effectiveness of such communications are also heard in the ongoing 
debate about media effects; for example, the inadequacy of research designs, the 
difficulty (if not impossibility) of separating out media influence from other 
influential factors, the role of personal belief structures in the reception of 
messages, the lack of long-term studies, and most frustratingly, the contradictory 
nature of the findings. 
It is not my intention here to review the extensive literature on this debate, 
but to point out the connection between media effects and the effectiveness of 
political communications. If it can be argued, as it often has, that the case for 
media effects is not proven, [McLeod, Kosicki and Pan, 1991; McQuail, 1994; 
Livingstone, 1996; Cumberbatch, in Briggs and Cobley, 1998] then it would 
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follow that the same can be said for the effectiveness of political 
communications, which rely on the media to get their message across. However, 
as Livingstone says: "Most media researchers believe that the media have 
significant effects, even though they are hard to demonstrate, and most would 
agree that the media make a significant contribution to the social construction of 
reality. The problem is to move beyond this platitude. " [Livingstone, 1996, p. 
3211 
The same is true for the effects of political communications. As with 
media effects, for every claim for the influence of political communications, there 
is a counter-claim. Claims for a causal connection between a party's political 
communications and how people vote, for example, are not easy to substantiate. 
Some research seems to indicate that in fact, campaigns make very little 
difference to voters. In the 1992 general election in Britain, for example, Labour's 
vote increased just three per cent from start to finish of the campaign, despite its 
new and improved political communications [McNair, 1995, pp. 32-33]. In the 
1997 election, "The party which got the most positive press backing, Labour, fell 
back during the campaign, while the Liberal Democrats, who rarely got even a 
mention, gained the most ground" [McKie, 1998, p. 1291. Evidence that how a 
message is communicated can have an influence, particularly with undecided 
voters, and that the image of party policy is the most important [McNair, 1995, 
p. 34] did not seem to be supported by the results of the 1992 election in Britain 
or the 1993 federal election in Canada. British Labour leader Neil Kinnock was 
certainly more telegenic than the bland John Major, as was Kim Campbell, leader 
of the Canadian Progressive Conservatives, compared to jean Chretien, who has 
been described by Canadian political commentator Keith Davey as looking like 
"the man who drove the getaway car. " 
In fact, the evidence for the media's influence on voting behaviour is not 
very robust [Negrine, 1994, p. 157], but that has not stopped the claims for that 
particular influence. Franklin, for example, states that the last chapter in his 
book Packaging Politics "suggests that audiences are increasingly influenced by the 
ever more subtle and persuasive techniques of the communications professionals 
and 'spin doctors'. " [Franklin, 1994, p. 23] However, an examination of the 
chapter does not reveal any clear proof for such a statement: he refutes the 
theory of press influence; describes the multiplicity of social and cultural factors 
that can affect how people make political choices; cites a study of television 
coverage that concluded such coverage "followed public opinion, but did not 
lead it" [Franklin, 1994, p. 219]; and although he makes a convincing case for the 
influence of television on uncommitted voters, adds that the regulations governing 
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broadcasting ensure non-partisan coverage so that "television's influence is 
greater on public knowledge than attitudes. " [Franklin, 1994, pp. 2251 
Other examples abound. Crete, in his discussion of what constitutes an 
effective message in an election campaign, states that vague messages are most 
likely to be successful, but then concludes by citing studies that show "taking a 
stand on the issues could be more effective than being noncommittal or 
indecisive", and "that candidates who were neutral on the issues were 
considered less honest, less direct and less well informed than their opponents 
who took a stand. " [Crete, 1991, p. 24] Miller [1994] seems to contradict his 
own conclusions in his study of the media and propaganda in Northern Ireland. 
He concludes that because "a large proportion of people" in his sample believed 
the main points in the British government's version of what happened when three 
IRA members were killed on Gibraltar in 1988, "public opinion can be vulnerable 
to propaganda offensives by official sources. " He then makes the valid point 
that such influence, however, is mediated by "other sources of information 
available, prior beliefs, views and experiences", but adds: "Nevertheless... the 
media, can, under certain circumstances, have a strong influence on public 
perceptions of contemporary political issues and allow the powerful to legitimate 
their actions. " [Miller, 1994, p. 283] 
In McNair's discussion of the role of political communication in recent 
British and U. S. elections, he states: "Quantifying that role is difficult, but it is 
beyond dispute that effective political communication played a large part in 
saving Bill Clinton's term, and that it greatly helped the British Labour Party to 
its first government in eighteen years. " [McNair, 1998, p. 49] However, could it 
not be argued that Clinton's election victory was due in large part to the fact that 
he was running against an ageing, ineffectual opponent, who could not beat 
Clinton's record of economic success? And likewise, with the British Labour 
Party, could their victory not be attributed to the fact that the voters were tired 
of Tory sleaze and John Major's inadequate leadership, and that after 18 years, 
they felt it was time for a change? 
Philo states in his discussion of media audiences and message reception 
that "One task of good journalism is to seek the key pieces of information which 
do not 'fit' the templates and false stereotypes of some popular ways of 
understanding, and to develop them into alternative and critical accounts. " 
[Philo, 1998, p. 283] This is also the task of the good researcher. Part of this 
researcher's difficulty with the literature on effects is that it seems to assume that 
voters are swayed by image, and that there is no underlying substance to their 
electoral choices. This is a rather cynical view, and one not supported by the 
evidence. The most oft-cited example of political marketing based on image is 
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the election campaign of Ronald Reagan in 1980, which admittedly, raised the 
selling of the president to new levels of sophistication. But, as Scammell points 
out: 
Doubtless there are politicians guided by no goal other than the 
attainment of popularity and power, but pure, naked ambition scarcely 
provides an adequate explanation of political behaviour. Even Ronald 
Reagan, who might be thought the ultimate media-packaged candidate, 
developed his policies from the basis of genuinely held political 
convictions, although there can be no doubt about the importance of 
opinion research both in shaping Reagan's election campaign strategy and 
his actions as president. 
[Scammell, 1995, p. 10] 
However, Reagan's support was based not just on his image, but on his ability to 
communicate his political convictions, and his perceived competence in handling 
the important issues of peace and prosperity, according to the research done by 
Reagan's pollster, Dick Wirthlin [Scammell, 1995, p. 22]. 
Another assumption frequently made is that voters choose which political 
party to support on the basis of the party leader's appearance. This belief has 
governed the choice of leader in some political parties: for example, Labour 
party members elected Tony Blair as their leader "largely because of his 
perceived ability to look and sound good for the cameras" [McNair, 1999, p. 
142]. However, this approach has had mixed results, as mentioned earlier, 
because the public had concerns about issues of substance that over-rode matters 
of style. Kinnock may have been more telegenic than Major, but Labour's own 
focus groups as well as public polls revealed that British voters did not like him 
or believe in his competence, and that he "was Labour's most serious liability" 
[Scammell, 1995, p. 256-257]. In Canada, Kim Campbell was chosen leader of 
the Progressive Conservatives because it was felt her relative youth, lively 
personality and blonde good looks would create the impression of a new and 
revitalized party for the 1993 federal election. However, this was the election in 
which the Progressive Conservatives went from being the government with 169 
seats to being the smallest party in the House of Commons with just two seats. 
As Woolstencroft notes: "The leader, although dressed in fine attire, had neither 
the organizational preparedness nor clear and defensible policies to sustain the 
image so carefully nurtured. " [Woolstencroft, 1994, p. 9] In fact, her rival, jean 
Chretien, managed to use his less than statesmanlike appearance to good effect 
during the campaign when the Tories broadcast a television advertisement 
mocking his facial paralysis. Chretien responded by saying that "God gave me a 
physical defect and I've accepted that since I was a kid" [Woolstencroft, 1994, 
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p. 21], making the Conservatives look mean-minded and negative, willing to 
ridicule a person's physical disability in order to score political points. 
The question then arises, given the uncertain nature of the evidence for the 
seeming ease of manipulating the public, why does the belief in it still persist? 
One answer to this question is provided by Andrew Calcutt, who argues that the 
belief in the influence of modern political communications arises out of a long 
history of elitist theoretical tradition, dating back to the mass society critiques of 
Matthew Arnold and continuing through to those of the Frankfurt School. 
Calcutt sees this belief as essentially anti-democratic: "Formally expressed as a 
criticism of media moguls and the air of unreality arising from their manipulative 
practices, the underlying content of this approach is to raise a question mark over 
the universal franchise and demean the critical faculties of the overwhelming 
majority of the electorate. " [Calcutt, 1998, p. 165] He points to the case of 
Italian TV mogul Silvio Berlusconi, who was swiftly removed from office in 1994 
after just a few months in power. Although Berlusconi's controlling interests in 
television certainly made it possible for him to raise his profile during the election 
period, it could not protect him from the scrutiny of the voters in Italy, who, 
Calcutt says, 
have not lost the ability to measure media images against 
direct experience.. .. Berlusconi was seen to be just like any other 
political operator; and all the television channels in Italy could 
not have saved him from the inglorious exit from government 
which occurred in late December 1994. Once again, political and 
economic realities overtook the airbrushed images of politicians 
and other public figures. 
[Calcutt, 1998, p. 168] 
These kinds of political and economic realities, I would argue, have a greater 
effect on political outcomes than political communications. Therefore the focus 
of this thesis is on the political, social and economic realities that have influenced 
voters in Quebec and Scotland, rather than on what Negrine describes as 'Grand 
Theories' of mass media and democracy. [Negrine, 1996, p. x] I agree with 
Philo's criticism "of those areas of mass communication theory which have lost 
contact with the need to examine the real world in a systematic fashion. " [Philo, 
1999, p. 288] In order to understand the real world of political journalists and 
how they mediate the messages of nationalist parties, it is necessary to look at 
how they do their work. For this reason I chose to focus on how political 
journalists and nationalist parties interact with each other within the context of 
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such realities, as well as on how these parties get their message across through 
specific political communications strategies. 
Chapter Outline 
This thesis is divided into two sections: the first, consisting of four introductory 
chapters giving the background and theory, and the second, describing the 
political communication strategies and giving the case studies of the two parties. 
Following this introductory chapter, chapter two gives an overview of 
nationalism and cultural identity in Britain, Scotland, Canada, and Quebec, so as 
to provide an understanding of how their nationalisms have developed. Chapter 
three shows how nationalism in Quebec and Scotland have been given political 
expression by detailing the background and history of the Bloc Quebecois and the 
Scottish National Party. Chapter four takes a comparative look at political 
journalism in Canada, Britain, Quebec and Scotland and examines the role of 
Quebec and Scottish journalists in promulgating nationalism, as well as the 
climate in which they worked during the 1997 general elections. The second 
section of the thesis focuses on the interviews with political journalists and party 
strategists which provide the original material on which to base my analysis of 
their relationship and how it works. Chapter five describes the political 
communication strategies of the two parties leading up to the general election in 
the UK and during the federal election in Canada, both of which took place in 
1997. Chapters six and seven are the case studies of the political 
communications of the Scottish National Party and the Bloc Quebecois during 
their respective national elections, while chapter eight is my conclusion. 
Methodology 
One aim of this doctoral thesis is to look at the media relations strategies of the 
two parties during the national elections in Canada and Britain held in 1997, in 
order to understand the complex inter-relationship between political journalists 
and nationalist parties and whether this influences electoral outcomes. The 
second is to compare how national identity has been projected through the 
political communication strategies of the Scottish National Party, the Bloc 
Quebecois, and its predecessor, the Parti Quebecois. Four main research 
methods are used: first, extensive background reading on the history and politics 
of Scotland and Quebec, nationalism and cultural identity, media in Britain and 
Canada, and political communications theory; second, examination of the 
publications and public relations materials produced by both the Scottish 
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National Party and the Bloc Quebecois; third, tracking of the media response in 
the influential newspapers of the respective countries: the Montreal Gazette and La 
Presse, in Quebec; and the Scotsman, Scotland on Sunday, and the Herald in 
Scotland; and fourth, 20 interviews with media relations officers and others 
involved in developing communications strategies for both parties, as well as 
with political editors and columnists, so as to determine how these parties get 
their message across. 
The emphasis in this thesis is mainly on print journalism rather than 
television, for both practical and theoretical reasons. First, my background is in 
print journalism, and so I understand the working practices of print journalists. 
This proved extremely useful in evaluating the differences in the practices among 
British and Canadian, Scottish and Quebecois journalists, which I do in chapter 
four, and also, in gaining the confidence of the print journalists whom I 
interviewed for my research. Secondly, and most important, however, there is a 
valid case for print journalism's role in agenda-setting, particularly in Canada, 
where what Fletcher and Everett describe as "the prestige dailies" - the Globe and 
Mail, Le Devoir, La Presse, the Toronto Star and the Montreal Gazette - play a large 
part in determining the nature of election coverage [Fletcher and Everett, 1991, p. 
191]. Also, newspapers are seen as better sources of political information: as 
MacDermid found, "attention to television news turns out to be a rather weak 
predictor of political knowledge, while attention to newspapers is a very strong 
predictor of political knowledge. " [MacDermid, 1991, p. 87] In the UK, because 
newspapers are not bound by the same legal restrictions as the broadcast media, 
they can provide "an alternative, more opinionated view of elections. Besides 
determining how events are covered, the press plays an important so-called 
'agenda-setting' role by determining what is reported. " [Wring, 1997, p. 74] 
Television coverage of the two national elections in 1997 has not been 
ignored in this thesis, however, but there is a greater amount of material on 
Canadian television than on British. This is because Canadian television has long 
been seen as an essential component in nation-building, whose aim, according to 
the 1991 Broadcasting Act, must be "to safeguard, enrich and strengthen the 
cultural, political, social and economic fabric of Canada" [Romanow and 
Soderlund, 1996, p. 325], and as such, has played an important role in national 
identity. Canada's broadcasting system is also much more diverse than Britain's, 
with two public broadcasting services, one in French, Societe Radio Canada 
(SRC) and one in English, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC), serving 
francophone and anglophone communities across the country. In addition, 
Canadians have access to a much wider variety of channels, both private and 
public, available to 97 per cent of homes with television [Siegel, 1996, p. 10], 
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with 24-hour news services, specialty channels, parliamentary channels in both 
French and English, as well as the Cable Public Affairs Channel which covers, 
live and unedited, a broad range of political activities in Canada. 
However, this is all changing - since 1998, Britain has had its own 
parliamentary channel, BBC Parliament - and with the rapid growth in media of 
all forms, it is questionable whether print will still be able to claim an agenda- 
setting role in the future. As Adam Boulton concludes: 
The rapid development of political on-line services, the 
imminent multiplication of digital channels and the systemic 
convergence of electronic media will all mean that the public 
will be getting political information on-screen from many 
sources other than conventional television stations. Already 
party web-sites, 24-hour television and radio news channels, 
and local and cable broadcast services mean that the totality of 
election broadcasting is beginning to match the diversity of 
print. 
[Boulton, 1998, p. 203] 
Being A Canadianist 
Researching media effects is not easy. Most of the material on the subject - and 
there is a great deal of it, with more than 2,000 publications in just the years from 
1979-89 - is inconclusive and contradictory [Franklin, 1994, pp. 204-2051. As 
John Eldridge states: 
When we come to consider the multi-media world we now 
inhabit, with its multi-messages, multi-signifying systems and 
modes of discourse, the size, the scope and the velocity of it all, 
with its spiralling interconnections and its fragmentary 
discontinuities, the classical enlightenment task of 
understanding, explaining, interpreting and evaluating is 
difficult to accomplish. Let us acknowledge the difficulties but 
also suggest that the denial in principle of the enlightenment 
project (farewell to reason) may itself be a product of intellectual 
vertigo (all that is solid melts into air) and perhaps, if 
understandably, a failure of nerve. 
[Eldridge, 1993b, p. 3431 
There were particular difficulties with this enlightenment project, involving as it 
did comparative research in two regions 3,600 miles apart, in two languages, and 
during two national elections whose campaigns overlapped each other. A major 
difficulty was obtaining Canadian material. The problem of obtaining academic 
books on Canada in the UK is a long-standing one, which the British Association 
of Canadian Studies (BACS) has tackled by trying to increase awareness 
amongst publishers of the need for such books by the 400 "Canadianists" in 
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Britain. Fortunately I was able to get books at the University of Edinburgh, home 
to the oldest Centre of Canadian Studies in the UK, and through the Centre and 
BACS, discovered useful internet sources, such as the Canadian Studies list 
based at Trent University in Canada, which in turn provided me with other 
useful web-sites. The Canadian High Commission's Canadian Academic 
Newsheet was another excellent resource. Academic colleagues in Canada e- 
mailed me information and found books for me; friends and relatives clipped 
and saved relevant news and magazine articles; others tracked down elusive but 
necessary facts. The BACS conference of 1996 provided me with several papers 
on the Quebec referendum and its political aftermath which were very helpful. 
The internet was an invaluable resource: through it I was able to keep abreast of 
events in Canada via on-line newspapers, read the Bloc's statements, contact 
Elections Canada for information on the regulations governing media coverage 
during the 1997 federal election; and arrange for interviews with Bloc (and SNP) 
media strategists. Without it I would have been severely handicapped in my 
research. 
As well as the general lack of Canadian material available in Britain, 
there was not much material available on the Bloc Quebecois anywhere. Despite 
the influence the party has had on the Canadian political scene, very little has 
been written about it. As of this writing, I had only been able to locate two 
articles, three book chapters, and a book written by a Canadian Press reporter, 
besides Bouchard's autobiography and a biography of the former Bloc leader 
written by journalist Lawrence Martin. In addition, because of geographical and 
time restrictions, I did not have the same access to Bloc strategists as I did to 
those in the Scottish National Party, and the turmoil in the Bloc's organization 
before the election added to these difficulties. Also, because the Bloc did not up- 
date its election web-site, I was not able to obtain copies of its news releases. 
However, these problems in gathering information were offset by my background 
knowledge of Quebec politics acquired during my 48 years in Canada. 
A Word About Sources 
When it came to sources, I made a conscious decision to use, as much as possible, 
materials either produced by journalists or originating in the media: for example, 
Robert Bothwell's Canada and Quebec was developed from transcripts of 
interviews done for Open College at radio station CJRT in Toronto; Gilles 
Gougeon's A History of Quebec Nationalism was based on a series of television 
programmes broadcast on Radio-Canada's nightly public affairs programme Le 
Point; Restless Nation, by Alan Clements, Kenny Farquharson and Kirsty Wark, 
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based on the television series of the same name; Paper Lions by business journalist 
Maurice Smith, and broadcaster Ludovic Kennedy's In Bed With An Elephant are 
Scottish examples. I did this because it seemed to me that if I was writing a 
thesis exploring how journalists and the media transmitted the message of 
nationalist parties, it was essential that I use examples of their work. In 
addition, by doing so, I hoped to make a contribution to the case-studies in this 
field, of which there are not many, particularly in Canada. 
It was also for this reason that I did not footnote my references to 
newspapers and magazine articles in my text, but listed them in my bibliography, 
as they were primary sources. This created some difficulties when there were 
numerous articles by the same reporter, but it was less confusing than having two 
systems of referencing in my thesis. To make it easier to access the different 
forms of sources consulted, which also included party political documents, news 
releases, and material retrieved from the internet, these were listed under their 
specific categories, such as books and journals, newspaper and magazine 
articles, and party political documents. 
In addition, given the swiftly-changing nature of the media, and the on- 
rush of new political developments in Scotland, Quebec, Britain and Canada 
during the life of this study, my literature search was biased towards the most 
current sources, particularly those published in the late 1990s, in an effort to 
keep up-to-date. This proved almost impossible, but was extremely important, 
however, for the validity of my research findings. The political campaigns of the 
late 1990s in which voters can directly access information from on-line 
newspapers and political web-sites, as well as a multitude of television channels 
and radio stations both public and private, are quite different from those of the 
mid-1980s when information sources were much more restricted in form and 
content. As McQuail says: "The important if obvious point that the media are 
not constant as a potential influence, over time and between places, is often 
overlooked in the search for generalization. " [McQuail, 1994, p. 332]. This is 
particularly true, I might add, of Canadian newspapers, whose fortunes have 
improved greatly since 1997, with not only increased profits and staff hires, but 
also more quality journalism [Carlin, 1998; Noble, 1998] - but that is the subject 
of another study. 
Dealing with bias was a particular problem in my Canadian sources. The 
political situation is much more polarized in Canada than it is in Scotland, and 
so the books written on the Quebec situation, especially the most recent ones, 
reflect this. Books by anglophone journalists such as Diane Francis's Fighting For 
Canada, William Johnson's A Canadian Myth: Quebec, Between Canada and the 
Illusion of Utopia, and Lawrence Martin's The Antagonist were virulently anti- 
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nationalist, but I had to use them because they contained useful factual 
information. 
Unfortunately, some of the material written by Scottish academics about 
Quebec and Canada was not always accurate, which meant it could not be used 
as a reliable source in the absence of Canadian books and articles. Christopher 
Harvie describes Canada as having "states" in Fool's Gold; Lindsay Paterson 
talks about the Canadian "Union" in The Autonomy of Modern Scotland; and 
David McCrone refers to the Bloc Quebecois becoming the official opposition in 
the federal government "for a time" after an election held in 1996 [McCrone, 
1998, p. 147]. The brief section on Quebec in The Politics of Nationalism and 
Ethnicity by James Kellas [1991, pp. 94-98] has numerous errors. He gets the 
name of the FLQ wrong; confuses the North American Free Trade Agreement 
with "a free trade area"; and has Pierre Trudeau being leader of the Opposition 
in 1987, three years after he retired. These inaccuracies are perhaps 
understandable, given the lack of interest in Canadian Studies up until now, but 
it made the search for comparative sources on Quebec and Scotland more 
difficult and was a major obstacle in researching the thesis. 
Interviews: Questions and Answers 
The question of bias was also a problem in choosing which journalists in Quebec I 
was going to interview for my research. It is impossible to find people who do 
not have a strong point of view on the situation in Quebec; the best I could hope 
for was finding journalists who, although having a particular point of view, could 
be counted on to be fair. I was greatly helped by a former editor of the Montreal 
Gazette who was able to give me some names of political journalists who fitted 
that description, and who could be considered representative of journalistic 
opinion as a whole. I could not possibly interview all the major political 
reporters and editors there as I did in Scotland, where the journalistic corps is 
much smaller. There was not the same difficulty with bias in Scotland, unless 
you consider the fact that all the political journalists I interviewed were pro- 
Unionist; that was seen as objectivity in the context of the general election in the 
UK (the issue of bias is discussed further in the thesis). 
I did 20 interviews, 18 of them in-person and taped, and two of them by 
e-mail. I was able to interview my Scottish subjects both before and after the 
1997 UK election, which was helpful in giving me some context for Scottish 
politics and journalism. My interviews with Quebec journalists took place 
shortly after the Canadian election, and I spoke with Bloc strategists in late 
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October-early November of that year. Unfortunately, due to a rail accident I was 
unable to meet with the chief strategist of the Bloc campaign. 
Because I changed the focus of my thesis topic, the questions that I asked 
did not strictly relate to my final research question. However, that did not 
matter. In research, as in journalism, having the "right" question matters far less 
than having the right attitude towards the answers your interview subjects give. 
As Alia says, "quieter and less obtrusive ways of presenting the journalist's self 
in the world she or he is observing can lead to trust and improved access to 
information. " [Alia, 1996, p. 104] As I have found throughout my many years as 
a reporter, people tend to answer questions with what is uppermost in their 
minds. Sometimes that relates to your original question, but often it does not. A 
good reporter - or researcher - does not ask leading questions. The best 
information and/or insights often come from sitting back and observing, and it is 
more important to pay attention to what you are being told than to what you are 
trying to ask. If an interviewee keeps mentioning a particular topic that is not on 
your agenda, perhaps that is an indication that this is what you should be 
focusing on. For example, when one Scottish journalist kept going back to the 
subject of the newspaper price wars and how this was affecting his paper, I 
realized that it was necessary for me to discuss the role of journalists within the 
economic as well as the social and political culture in which they worked, which I 
did in chapter four. I also found that because I sat back and listened rather than 
trying to direct the responses, I was given enough information in a broad context 
that I had plenty of material for my case-study chapters - more than 125 pages 
of transcription. Even though in two instances, those with the political party 
leaders, my interviews were only 15 to 25 minutes long, I was still able to obtain 
some extremely useful insights that helped direct the focus of other interviews 
which followed. 
As a result, my findings and conclusions are not as simple and 
straightforward as I had at first envisioned, but that is perhaps to be expected. 
As one of my more experienced academic colleagues advised me: "The truth is 
often messy. If your conclusions are too tidy, you most likely haven't done your 
investigation properly. " 
A Perfect Thesis Versus A Good One 
Another academic also advised that when trying to complete a doctorate, it was 
important to remember that a thesis did not have to be perfect; it only had to be 
good. This research project has its limitations, of course. Some of these were the 
inevitable result of doing a comparative study in two countries; others were due 
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to the inherent difficulties of the researcher's role, while some came from the 
author's own background and experience. 
First, having to do a study of Quebec from a base in Scotland and only 
briefly in Ottawa, Canada's capital, meant that it was physically difficult for me 
to obtain interviews with Bloc media strategists and francophone reporters. In 
addition, given the polarized nature of the debate on Quebec sovereignty in 
Canada, there were obstacles to getting an inside look at the Bloc and its 
operations, as I am clearly a federalist, although in the lexicon of the 
sovereigntist-federalist argument, a "moderate" one. This opened some doors, 
but closed others: with the help of those political aides within the Bloc who were 
keen to improve understanding of the party and its aims in the Rest of Canada, I 
was able to get interviews with the leader of the party, a political assistant who 
worked closely with him on the campaign, a media strategist, and a francophone 
reporter who had spent several weeks covering the federal election in Quebec. 
Attempts to obtain an interview with the editor/ publisher of Le Devoir, Quebec's 
influential sovereigntist newspaper, failed because of the perceived federalist 
bias of my research. 
Second, contending with the insider-outsider tensions of a project such as 
this proved frustrating. Gaining access to the inner workings of two nationalist 
parties in the run-up to and aftermath of crucially important national elections 
was not easy. However, being an outsider can also be useful. As Alia notes: 
"Sometimes it takes the combined voices of insiders and outsiders" to get at the 
truth [Alia, 1996, p. 991. Being an outsider often gave me the critical distance 
necessary for an objective view. Third, there were obviously clear limitations to 
such a short-term study as this, which covers the period leading up to the 1997 
national elections in the two countries and shortly after: how political parties get 
their message across is a long-range process, not one that just occurs during the 
brief weeks of a national campaign, but again, lack of time and resources 
restricted its scope. 
Fourth, the limitations imposed by my background and experience also 
provided obstacles, although these did not prove insurmountable. This project 
required a knowledge of sociology and political science, neither of which I had 
ever studied in any formal way; I also had little experience of research methods, 
having completed a Master's degree in journalism that was mostly vocational in 
its content. In addition, I come from a profession, journalism, and an academic 
research culture, North American, that has tended to emphasize the historical- 
empirical approach over the analytical, where facts and data count more than 
theoretical analysis. This necessitated a rather steep learning curve, following in 
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the best Scottish tradition of "the lad o'pairts", whose talent and intellect were 
enough to counter deficiencies in education and experience. 
Finally, the question of audience was another problem to be solved. 
When I first began writing my thesis, the assumed audience was that of the 
Canadian generalist reader; one who was interested in the comparison of the 
Quebec and Scottish situation, but did not necessarily have an in-depth 
understanding of the topic. However, as the thesis progressed, I realized I would 
have to provide more explanation of specifically Canadian terms and 
background for UK readers, as well as do the same for Canadian readers who 
would be encountering information specific to Britain. I have tried to strike a 
balance, so that the writing will not be too simplistic or repetitious for either 
national public, and interesting to both. 
Conclusion 
When I began my'thesis, I had planned to analyze the media relations strategies 
of the Bloc Quebecois and the Scottish National Party, with the goal of finding 
out what helped or hindered the promotion of their message. I assumed, 
somewhat naively, that I could not only clearly identify these factors, but could 
also demonstrate how they affected the performance of the two parties at the 
polls. I soon realized that this was not possible: there were a few independent 
variables I had not considered, such as several million voters, and as I read the 
literature, began to understand what a quagmire audience effects research is. 
In addition, as I interviewed political journalists and politicians, I kept 
stumbling over the issue of objectivity. Upholding standards of objectivity has 
been particularly problematic for francophone journalists in Quebec. Although 
uniformly nationalist, their loyalties are divided between the sovereigntist and 
federalist camps, and they must work in a political atmosphere that is fiercely 
polarized. They are also subject to strong criticism from some of their 
anglophone colleagues, who may not fully appreciate the constraints under which 
they operate, and who have a different notion of what constitutes objectivity. In 
Scotland, the issue seems more straightforward, on the surface, but there are 
difficulties there, too. As evidence from my research revealed, journalists who 
are not automatically anti-nationalist are perceived as less objective by their 
colleagues than those who support the other political parties. 
Finally, the 1997 election results seemed to contradict the view that good 
political communications, based on a clear and well-determined overall strategy, 
are the key to electoral success for a political party. The Bloc, after two more 
changes of leadership and an election campaign widely regarded as a shambles, 
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managed to re-elect 44 MPs, more than all the other parties in Quebec combined. 
The Scottish National Party, which had a five-year strategic plan, excellent 
communications, and an experienced and talented leader, gained half a 
percentage point in the popular vote, and took three seats from the 
Conservatives, but failed, once again, to make a breakthrough in Scotland's 
central belt. 
Apparently other factors had a greater influence. Analyzing what these 
factors were, and why they had such an influence, is the task of this thesis. 
These include the specific historical and cultural developments that were the 
basis for nationalist movements in Scotland and Quebec, examined in chapters 
two and three; the nature of political journalism in the two regions, analyzed in 
chapter four; and the political communications of the Scottish National Party 
and the Bloc Quebecois and its provincial counterpart, the Parti Quebecois, 
looked at in chapters five, six and seven. In the next chapter, I explore the 
historical and cultural factors that led to the rise of nationalism in Quebec and 
Scotland, within the context of the larger nation-states in which they exist, 
Canada and Britain, so as to understand how their national identities were 
constructed, and from there, what the role of nationalist parties and the 
journalists who report on them are in expressing that identity. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
One, Two, Three Many Nationalisms 
Nationalism is a complex subject. There is a welter of theories as to its causes in 
the literature, many of them contradictory. In the case of Scotland, a stateless 
nation, and Quebec, which began as a remnant of a state and is now a nation 
within a state, or as McCrone says, "a nationless state" [McCrone, 1998, p. 176], 
the theories do not easily apply. This thesis approaches nationalism as a case 
study in political communications, not as theory, and thus the focus in this 
chapter will be on the development of the particular nationalisms of these two 
territories. However, it is important to place the nationalisms of Quebec and 
Scotland, as well as that of their surrounding states, Canada and Britain, within 
the context of current theories on nationalism if we are to understand their 
origins. 
As McCrone so reasonably suggests, the fact that there are so many 
theories of nationalism should not surprise us: there is a wide range of historical 
experience among nations to serve as examples for them [McCrone, 1998, p. 3]. 
A major theoretical conflict in current debates on nationalism is between those 
who see it as an inevitable product of industrialization, for example, Gellner, 
Anderson and Hobsbawm, and those who see its origins as pre-dating modern 
times, such as Smith, Hutchinson and Greenfeld. The modernist approach as 
expressed by Gellner, Anderson and Hobsbawm, takes the view that nationalism 
developed as a result of the Enlightenment in the 18th century, in which it became 
the unifying ideology of an increasingly secular society, taking the role formerly 
played by religion. "Print-capitalism" was essential to its development 
[Anderson, 1991], as was a highly-industrialized society and a mass education 
system for the promulgation of culture [Gellner, 1983]. Nationalist myths and 
traditions were not to be taken seriously, as they were invented rather than 
authentic [Hobsbawm, 1990]; and nations that "have navels invented for them 
by their own nationalist propaganda" (in other words, were made, not born) 
were by far the most common, according to Gellner [1990]. 
Unfortunately, such modernist theories do not work for Scotland, Quebec 
or Britain's founding nation, England. Greenfeld's historical analysis of the 
development of nationalism in England states that English identity grew out of 
the Protestant Reformation, and in particular, the printing of the English bible, 
which gave Englishmen "the language in which they could express the novel 
consciousness of nationality, for which no language had existed before" 
[Greenfeld, 1992, p. 52] a century before the Enlightenment period. Scotland's 
national identity was forged during the Wars of Independence from 1290 to 
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1320, when Scotland was a pre-literate, pre-industrial society [Broun, Finlay and 
Lynch, 1998]. The Declaration of Arbroath, in its expression of a Scottish 
identity based on the independence of the kingdom of Scotland, demonstrated, 
as Watson notes, "a new form of identity which, whatever modern historians 
might say, is testimony to the existence of a nationalism which looks uncannily 
like the modern version, albeit without the emphasis on rights of citizenship. " 
[Watson, 1998, p. 31] With Quebec, the early colonial administrators sent over 
to govern the impoverished, semi-literate settlers in the wilds of 18th-century 
New France were struck by the independent nature of les Canadiens, as they called 
themselves. This attitude of feisty independence, reinforced by the colonists' 
strong resentment of their treatment by French soldiers during The Seven Years' 
War, is seen by some Canadian historians as the beginning of Quebec nationalism 
[Gougeon, 1994; Bothwell, 1995]. 
It is those academic writers such as Smith, Greenfeld and Hutchinson who 
have developed a different model for nationalism, one that is not so dependent 
on the modernist view, that seems more applicable to the cases of Scotland and 
Quebec, as well as Britain and Canada. As McCrone states: "Modernism fails to 
locate the nation in a historical sequence of cultural shaping, and hence 
overdraws the distinction between 'tradition' and modernity, frequently missing 
the deep roots which nations have in an ethnic substratum" [McCrone, 1998, p. 
12]. McCrone's theory of neo-nationalism is also useful in typifying the current 
nationalisms of Scotland and Quebec, which share some common features: 
multiple national identities; a predominately civic character; social-democratic 
politics; and certainly, ambivalence about their ultimate aims (McCrone, 1998, 
pp. 128-29). However, in stating that theirs are examples of nationalisms that 
have emerged in the late 20th century, he underestimates the historical continuity 
of nationalist sentiment in both regions which underpins modern Scottish and 
Quebec nationalism and is vital to the understanding of its development. 
In addition, McCrone's model, along with modernism, fails to grasp the 
emotion that is the basis for national and cultural identity [Connor, 1994b]. As 
Smith says, nationalism 
provides the sole vision and rationale of political solidarity 
today, one that commands popular assent and elicits popular 
enthusiasm. All other visions, all other rationales, appear 
wan and shadowy by comparison. They offer no sense of 
election, no unique history, no special destiny. These are the 
promises which nationalism for the most part fulfils, and the 
real reasons why so many people continue to identify with the 
nation. 
[Smith, 1991, p. 176] 
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The failure to understand the emotional basis for such national and cultural 
identity, I would argue, has been a major factor in the movements for 
independence, most certainly in Quebec and in Scotland. For example, why 
would Quebecers identify with Canada when during the late 1940s, "the French- 
Canadians were clearly second-class citizens in their own province, underpaid, 
barred from top jobs, casually dismissed as folk-singing habitants who would 
perform the drudge duties for their English overlords" [Keate, 1980, p. 55] ? 
In order to understand the underlying emotions of nationalism, rather 
than emphasizing reason over passion, the oft-stated personal credo of former 
Canadian prime minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau [Whitaker, 1980], we must use 
our reason to analyze the passion. To say that people's behaviour is irrational 
may just mean, after all, that we do not know what their rationale is. In the 
words of Jane Jacobs: 
Nationalist emotions are dangerous, of course.... But they are 
valuable emotions, too. These emotions are felt deeply by 
separatists, and they are felt equally deeply by those who ardently 
oppose separatists. The conflicts are not between different kinds 
of emotions. Rather, they are conflicts between different ways of 
identifying the nation, different choices as to what the nation is. 
Trying to argue about these feelings is as fruitless as trying to 
argue that people in love ought not to be in love, or that if they 
must be, then they should be cold and hard-headed about 
choosing their attachment. It doesn't work that way. We feel; 
our feelings are their own argument. 
[Jacobs, 1980, pp. 3-4] 
In this chapter I look at the different ways of identifying the nation in 
Britain, Canada, Quebec, and Scotland, and specifically, the complex layering of 
the many nationalisms of Canada and Britain. In Canada that includes those of 
Britain and France, described in the past as the country's two founding nations; 
those of Quebec and English-speaking Canada, or ROC, the Rest of Canada, as it 
is now more commonly known; and that of the First Nations, Canada's 
aboriginal peoples. The nationalisms of Britain may seem less complex, but this 
is deceptive, for they take in not only England and Scotland, but also Northern 
Ireland and Wales: this chapter will focus on the first two. 
I am doing this because it is essential, particularly for an understanding of 
nationalism in Canada, to look at its historical antecedents. Without that 
knowledge, the anger and hurt of Quebec separatists, the bewilderment and 
sense of betrayal felt by English-speaking nationalists, and the icy fury of Pierre 
Trudeau in his life-long campaign against nationalism will seem irrational; but 
they are not. 
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Similarly, the rest of Canada's seeming inability to establish its own 
identity until very recently will make much more sense when looked at in the light 
of British nationalism, and modern Britain's own crisis of identity. English- 
speaking Canada has never had the same confidence of vision or sense of its own 
culture as does modern-day Quebec, and has, in fact, tended to define itself in 
terms of what it is not - not British, not American. 
Scotland's nationalist aspirations will not make sense, either, unless one 
knows the historical logic of its grievances, which makes its present role as a 
region within a highly-centralized, unitary state - albeit one with its own 
parliament and a certain measure of autonomy - still problematic. 
British Nationalism or, the Land of Ukania 
The topic of British nationalism is a difficult one. To speak of British 
nationalism seems almost an oxymoron; one can talk of Welsh, Scottish, or Irish 
nationalism with a degree of certainty, but is there such a thing as British 
nationalism? Or is it just English nationalism? Even Britain's official name - the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland - denies any nationality, 
as Benedict Anderson so trenchantly observes [Anderson, 19911. 
Greenfeld's analysis of the influence of the Protestant religion in the 
development of British nationalism has been mentioned earlier; how the liberty 
embodied in Protestantism, with its emphasis on what Greenfeld describes as 
"the priesthood of all believers" [Greenfeld, 1992, p. 52] was also reflected in the 
liberal values of Britain's constitution, which, patriotic Britons believed, made 
theirs "the freest nation in the world" [Colley, 1996, p. 356]. England was the 
model for the concept of the nation; what distinguished English nationalism from 
that of the French, for example, was the emphasis on the individual. In France 
the collective rights of the nation over-rode those of the individual citizen. 
In England, the source of the authority was the individual, 
a thinking human being; individuals delegated their authority 
to representatives, and thus empowered the nation. In France, 
it was the nation from which authority emanated, and it 
empowered individuals. 
[Greenfeld, 1992, p. 1671 
But the seeds of the decline in English nationalism were planted in the 
18th century, according to Greenfeld, when British loyalties were transferred to 
the concrete institutions of land, government and the monarchy, rather than the 
principles of liberty, equality and reason. By the 19th century, the language of 
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patriotism had been appropriated by Britain's ruling elite, in order to restrain 
increasing class conflict. Patriotism became Conservative, racist and royalist 
[Cunningham, 1989]. In the 20th century, Britain was still dominated by what 
Tom Nairn calls "Royalism", which buried its nationalist impulses because of the 
central and unquestioned role that the monarchy played in British society. 
Nationalism is inherently populist: it is the conception of a 
people's sovereignty and innate agency, which (therefore) a 
national State is in principle supposed to embody and serve. 
But - precisely - such populism was and has remained utter 
anathema to Great Britain's post-1688 State. For long the most 
liberal and advanced of countries in a Europe still dominated by 
Absolutism, it grew abruptly middle-aged in the face of 1776 and 
1789. 
[Nairn, 1988, p. 136] 
The main difficulty in defining British nationalism today is that the 
traditional sources of national pride and identity - Protestantism, the 
constitution, economic success, the Empire, and the monarchy - no longer have 
the same power and resonance that they once did. The religious freedom of 
Protestantism is no longer unique to Britain, the constitution is seen as "a 
ramshackle contrivance badly in need of radical renewal" [Miller, 1995, p. 1711, 
the UK's economic performance has declined, the empire is no more, and the 
monarchy is in disrepute. To what symbols of national pride can the residents of 
Ukania, as Tom Nairn calls it, turn to? Perhaps the solution is to build a theme 
park on the Isle of Wight, as in Julian Barnes' satirical novel, England, England, 
where up-market tourists view such "Quintessences of Englishness" [Barnes, 
1998, p. 83] as the Royal Family, Robin Hood and His Merrie Men and the White 
Cliffs of Dover, and everything is as "you imagined England to be, but more 
convenient, cleaner, friendlier, and more efficient. " [Barnes, 1998, p. 184] 
This is irony, but the observation by one of the book's characters that in 
"the modern world, stability and longterm economic prosperity are provided 
more effectively by the transnational corporation than by the old-style nation 
state" [Barnes, 1998, p. 128] rings true as modern-day Britain struggles to find a 
new identity for itself, faced with the burgeoning nationalism in Wales and 
Scotland, as well as the perceived threat of dominance by the European Union. 
Britain is now suffering from "identity angst" [Nairn, 1997, p. 212], and this 
identity angst became a theme during the 1997 election, with the Conservatives 
"emphasizing the threat to the United Kingdom from devolution and federal 
Europe" [Butler and Kavanagh, 1997, p. 152], to which Labour responded by 
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appropriating the traditional Tory symbol of Fitz the British bulldog for a 
political broadcast in an effort to prove that it was also the party of patriotism. 
Unfortunately, the symbolism backfired: Fitz may have been a "metaphor for 
Britain", as the Labour party said, but, as Mitchell points out, "the connotation 
behind the metaphor for ethnic minorities was racist and xenophobic. " [Mitchell, 
1997, p. 138] Labour later dropped the bulldog advertisement after complaints 
from minority groups who found it too reminiscent of the British National Party, 
but made sure that the Union Jack was in evidence at news conferences and 
party meetings [Mitchell, 1997, p. 138]. 
As we shall see in the rest of this chapter, Britain's current identity crisis 
sounds familiar to Canadians, who have struggled with the issue of national 
identity throughout their history, first as a colony of Britain, and then later, as an 
economic colony of the United States. The problematic role of national identity 
is just one of numerous themes in the origins of English and French nationalism 
that are reflected in those of Britain and Scotland, Canada and Quebec today. In 
Britain, the anti-democratic role of the monarchy, the belief in individual rights, 
and the Francophobia of the English; in France, the influence of the Catholic 
church, the belief in collective rights and the centralization of government, and in 
turn, the Anglophobia of the French, all echo throughout their history. In 
particular, the "Royalism" of the United Kingdom that Nairn describes proved to 
be a pivotal factor, its tradition of elitist anti-populism putting Britain on a 
collision course with Scotland and greatly influencing the course of Canadian 
nationalism in both English-speaking Canada and Quebec. 
Canadian Nationalism, or Not-Land 
As with British nationalism, the topic of Canadian nationalism is also a difficult 
one. The first problem is: does it even exist? I would argue that until very 
recently in its history, the answer is no. The second question to answer is: whose 
nationalism are we talking about? If we are talking about Canada as a whole, 
and the Canada of today, then we must speak of one, two, three many 
nationalisms. As Collins points out, if Quebec is a nation without a state, then 
Canada is a state without a nation [Collins, 1990]. But this definition does not 
include Canada's aboriginal peoples, who now describe themselves as the First 
Nations. 
It is a commonly-heard cliche in Canada that it is "Not-Land"; not 
British, and not American. Perhaps this is the easiest way to define a country 
that has no shared ethnicity, language, or historical experience. But even that 
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phrase does not hold up when you look more closely at this baffling country. A 
more accurate saying would be, "Not British now, and not American then. " 
The history of English-speaking Canada really begins with the end of the 
American Revolution and the arrival of the United Empire Loyalists, those who 
remained faithful to the British crown and fled to Canada. But even this group of 
exiles were multicultural and multiracial: of the original 45,000 Loyalists, 28 per 
cent were German, 23 per cent Scottish, and 12 per cent black [Richler, 1993, p. 
65]. 
Many settled in the area of Canada later to become the provinces of Nova 
Scotia, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island. But some 25,000 settled in 
the province of Quebec, which at that time included territory now in the province 
of Ontario. These settlers were unhappy that although they had come to a 
supposedly British land, they had none of the British institutions they were used 
to, in particular, an elected assembly [Bothwell, 1995, p. 24]. The response of 
the British government was, in 1791, to divide Quebec into two: Upper Canada, 
with a population of 25,000, mostly Protestant and English-speaking; and Lower 
Canada, whose 200,000 residents were largely French, Catholic, and rural. 
However, if other nations are imagined communities, Canada was a 
deliberately planned one, designed to thwart any of the radical and democratic 
impulses emanating from the French and American revolutions. 
Not only did the early Loyalist settlers bear with them the usual 
bitterness of emigres towards the ideas and symbols of the 
revolutionary nation from which they had fled - nurturing an 
anti-Americanism, not to speak of anti-democratic sentiments, 
which were to remain persistent features of Canadian political 
life - but this basic strain was consolidated and encouraged by the 
ideological mission of the Colonial Office .... 
The colonial 
administrators came to Canada armed with a mission to build a 
conservative, un-American, and undemocratic society in the 
northern half of the continent. 
[Whitaker, 1992, p. 11] 
They largely succeeded. Even the Rebellions of 1837 in both Lower and 
Upper Canada did not fundamentally alter this pattern. In Upper Canada, the 
rebellion against the ruling clique of the Tory Family Compact, who controlled the 
colonial government, bureaucracy and legal system through family connections 
and patronage, failed for lack of support. Its defeat legitimized the status quo, 
in which the government gave "special privileges, pay-offs, and other forms of 
corruption.... The Tory triumph also involved a great deal of secondary non- 
economic legitimation as well: British loyalty, the identification of conservative 
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elitism as British, and reform as American and therefore treasonous. " [Whitaker, 
1992, p. 18] 
The British North America Act, which created the Dominion of Canada in 
1867, embodied these same principles. Unlike the United States, Canada was to 
be highly centralized, with the main role of government being the provision of 
economic infrastructure, specifically the railways, which were to unite the country 
from coast to coast. But the BNA Act also established Quebec and Ontario as 
two separate provinces, thus recognizing that there were two languages and two 
cultures. What this meant, Whitaker says, was that "Canadian nationalism, as 
such, would be economic nationalism more than any other kind of 
nationalism... . 
The basic source of authority and legitimacy for the new nation 
was to be found in the traditional Tory notion of historic continuity with the 
British Crown. " [Whitaker, 1992, p. 21] 
Thus English-speaking Canada had no nationalist ethos of its own, but 
had to borrow one from Britain, which it did with great enthusiasm. Following 
Confederation, the artists and intellectuals of the Canada First group, and their 
successors, the ministers, teachers and writers of the Imperial Federation 
movement in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, "looked to their 
Britishness and their place within a world-wide empire. " [Whitaker, 1992, p. 24] 
This attachment lasted long after "the British Empire began its slow evolution 
into the token of Commonwealth.. . Canada remained one of the few countries 
voluntarily swayed by British values and personalities, the monarchy chief 
among them. " [Newman, 1995, p. 44] This identification with the mores of the 
British was not uncommon in the colonies, particularly among the upwardly 
mobile, as Benedict Anderson has noted, and Canada was no exception. 
The most fervent admirers of the British connection were 
Canada's upper classes. Vincent Massey, scion of the agricultural 
implements firm, served as High Commissioner in London 
from 1935 to 1946. He took to wearing a handkerchief up his 
sleeve, referred to his native land as 'Canader' and became so 
much more English than the English that Lord Cranborne, Lord 
Privy Seal in Sir Winston Churchill's cabinet, once observed 
with a perfectly straight face: 'Fine fellow, Vincent - but he does 
make one feel a bit of a savage. ' 
[Newman, 1995, pp. 44-45] 
Of course, the major difficulty with this kind of cultural nationalism and 
its belief in British racial superiority and the God-given right of British rule is that 
it could not help but antagonize French Canada. Pierre Elliot Trudeau, the son of 
a Scots-Canadian mother and French-Canadian father, believed that the solution 
was to create a new nationalism based on a pluralist vision, in which Canada 
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was recognized as a land of many cultures with "two main ethnic and linguistic 
groups.... Canada could become the envied seat of a form of federalism that 
belongs to tomorrow's world... it could become a brilliant prototype for the 
moulding of tomorrow's civilization. " [Trudeau, 1968, p. 179] This nationalism 
would also help Canada resist the threat of annexation to the United States, for 
it would provide a unique identity, superior to the American concept of the 
melting-pot. 
Such a pluralist vision would require a major investment by the federal 
government to make it work, however, especially if it was going to make 
Quebecers feel that it was worth their while to remain within Canada. 
Resources must be diverted into such things as national flags, 
anthems, education, arts councils, broadcasting corporations, 
film boards; the territory must be bound together by a network of 
railways, highways, airlines; the national culture and the 
national economy must be protected by taxes and tariffs; 
ownership of resources and industry by nationals must be 
made a matter of policy. In short, the whole of the citizenry 
must be made to feel that it is only within the framework of the 
federal state that their language, culture, institutions, sacred 
traditions, and standard of living can be protected from external 
attack and internal strife. 
[Trudeau, 1968, p. 193] 
This passage, written in 1964 before Canada had its own flag or official 
anthem, and four years before Trudeau became Liberal prime minister, proved 
prophetic. During the initial years of his term as prime minister from 1968-79, 
this was Trudeau's programme. But during the early 1980s and after 1984 when 
the Progressive Conservatives under Brian Mulroney took power, federal 
government support for such national institutions and policies was gradually 
withdrawn. Why this happened is a subject of intense and polarized debate in 
Canada. Right-wing analysts will say that it was because the federal government 
could no longer afford the costs of the welfare state; those on the left will say 
that it was because the government wanted to destroy Canada's national 
institutions in order to encourage its economic and cultural annexation by the 
United States. 
These two views crystallized during the election of 1988, which, Whitaker 
says, "was the English-Canadian equivalent of the 1980 sovereignty-association 
referendum in Quebec. " [Whitaker, 1992, p. 310] The central issue in the 
campaign was the proposed Free Trade Agreement, which would reduce barriers 
to cross-border trade which protected home markets. However, as many 
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Canadians realized, doing so would reduce national sovereignty at both the 
federal and provincial levels, as well as threaten Canadian culture and resources. 
The Pro-Canada Network formed to campaign against the deal was a 
broad coalition of groups, including labour, women, senior citizens, farmers, 
environmentalists, and artists, which despite its meagre resources, provided an 
effective defense against the market-driven attacks led by its neo-conservative 
opposition, the corporate-financed Business Council on National Issues. 
However, because the anti-Free Trade vote was split between the Liberals and 
the New Democratic Party, the Progressive Conservatives won the election, and 
the FTA, which later became the North American Free Trade Agreement with the 
addition of Mexico as a signatory, was a fait accompli. 
The disillusionment was palpable. It did not help Canadian unity that 
Quebec voted overwhelmingly in favour of the Tories and free trade. 
Quebec stood entirely outside the passions generated by 
Canadian nationalism. Historically, Quebec (shielded perhaps by 
language) has never shared English-Canadian apprehensions 
about American domination. By 1988 Quebec was a business- 
oriented society which took its cues from a francophone 
economic elite who had become the new cultural 
heroes.... Certainly the role played by Quebec in the great free 
trade election did not escape the notice of bitter English- 
Canadian nationalists. 
[Whitaker, 1992, p. 315] 
What had been Canadian nationalism's finest hour, creating a movement 
"which was generous, liberal and compassionate" [Whitaker, 1992, p. 314], 
turned sour. The antagonism toward Quebec and the anger against the 
government felt by voters in the rest of Canada effectively destroyed the Meech 
Lake Accord, which had been engineered by Mulroney to answer Quebec's 
demand for more autonomy and by doing so, increase his party's support in 
Quebec. However, to become reality, it had to be ratified by all of Canada's 10 
provinces, but the agreement soon began to fall apart, with opposition in the 
Manitoba legislature led by aboriginal member Elijah Harper, who wanted 
inclusion of native rights, and in Newfoundland, by Premier Clyde Wells, who 
disagreed with the concept of special status for Quebec. The Meech Lake Accord 
died after the two provinces refused to endorse it. Quebec had thought that 
because the Accord had been signed by the nine premiers in English-speaking 
Canada, it was a done deal. But this was not the case. 
What Quebec politicians did not understand was that English 
Canada was no longer the kind of country where twenty million 
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people could be delivered by the signatures of ten politicians. As 
the deal unravelled on the larger stage, Quebec politicians spoke 
of a betrayal of trust, of a broken contract. To many English 
Canadians, the breach of trust was between them and their 
politicians, not between English and French Canada. 
[Whitaker, 1992, p. 316] 
The failure of Meech Lake in 1990 led inevitably to the failure of the 
national referendum on the Charlottetown Accord in 1992, the formation of the 
Bloc Quebecois, and the second Quebec referendum on sovereignty-association 
with Canada in the fall of 1995, lost by only the narrowest of margins. The 
aftermath has left Canada more divided than ever, but out of this situation has 
come a realization that perhaps Canada needs to work harder at promoting its 
national identity. As Gordon Gibson says: 
We have been extremely diffident toward such matters in 
Canada, even declining the opportunity to build up national 
symbols or heroes. Our head of state, the Queen, is a foreigner, 
and that suits us just fine. We don't glorify one language, or one 
culture, or one religion, and we manage to see everyone's point 
of view to the extent where concepts of right and wrong melt 
and dissolve into a confused political correctitude. There are 
some very good things about this laid-back tolerance - indeed, it 
is one of the finest attributes of Canada. But there is a problem. 
People who are not determined and passionate about anything 
less abstract than democracy and motherhood can get taken to 
the cleaners by more focused elements with more specific goals. 
[Gibson, 1994, pp. 47-481 
The federal government's response was to set up a $20-million unity agency, the 
Canada Information Office, whose task is "to wave the flag across the country 
and counter separatism in Quebec" [Globe and Mail, 1996). The agency, headed 
by Deputy Prime Minister Sheila Copps, is designed to work with grassroots 
unity groups, promote youth exchanges, and dispel what the government calls 
separatist "myths". Perhaps Trudeau's lessons have been re-learned. 
Quebec Nationalism - Je Me Souviens 
In his book Jihad vs. Mc World, Benjamin Barber says that for a nation to hold 
together, there must be 
not just common remembering but common forgetting. 
Differences are held in suspension in successful communities of 
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difference - what civic nations are when they succeed - and that 
entails a certain amount of studied historical absentmindedness. 
Injuries too well remembered cannot heal. 
[Barber, 1995, p. 167] 
Quebec remembers only too well what the rest of Canada has forgotten, or never 
knew. Right from its earliest days as a colony in New France, it was a 
beleaguered nation, fighting a fierce struggle for its existence, both physical and 
cultural. The French made sporadic attempts to settle in the territory known as 
Canada following its discovery in 1534 by Jacques Cartier, but there was no 
permanent settlement established until 1608, when 30 people led by Samuel de 
Champlain came to the colony, most of whom died. The French government was 
never keen to invest in the territory, a pattern that persisted throughout its 
history in North America, and Champlain's plans for the development of the 
area were ignored [Trofimenkoff, 1983]. The word "Canadiens" was used to 
refer to the native Iroquois, who played a vital role in the colony as trappers, 
warriors, and most importantly, as teachers in the ways of survival in this cold, 
vast land. 
It was not until the 1620s and after that the population of the colony 
began to stabilize, supported by the rich investors of the Company of One 
Hundred Associates and later, the Communaute des Habitants, in order to take 
advantage of the profitable fur trade. But their dreams of wealth did not come 
easy, as Trofimenkoff notes: "On numerous occasions the dream even appeared 
to be more of a nightmare: many a night the twenty-five hundred settlers of 1660, 
shivering in their beds from cold and fright, hoped they would awaken in 
France. " [Trofimenkoff, 1983, p. 3] But from these people came the generation de 
1'enracinement, the founding generation, who, as historian Robert Lahaise says, 
"were born here of French parents and who weren't about to jump on the boat 
and go home to France. " [Gougeon, 1994, p. 6] 
This was the beginning of a uniquely French-Canadian identity, strongly 
differentiated from the French in the Old World. It was marked by a sense of 
freedom and lack of social stratification. Young, ambitious, and mostly penniless 
(Lahaise estimates that some 95 per cent of the 10,000 immigrants to New France 
couldn't afford to go back), les Canadiens - as they were now known - were 
sometimes obnoxiously independent, at least to their colonial masters. 
North America democratized its people as much as in New 
France as in New England. So much so, in fact, that the French 
administrators repeatedly took great offence. Hocquart, one 
intendant, wrote in 1737 that the Canadiens were 'intractable by 
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nature'. At the very moment of our defeat, Montcalm spoke of 
our overly independent spirit, and the Comte de Bougainville 
went so far as to declare 'We seem to be two different nations, 
indeed enemies. ' 
[Gougeon, 1994, p. 7] 
It was their own style of fighting, learned from the Indians, and their resentment 
of the high-handedness of the French soldiers during the Seven Years' War that 
prompted the comments of Montcalm and de Bougainville. For the feisty 
Canadiens, it was, as Governor Louis Frontenac had once said, every man to his 
own tree, rather than the rigid order of the French regulars, "which required their 
soldiers to die dutifully one row at a time. " [Gougeon, 1994, p. 7] But not even 
their superior skills in battle could save them from defeat in 1759, with a fighting 
force of 14,000 Canadiens, 5,000 French, and 2,000 Natives against 35,000 
English. Their loss at the battle of the Plains of Abraham, the infamous Conquest 
of 1759 and its aftermath, left wounds that have yet to heal. 
From Conquest to Confederation 
It was a foregone conclusion that France would have lost its colonies in North 
America, if not in 1759, then at some point soon after. The numbers tell the 
story. There were 70,000 people in French Canada, but a million and half in 
British North America. The French government was no longer willing or able to 
finance Canada, for which it had no long-term plans. Britain was better- 
equipped militarily and financially, and moreover, wanted control of North 
America. 
The battle that decided the fate of French Canada was over in an hour, 
with both its generals, Louis Montcalm and James Wolfe, killed, along with 1,200 
French and Canadien soldiers and 600 British. Canadian historians, both French 
and English, have continued the battle in words, debating whether the Conquest 
was an opportunity or an obstacle. The facts seem to indicate the second. A 
quarter of the houses in New France were destroyed, and almost 80 per cent of 
those in Quebec city, while the advancing British army burned every farm from 
the Gaspe to Quebec. Many died, "either by the cannonball or from cold, hunger 
and epidemics, while the rest were reduced to shivering in their rags. " [Gougeon, 
1994, p. 15] In addition, the population was financially ruined when the paper 
money issued by the French up to almost the end of the war became worthless. 
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English Canadians have had difficulty understanding the emotional 
significance of this loss. But then, as Susan Mann Trofimenkoff explains, they 
have never known what it is like to be a conquered minority. 
Therefore a great leap of imagination is required.... Perhaps only 
an analogy can assist the leap of imagination. Conquest is like 
rape. The major blow takes only a few minutes, the results no 
matter how well camouflaged, can be at best unpredictable and at 
worst devastating. 
[Trofimenkoff, 1983, p. 20] 
Les Canadiens had been abandoned by France, but this separation from the 
mother country, 5,000 kilometres away, also reinforced their linguistic identity. 
Unlike the French, who have many local dialects, they had an almost uniform 
accent which came from the flues du roi, the female orphans from Paris sent to 
New France between 1665 and 1673 to help populate the colony. 
The result of this separation was to isolate the Canadiens within their 
own country, creating the two solitudes that still define Canada today. 
The Canadian identity was radically split from that moment 
onwards. On the one hand, 95 per cent of the inhabitants were 
Francophone, Catholic, poor farmers, nostalgic for a past they 
idealized, and on the other hand, there was a tiny minority of 
Anglophones, wealthy Protestant tradespeople with all the usual 
arrogance of conquerors. 
[Gougeon, 1994, p. 15] 
The British government tried in vain to make the province of Quebec (as it was 
now called) an English colony. It passed the Constitutional Act of 1791 in an 
attempt to accommodate the demands of the newly-arrived United Empire 
Loyalists, but it just reinforced the political tensions. In fact, the first debate on 
the first day of the newly-formed legislature of Lower Canada in 1792 concerned 
the preservation of the French language [Bothwell, 1995, p. 271. 
It was during the early 19th century that nationalism became firmly 
established in Lower Canada, led by Louis Joseph Papineau and the Patriotes. 
Inspired by nationalist and progressive movements in Europe, Latin America, 
and the United States, they wanted an inclusive, democratic Canadien nation. 
Within the British Empire, this distinct society would not be for just les Canadiens 
pure lame, those of the original French stock. "It also meant coexistence with 
people who didn't necessarily have to speak French but who respected Canadien 
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culture and the rights of the Canadien majority in Lower Canada. " [Gougeon, 
1994, p. 19) 
But this nationalism was not entirely benevolent. It also grew out of the 
anxiety felt not only by the frustrated middle-class desirous of power, but also 
the rural habitants, whose impoverished existence was threatened by a shortage 
of arable land and repeated crop failures. Papineau was quite willing to exploit 
this ressentiment, and did so effectively, as "the first of Quebec's nationalist 
leaders with all the charisma such leaders have subsequently displayed. " 
[Trofimenkoff, 1983, p. 701 But although his charisma was enough to spark the 
Rebellion of 1837, it was not enough to give it broad-based support. The 
rebellion failed, with terrible consequences that inflicted more wounds on les 
Canadiens. The British made numerous arrests, hanging and deporting many of 
the rebels. Hundreds were thrown in jail, people killed, houses burned, and large 
amounts of private property confiscated [Bothwell, 1995, p. 33]. 
The political consequence was the Durham Report, which contained the 
prescient phrase that Canada was "two nations warring in the bosom of a single 
state" and which recommended assimilation of the French-speaking majority. 
Out of this came the Act of Union in 1840, which made Upper and Lower 
Canada one province, with an assembly designed to give the English a majority 
of seats - despite their much smaller population. It would seem that Canadien 
nationalists were doomed, but that was not to be the case. 
In fact, only five years later Papineau returned from exile in Paris, and in 
1847 rejoined the assembly, where, as a member of les Rouges, he demanded 
repeal of the Union and annexation to the United States. A group of radical 
nationalists who opposed the growing clericalism in French Canada, les Rouges 
found a cultural home in the Institut Canadien of Montreal, which provided 
lectures, books and a place for the freethinkers to discuss the ideas promulgated 
in their paper L'Avenir. 
Their anti-clericalism was in response to the church's growing influence in 
French Canada following the Union, an influence that re-defined its nationalism. 
Whereas religion had been seen as one part of French Canadian nationalism, and 
the church as a means of defending that nationalism, "clerical ideologists made 
religion integral to nationalism and awarded the church the central role in the 
defence of the nation. " [Cook, 1995, p. 89] 
By the 1850s, massive British immigration meant that the French had 
become a minority in the Canadian assembly. But former patriote Louis- 
Hippolyte Fontaine saw - as did Lucien Bouchard more than 140 years later - 
that the way to power was through bloc politics. 
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He argued that if French Canadians worked together, if they all 
voted for the same party and the same leader, and didn't divide 
the way English Canadians did, they could exercise greater power 
in the new political-constitutional arrangements than their 
numbers alone would have allowed them to. 
[Bothwell, 1995, p. 36] 
For the next two decades, that is what French Canadian leaders did, until the 
stability of the government itself became threatened because of brokerage politics. 
"Governments could rarely sustain a majority for more than a few months as the 
four-way pulls in the assembly tugged at the political fabric... . The politicians at 
the time were as dizzy as history students since. " [Trofimenkoff, 1983, p. 106] 
The solution was Confederation. Unlike other attempts to resolve French 
and English differences, this time French Canadians were consulted. It was also 
a subject of great debate by both the radical Rouges, who did not like it, and the 
conservative Bleus, who did. The Rouges were opposed because they feared - 
perhaps rightly - that Confederation was a just a scheme to benefit the promoters 
of the cross-country railways that were to be built as part of the deal. They also 
did not like the fact the public would not have a hand in drafting the constitution 
or be able to vote on it. 
The reasons the Bleus liked it are extremely interesting in the light of 
Quebec's modern history. As historian Arthur Silver explains: 
It was sold to the general public, at least the public that read the 
press and discussed these sorts of questions, as a kind of 
sovereignty-association.... The pro-Confederation editorialists, 
speech-makers, and pamphleteers pushed that aspect of the 
arrangement - that Quebec was going to be separated, that French 
Canadians were going to have a state of their own which would 
have complete control over all matters of provincial 
jurisdiction, and that it was a move towards greater separation. 
[Cited in Bothwell, 1995, p. 38] 
The French fact would finally be recognized in Canada, a country with two 
official languages and cultures, based on the two founding nations of Britain and 
France. That was the dream: of course, the reality was quite different. 
From Confederation to Conscription 
The expectations that French Canadians had of Confederation were soon 
disappointed. Although they now had their own province, in which they could 
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preserve and protect their language, culture, religion, laws and way of life, it was 
clear that the bonne entente of 1867 was not being maintained. French Canadians 
outside of the province - first in New Brunswick, then Manitoba, the Northwest 
Territories, and finally Saskatchewan and Alberta - gradually lost their rights to 
education in their own language and religion. In addition, Quebec was becoming 
increasingly marginalized as just one of seven provinces within Confederation, 
and now with less than 31 per cent of the Canadian population. 
However, the most dramatic example of this for French Canadians was 
the 1885 hanging of Louis Riel, the charismatic Metis leader of the Red River 
Rebellion in Saskatchewan, which became a catalyst for nationalism in Quebec. 
The Metis, the original inhabitants of the territory, were threatened by the 
incursion of white European settlers, and looked to Riel as the leader who would 
assert their rights to the land, and protect their way of life and their francophone, 
Catholic identity. Riel was believed to be the protector of the French language 
and Catholicism in Western Canada by francophones in Quebec, and his 
execution "was definitely seen as a direct hit on a fellow French Canadian. " 
[Gougeon, 1994, p. 341 Out of the reaction to Riel's death came the man 
described as "the father of separatist thought under Confederation" [Gougeon, 
1994, p. 34], Jules-Paul Tardivel, and a strong nationalist movement under the 
leadership of Honore Mercier. During the Riel Crisis Mercier had tried to create a 
bloc of MPs to be the voice of French Canadians in Ottawa, and when that 
failed, formed the provincial Parti National and became premier as leader of that 
party in 1887 [Bickerton, Gagnon and Smith, 1999, p. 166). 
Tardivel, a journalist and novelist, believed in a separate Quebec, but his 
was a conservative vision, based on a rural, agricultural and Catholic nation- 
state, the same nationalist vision that was to inspire Abbe Lionel Groulx more 
than 40 years later. Mercier differed from Tardivel in that he did not believe 
Quebec should be independent; rather, he argued it should have greater 
autonomy from the federal government, a theme of Quebec premiers to the 
present day. When Mercier talked about independence, he meant independence 
from the British Empire, and in this his views were similar to those of Henri 
Bourassa, another influential figure in French Canadian nationalism, who became 
leader of the first bloc of nationalists from Quebec to sit in the House of 
Commons. 
For Henri Bourassa, the moment of truth was the decision by Canada's 
first French Canadian prime minister, Wilfrid Laurier, to send volunteer troops to 
fight in the Boer War in 1899. He resigned his seat in protest against English 
Canada's subservience to Britain, a subservience that he felt threatened its 
independence. 
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Henri Bourassa and those who thought like him... tended to 
believe that English Canadians were the ultimate hyphenated 
nationality, that they were not really Canadian in spirit, no 
matter what their citizenship. They responded to Britain's needs 
and not to Canada's. 
[Bothwell, 1995, p. 55] 
Bourassa believed that Canada needed its own identity, one based on provincial 
autonomy and biculturalism. He became leader of the Nationalist League in 
1903, whose goal was "to convince all Canadians that the time had come to forge 
an independent Canadian identity" [Bickerton, Gagnon and Smith, 1999, p. 164], 
and in 1910 began publishing Le Devoir as a platform for his views. His 
Nationalistes became part of a Nationalist-Conservative alliance that sent 27 MPs 
to Ottawa in 1911, the first example of a federal nationalist bloc. United by 
their anti-imperialist and anti-conscription views, they were unable to influence 
the Conservative government because of their small numbers, and when Laurier 
expropriated their independence stance, "the nationalists gradually lost their 
appeal and their movement lost its momentum. " [Bickerton, Gagnon and Smith, 
1999, p. 168] 
This same conflict over Canada's role vis-a-vis the British Empire 
occurred during the Conscription Crisis of 1917, but it was much more violent - 
five people were killed and 70 people wounded in one Quebec city riot [Johnson, 
1994] - and had dramatic consequences for French-English relations. The two 
Canadas were united in supporting volunteer involvement of Canadians at the 
beginning of World War One. But as the war dragged on, and recruits were 
harder to find, prime minister Robert Borden wanted to impose conscription. 
English Canadians, still strongly attached to the Empire, were in favour; French 
Canadians were not. Laurier, now leader of the opposition, wanted a 
referendum on the question, but Borden rejected that idea and fought the election 
campaign of 1917 on the issue. Feelings were running so high that the government 
members from Quebec were in physical danger during the campaign. One, 
cabinet minister Albert Sevigny, 
lived through some horrific and terrifying moments. The only 
political meeting he tried to hold in his Dorchester riding took a 
tragic turn and he was nearly killed when the crowd's rage went 
wild. Attempts to poison him to death and stone-throwing 
attacks on his home added to his tragedy.... Everywhere in 
Quebec, French Canadians were angry and took ferocious 
exception to anyone who opposed their saviour, Laurier. 
[Gougeon, 1994, p. 48] 
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The English Canadian majority won. In response, the Quebec legislative 
assembly debated the Francoeur motion, which stated in effect that if English 
Canadians felt that French Canadians were hindering Canada's progress, the 
province would consider breaking the 1867 Confederation agreement. The 
motion was made more in sorrow than anger, and never went to a vote. But it 
indicated to the defeated nationalistes that their best option was to withdraw into 
"fortress Quebec", where they stayed for the next four decades. 
Abbe Groulx, Duplessis, and La Grande Noirceur 
During the years following World War One, Quebec nationalism took a rightward 
turn under the activist leadership of Abbe Lionel Groulx and the political 
leadership of Maurice Duplessis, premier of the province from 1936-39 and 
1944-59. This nationalism focused on la survivance, the survival of the French 
Canadian way of life within Quebec, but in doing so, displayed a disturbing 
tendency towards anti-semitism and fascism. 
Abbe Groulx was an enormously influential figure in Quebec, still revered 
today. Teacher, priest, writer, and historian, he founded both the nationalist 
journal and organization, Action francaise. He was distressed by the changes in 
Quebec arising out of the increased industrialization and urbanization of its 
society, and sought to strengthen the French language, Catholicism, and the 
family as a defence against these changes and their corrupting effects. Like many 
Quebec nationalists, he believed in "a convenient ethnic division of labour that 
gave spirituality and virtue to the French Canadians, leaving to the English 
materialism, practicality, and, of course, control of the economy. " [Cook, 1995, 
p. 122] He was a visionary, however, in that he saw the need for a class of 
French-Canadian entrepreneurs, who would contribute to Quebec's identity, and 
he also understood the role of the state in affirming that identity and the 
institutions that supported it. But he supported a boycott campaign, Achat chez 
nous, against Jewish shop-keepers, favoured the fascist philosophies of 
Mussolini, Salazar and Franco, and expressed strong anti-Semitic beliefs in his 
writings throughout his long career [Richler, 1992; Gougeon, 1993; Delisle, 19951. 
The second major influence in this time period was Duplessis, le chef, who 
formed the nationalist political party, the Union Nationale, made up of a 
coalition of Liberals and Conservatives. Duplessis was not at heart a 
nationalist; he was, after all, originally a member of the Conservatives, but he 
could see the benefit of using nationalism to get and keep political power in the 
province. The expression of his nationalism was inward-looking and reactionary. 
He was against the centralization of the federal government, and rejected monies 
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from Ottawa in order to protect Quebec's political autonomy, while at the same 
time encouraging investment from American corporations. 
The hopes of nationalists that under Duplessis Quebec would achieve 
economic independence were soon dashed. But his initial term as premier was 
cut short by the issue of conscription when the provincial Liberals won the 1939 
election on the strength of a pledge from the federal government that Quebecers 
would be protected from conscription if they voted Liberal. French Canadians 
were not keen to participate in the war: some were more inclined to support the 
right-wing, Catholic Petain government in France rather than the Free French led 
by Charles De Gaulle [Bothwell, 1995, p. 731. By 1942 the federal government 
realized that despite more than one million volunteer recruits out of a population 
of 12 million, it could not keep its pledge, and held a national referendum on the 
issue. The results were almost evenly split, with 71 per cent of the voters in 
Quebec saying no, and 80 per cent of the voters in the rest of Canada saying yes 
[Trofimenkoff, 1983, p. 260]. 
This time the protest was not violent. Instead, the anger and 
disillusionment focused on the formation of the Bloc Populaire, a coalition of 
nationalists from both right and left, not unlike that of the Bloc Quebecois 50 
years later or Bourassa's Nationalistes 40 years earlier. However, the BP was 
short-lived. It ran candidates in the 1944 provincial election, enabling 
Duplessis's Union Nationale party to get back in power by splitting the vote, and 
won two seats in the federal election the following year. 
Duplessis was to remain in office for another 15 years. His regime was 
marked by widespread corruption, including bribery of the press and government 
officials as well as the buying of votes, persecution of religious minorities, and 
virulent anti-unionism [Trudeau, 1968; Keate, 1980; Trofimenkoff, 1983; Richler, 
1992; Gougeon, 1993; Cook, 19951, which earned it the title of la grande noirceur 
(great gloom). Starting in the 1950s, however, some intellectual light began to 
pierce this gloom. 
Duplessis and other traditional nationalists had not wanted Quebec to 
participate in the post-war welfare state because they saw it as a threat to 
French Canadian culture. They believed that the church, not the federal 
government, should look after education, health and social services. But there 
was growing discontent with this reactionary view, expressed in the magazine 
Cite Libre founded in 1950 by Pierre Trudeau and Gerard Pelletier. They had 
both campaigned for the workers in the 1949 strike at Asbestos, a turning-point 
in the province's history. The horrific sight of workers being beaten senseless by 
the provincial police aroused the conscience of the church and media, and began 
the process of social change that was soon to permeate all levels of Quebec. 
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The intellectuals at Cite Libre were opposed to this backward form of 
nationalism, which they saw as a means for opposing social change, and worse, 
as "nothing more than a rationalization of French-Canadian economic inferiority 
and a justification for clerical power. " [Cook, 1995, p. 125] What Quebec 
needed, they believed, was to develop its own business class which would 
encourage and promote the province's economy, and use the federal government 
to protect the interests of French Canadians, instead of withdrawing from it. 
La Revolution Tranquille - Maitres Chez Nous 
Following the death of Duplessis, the Liberals were swept into power in 1960. 
The party had a new leader, Jean Lesage, a former federal cabinet minister, 
chosen for his television-friendly image [Gougeon, 1994, p. 88], and a new 
programme prepared by Georges-Emile Lapalme, which became the basis for la 
revolution tranquille, or the Quiet Revolution. It also had the equipe du tonnerre, or 
thunder squad, a dynamic team of cabinet ministers which included Rene 
Levesque, the popular television news anchor who later founded the Parti 
Quebecois. The strategy of the new government was a nationalist one: it was 
determined to boost the Quebec economy, and most importantly, ensure that the 
benefits of that economy went to Quebecers. The people of Quebec were to be 
maitres chez noes, masters in their own house, in the words of the slogan 
promoted by Levesque. 
During the six years of the Lesage government, five new ministries were 
established; the civil service increased by almost a third; regional economic 
councils for economic development were created; labour laws were revised; a 
provincial health insurance programme was implemented; a Quebec pension 
plan, separate from the Canadian pension plan, was developed, whose funds 
could be used for investment in the province; and the education system was 
completely revised. The last was the most significant, for it broke the 
stranglehold the church had on education in Quebec, establishing the first 
Ministry of Education in the province since 1873 [Gagnon and Montcalm, 19901. 
But nationalist tensions split the Lesage cabinet. Lesage was a committed 
federalist and began to isolate those on the nationalist wing of the party, 
particularly Levesque. In 1966 the Liberals were unexpectedly defeated by the 
revived Union Nationale, due to the splitting of the vote by the Rassemblement 
pour l'Independance Nationale (RIN), a pro-independence party. Soon after 
Levesque realized that he could not achieve his nationalist aims within the 
Liberal party, and left in 1967 to form the Mouvement Souveraint6 Association, 
which later became the Parti Quebecois. 
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While these conflicts were being played out at the political level, a more 
violent and extremist form of nationalism was occurring on the streets. In 1963 
the Front de Liberation du Quebec (FLQ) placed bombs in an army recruiting 
centre and Armoury, then mail-boxes in the upper-class WASP neighbourhood of 
Westmount in Montreal, and three years later, a shoe factory and textile mill, 
"symbols of working class exploitation" [Trofimenkoff, 1983, p. 312]. Six 
people died in these incidents [Desbarats, 1976]. This angry nationalism of the 
FLQ was an ethnocentric one, based on the belief that only an independent 
Quebec would save French culture and language. Any co-operation with English 
Canada was a sell-out of Quebecers, whom they saw as an oppressed minority - 
les negres blancs d'Amerique Nord, or the white niggers of America, in the words of 
FLQ strategist Pierre Vallieres. 
Matters were not helped by the visit of French president Charles de 
Gaulle to Canada for its centennial in 1967, supposedly a time to celebrate 
national unity. 
de Gaulle landed at Quebec city, barely acknowledged the federal 
presence, accepted the hospitality of the provincial government, 
drove to Montreal, and in a memorable speech at Montreal's 
City Hall, uttered a phrase that gladdened the hearts of all those 
who supported Quebec independence: 'Vive le Quebec libre! ' 
[Long live free Quebec! ] The crowd cheered, leaving no doubt in 
the rest of Canada that there were plenty of Quebeckers who did 
not find the idea of independence strange or repulsive. The 
government of Canada did, and said so, and de Gaulle departed 
in a hurry. 
[Bothwell, 1995, p. 121] 
The Canadian government's response was not an over-reaction. As Allan 
Gotlieb, former undersecretary for external affairs, recalls: "there were groups 
within the Elysee (the French presidential palace) and within the intelligence 
services of France who were actively promoting and scheming for the 
independence of Quebec. " [Bothwell, 1995, p. 1221 
Canada was, as the 1965 Report of the Royal Commission on 
Bilingualism and Biculturalism stated, "passing through the greatest crisis in its 
history. " [Bothwell, 1995, p. 1101 Ironically, it was the formation of the Parti 
Quebecois which rescued Canada from becoming a Northern Ireland, because it 
created an electoral vehicle for Quebec's nationalist goals. However, it took the 
terrorism of the 1970 October Crisis, in which British Trade Commissioner James 
Cross was taken hostage and Quebec labour minister Pierre Laporte murdered, to 
make nationalist Quebecers pull back from the brink of the abyss and put their 
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faith in the PQ. Although there was protest both within and without Quebec 
against Trudeau's imposition of the War Measures Act and the arrest and 
detention of 497 suspected FLQ sympathizers, none of whom had any 
connection with the FLQ cells responsible [Caplan, 1993, p. 27], "most 
Canadians, however queasy they might feel at the sight of the military, were even 
more unnerved by the thought of murder. " [Trofimenkoff, 1983, p. 325] Even 
Pierre Vallieres publicly stated his opposition to terrorism, and urged nationalists 
to support the Parti Quebecois. 
Neither his endorsement nor Pierre Trudeau's disapproval proved to be 
obstacles for the acceptance of the PQ, and that is largely because Levesque 
understood the need to reassure cautious Quebecers and anxious English 
Canadians. He "was able to convince many a listener that the leap from Quiet 
Revolutionary quarrels with Ottawa to separatist certitude was merely a matter 
of natural evolution.... Levesque's dream of nation was carefully fashioned to 
inspire, not to frighten. " [Trofimenkoff, 1983, p. 326] The PQ became the 
government of Quebec in 1976 when it won 71 out of 110 seats in the province's 
national assembly. 
How the Parti Quebecois and later the Bloc Quebecois translated their 
dream of nation into government action will be the subject of my next chapter, in 
which I examine the history and development of independence movements and 
parties in both Scotland and Quebec. But in conclusion to this discussion of the 
evolution of Quebec nationalism throughout the centuries, it is important to note 
two factors in its development. The first is its refusal to be thwarted, despite 
obstacles that would seem impossible to overcome. If, as historian Richard 
Desrosiers says, "there is a constant in the history of the Quebec people, it is the 
rise in national self-assertion and the questioning of the link with the Canadian 
whole. " [Gougeon, 1994, p. 951 The second is its struggle over how best to 
preserve its language and culture, a struggle made even more difficult in modern 
times as Quebec finds itself becoming, along with the rest of Canada, an 
increasingly multi-ethnic, multicultural society. As a consequence, Quebec 
nationalism suffers from a "profound ambiguity", Julie Bernier explains: 
A closer look at the last referendum campaign [in 1995] seems to 
confirm that Quebec nationalism is still profoundly ambivalent, 
for there was a constant shifting between an appeal to cultural 
belonging directed mainly to French Quebecers, and an appeal 
based on civic, liberal and pluralist commitments directed to all 
those who inhabit the territory of Quebec; that is to say between 
an appeal to the "We", understood as Quebecois from French 
descent, and the "We", understood as Quebecois of all origins. 
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This ambiguity seems to be enduring, even though Quebec 
nationalism has undergone tremendous transformations since 
the 1960s. 
[Bernier, 1996, p. 1] 
Nowhere is this ambiguity more visible than in the relationship of the Quebec 
government with the First Nations people living in their midst, an ambiguity that 
goes back to the first decades of settlement in New France. 
The First Nations - Sovereign Nations, Too 
The first French explorers of North America labelled the native peoples as 
"sauvaiges", seeing them as "uncivilized, lacking religion, laws, and government" 
[Cook, 1995, p. 73]. But the French in Canada soon discovered that they needed 
these savages to survive and prosper: without their knowledge of the fierce 
climate and territory, their skills at hunting, fishing and trapping, and their 
superior ability as warriors, their lives in the fragile colony would have been 
harsher and even more tenuous. They also soon realized that, contrary to the 
initial observation of Jacques Cartier that these were a people who could be 
easily converted, they could not be assimilated. The French Catholic 
missionaries, to their credit, recognized the importance of spirituality and 
ceremony in the lives of native people, similar to the emphasis in the Catholic 
faith, and therefore were more tolerant of native religious beliefs than the English 
Protestants. 
For these reasons, the natives formed strong bonds with the early French 
settlers, and in fact were seen as indispensable allies in the colonial wars of the 
17th and 18th century, operating as power brokers, "balancing the British and 
the French in the interest of preserving their own autonomy, their own 
independence. " [Bothwell, 1995, p. 11] But after the Treaty of Versailles in 1783 
which settled the wars, their military influence ended. This, added to the decline 
of the fur trade, the loss of their lands, the decimation of their numbers through 
illnesses such as smallpox, measles, diphtheria and influenza, and the over- 
hunting and fishing which was destroying the habitat on which they depended 
for survival, meant that native people became isolated and marginalized. 
The British conquerors were not as tolerant as their French predecessors: 
they made assimilation their goal, a goal pursued with great determination by 
Canadian governments until the increasing militancy of First Nations people put 
a stop to it. A document, To the Source, prepared by the Assembly of First 
Nations, describes the effect of this policy: 
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The struggle for cultural supremacy started as soon as the 
Europeans landed. Since then... virtually every authority and 
institution in Canada - has done everything in its power to turn 
Aboriginal peoples into Eurocanadians. These institutions have 
used force, bribery, co-option, coercion, conversion, persuasion, 
persecution, trickery, neglect, forcible adoption, and sheer 
indifference. They have employed the courts, the schools, social 
services, the prisons, the churches, the police, even the army, 
and legions of federal and provincial bureaucrats. They have 
taken our land, our rights, and our children.... But they didn't 
break us. We survived. 
[Cited in Cook, 1995, p. 79] 
They survived, and became a third force in Canadian nationalism, one that also 
demanded autonomy, independence, and self-government from both federal and 
provincial governments. It was the aboriginal Elijah Harper who helped block the 
ratification of the Meech Lake Accord by refusing to give assent in the Manitoba 
legislature because it did not include native rights. It was Cree lobbying which 
stopped the $12.7-billion Great Whale hydro-electric project planned for 
northern Quebec, and it was the Mohawks in the confrontation at Oka who 
demonstrated to the world their determination to protect the land of their 
ancestors, threatened by the development of a golf course. 
Quebec aboriginals have once again becoming the spoilers in a national 
power struggle, this time between the Parti Quebecois and the Liberal government 
in Ottawa, saying that if Quebec decides to separate without their consent, then 
they will separate from Quebec, taking their resource-rich territory with them. 
However, despite their own history, Quebecers have so far failed to understand 
the position of the Cree. 
Native American Crees have made their own case for 
separatism within Quebec, although in the language of a people 
who see themselves more as guests on the land than its 
'owners'. They have been greeted with an intensely hypocritical 
lack of sympathy by Quebecois who somehow cannot grasp the 
connection between their own suit against Canada and that of 
the Cree against them. 
[Barber, 1995, p. 178] 
In the words of Ovide Mercredi, grand chief of the Assembly of First Nations: 
"You have not allowed yourselves to be assimilated, you have 
not allowed your collective identity as a people, as a nation, to be 
undermined. We are no less distinct than you. We deserve to 
survive just as much as you do. If it belongs to Quebecers and 
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no one else to decide what powers to grant themselves to ensure 
their full flowering, then it is the same for us. " 
[Cook, 1995, p. 81] 
Scottish Nationalism 
Scottish nationalism is difficult for a Canadian to understand. When compared 
with Canada's three nationalisms, it is a puzzle. Unlike English Canada, its 
nationalism is highly emotive, with national symbols, historical heroes, and a 
strong cultural identity. Like Quebec, Scotland has always had an independent 
culture, and a strong linguistic identity. Unlike English-speaking Canadians, 
Scots do not usually have to explain what country they are from. Like Quebecers 
and First Nations peoples, Scots have resisted assimilation by the dominant 
culture, while English-speaking Canadians have tended to resolve their identity 
crisis by succumbing first to the culture of Britain, and then to that of the United 
States. 
However, Scotland does not have political sovereignty and does not seem 
to want it - at least not to the same extent that Quebecers and the people of 
Canada's First Nations do - and in fact, voluntarily surrendered its sovereignty 
with the Treaty of Union in 1707. Granted, Scotland has had a great deal of 
political autonomy, which has given it a certain amount of independence in 
governing its own affairs. It is also true that the British government has been far 
more intransigent on the subject of constitutional change than the Canadian. 
Although it has now given Scotland its own parliament, this body has nothing 
like the legislative clout enjoyed by Canadian provinces. To a Canadian 
observer, the historical reluctance of the UK government to devolve power to 
Scotland seems all the more strange when you look at the history of Canada to 
Confederation, when the British imperial government made five legislative 
attempts to accommodate the French fact in North America (1763,1774,1791, 
1841, and 1867). It also seems strange when you look at the history of Scotland: 
how could a nation formed more than 965 years ago not be considered 
independent now? 
Great Beginnings 
History plays a vital role in Scotland's identity. The importance of history in the 
Scottish consciousness is especially striking to anyone from Canada, a country 
which, as Collins says, has "so much space and so little history" [Collins, 1990, 
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p. 115]. It is characteristic of public life in Scotland that its political leaders will 
hotly debate whether William Wallace was "a loser", as have SNP leader Alex 
Salmond and former Scottish Secretary Michael Forsyth, and that the debate 
would be so widely publicized in the media. This attachment to history is strong 
because "Scotland the nation exists because of the way its people understand 
their own past. " [Marr, 1995, p. 81 To understand Scotland's past is to 
understand its national identity, an identity that has been threatened by war and 
division right from its earliest beginnings, and by the power of England. 
It was in 1034 A. D. that Duncan I united the Picts, Scots, Britons and 
Angles in a kingdom whose territory closely resembled that of modern Scotland. 
Their union followed several centuries of struggle, and was promoted by five 
main factors, which also contributed to the nation's sense of identity [Mackie, 
1991]. The four peoples shared the common religion of Christianity, and a 
similar political and social structure, based on small kingdoms in which people 
lived as part of a kin group in small villages or homesteads. The predominance 
of the Picts provided a solid foundation for the nation, needed to withstand the 
continuing attacks from the Scandinavian countries (attacks which had 
prompted the earlier union of the Scots and the Picts under Kenneth MacAlpin in 
843 A. D., which some historians say is the true beginning of Scotland). The 
union also depended on the support of England to continue the dynasty of the 
Canmores under Malcolm III, a mixed blessing, for, as Mackie notes, "Along with 
English aid came the risk of English domination. " [Mackie, 1991, p. 35] 
Fortunately for Scotland, the monarchy was a strong one, and during its 
more than two centuries of existence, was able to give the country a unified 
structure based on feudalism, the reform of the church, the establishment of the 
royal burghs, and its own effectiveness [Smout, 1985]. The authority of the king 
was essential to the nation's identity, and so it was extremely important to 
establish the monarch's antiquity and independence, in order to combat English 
claims to Scotland based on its supposedly superior origins. Scottish medieval 
historians invented a monarchical tradition of their own, in which the Scottish 
kings were descended from a Greek prince and the daughter of the Pharaoh who 
came to Scotland via Spain and Ireland, carrying the Stone of Destiny. As 
Andrew Marr notes, tongue-in-cheek, "All true Scots are thus the descendants of 
a Greek hard man and an Egyptian immigrant. " [Marr, 1995, p. 10] ] 
However, the stability of the Canmore dynasty ended in 1290 with the 
death of the Maid of Norway, the last heir to the throne, and a fierce struggle for 
Scotland's survival began, as Edward I of England used tactics "marked by 
sharp practice, arrogance, and brutality" [Mackie, 1991, p. 63] to conquer the 
Scottish nation. But if anything, this struggle strengthened Scotland's identity. 
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The Wars of Independence were "a crucible in which all lost their old ethnic 
loyalties and became part of a coherent Scottish nation, assertive, warlike, 
resilient, patriotic and freedom-loving. " [Smout, 1985, p. 33] It is easier to 
understand the resonance of such historical figures as William Wallace and 
Robert the Bruce in this context, for without them, Scotland might have gone the 
way of Wales. 
A country's defining moments tend to come when it survives 
threatened extinction. The independence wars, opened by the 
rural guerrilla William Wallace with the support of the Scottish 
Catholic church, really were critical to Scotland's existence.... The 
country would have disappeared into vassalage in the early 
1300s had it not been led by a military genius. Scotland's 1314 
was, in that sense, like Britain's 1940. 
[Marr, 1995, p. 13] 
The Battle of Bannockburn in 1314, when the Scots were led to victory by 
Robert the Bruce, was the turning-point in Scotland's fight for independence, and 
as such has acquired great significance as a symbol of Scottish resistance. 
Another equally important symbol is the Declaration of Arbroath, whose 
"sonorous wording expresses all the fierce nationalism of the fourteenth century" 
[Smout, 1985, p. 27]. Sent by Scots nobles to the Pope in 1320 to persuade him 
of Robert the Bruce's legitimacy as King, it stated: 
For so long as an hundred remain alive we are minded never a 
whit to bow beneath the yoke of English dominion. It is not for 
glory, riches or honours that we fight: it is for liberty alone, the 
liberty that no good man relinquishes but with his life. 
The Declaration is also remarkable for its view of the king's role. It pledged that 
he could be overthrown by his subjects "if he compromised their independence. 
He was 'King of Scots', not King of Scotland, already a limited monarch of a 
people , not lord and owner of a land. In medieval constitutional thought this 
was a radical claim. " [Marr, 1995, p. 11] 
The loyalty of the barons was well-rewarded. Bruce was an effective 
monarch, and on his death in 1329 left behind "an ordered, well-established 
kingdom" [Mackie, 1991, p. 79], but after his reign Scotland suffered from 
inadequate royal government for more than two centuries. King David II was 
imprisoned in England for 11 years from 1346-1357; the two kings following him, 
Robert II and III, "reigned for a total of thirty-five years with such desperate 
incompetence that in the words of one chronicler justice herself seemed an outlaw 
from the kingdom. " [Smout, 1985, p. 33] James I was kidnapped by the English 
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on his succession at age 11 in 1406; after he was released from prison in 1424 he 
proved himself a capable monarch but was murdered after just 13 years on the 
throne. Following his death in 1437 and until 1567 "every Scottish monarch 
came to the throne as a child" [Smout, 1985, p. 33], including James VI, who did 
not reach the age of majority until 1587. 
It was his determined efforts that resulted in the Union of the Crowns in 
1603, which began the process that inevitably led to the Treaty of Union in 1707. 
As Smout says, the Treaty of Union was "the capstone to a process of 
constitutional amalgamation that James VI and every other monarch after him 
had earnestly desired. " [Smout, 1985, p. 198] With royal governance in London, 
a weakened parliament in Scotland, and the nobles of Scotland and England 
joining together to put the Protestant William III on the throne in England, it was 
only a matter of time before the elites of the two countries decided to make a 
deal. The Treaty of Union has generated much propaganda on both the unionist 
and nationalist sides of the story: nationalists will say the only reason it 
happened was because the Scottish leaders were bribed with money and/or 
promises of political advancement, while unionists state that Scotland was too 
weak politically and economically to go it alone. The truth is more complex. 
Scottish parliamentarians would have preferred a federation, but England 
wanted union, and Scotland was in no position to resist, threatened by a civil 
war between Jacobites and Hanoverians. 
Resistance to the union came from both within and without parliament. 
Fletcher of Saltoun has become a folk hero of present-day nationalists for his 
opposition to the treaty and his battle for an independent Scotland while serving 
as a member of the last Scottish parliament. On the streets of Edinburgh, 
Glasgow and Dumfries mobs rioted in protest, and during the debates in 
parliament anti-Union petitions, almost 90 of them, came from all over Scotland. 
[Marr, 1995]; what was more significant, not one pro-Union petition was 
received [Devine, 1999]. "Rioting in Glasgow was so intense and such a threat to 
public order that 200 dragoons were sent to the west" [Young, 1998, p. 1271 
while in Dumfries several thousand watched as "the proposed Articles of Union 
were ritually burnt" [Devine, 1999, p. 9]. But despite the popular opposition, 
the treaty passed by 110 votes to 69. Its passage changed Scotland irrevocably. 
The Act of Union made a separation in the nation that created a 
unique and confused historical legacy. The people were 
separated from their legislature. This meant that insofar as 
democratic government is the fulfilment of the people's will, 
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Scots would be denied the means of self-government. Yet they 
retained the characteristics of a nation without the political 
identity of one. 
[Mcllvanney, 1991, p. 138] 
The treaty was supposed to ease the friction with England and bring 
prosperity to Scotland, but initially it did neither. Scotland's economy suffered 
from free trade because, as Daniel Defoe wrote at the time: "the Union opens the 
door to all English manufacturers and suppresses their own. " [Cited in Marr, 
1995, p. 22] By 1713 what Mackie describes as "the patronizing attitude of the 
English - their assumption that England had 'bought' Scotland, and that this was 
no equal partnership" [Mackie, 1991, p. 266] caused such strong economic, 
constitutional and ecclesiastical grievances that a motion in the House of Lords 
to rescind the Act of Union, supported by all the Scottish members, was only 
narrowly defeated. 
The treaty was also supposed to solve the problem of royal succession, 
but that took more than 30 years and the crushing of four Jacobite attempts to 
put a Stewart king on the throne. These attempts, culminating in the defeat of 
Prince Charles and his Highland army at the Battle of Culloden in 1746, 
accentuated the traditional divide between Highlander and Lowlander and 
accelerated the destruction of the Highland way of life. The brutal punishment of 
the prince's Highland supporters did not meet with much sympathy from 
Lowlanders, who saw the Gaels as lawless barbarians. In fact, says Marr, to 
some "their extirpation was seen as a positive liberation, a leap towards 
modernity, brought about by the Union with England. " [Marr, 1995, p. 30] 
Part of the reason for the failure of the Jacobite cause was that Scottish 
discontent "was both wide and deep" [Mackie, 1991, p. 268]. Scotland was 
becoming more prosperous, and this "growing economic prosperity inclined men, 
especially the wealthier men, to accept with complacency a rule of which 
perhaps, in theory, they did not approve. " [Mackie, 1991, p. 269] But this same 
prosperity encouraged the rise of the middle class and the intellectual flowering 
of the Enlightenment, in which Scots accomplished great things in the arts and 
sciences (achievements still cited today by patriotic Scots, according to William 
Mcllvanney). As lain Finlayson describes it: 
The poet sat down with the physicist, the philosopher with the 
painter, the artisan with the academic, so that no art or science 
was uninformed by any other.... in this period, the Scots invented 
the science of sociology, the discipline of statistics, pioneered the 
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first census... published the first edition of the Encyclopaedia 
Britannica, wrote legal treatises still consulted today.. . and bred both Burns and Scott. 
[Finlayson, 1987, p. 145] 
As with so much of Scottish history, however, the reasons given for this 
development are based on whether the writer is in the unionist or nationalist 
camp. Unionist academics have been inclined to say that it was due to the 
civilizing influence of the Union; however, the evidence seems to indicate that the 
seeds of the Enlightenment were sown long before it was enacted [Beveridge and 
Turnbull, 1989; Mackie, 1991; McCrone, 1992; Harvie, 1994; Marr, 1995]. 
Beveridge and Turnbull are particularly scathing in their criticism of the unionist 
perspective of Scottish history, which they describe as "inferiorism", and its 
portrayal of The Enlightenment "as of startling precocity, near-incredible to the 
historians themselves.... There occurs an alchemic transmutation of a base-metal 
culture into glittering gold. " [Beveridge and Turnbull, 1987, p. 29] 
Beveridge and Turnbull are also critical of Tom Nairn's view, as stated in 
The Break-Up of Britain, that there was no authentic Scottish nationalism from 
1800 to 1920. Again, the evidence suggests otherwise, that there was "a thread, 
sometimes hidden, sometimes clear, that can be traced" of nationalist thought 
during this time period [Marr, 1995, p. 26]. The United Scotsmen, an 
underground organization of radical reformers who argued for annual 
parliaments and universal suffrage, operated from 1797 until 1802 [Smout, 
1985]. The members of the secret Committee of Organization for forming a 
Provisional Government were behind the Radical War of 1820, in which 60,000 
workers went out on strike [Mackie, 1991]. As well as establishing a provisional 
government, the committee wanted to restore the Scottish parliament and to 
separate from England. 
A less radical manifestation of nationalism, and led by the committed 
unionist Sir Walter Scott, was the campaign in 1826-27 to keep the Scottish £1 
note. The British government's move to ban paper money under £5 in order to 
aid failing British banks was angrily protested, as it would have decimated the 
Scottish economy with 63 per cent of Scottish currency in bills under £5 
[Kennedy, 1995], and Scott's argument that English ministers were only too 
willing to experiment at the expense of Scotland sounds familiar after the poll- 
tax debacle of the Thatcher government [Marr, 1995]. In the 1850s the Scottish 
Rights Association pressed for changes in the way Scottish affairs were dealt 
with at Westminster, demands that were still being made 30 years later and 
which were an impetus to the drive for Home Rule [Mitchell, 1996]. In the 1880s, 
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the Highland Land Law Reform Association agitated for the rights of crofters, 
and its political arm, the Crofters' Party, won four seats in the 1885 general 
election [Smout, 1987]. The radical faction of the Gladstone Liberal Party 
provided a home for the dissident nationalism in Scotland that had been 
expressed earlier in the Chartist movement [Marr, 1995]. 
But, as Harvie explains, Scottish nationalism had a rival in the 19th 
century, and that was opportunity overseas. "To ask a middle-class Scot to 
concern himself with his country was to tell him to stay at home and let his 
business go hang. " [Harvie, 1994, p. 56] Scots left their country to improve 
themselves, while acting as representatives of the British Empire in government, 
business, and the professions. In doing so, however, they resisted assimilation, 
contrary to the usual pattern which Tamir describes (and which was seen in 
Quebec, where 800,000 French Canadians emigrated to the mill-towns of New 
England during the 19th century). 
A powerful, although unofficial, way of motivating individuals 
to assimilate (or to emigrate) is to present them with a forced 
choice between two unequal options: either to join a stronger, 
wealthier nation and share in its sense of security, its economic 
prosperity, and, at times, its feelings of superiority, or to remain 
closed within their own culture, doomed to marginalisation and 
very often poverty. 
[Tamir, 1993, p. 1541 
If anything, they imposed their own cultural values on the countries where they 
lived, certainly in Canada, whose "very identity was the triumph of its Scots 
settlers"[Harvie, 1994, p. 63], and demonstrated that freed from the constraints 
of a rigid, class-based society, they could succeed. But their very success raised 
questions with Scots about Scotland's position within Britain. Why could they 
govern in the colonies but not at home? Why did they have to emigrate to 
improve themselves? 
Great Expectations 
The Scottish nationalism of the 19th century was not a separatist one, and was 
committed to achieving its goals within the context of the United Kingdom. It 
was possible to be both a unionist and a nationalist, for the common view was 
"that Scotland was a partner in the Union: it could best realise itself as a nation 
if it remained within the Union, and could best ensure its status as a partner by 
always reminding England that Scotland was a nation, not a region. " [Brown, 
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McCrone, Paterson, 1996, p. 16] It was this view that led to the establishment of 
the Scottish Office in 1885, the first example of 'administrative devolution' 
[Brown, McCrone, Paterson, 1996, p. 40], to deal with criticisms that Scottish 
affairs were not being given the proper amount of attention. Such unionist 
nationalism was the basis for the Scottish Home Rule Association founded in 
1886, but it was very much a fringe movement, with goals that fit within the 
imperial model. The SHRA wanted a Scottish legislature, but as part of a 
federation which would include the colonies of the British Empire, as well as 
Ireland and Wales, in a United States of Great Britain [Mitchell, 1996, p. 70]. The 
organization did not last long, or have much concrete effect, but it was important 
because it was the first of several Home Rule pressure groups and was 
instrumental in the development of the nationalist movement in Scotland. The 
later movements survived because they were driven by the desire for reform in 
Scotland rather than the preservation of the union, and so attracted the support 
of radical Liberals in pre-war Scotland and that of Labour after. 
Although this identification of the Home Rule movement with progressive 
politics enabled its survival, it did not ensure its success. James Mitchell's 
chronology of Scottish self-government lists 12 separate votes on bills to 
introduce Scottish home rule between 1889 and 1920, and that does not include 
the occasions when bills were introduced and either did not proceed or were 
talked out. The Scottish Home Rule Association, reincarnated in 1918, was 
increasingly frustrated by its lack of progress, while the more radical Scottish 
National League called for independence. Following the failure of the 
Government of Scotland Bill in 1927, which was based on the devolution 
proposals drawn up by the Scottish National Convention, the SHRA, the 
Scottish National League, the Scottish National Movement and the Glasgow 
University Scottish Nationalist Association formed the National Party of 
Scotland. It merged with the Scottish (Self-Government) Party to become the 
Scottish National Party in 1934. 
The convoluted origins and history of the SNP will be described in greater 
detail in chapter three. It is important to note, however, that the Scottish 
National Party combined two nationalist traditions that have been warring with 
each other ever since its start: the gradualists, personified in the SHRA, who 
believed in home rule; and the fundamentalists, who believed that anything less 
than independence was a sell-out. 
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Scottish Nationalism Today 
Modern Scottish nationalism has changed fundamentally from that of the 19th 
century. It is no longer unionist, and has none of the sentimental tartanry 
associated with Sir Walter Scott, the Kailyard school of literature, or the Ossian 
poems. It is definitely left-of-centre, and is based on the political and civic 
culture of Scotland, in opposition to that of England. This sense of separateness 
from the government of Britain increased dramatically during the Thatcher years, 
when the civic autonomy of Scotland was threatened by centralizing 
Conservative party policies: 
Thatcher represented a new Toryism, one that had forgotten a 
sense of the Union as a partnership. Her government took the 
absolute sovereignty of parliament literally, neglecting a 
tradition that it should limit its own power in the interests of 
tolerable rule, and she was able to do this because the erstwhile 
constitution has been built on conventions and understandings, 
rather than on formal documents. 
[Paterson, 1994, p. 169] 
The result was that Scots now felt "a stronger sense of subordination to London- 
based government than ever before. It is this heightened awareness of its power 
to impose deeply unpopular policies on a sullenly hostile Scotland which has 
strengthened the support for Scottish nationalism. " [Gallagher, 1991, p. 91] 
It has also strengthened Scottish national identity. As Brown, McCrone 
and Paterson show in their survey of polls done in the UK from 1986 to 1992 on 
the question, people living in Scotland see themselves predominately as Scottish, 
rather than British, and this holds true across all social classes and regions. 
Because Scots have kept their basic institutions - the church, education and legal 
systems, local government - they have also kept a degree of independence which 
maintained their identity. "Feeling Scottish was not a sentimental left-over of 
previous independence, but derived from the day-to-day workings of Scottish 
civil society as it affected people directly. " [Brown, McCrone and Paterson, p. 
205] Scotland's civic culture was the unifying factor; destroy that and Scotland's 
identity as a nation would be destroyed. As Marr says, the defining moments of 
a country occur when it is threatened with extinction. In the words of William 
Mdlvanney : 
Stands Scotland where it did? Just about, but not for much 
longer. A crisis-point has arrived. We will either become more 
ourselves or less ourselves in the next few years. We cannot 
much longer maintain the ambiguity of our present situation: 
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that of a people who retain a strong sense of themselves as a 
nation yet have no effective structure of government within 
which to develop and give expression to that sense. 
[Mcllvanney, 1991, p. 250] 
Now that Scotland has its own parliament, it has the legislative means to express 
its own national identity. Whether or not this will lead to independence is a 
moot point. 
Conclusion 
Scotland and Quebec are two among many nations within states who are 
struggling to assert their autonomy. Their stories are unique but also part of a 
wider trend, and as such, they can tell us a great deal. As Brown, McCrone and 
Paterson point out, " Small nations are like corks in the sea. They are the first 
indicators of the way currents are flowing, and that the tide is turning. " [Brown, 
McCrone and Paterson, 1996, p. 2151 In a world where power no longer belongs 
to national governments, but to what Benjamin Barber calls "one McWorld tied 
together by communications, information, entertainment, and commerce" [Barber, 
1995, p. 4], people look to their own communities for a sense of belonging and 
security. In its pathological form, this desire for a national identity becomes "a 
threatened balkanization of nation-states in which culture is pitted against 
culture, people against people, tribe against tribe, a Jihad. " [Barber, 1996, p. 4]] 
Both McWorld and Jihad are inter-connected, he says, for without the social 
alienation caused by the consumption-based values of McWorld, Jihad would not 
be able to attract converts. 
Markets are contractual rather than communitarian, which 
means they stroke our solitary egos but leave unsatisfied our 
yearning for community, offering durable goods and fleeting 
dreams but not a common identity or a collective membership - 
something the blood communities spawned by Jihad, reinforced 
by the thinness of market relations, do rather too well. 
[Barber, 1996, p. 243] 
Barber sees citizenship, the active participation in community institutions, as the 
solution to the lack of meaningful existence in McWorld which jihad tries to fulfil. 
"Citizenship is not a cure for spiritual malaise but spiritual malaise is a 
roadblock to citizenship because it impairs the capacity to create the community 
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institutions on which a civil society and a democratic culture must rest. " [Barber, 
1996, p. 275] 
It is interesting to analyze where Canada, Britain, Scotland and Qu6bec 
fit into his model. Looking at them in Barber's context, Britain and the rest of 
Canada are clearly part of the McWorld pattern, while Quebec is both McWorld 
and Jihad at once. As Barber explains, Quebec sees its security in joining the 
global economy which can give its culture legitimacy. "Quebec thus favors its 
francophone cultural roots at the same time it celebrates its emerging economic 
status as a highly productive economic partner" [Barber, 1996, p. 178]. 
Scotland, however, is neither, an anomaly in its communitarian outlook, based on 
"a social and cultural order which placed a premium on collective, co-operative 
and egalitarian commitments" [McCrone, 1992, p. 120], an outlook which seems 
almost anachronistic - or does it represent a model for the future? Certainly it 
seems to be closer to the ideal of liberal nationalism presented by Yael Tamir, in 
which 
national fellowship symbolises a belief in the existence of special 
ties and obligations binding the members of a nation. 
Nationalists view this ideal as the natural outcome of a 
collective destiny, a shared culture, and a faith in a common 
future, emphasizing the perception of the nation as 'a caring 
community', where individuals are able to overcome their 
egoistic inclinations and cooperate for the sake of mutual 
prosperity. 
[Tamir, 1993, p. 65] 
In this chapter I have examined the histories of Britain, Canada, Quebec 
and Scotland in order to understand how they developed their sense of national 
identity. In the next chapter I look at the histories of the Scottish National Party 
and the Bloc Quebecois, how they became the political expression of nationalist 
movements in Scotland and Quebec, and in turn, how their different political 
approaches affected their political communications. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
The Scottish National Party and the Bloc Quebecois: 
Scotland Is Not Quebec 
The previous chapter of this thesis examined the origins of nationalism in 
Scotland and Quebec, placing it within the context of their own histories and 
current theories of nationalism. This chapter focuses on the origins of the 
Scottish National Party and the Bloc Quebecois and how they developed as the 
political voice of the nationalist movements in their regions. Although the parties 
share some of the same characteristics, they differ greatly in their basic 
philosophies of nationalism. 
After the defeat of the 1995 referendum in Quebec, Canadians were 
shocked to hear Parti Quebecois leader Jacques Parizeau state that the reason for 
the separatist loss was "money and the ethnic vote" - that it was the support of 
big business and the overwhelming "No" vote among Quebec's ethnic voters that 
had determined the result. Not only were the repercussions of what the Scotsman 
later described as "the anti-immigrant outburst" felt in Canada [MacMahon, 
1995], with the PQ leader announcing his resignation 24 hours later because of 
the resulting controversy over what were widely perceived as racist remarks, but 
they also resonated in the UK House of Commons, where Labour MP Norman 
Hogg tabled a motion condemning Parizeau's comments. 
Scottish National Party leader Alex Salmond said in response to that 
motion: "We should remember that Quebec is not Scotland and Scotland is not 
Quebec. " He went on to say that Quebec's nationalism, based as it was on 
language and ethnicity, was "a two-edged sword", while Scotland followed "the 
path of civic nationalism. " [MacMahon, 19951 Salmond's words point out a 
crucial distinction between the two nationalist movements and the political 
parties that represent them, one which cannot be emphasized too often. 
Although on the surface it would seem that their nationalist imperatives are 
similar, in fact they are completely different in almost every aspect, most 
strikingly in the areas of language, culture and ethnicity, but also in the context of 
the political structures in which they exist. 
Language and culture has always been a critical element in Quebec 
nationalism, if not its raison d'etre. Quebec's desire for economic control has been 
viewed by its nationalist leaders as a means of preserving the French language 
and promoting its own cultural agenda, but that is not the case with Scotland, as 
I will demonstrate in this chapter. Ethnicity has not been the issue in Scottish 
nationalism that it has been in Quebec. There are two phrases often quoted in 
the two countries that vividly illustrate the difference in cultural attitudes. 
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Quebec nationalist leaders frequently speak of "un Quebecois pure laine", pure 
wool, or "de vieille souche", old stock, referring to someone descended from the 
original French colonists of more than 300 years ago; while in Scotland, the words 
"We are a mongrel nation", spoken by Scots author William Mcllvanney to the 
applause of some 25,000 demonstrators at a pro-home rule rally in 1992 [Marr, 
1995, p. 2411 are cited repeatedly as proof of Scottish inclusiveness. 
The political structures in which the two countries operate are also very 
distinct. Canada's federal government is among the most de-centralized of 
modern nations, with ten provincial legislatures which have extensive legislative 
and financial powers. It is unique, too, in the degree of sovereignty given its 
people, as evidenced in the consultative exercise undertaken by the Canadian 
government in 1991 before the referendum on the Charlottetown Accord. More 
than $23 million was spent by the government on nation-wide consultations with 
some 400,000 adults and 300,000 school children, a process which Canadian 
writer Mordecai Richler described as "democracy gone berserk" [Richler, 1993, p. 
222]. Perhaps: but it is in great contrast to the United Kingdom's highly unitary 
state with its unwritten constitution, in which sovereignty resides in Westminster, 
and where providing a national parliament without tax-varying powers was seen 
as a reasonable choice on a referendum ballot. 
The roots of these differences lie deep in the histories of these nationalist 
parties and the movements that led to their birth: in Scotland, the struggle for 
home rule, and in Quebec, the struggle for autonomy and recognition as a distinct 
society within Canada. The histories tell the story: by understanding them we can 
understand why the SNP and the Bloc have developed as they have. 
Early Beginnings 
Although nationalist feeling had existed in Quebec almost from its early 
beginnings as the colony of New France, it was not until the Rebellion of 1837 
and the formation of les Patriotes under the leadership of Louis Joseph Papineau 
that "the idea of an independent French-speaking state in North America 
emerged as a clear and influential political objective. " [Desbarats, 1976, p. 1421 
By the early 20th century, the main strands of Quebec's complex nationalist 
tapestry had been created by the influential figures of Jules-Paul Tardivel, Honore 
Mercier, Henri Bourassa, and Wilfrid Laurier. 
These four men, Tardivel, Mercier, Bourassa, and Laurier, 
dominated the debate on the role and future of French Canada 
for virtually forty years, personifying four enduring aspects of 
political thought in Quebec: Quebec independence, Quebec 
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autonomy, pan-Canadian French-Canadian nationalism, and 
anti-nationalist conciliation. 
[Fraser, 1984, p. 4] 
These same strands are personified in the leaders of Quebec today, with Jacques 
Parizeau still vigorously pursuing the independantiste stance from the sidelines; 
Lucien Bouchard espousing sovereignty-association, that peculiar hybrid of 
autonomy with economic and political association; Jean Charest, former leader of 
the federal Progressive Conservatives and now head of the Quebec Liberals, 
attempting to voice the concerns of francophones throughout Canada; and prime 
minister jean Chretien, promoting the strong federalist, anti-Quebec nationalist 
views that have made him extremely unpopular in his home province. 
They also struggle with the same issues that concerned Tardivel, Mercier, 
Bourassa and Laurier, and which still dominate the nationalist debate in Quebec 
and the rest of Canada: how can Quebecers best preserve their language and 
culture in an English-speaking continent where they feel "that we're a cube of 
sugar in a gallon of coffee" [Bothwell, 1995, p. 210]? What is the relationship of 
Quebec to the United States? Is Quebec nationalism a right-wing, conservative 
movement, or one grounded in a socially progressive ideology? What place is 
there for English-speaking minorities within a sovereign Quebec? How can 
Quebecers enhance and preserve their economic security? 
The Parti Quebecois has grappled with these issues for more than 30 
years, winning three provincial elections, but losing two referendums. How the 
PQ has used its legislative power to preserve and promote French language and 
culture and ensure francophone control of the Quebec economy makes an 
interesting study of the way a nationalist movement translates its dreams into 
action. 
The Parti Quebecois - Dreams Into Action 
For the Parti Quebecois, dominated as it was by members of l'industrie de la 
parole, or the word industry - teaching, law, journalism and the civil service - the 
preservation of the French language was central to their vision. Thus the first 
task of the PQ after it came to power in November 15,1976 was to create 
language legislation that would make French "the defining reality of Quebec" 
[Fraser, 1984, p. 911, legislation that would also govern education, commerce, 
and social policy. Under the direction of Camille Laurin, minister of state for 
cultural development, who believed "that thought, and therefore culture, are 
inextricably linked with language" [Fraser, 1984, p. 97], the goal was "to make 
58 
Quebec as French as Ontario is English, and to do away with official 
bilingualism"[Fraser, 1984, p. 981. Quebec nationalists were concerned about the 
threat to their linguistic community from the decline of the francophone birth rate, 
the assimilation of immigrants into the English-speaking community through the 
education system, and the domination of business by anglophones. The issue of 
language went to the heart of these concerns, as Fraser notes: 
Quebec's language legislation flowed from the fears that are 
among the profoundest elements in Quebec history: fear of 
assimilation, fear of humiliation, fear of loss of control of society 
and loss of identity. It was not long since those fears had been 
religious, and linked to a fear of loss of faith: now they were 
identified with language. 
[Fraser, 1984, p. 2701 
The result was Bill 101, the Charter of the French Language, passed in 1977. 
Under the terms of the bill, access to English language schools was restricted to 
children who had parents or older siblings educated in English within Quebec, or 
whose parents were newcomers but had been educated in English outside 
Quebec. French was made the language of business: commercial signs had to be 
in French, as did all communications in English businesses, and no longer could 
lack of English be used as a barrier to promotion. Firms with more than 50 
employees were required to submit a plan outlining their use of French in the 
workplace, and if these were not satisfactory, they would not receive the 
francisation certificate necessary to qualify it for provincial government 
contracts, licenses and permits [Gagnon and Montcalm, 1990]. 
Although Bill 101 was later amended by Bill 57, which allowed more 
flexibility for the use of English in its provisions, the basic thrust of the legislation 
remained. It was, as Fraser says, "a divisive code, conveying one message to 
most francophones and quite another to most non-francophones; reassuring to 
the one group, and threatening to the other. But it did work a transformation. " 
[Fraser, 1984, p. 110] Quebec's French-language schools became an integrating 
force, teaching both Quebecois and immigrant children how to become French- 
speaking citizens. French became the language of everyday life, both in the 
community and at work. Where businesses would have given senior positions to 
older anglophones, they now began promoting young francophones. Ironically 
enough, as Fraser points out, Bill 101 promoted greater pluralism in Quebec, as 
francophones "began to acquire a social skill that the rest of North America had 
been learning for over a century: how to listen to one's language being spoken 
with a foreign accent. " [Fraser, 1984, p. 111] But it did not resolve the 
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ambiguities in Quebec's attitude towards its English-speaking minorities, both 
anglophone and allophone, although Laurin tried to reassure them that the law 
"would not legitimize xenophobia but rather eliminate it by diminishing the 
insecurities of Quebecers that gave rise to racism. " [Fraser, 1984, p. 98] 
Cultural preservation was not just a matter of language to the Parti 
Quebecois, but also the control of immigration so that greater numbers of French- 
speaking immigrants would be directed to Quebec; closer ties with La 
Francophonie, the French equivalent of the British Commonwealth, founded in 
1985; and the establishment of a Quebec presence in the world through a network 
of offices in the U. S., Western Europe, Latin America, Africa, the Middle East 
and the Pacific Rim, as well as generous government funding of Quebec film, 
theatre, art, music and literature. 
During the early years of its first term the Parti Quebecois also enacted an 
ambitious programme of social legislation, introducing a public automobile 
insurance plan, improvements in social security, consumer protection laws, and 
rights for women; they increased the minimum wage, passed anti-strike-breaker 
legislation, and established new crown corporations. Initially the relationship 
between the PQ and business was not a happy one: the government's belief in 
state intervention, its passing of Bill 101 and the tendency of some cabinet 
ministers to use anti-business language created conflict [Gagnon and Montcalm, 
1990]. However, despite this negative perception, the Parti Quebecois was keen 
to promote the private sector, and in fact, "spent far more on trade and industry 
than any other Canadian province" [Gagnon and Montcalm, 1990, p. 62]. The 
burgeoning funds in the Quebec Pension Plan deposited in the Caisse de depot et 
placement were used increasingly for investment in Quebec firms, and the 
province's purchasing policy encouraged the buying of goods from Quebec 
companies. In 1979 Rend Levesque stated publicly that business was a key 
player in the economic development of the province [Gagnon and Montcalm, 
1990, p. 63], and Jacques Parizeau, then finance minister, introduced the highly 
successful Quebec Stock Savings Plan, which offered generous income tax 
deductions for investment in Quebec companies. 
During its second term, the PQ government became even more pro- 
business. Almost all areas of the private economy became eligible for government 
assistance, which one government minister conservatively estimated as being $1 
billion annually [Gagnon and Montcalm, 1990, p. 64]. This "market 
nationalism", as Canadian economist Thomas Courchene calls it, developed 
partly as a result of the general global shift in the 1980s towards business- 
oriented values, but also in response to the loss of the referendum. If the 
nationalists could not gain political control of their own territory, they could at 
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least gain economic control. The PQ became, in the words of Courchene, "the 
most business-oriented or market-oriented government in Canada" [Longstaff, 
1992, p. 371, leading to what he called Quebec Inc., "the made-in Quebec 
collaboration between the provincial government, business, and labour to favour 
Quebec-based business enterprises, francophone managers and entrepreneurs, 
and Quebec-based workers. " [Johnson, 1994, p. 291] They did not see the U. S. 
as a threat, as did nationalists in English-speaking Canada, but as a business 
partner. Levesque himself was very pro-American [Fraser, 1984, Bothwell, 
1995], and felt that French Canadians had been held back by the Anglo 
domination of business. 
It had kept them from being the captains of industry and 
running their economy, from having the kind of pride that 
comes from knowing, in a mill town in Quebec, for example, 
that all the big houses on the hill aren't held by Anglos. And he 
wanted to turn that around. 
[Bothwell, 1995, p. 159] 
However, the government's pro-business approach led to conflict with its 
traditional allies, the trade unions, during the recession of the early 80s. 
Declining tax revenues and increasing inflation meant that the PQ was not able to 
pay planned wage increases to the province's 300,000 public service employees 
without risking its credit rating on Wall Street [Bouchard, 1992, p. 96]. 
Negotiations on the issue led by Bouchard failed and the cuts were imposed 
through government legislation, to which the unions responded with illegal strikes 
and angry criticism of Levesque. 
There was further conflict within the party on the constitutional issue that 
led to a major split and the resignation of Jacques Parizeau and other hard-liners 
within the PQ in 1984. In 1981, the Canadian government, under the leadership 
of Pierre Elliot Trudeau, began negotiations to bring home the Canadian 
constitution, contained in the British North America Act of 1867 passed by the 
British parliament. Rene Levesque agreed to take part, but withdrew from the 
talks, which ended during what Quebec nationalists bitterly refer to as "the night 
of the long knives" [Bouchard, 1992, p. 95] when the federal government and the 
nine other provinces agreed to entrench provisions in the constitution which 
sovereigntists felt limited Quebec's powers over language and education. The 
Quebec National Assembly voted against the constitutional agreement, but the 
repatriation went ahead anyway, marked by a special signing ceremony April 17, 
1982 on the lawn of Parliament Hill in Ottawa attended by the Queen. The 
conflict with Parizeau arose over Levesque's adoption of le beau risque, which 
61 
abandoned the separatist option in favour of negotiating with the newly-elected 
government of Brian Mulroney, who had pledged to bring Quebec back into the 
constitutional family "with honour and enthusiasm" [Gagnon, 1999, p. 290] as 
part of his election platform, and in doing so, had won the support of 
nationalists in Quebec. Levesque felt that if "Canadian federalism would be 
made to work, that was a risk worth taking. " [Bothwell, 1995, p. 1811 But 
Parizeau disagreed, and took a quarter of the cabinet with him. Within a year 
Levesque resigned and the PQ was defeated. Pierre Marc Johnson became leader 
of the party on a programme of moderate nationalism, or "national affirmation", 
more akin to that of the old Union Nationale [Bothwell, 1995, p. 181], but he 
was soon deposed by Parizeau, who became head of the PQ in 1988, committing 
it to a strong independence platform, which it had to abandon after another 
election loss in 1989. 
With the help of Bloc leader Lucien Bouchard, Parizeau and the PQ 
narrowly won the provincial election in 1994, and soon began preparations for 
the referendum on sovereignty-association held in October 1995, which is 
described later in this chapter. After Parizeau's resignation, Bouchard became 
head of the PQ, and had to wrestle with the same economic and political 
problems that plagued Rene Levesque. He antagonized the left wing of the party 
by imposing spending cuts to reduce the provincial deficit and pursuing a pro- 
business agenda, as well as pushing for the maintenance of bilingual signs 
[Seguin, 1996], but, despite the dislike of his deficit-cutting measures, Quebec 
voters still supported the Parti Quebecois [Mackie, 1996]. 
The Referendums of 1980 and 1995 - Defining Choices 
The Quebec referendums of 1980 and 1995 were events of enormous significance 
in Canada. In both Quebecers chose to stay in the Canadian confederation, in 
the first, by a comfortable majority; in the second, by the narrowest of margins. 
These were defining choices, which forced Canada and Quebec to confront their 
two solitudes as they never had before. With the 1980 referendum, it seemed for 
the first time that Canada's peaceable kingdom could break up. Certainly at the 
start of the referendum campaign, it looked as if the "Yes" side could win, with a 
small majority, 51 per cent [Fraser, 1984, p. 234], in favour, according to party 
polls. 
The wording of the referendum had been chosen with particular care, "the 
product of millions of dollars worth of public opinion polling and thousands of 
hours of consideration by focus groups, advertising specialists, and 
communications consultants. " [LeDuc, 1996a, p. 1] It was designed to assuage 
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the most nervous nationalist, avoiding the word independence and asking that 
the Quebec government be given "the mandate to negotiate" a new agreement 
between Quebec and Canada. The PQ was well aware that isolating the issue of 
independence from the goal of forming government had helped them to win 
power: to win the referendum they had to do the same [LeDuc, 1996a]. This was 
the question: 
The government of Quebec has made public its proposal to 
negotiate a new agreement with the rest of Canada, based on the 
equality of nations; 
This agreement would enable Quebec to acquire the exclusive 
power to make its laws, levy its taxes, and establish relations 
abroad - in other words, sovereignty - and at the same time, to 
maintain with Canada an economic association including a 
common currency; 
No change in political status resulting from these negotiations 
will be effected without approval by the people through another 
referendum; 
On these terms, do you agree to give the Government of Quebec 
the mandate to negotiate the proposed agreement between 
Quebec and Canada? 
However, even with the most careful wording, a rigorous and well- 
planned campaign strategy, and the vigorous performance of the charismatic and 
much-loved Rene Levesque, the referendum faced three major obstacles: the 
credibility and popularity of Pierre Trudeau; the reluctance of a significant 
percentage of francophones to endorse it; and, unexpectedly, a strong backlash 
from anti-feminist women prompted by an off-the-cuff remark from PQ cabinet 
minister Lise Payette during the campaign. Trudeau, newly returned as prime 
minister, was even more popular than Levesque in his home province among both 
francophones and anglophones [LeDuc, 1996a], so that when he used the term 
"renewed federalism" as a defence of the status quo, he was believed. Trudeau's 
strong francophone support meant that despite his best efforts, Levesque could 
not achieve the 62 per cent francophone majority needed to achieve victory 
[Fraser, 1984, p. 234]. Finally, the comment by Payette that the wife of the 
Liberal party leader was an "Yvette", the smarmy, docile little girl of Quebec 
primers, resulted in a massive rally of 15,000 women in the Montreal Forum, who 
shouted their opposition to the referendum. These Yvettes, as they called 
themselves, "were to summon their courage and tenacity and reject the ruinous 
consequences of separatist seduction. It was the duty of women to say NO. " 
[Trofimenkoff, 1983, p. 331] 
The result of the May 20 referendum vote was clear: with a turn-out of 
85.6 per cent, the "Yes" side received 40.44 per cent, the "No" 59.66. Losing the 
referendum, heart-breaking as it was for Quebec nationalists, did not affect the 
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PQ's electoral success in the next provincial election, for the party won a second 
term in 1981. But as Bothwell notes: "The loss of the referendum left the Parti 
Quebecois becalmed. It was still the provincial government of Quebec, but 
without a mandate to act on the issue, sovereignty or independence, that lay at 
its emotional core. " [Bothwell, 1995, p. 166] 
Jacques Parizeau, Minister of Finance in the PQ government, quit the 
party in 1984 when Rene Levesque abandoned sovereignty-association for le beau 
risque of working with the federal government to right the wrongs of Canada's 
constitution. A staunch separatist, he had always believed that sovereignty- 
association was unworkable, and at best, a stepping-stone towards 
independence [Bothwell, 1995, p. 157]. He returned as leader of the Parti 
Quebecois in 1988, determined to reach that goal. However, after the PQ's 
defeat in the 1989 provincial election, Parizeau was forced to learn the lesson his 
predecessors had. Originally he thought "that a second referendum might be 
unnecessary, that a future PQ government might treat an electoral mandate as a 
sufficient basis for a unilateral declaration of independence" [LeDuc, 1996, p. 7], 
but it soon became clear that this was not a good strategy. For the 1994 election, 
Parizeau committed the party to a second referendum within its first year in 
office, which helped return the PQ to power, but with only a very small majority 
- 45 per cent to the Liberal party's 44 per cent [LeDuc, 1996a]. 
The referendum question of 1995 was simplicity itself compared to that 
of 1980, but even so, its wording was refined to make it more palatable to the 
independence-shy Quebec voter following province-wide consultations [LeDuc, 
1996a]: 
Do you agree that Quebec should become sovereign, after having 
made a formal offer to Canada for a new economic and political 
partnership, within the scope of the bill respecting the future of 
Quebec and of the agreement signed on June 12,1995? 
As in 1980, the referendum campaign in 1995 focused on creating a new 
relationship with Canada and the negotiations that would make it happen if the 
"Yes" side won. What made the margin of victory so close the second time 
around were the roles played by Lucien Bouchard, then head of the Bloc 
Quebecois, and Prime Minister Jean Chretien. Bouchard had great credibility, not 
only as a political figure - Parizeau had designated him as the one who would 
negotiate with Ottawa in the event of a "Yes" vote - but on a personal level as 
well. Chretien, on the other hand, did not enjoy the same popularity or 
credibility, and was perceived to have betrayed Quebec on the constitution. 
[LeDuc, 1996a, p. 6] When Bouchard told Quebecers that a sovereign Quebec 
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could still keep its ties with Canada, including economic association, dual 
citizenship, and a common currency, thus soothing their fears about separation, 
he was believed. When Chretien spoke on behalf of federalism, he was not. 
The 1995 referendum campaign was also influenced by a major rally, this 
time, the "Unity Rally" in Montreal held just three days before the crucial vote 
October 30. An estimated 100,000 Canadians from all across Canada came by 
bus, car, train and plane to attend the rally, many of them on discounted tickets 
provided by transportation companies backing the "No" side. It was said by 
anglophone media commentators following the event that the sight of thousands 
of normally reticent anglophones waving the Canadian flag and shouting 
themselves hoarse with enthusiasm for national unity tipped the balance in 
favour of the federalists, but there is no way of knowing whether this is true or 
not. It is true that many Quebecers perceived the demonstration much more 
negatively, because it was seen as just another example of ROC's inability to 
share identity space, as Charles Taylor explains: 
The classic refusal to share identity space very often takes the 
form of elaborate declarations welcoming difference and 
assuring the people thus marginalized that they are loved. But 
this is received by the people concerned as an insulting 
acceptance of them merely as folkloric enrichment of the larger 
society, while refusing to allow them a say in the definition of 
the common identity. We love you, but shut up, is the message 
received. 
[Taylor, 1996, p. 123] 
It was, however, seen as a critical moment in the campaign, and indeed, in 
Canadian political history. 
The Bloc Quebecois had a different interpretation as to what the results 
of the referendum and its aftermath meant. 
With a turn-out rate of 96%, the Quebec voters nevertheless 
reject the government's project, but by very little: 50.66% NO to 
49.4% YES (a majority of barely 53,000 votes). These very close 
results show that the sovereigntist project is even more alive 
than ever and that the entire Canadian dilemma remains. 
At the closing of this referendum, Prime Minister Jean Chretien 
formulates certain proposals in an attempt to bring Quebec into 
the constitutional fold. However, the reaction is unanimous: 
the cosmetic changes put forward by the Prime Minister do not 
respond at all to Quebec's historical claims and are rebuffed. The 
deadlock continues. 
[Bloc Quebecois milestones] 
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The fact remains, though, that whatever the wording or the specific political 
circumstances of the two referendums, support for sovereignty has remained 
fairly constant at "well below fifty percent of the electorate" since the 1980s 
[LeDuc, 1996a, p. 9], because most Quebecers simply did not want to give up 
their connection with Canada [LeDuc, 1996a, p. 10]. As Quebecois political 
scientist Louis Balthazar explains: 
I think Quebecers love Canada and are prepared to live in a 
country called Canada. They've shown it on a number of 
occasions. But their immediate sense of belonging, their primary 
patriotism, is directed towards Quebec. To the extent that 
Quebecers can be Quebecers first and then Canadian, I 
believe their Canadianism can go quite a long way. 
[Gougeon, 1994, p. 1141 
Sovereignty-Association or Independence? The War of Words 
Terminology soon becomes a problem in any discussion of Quebec nationalism. 
Just as the issue of language is central to the vision of Quebec nationalists, so is 
the issue of wording. A bewildering array of terms is used to describe "the 
sovereigntist project", as Canadian journalist Peter Newman points out: 
Quebec's nationalists believed in at least six degrees of 
separation: independence, sovereignty, autonomy, special status, 
separation and sovereignty-association. Separatist Pierre 
Drouilly, a University of Montreal sociologist, speculated that 
the real problem with the sovereignty option was that it always 
required a "Yes" vote. Since Quebeckers had an unbroken record 
dating to 1942 of voting "No" in provincial and national 
referenda, he predicted certain victory if the referendum 
question were reworked to read : "Don't you disagree with the 
idea that Quebec shouldn't be a non-sovereign state? " Or more 
simply: "Do you agree that Quebec shouldn't become a sovereign 
country? " 
[Newman, 1995, p. 334] 
Many a truth is spoken in jest: however, Newman has made a common error in 
describing Drouilly as a separatist, for it is considered a pejorative term in 
French as well as in English, "and has usually been avoided or resented by those 
advocating independence for Quebec, or sovereignty-association. " [Fraser, 1984, 
p. 3961 This was because separatism had the connotation of cutting all ties to 
Canada, and that was not their goal, nor apparently, the desire of the Quebec 
people. The preferred term in the 70s and 80s was independence or 
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independentist [Fraser, 1984]; but in the 90s it is sovereignist or sovereigntist. 
Now, it may be argued that this is sophistry, meant to disguise the true nature of 
what Quebec nationalists want, but this ambiguity in meaning reflects the 
ambiguity felt by Quebecers on the issue. The language is complex and divided 
because the feelings are: Quebecers have dual loyalties. 
Most of this terminology was developed during the debate on the 
referendum of 1980 and indeed, was not heard of before then [LeDuc, 1996a]. 
Words and phrases such as sovereignty, sovereignty-association, renewed 
federalism, a mandate to negotiate, economic association or a common currency 
were not part of the PQ platform in the 70s. These were words chosen to help 
win the referendum, and although it may seem that they did not work the first 
time around, the process by which they were chosen helped determine winning 
strategies for the PQ. What the extensive polling done for the referendum 
revealed was that if voters were convinced that the choice was between different 
methods of government, rather than between Quebec and Canada, then the 
referendum had a better chance of succeeding. Although the leadership in the PQ 
may have liked the word independence, it was a non-starter with the Quebec 
voter: a 1979 survey by Le Centre de recherches sur l'opinion publique showed 
that only 19 per cent of voters would vote "Yes" if the referendum question had 
proposed independence for Quebec [LeDuc, 1996a]. The Parizeau definition of 
sovereignty - more akin to separatism - had a "very favourable" response from 
just 15 per cent of those surveyed in the 1993 Canadian National Election Study 
and a "very unfavourable" response from 30 per cent [LeDuc, 1996a]. 
Interestingly enough, in the run-up to the provincial election in 1994, both 
Parizeau and Bouchard began to use the word "separatist" again as part of their 
political strategy to polarize the issue, now that Quebec was headed by a 
premier, Daniel Johnson, who was a committed federalist. "Since the nationalists 
were ahead in the opinion polls, they wanted to make the most of their expected 
mandate in the upcoming provincial elections. As their support fell away in the 
campaign, they dropped the expression. " [Keating, 1996b, p. 80] 
Quebec's nationalist leaders still continue to play on words, as Keating 
says: whether their motives are as cynical as he seems to imply is difficult to 
know. It could be that the ambiguity of the term sovereignty is more convenient 
than just confused, but there are limits as to how far the definition will go, as 
LeDuc explains: 
A sovereign Quebec might be an independent country, with its 
own currency, passports, membership in the United Nations, 
and foreign relations, or it might be a participant in some sort of 
restructured Canadian confederation. The political elasticity of 
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the term makes it appealing to both those who envision a fully 
independent sovereign Quebec state and to others who continue 
to believe in a more or less confederal alternative. But the 
concept of sovereignty can be stretched only so far before it tends 
to snap back toward the two more starkly defined alternatives 
which have always been much less popular with most 
Quebeckers - to remain within the Canadian federation as it 
presently exists, or to risk a plunge into uncharted and possibly 
dangerous political waters. 
[LeDuc, 1996a, p. 9] 
The Bloc Quebecois - An Independence Voice in Ottawa 
The Bloc Quebecois was born out of the debacle of the Meech Lake Accord and 
the failure of le beau risque initiated by Brian Mulroney and supported by Rene 
Levesque. It had been a long march to this point, according to Quebec 
nationalists, who felt that nothing more could be done within the context of the 
Canadian federal system to achieve Quebec's aims. The repatriation of Canada's 
constitution in 1982 without the province's consent was the beginning of the end, 
and the passage of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms was seen as another 
example of English Canada's continuing attempts to assimilate Quebec and make 
it a province just like any other [Gagnon, 19961. The only way Quebec could take 
charge of its destiny was through the formation of a federal political party which 
would fight for Quebec's interests in Ottawa and work for its political 
sovereignty. 
The BQ's meteoric rise - the party was officially founded in June of 1991, 
and became the Official Opposition in the Canadian House of Commons in 
October 1993 - was not without its problems. Like the Scottish National Party, 
it was plagued by ideological divisions in its early days, but unlike the SNP, 
these were soon overcome, enabling the Bloc to develop into a highly-disciplined 
political party with a clear focus and well-planned strategy for winning seats. 
Most of its worst conflicts occurred during the party's formative stages, when the 
fledgling group of sovereigntist MPs led by Bouchard was trying to decide its 
future. It was no wonder that tensions existed, as the group included both 
former Progressive Conservative and Liberal MPs, and even a former Maoist, 
trade union negotiator (and now Bloc leader) Gilles Duceppe. The Tories in the 
group wanted it to become a formal political party, while Bouchard and 
Duceppe wanted "to build a nonpartisan movement -a rainbow coalition - with 
relatively loose structures" [Cornellier, 1995, p. 47]. Bouchard resisted, partly 
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because he was not ready to commit himself again to a life in politics, but also 
because he did not want to antagonize the Parti Quebecois. 
There were also some concerns among PQ supporters about the sincerity 
of the Bloc, especially since the failure of le beau risque, and whether it would be a 
rival rather than an ally. However, these doubts were eventually overcome, but 
not without some political purges of executive members close to former PQ leader 
Pierre Marc Johnson, an opponent of Parizeau [Cornellier, 1995]. The Bloc's 
relationship with the PQ was cemented during the referendum campaign on the 
Charlottetown Accord, in which Bouchard ably performed on behalf of the "No" 
side. The campaign marked the beginning of the Bloc's use of the PQ's well- 
organized electoral machine, but also the end of the rainbow coalition, as it 
became clear that there was no place for members of any other parties. 
Once the decision had been made to become a political party and run in 
the federal election, progress was swift. From October 1992 to October 1993, the 
Bloc increased its membership from 25,000 to 105,000, and raised approximately 
$3 million, more than two-thirds of it in less than five months [Cornellier, 19951. 
When the Bloc and the PQ consolidated their mailing-lists for the campaign, they 
discovered, much to their surprise, that some 60 to 65 per cent of the Bloc's 
members did not belong to the Parti Quebecois; they were new sovereigntist 
supporters. Aided by a $1.45 million loan from the Caisse General Desjardins 
who accepted the 50 per cent of election expenses authorized by Elections 
Canada as guarantee [Cornellier, 1995, p. 76], the Bloc was able to fund a $4 
million campaign with close to 100 staff. At the instigation of Jacques Parizeau, 
the PQ provided vital support in fund-raising, organization, research and polls, 
as well as the expertise of senior PQ strategists. When the votes were counted, 
they confirmed what the party's polls had been reporting throughout the 
campaign: the Bloc had won more than 50 per cent of the vote in Quebec and 54 
out of the 75 federal seats. 
Bouchard did not want to antagonize English-speaking Canada and so 
did not move into the official Ottawa residence for the leader of the opposition, 
Stornoway. As the official opposition, the Bloc was entitled to several other 
benefits as well, including a budget of $2.6 million for research and staff [Wills, 
1997d], the right to ask the first question in the House, priority in committees 
and automatic membership of parliamentary delegations. Bouchard had the right 
of reply to government speeches without time limits, could meet foreign 
dignitaries, and was paid a higher salary. These resources helped enormously in 
achieving the goal of raising the Bloc's profile in the rest of Canada, and the strict 
discipline which Bouchard imposed also earned respect for the new party from 
parliamentary observers and the media. Under his leadership, Bloc MPs had to 
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adhere to a code of conduct, with everything being "organized, structured, 
controlled" [Cornellier, 1995, p. 93]. 
When the time came for the Parti Quebecois to contest the provincial 
election in 1994, the Bloc returned the favour and worked alongside them to win 
victory. Bouchard campaigned "brilliantly and effectively" [Newman, 1995, p. 
341], but there was a conflict between Parizeau and Bouchard as to whether the 
election was sufficient to assure sovereignty, or if a referendum was required. 
This was soon resolved in Bouchard's favour, however, as evidenced by the 
campaign motto, "At first, a government, and then sovereignty" [Cornellier, 
1995, p. 133]. Although the two parties worked smoothly together, Bloc 
strategists were critical of the PQ's failure to deal with the sovereignty issue, a 
failure that left them with a small majority which would handicap the future 
referendum campaign. 
The Bloc nearly lost its leader when he contracted necrotizing fasciitis (or 
the "flesh-eating disease") in late November. Close to death, his left leg was 
amputated, but he rallied, and returned to the House of Commons three months 
later, in a cleverly orchestrated comeback that gave him maximum media 
exposure [Cornellier, 1995, p. 1391. He and Parizeau continued to have conflicts 
over the nature and timing of the referendum, with Parizeau insisting that it must 
be held within the first year of his government, and that it be a straightforward 
question on an independent Quebec forming an economic partnership with the 
rest of Canada. Bouchard's view was that sovereigntists "needed a softer stand 
to avoid a crushing defeat" [Cornellier, 1995, p. 151]. Once again, though, the 
conflicts were resolved, with Bouchard, Parizeau, and Mario Dumont, the young 
leader of the minority nationalist party, Action democratique du Quebec, signing 
an agreement to join forces in the referendum which outlined the terms of 
sovereignty and its accession. 
Bouchard's energetic and emotive campaigning during the referendum was 
an influential factor in its final outcome. Although the referendum was defeated, 
the narrowness of the defeat was due, in part, to his ability to soothe the fears of 
Quebecers about outright separation, and his credibility and popularity as a 
political figure in Quebec. Bouchard's next move was to assume the leadership 
of the Parti Quebecois, following the resignation of Parizeau. The man chosen to 
replace him in February of 1996, Michel Gauthier, was a unilingual francophone, 
who had to deal with a party demoralized by the loss of the referendum, and 
the departure of its charismatic leader. Plagued by the divisions between the left 
and right wings of the party as well as by criticism of his performance in the 
media and by members of his own party, Gauthier announced his resignation 
December 2,1996. Gilles Duceppe, the first elected Bloc MP and the only one 
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elected twice, was chosen as the BQ's new leader at the annual convention March 
15. Fluently bilingual, unlike Gauthier, Duceppe had served as caucus whip 
under Bouchard and was said to be the Quebec leader's favourite [Bauch, 1997a; 
Martin, 1997]. When, at the end of April, the 1997 federal election was called 
for June 2, he had been party leader six weeks - hardly enough time to prepare a 
strategy for the campaign. 
The Bloc has occupied a unique place in the House of Commons. As 
Cornellier notes: "It has no real program other than sovereignty, and one aim - to 
die as fast as possible afterwards. " [Cornellier, 1995, p. 157] However, with the 
collapse of the New Democratic Party, which was reduced to nine seats and 
unofficial party status in 1993, Bloc MPs "have become Canada's social 
conscience. This is quite ironic considering that the Bloc Queb6cois wants to take 
Qu6bec out of the current Canadian federal system. " [Gagnon, 1996, p. 22] It 
was the Bloc that fought against cuts to social services and unemployment 
insurance, pushed for improved labour legislation, proposed a total ban on 
handguns, and advocated amendments to the Human Rights Act to ban 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation [Cornellier, 1995; Gagnon, 
1996]. At the same time, however, the Bloc, unlike the left in English-speaking 
Canada, supported the North American Free Trade Agreement, "a consensus 
that has prevailed in Quebec for more than a decade, one that gave Brian 
Mulroney his second majority government. " [Cornellier, 1995, p. 122] Free trade 
was viewed as the way to create the economic resources necessary to implement 
and maintain social programs [Cornellier, 1995], and also the means to liberate 
the Quebec economy from its dependence on Canada because the province could 
go to the U. S. for markets and technology [Newman, 1996, p. 336]. 
Gagnon says that it is understandable that Quebecers can no longer see 
the value of staying in Canada, given the Thatcherite vision of the federal 
government during the last decade which has resulted in the destruction of 
national institutions 
that had given a meaning to being Canadian. The undermining 
of the old-age pensions, unemployment insurance, university 
education, research and production centres (National Film 
Board, Telefilm Canada, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation), 
the privatization of railways and airports, and the elimination of 
the government's arm-length agencies, such as the Economic 
Council, have all contributed to a crisis of identity. Such moves 
have led many Quebecers to believe that Canada had outlived its 
useful existence. 
[Gagnon, 1996, p. 23] 
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With the Bloc in Ottawa, Quebec sovereigntists could now express their own 
political and social identity at the national as well as at the provincial level, 
something they had never been able to do before. 
A Divided House - the Origins of the Scottish National Party 
Looking at the histories of the Parti Quebecois, the Bloc and the Scottish 
National Party, it is easy to see some strong similarities, with all three parties 
torn by left-right splits, dissension between the idealists who want independence 
and nothing else, and the pragmatists who see the road to independence as being 
more curved and convoluted than straight and narrow. However, there are also 
strong differences between the nationalist parties of Quebec and the SNP, as I 
have noted before, and not just those arising from the ethnic dimension of 
Quebec's nationalism. However rancorous or antagonistic the divisions within 
the PQ and the Bloc, they have never been allowed to damage the parties to the 
same extent that such divisions have in the SNP. No matter how close to the 
abyss the PQ or the Bloc have come, at the final moment, they have pulled back, 
re-grouped, and learned from their mistakes. This has not always been the case 
with the SNP. As James Mitchell has noted in his study of the self-government 
movement in Scotland: 
It is striking how rarely the movement has taken account of its 
own history. Equally striking have been the high expectation 
and subsequent disillusionment. In part the disillusionment 
has been due to a limited appreciation of the weakness of each 
strategy, the history of the movement, and the strength of its 
opponents. 
[Mitchell, 1996, p. 3001 
Although he is describing here the flaws of the self-government movement in 
general, it is certainly applicable to the SNP. It is only in recent years that the 
Scottish National Party has been able to overcome these divisions, divisions that 
perhaps were inevitable given the origins of the party and how it developed. 
It initially grew out of six separate organizations which took several years 
to complete their own Scottish union in 1934: the Scottish Home Rule 
Association (SHRA), the Scots National League (SNL), the Scottish National 
Movement (SNM), the Glasgow University Scottish Nationalist Association 
(GUSNA), the National Party of Scotland (NPS), and the Scottish Party. The 
SHRA, founded in 1918 by Roland Muirhead, a radical, republican businessman, 
lasted the longest and had the most members, but was doomed to failure because 
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it was unable to attract a broad base of support and most critically, to persuade 
Labour MPs to push for Home Rule. 
Muirhead, who was a member of the Independent Labour Party, wanted 
the SHRA to be a non-partisan organization that would draw in Scots from all 
parties, but in actual fact, it soon became dominated by members of the Labour 
Party and their trade union supporters [Finlay, 1994]. By 1920 the SHRA had 
138 organizations and 1,150 individuals belonging to it as well as its own 
monthly bulletin [Finlay, 1994], but the organization began to fall apart when 
members became frustrated by the Labour Party's unwillingness to back Home 
Rule bills at Westminster. It was after the failure in 1924 of a private member's 
bill for Home Rule put forward by Glasgow MP George Buchanan - which the 
SHRA had helped draft - that there was serious talk of forming a Scottish 
national party [Brand, 1978, p. 180]. 
The Scots National League, started in 1920, was, by contrast, a much 
smaller group, but more influential. The original impetus for the organization was 
a kind of Celtic romanticism, promoted by its two founders, William Gillies and 
Stuart R. Erskine of Mar. Most of the SNL's members lived in London, "where it 
was supported by bagpipe-listening, Jacobite-song-singing exiles" [Marr, 1995, p. 
66], and its early years were characterized by "a chronic lack of realistic 
policies... ineffective and limited party machinery, together with half-baked and 
muddy objectives" [Finlay, 1994, p. 42]. However, the superior organizing skills 
of Tom Gibson, one of the many who left the SHRA after the failure of the 
Buchanan Home Rule bill in 1924, energized the SNL and gave it a focus and 
credibility. Membership increased, new branches were set up, a paper, the Scots 
Independent, was founded in 1926 (and is still publishing), and the executive was 
restricted to those living in Scotland. Gibson also shifted the group's emphasis 
away from cultural issues and more towards economic ones, making it less 
isolationist and closer to the mainstream of British politics [Brand, 1978, p. 187]. 
These changes angered some, leading to the breakaway group, the Scottish 
National Movement, headed by poet and journalist Lewis Spence, who "was a 
colourful and charismatic figure" [Finlay, 1994, p. 52], and, although good at 
getting publicity for the SNM [Brand, 1978, p. 189] knew little of and cared 
nothing for political organization, unlike Gibson. The split was, however, only a 
temporary set-back for the League, which began promoting the idea of a national 
party through the pages of the Scots Independent, and attacking Scottish Labour 
MPs for "being little more than Westminster lackeys" [Finlay, 1994, p. 55]. 
Most significantly, though, under Gibson's influence, the League began developing 
an economic rationale for independence which made it unique among the 
nationalist groups, a rationale very similar to that of the present-day Scottish 
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National Party, arguing that "Scottish social and economic maladies were the 
result of bad government from Westminster, and that once Scotland was in 
control of her own destiny, the economy would flourish. " [Finlay, 1994, p. 60] 
It took the intervention of John MacCormick of the Glasgow University 
Scottish Nationalist Association to get the National Party of Scotland off the 
ground, but it took a great deal of wrangling. The chief obstacle was the conflict 
between the SHRA's Muirhead and Gibson over strategy. Muirhead found it 
difficult to abandon the idea that Home Rule could be achieved through the 
established parties, and even when he accepted that a new party was necessary, 
he disagreed with Gibson on the need for detailed policy objectives. Gibson 
"believed that, unless the new party could translate the Home Rule issue for the 
benefit of the man in the street and explain its relevance in bread-and-butter 
terms, they would never attract sufficient electoral support. " [Finlay, 1994, p. 
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Progress was finally made when a provisional steering committee to 
establish a national party, made up of the representatives of all the nationalist 
groups and chaired by the affable and energetic MacCormick, was formed in 
February, 1928. In June of that year the NPS was founded, and in January of 
1929, contested its first by-election with Lewis Spence as its candidate in North 
Midlothian. The campaign was a disaster, not only due to the inadequacies of 
the candidate, but also the party's organization and policies. Its weakness in 
these areas was not helped by another split that developed between the 
fundamentalists, led by C. M. Grieve (the poet Hugh MacDiarmid), whose 
militant Celtic nationalism had overtones of fascism and racism [Finlay, 1994, 
pp. 84-85], and the moderates, who wanted the NPS to be seen as a serious 
political party. The lack of any electoral success exacerbated these conflicts and 
stymied the attempts made by MacCormick, now NPS secretary, to attract 
establishment nationalists to the party in order to give it a more moderate image. 
A further setback occurred with the formation of the Scottish Party in 
1932 by George Malcolm Thomson and Andrew Dewar Gibb, who were opposed 
to the separatist and socialist philosophies of NPS members, as well as to Celtic 
extremism. This spurred MacCormick to re-double his efforts to bring socially 
prominent Scots into the NPS, "often with more regard for their social standing 
than their political viewpoint" [Mitchell, 1996, p. 182]. The response to his 
overtures was not favourable, either from the aristocrats or from NPS members 
who were worried that he was willing to abandon party principles in order to 
appease more conservative nationalists. MacCormick, however, was keen to join 
the two parties together, so much so that he was willing to ignore the strong 
political differences between the two. 
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Following a tumultuous annual conference in 1933 which highlighted the 
deep divisions within the party, MacCormick began a campaign of expulsions 
against the fundamentalists and others who opposed the move towards union 
with the Scottish Party, while many others resigned because they felt the NPS 
had deserted its principles [Finlay, 1994]. However, negotiations continued, and 
as the NPS needed the money and prestige of the Scottish Party, which in turn 
needed the numbers and political organization of the NPS, both parties had good 
reasons to merge. The process was aided considerably by their sponsoring a joint 
candidate, Sir Alexander MacEwen, at the 1933 by-election in Kilmarnock, in 
which he won a respectable 16.8 per cent of the vote [Mitchell, 1996, p. 182], and 
in early 1934 agreement was reached on the terms of the merger, which were soon 
approved by both parties. 
The first annual conference of the Scottish National Party was held April 
7,1934 in Stirling. It was not a happy political marriage. As Mitchell notes, 
there were conflicts over almost every aspect of the party, including ideology, 
goals, policies, strategy, tactics, and, as always, personalities. The compromises 
made to enable the merger nearly crippled the party, as Finlay explains: 
In order to encompass people of widely differing political 
ideologies, the Scottish National Party had to abandon most of 
the social and economic policies of the NPS, which tended 
toward the left of centre, and replace them with a quasi-utopian 
brand of nationalism. 
[Finlay, 1994, p. 156] 
It would take almost ten years to resolve these differences. Initially, however, 
members of the new party were full of confidence and enthusiasm. "Previous 
recriminations and accusations of sell outs were forgotten in the quest to build a 
new force in Scottish politics. " [Finlay, 1994, p. 164] Membership increased, 
party debts were paid off, the branch network strengthened, and the first full- 
time paid organizer hired. 
However, this new-found unanimity did not last long. By 1935 splits 
between the left and right wings of the party over the issue of self-government 
and strategy had emerged. A further blow occurred when the party president, 
the Duke of Montrose, announced that he was resigning the Conservative whip in 
the House of Lords to join the Liberal party. This was a shock to many members 
of the SNP, who found that their leader not only belonged to another party, but 
also did not support their own policy restricting dual membership. This lack of a 
clear identity for the SNP as well as any clear economic and social policies, 
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coupled with poor election planning and organization, resulted in the worst 
performance by the party since entering politics [Finlay, 1994]. It was the 
beginning of a period of "irreversible decline" [Finlay, 1994, p. 183], 
characterized by schisms and factionalism. Although by 1937 the left wing of the 
party dominated, there were still quarrels over election strategy and co-operation 
with other political groups, issues that continued to trouble the SNP for several 
years. The party was also hindered in the 30s by the British public's fear of 
militant nationalism due to its association with Nazi and fascist dictators. 
By the start of the war in 1939, the SNP faced numerous problems, 
including, "uninspiring leadership, poor discipline, low morale, declining branch 
activity, increasing financial pressures, and last but not least, the stigma of being 
nothing more than an inconsequential fringe group in Scottish politics. " [Finlay, 
1994, p. 207] But it was, ironically, another split that enabled the party to set a 
new and successful course, this time over the issue of conscription and cross- 
party co-operation. In 1937 the SNP had committed itself to a policy of anti- 
conscription, but now that war had broken out, the leadership realized that this 
policy would make the SNP look unpatriotic, and at the urging of John 
MacCormick, somewhat reluctantly came out in favour of the war effort. But 
there was strong pressure from the anti-war faction within the party which was 
angered by this stance, taken without formal consultation from the National 
Council [Brand, 1978; Finlay, 1994]. Radical party members were also unhappy 
with MacCormick's continued efforts to set up a united front on Home Rule. 
When Douglas Young, a convicted anti-conscriptionist, won the post of 
party chairman over MacCormick's favoured candidate, journalist William 
Power, at the 1942 conference, MacCormick left, taking his followers with him. 
His departure divided the nationalist movement in Scotland, but not all the 
effects were negative. True, the SNP lost activists, most of whom went on to 
work for MacCormick's Scottish Convention, but it also brought back others such 
as Tom Gibson and Hugh MacDiarmid who had left the party because of their 
disenchantment with MacCormick's leadership. It also got rid of the party's 
internal opposition, making it more clearly focused on the goal of independence 
[Brand, 1978, p. 241]. 
Aided by a new leadership that was united in its left-of-centre political 
views, a chairman with a high public profile, and the exceptional organizing skills 
of Dr. Robert McIntyre in the position of secretary, the party thrived, with branch 
membership increasing 60 per cent in one year. It was McIntyre's efforts that 
enabled the SNP to become a modern political party with a clear set of policies, a 
well-organized membership, and a strong commitment to contesting elections 
both nationally and locally [Finlay, 1994]. Most importantly, the Scottish 
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National Party now had a distinctive political identity, which, as articulated by 
McIntyre, emphasized community control rather than centralized planning as the 
way to social justice. In 1945 the SNP won its first parliamentary seat when he 
took 50 per cent of the vote at the Motherwell by-election. Although his victory 
was short-lived (McIntyre lost his seat in the general election 12 weeks later) it 
accomplished a great deal, reinforcing the value of contesting elections and 
raising the party's profile and credibility. Choosing principle, rather than 
expediency, was a winning strategy. 
Modern Times, Hard Choices 
The period from 1945 to 1967 was, as Mitchell notes, a quiet one for the SNP, a 
time of "sober assessment of the party's potential" [Mitchell, 1996, p. 174], with 
few electoral successes. But it was during this time that the SNP strengthened its 
organization, clarified its policies, and established the base for its political 
victories in the 60s and 70s under the capable leadership of McIntyre, Tom 
Gibson, and former journalist Arthur Donaldson. At the 1946 conference, the 
party adopted a statement which was to be the basis of SNP policy until the 
early 60s, and which expressed a strong commitment to democratic self- 
government and concentrated on bread and-butter issues. The 1948 conference 
passed a resolution supporting European unity, a first step in the party's move 
towards a policy of independence in Europe. 
The SNP also managed to develop a somewhat co-operative relationship 
with the Scottish Convention Association organized by John MacCormick. 
Several SNP members joined the Convention, a non-partisan organization for the 
promotion of Home Rule. Although the party voted not to join the Scottish 
National Assembly organized by the Convention in 1947, individual members 
were free to participate as they wished, and when the Scottish Covenant was 
publicly launched, Robert McIntyre was one of the first to sign [Mitchell, 1996, 
p. 196]. During the 1950s the formation of Roland Muirhead's Scottish National 
Congress (modelled on Gandhi's Indian National Congress) and the non-partisan 
group Scottish Alliance added to the party's tensions over its election-based 
strategy and the issue of cross-party membership, but both these organizations 
soon died. 
It was in the 1960s that the Scottish National Party finally emerged from 
the political wilderness. The decline of the Covenant Association and struggles 
within the Labour Party helped the SNP score some important successes in by- 
elections, first in 1961 when Ian Macdonald won 18.7 per cent of the vote in 
Bridgeton, and in 1962, when William Wolfe won 23 per cent of the vote in West 
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Lothian, the result of having "a well-organised machine and model candidates. " 
[Mitchell, 1996, p. 199] Macdonald became a full-time organizer for the SNP, 
and his considerable talents enabled the party to increase its members from 2,000 
to 30,000 in just four years. Wolfe, as vice-chairman in charge of publicity and 
development, understood the importance of media coverage, and established the 
SNP's reputation as the Scottish party with the most effective publicity. In 1965 
the party won the right to air political broadcasts for the first time. The Alba 
Pools, a nationalist pools system, was started, and became a lucrative source of 
funds for the party. Wolfe also began the process of revising SNP policy, and 
assistant national secretary Gordon Wilson drew up a new structure for the 
party's organization, which has remained in place since with only a few 
revisions. A new generation of leaders came into the party, such as Wilson, 
Margo MacDonald, and Winnie Ewing, leaders who are still influential today. 
The SNP also began an aggressive strategy of contesting local elections which 
raised the party's profile further: in 1967 the SNP won 200,000 votes and 69 
county and burgh seats. Robert McIntyre was elected to Stirling council and later 
became provost. The party began fielding more candidates in national elections 
as well, 15 in 1964 and 23 in 1966. 
The Scottish National Party's big breakthrough came shortly after, in 
1967, when Winnie Ewing won the Hamilton by-election with 46 per cent of the 
vote, in what was presumed to have been a safe Labour seat. Ewing's energetic 
performance and the ensuing publicity, which Wolfe calculated was more than 
the party had received in the last 20 years [Marr, 1995, p. 119], certainly helped 
the party in the local elections that followed, when the SNP won 34 per cent of 
the vote. Although these victories came as a surprise to some, the reasons for 
them were not hard to figure out, says Marr: "disillusion with the Wilson 
government, which had failed to build the shiny new economy it had promised 
four years earlier; Tory and Labour uninterest in Home Rule; and the SNP's hard 
grind to make itself an effective vote-gathering outfit. " [Marr, 1995, p. 119] Ian 
Macdonald's hard work as an organizer was certainly an important factor; by 
1969 the party had 125,000 members in 470 branches [Kemp, 1993, p. 98], which 
provided a solid community base for the party. However, this level of 
achievement was not sustained. This was the beginning of what Mitchell 
describes as "the SNP's drunk period" [Mitchell, 1996, p. 174], in which the 
party reached the greatest heights of its popular support, only to have it crash 
dramatically in 1979. 
Although Ewing lost Hamilton in the general election of 1970, the SNP 
won its first seat when Donald Stewart took the Western Isles constituency, but 
failed to make any more gains because its electoral support was spread evenly 
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across Scotland, in what became a consistent pattern of voting. This was a 
disappointment for party activists, who had great expectations of success in the 
1970 election, based on the fact that the SNP had the largest membership of any 
party in Scotland, and had outperformed the other parties in the local elections 
[Harvie, 1994, p. 177]. However, more victories were to follow in by-elections, 
with Margo MacDonald winning Govan in 1973, while in the same year Gordon 
Wilson came a close second with 30 per cent in Dundee East. Former party 
president Robert McIntyre became provost of Stirling in 1971 after gaining 35 per 
cent of the vote in Stirling and Falkirk. The big breakthrough for the nationalists 
finally came in the two 1974 general elections, when the SNP won seven seats in 
February, and then increased that number to a football team of 11 in October on 
a vote of 30.4 per cent. 
There were two main factors that made it possible: the Labour 
government's publication of the Kilbrandon report in 1973, which recommended 
a Scottish assembly; and the party's well-orchestrated publicity campaign on the 
North Sea oil, "the most sustained and powerful in its history" [Mitchell, 1996, 
p. 210]. The timing of the Kilbrandon report was especially fortuitous, coming as 
it did just before the by-elections and shortly before the general election, and 
helped give support to the nationalist cause. The oil campaign was backed by 
the research of economist Donald Bain, who had seen firsthand in Alberta the 
benefits to be derived from oil revenues, and the SNP's professional public 
relations team [Harvie, 19951. The SNP showed that the oil revenues could make 
Scottish independence economically viable, and the strength of its research and 
communications office meant that journalists and businessmen used the SNP as 
their information source on oil policy rather than the government [Harvie, 1995, 
p. 123]. 
But oil was not enough to sustain the SNP's popularity at the polls. Its 
downfall was the party's failure to deal with the issue of devolution, coupled 
with the party's lack of parliamentary experience. The SNP had forgotten Robert 
McIntyre's point that it was important for party members to win local elections 
and participate in local government so that they could develop competence in 
governing. By making the pursuit of seats at Westminster its greatest goal, the 
party was turning its own political philosophy upside down [Mitchell, 1996]. 
Of the 11 MPs, only Ewing and Stewart had some parliamentary 
experience, and the others had very little political experience at all, which created 
considerable difficulties for them as they struggled with the ins-and-outs of the 
devolution issue while under the intense media scrutiny generated by their 
position as the power brokers in the minority Labour government. Although the 
SNP agreed to support Labour "as long as it worked for a devolved Scottish 
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assembly" [Newman, 1990, p. 17], the SNP "voted with the government 117 
times, against it 179 times, and abstained 95 times. Splits even developed 
among the MPs themselves. " [Newman, 1990, p. 17] There was no mechanism to 
establish links between the elected members - both MPs and local councillors - 
and the party organization, which created more conflicts. The party also made 
the mistake of assuming that it was the only voice of Scottish independence, and 
refused to join forces with nationalist politicians outwith the SNP such as Jim 
Sillars, who left Labour to form the Scottish Labour Party. 
Most importantly, because the party could not make up its mind on 
devolution, it "failed to project a coherent and consistent political message. It 
was as easy for Labour to point to the SNP's support for 'Tory policies' as it 
was for the Tories to point to SNP support for 'socialist causes"' [Mitchell, 1996, 
p. 218]. SNP members argued about whether devolution would be a stepping- 
stone to independence, or a barrier, and if it was worth the political cost of its 
entanglement with the Callaghan Labour government. These arguments created 
bitter divisions in the SNP that caused both short and long-term damage to the 
party. By 1978 the SNP was in decline, but it was the disillusionment of the 
1979 referendum campaign that almost destroyed it. 
The Referendum of 1979 And Its Aftermath 
1978 was a year of disappointments for the SNP, beginning with the passage of 
an amendment to the devolution bill which stated that if less than 40 per cent of 
the total electorate voted 'Yes" in the referendum, the government would move an 
Order in Council repealing it. The passage was doubly humiliating, coming as it 
did on January 25, Bums' Night, and from George Cunningham, who was a Scot 
and Labour MP for Islington. This "wrecking amendment" [Mitchell, 1996, p. 
215] was considered "the most significant backbench intervention in British 
politics since the war. " [Clements, Farquharson, and Wark, 1996, p. 72] In April 
the SNP's high hopes for taking the Garscadden seat from Labour in the by- 
election were dashed when Donald Dewar won, and a month later George 
Robertson defeated Margo MacDonald in Hamilton. The SNP's campaign in the 
October by-election for Berwick and East Lothian was marred by conflict over 
the choice of candidate. At the same time there was conflict between the SNP 
MPs and the party executive as to whether the government should be brought 
down. The executive wanted to keep the government in until the referendum was 
held, while the MPs, disillusioned and tired of "the sordid nature of 
Parliamentary deals" [Mitchell, 1996, p. 216] wanted to end it all. 
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The referendum campaign brought further disillusionment. At the start of 
the campaign it looked as if the "Yes" side would win; polls had consistently 
shown a substantial majority in favour, and up until the last week this support 
held [Bochel, Denver and Macartney, 1981, p. 143]. True, there was no 
government money provided for the campaign as had been done for the 
referendum on joining the European Economic Community in 1975, and no 
restrictions on spending, which meant the "No" side had more of an advantage, 
but "not overwhelmingly so" [Bochel, Denver, Macartney, 1981, p. 145]. 
However, the "Yes" side was split, with the "Labour Says Yes" campaign 
refusing to talk to the SNP's "Yes" campaign, and both unwilling to join with the 
cross-party groups, Alliance For An Assembly, and Yes for Scotland (co- 
ordinated in West Lothian by the 24-year-old Alex Salmond). Voting day March 
1 was snowy and cold. When the results came in, 62.9 per cent of eligible voters 
had turned out; 51.6 per cent voted yes; and 48.4 per cent voted no; but with 
only 32.9 per cent of the total electorate voting in favour, the vote was lost to the 
40 per cent rule. Former SNP party activist Donald Bain recalls the bitter 
aftermath: 
When the referendum came, in 1979, the SNP found itself trying 
to sell the Scottish people a pathetic little assembly for which 
even SNP members had minimal enthusiasm. The Labour party, 
meanwhile, made virtually no effort to back its own proposals, 
Labour opponents of devolution (Tam Dalyell, Brian Wilson 
and Neil Kinnock in particular) being more visible than 
proponents. When the referendum produced only a narrow 
'Yes' and without crossing the notorious 40 per cent threshold 
the sense of betrayal and of having been duped into following a 
blind alley were enormous. 
[Bain, 19951 
This was snatching defeat from the jaws of victory, and the resulting emotional 
fall-out nearly tore the SNP apart. The difference in attitude between Quebec 
and Scottish nationalists to the results of their respective referendums is striking: 
a narrow defeat in the 1995 referendum was seen by Quebec sovereigntists as a 
success, an important step on the way to achieving their goal; while to Scottish 
nationalists, the 3.2 per cent majority they achieved was an irredeemable failure. 
After the referendum SNP MPs had little heart for keeping the Labour 
government in power, and when the opportunity came to go against the 
government on a Conservative motion of non-confidence March 28, they did, in 
Callaghan's famous phrase, "like turkeys voting for an early Christmas". In the 
81 
election of May 1979, the SNP lost nine seats, keeping only the Western Isles and 
Dundee East, and winning just 17.3 per cent of the vote. 
The response of the party to this defeat as it tried to re-define itself was, 
as Marr says, stunts and schisms. "There were campaigns of civil disobedience, 
expulsions, mutual denunciations of irreconcilable factions, stormings out and 
breakings in. " [Marr, 1995, p. 1851 The party split into fundamentalist and 
socialist camps, both, "reactions to defeat, deriving from events in the past 
rather than looking forward" [Mitchell, 1996, p. 221]. The '79 Group, made up 
of "older members with scores to settle and an irreverent youthful membership" 
[Mitchell, 1996, p. 223], argued that the only way forward for the SNP was to 
become a radical socialist republican party. The group did provide some creative 
energy for the party during a difficult time, but not much in the form of policy, 
and its strategies were questionable, causing a great deal of internecine warfare 
within the SNP. Its greatest success was at the 1981 conference in Aberdeen, 
when three of its members were elected to the executive, the most influential of 
these being Jim Sillars in the post of vice-chairman of policy, who had joined the 
party the year before. The '79 Group pushed for a policy of civil disobedience, 
and although the policy was approved, mainly because Sillars was its 
spokesman, it was not backed by party members and was strongly opposed by 
the more fundamentalist office-bearers on the executive. As enacted, the policy 
ended up making the SNP look foolish: a break-in at the Royal High School in 
Edinburgh, site of the proposed Scottish Assembly, resulted in the arrest of six 
'79 Group members, and a planned mass demonstration the week after fizzled 
out for lack of support. 
At the 1982 conference in Ayr, senior members of the party, led by Winnie 
Ewing, formed the Campaign for Nationalism with the one purpose to have the 
'79 Group banned. Confronted with this opposition, SNP leader Gordon Wilson 
moved an emergency motion to ban all groups within the party, which passed 
308 to 188. The Campaign for Nationalism immediately disbanded, while 
members of the '79 Group were televised angrily walking out of the conference; 
Jim Sillars, however, retained his post on the National Council. The conflict, 
however, still continued, as members of the '79 Group formed the cross-party 
Scottish Socialist Society as a means of getting around the ban. The result was 
the expulsion of seven members of the group, including Alex Salmond, and it was 
only after a "long and worrisome appeal, involving forty hours of hearings in 
front of a party tribunal" [Marr, 1995, p. 191] that the expulsions were 
commuted to suspensions and they were allowed back into the party in April 
1983. However, the damage had been done: at the national election in June of 
that year, the SNP's share of the vote fell to 11.7 per cent and it lost 53 out of 72 
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deposits, although it did manage to hold onto its two seats, "despite appalling 
public scenes of division and a disregard for its image with the electorate. " 
[Mitchell, 1996, p. 2301 
Once again the SNP began the slow process of renewing itself. The 
struggle between opposing factions became more muted as the party established 
itself as left-of-centre and began "to acknowledge its radicalism on social and 
economic issues" [Mitchell, 1996, p. 232]. The party also began revising its 
policy on Europe, led by Gordon Wilson, who was able to get a motion passed 
backing membership in the European Community at the 1983 conference. In the 
1987 election the party emphasized its role as the only Scottish party, expressed 
in its slogan, "Play the Scottish Card". The results were not as good as had been 
hoped: the party won just 14.1 per cent of the vote and lost its seats in Dundee 
East and the Western Isles to Labour. However, it did make new gains, bringing 
back Margaret Ewing in Moray and Andrew Welsh in Angus, with Alex Salmond 
winning in Banff and Buchan. 
The following year Jim Sillars scored an impressive victory in the Glasgow 
Govan by-election, winning 48.7 per cent of the vote, and the month after, 
support for the SNP rose to 31 per cent in a Market Opinion Research 
International (MORI) poll [Newman, 19901. This growing popularity was due in 
part to the SNP's policy of Independence in Europe, passed at the 1988 
conference, which helped ease some of the voting public's concern about Scotland 
going it alone. In addition, the party's aggressive stance towards the hated poll 
tax, expressed in the "Can Pay, Won't Pay" campaign, attracted young, left- 
wing members of the working class who traditionally would have voted for 
Labour. The emergence of a new generation of "much tougher and more 
sophisticated" SNP activists led by Alex Salmond [Mitchell, 1996, p. 222] and 
the party's decision to work for Home Rule within the cross-party Scottish 
Convention added to the SNP's credibility. It looked as if the SNP was on its 
way back; but then another damaging split occurred which torpedoed the party's 
progress until after the 1992 election. 
The issue was the Scottish National Party's participation in a Scottish 
Constitutional Convention, which had been fought over throughout the 1980s. 
Gordon Wilson had introduced motions supporting the Scottish Constitutional 
Convention at the 1982,1983 and 1984 SNP conferences, and at the last one, 
party members narrowly agreed to it and to participating in the Campaign for a 
Scottish Assembly. In August 1988 the national executive voted to meet with the 
members of other parties to discuss the Convention proposal, and formal talks 
were held at the end of January, 1989 to explore the conditions for participation. 
Although not all of the SNP's demands were met, progress towards some kind of 
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working relationship was made, and Gordon Wilson told the press that the talks 
had been "very successful" [Marr, 1995, p. 203]. 
The response from the fundamentalists in the party was immediate and 
outraged. After a weekend of angry telephone calls to the SNP participants, 
Wilson decided that the SNP had to withdraw immediately, without waiting for 
the next executive meeting in February. He consulted with all the party office- 
bearers, except Alex Salmond, his deputy leader, who was the one most likely to 
have protested the move [Mitchell, 1996, p. 242], not because he necessarily 
supported the SNP's involvement, but because he felt the timing of the 
withdrawal was wrong [Kemp, 1993, p. 162]. Salmond, along with other 
nationalists, was surprised to hear James Sillars announce on the Sunday night 
that the SNP was out. "That was the moment when the trust between him and 
Sillars disappeared. " [Marr, 1995, p. 203] 
When the executive did hold its meeting, the vote was 22 to 1 against 
participation, despite the intervention of Robert McIntyre, who warned that by 
quitting the talks the SNP was missing an opportunity to be seen as 
"statesmanlike and cooperative" [Marr, 1995, p. 204]. The executive's decision 
was confirmed at the March meeting of the national council by a vote of 191 to 
41, following a debate that was "one of the most ill-tempered and tense in the 
SNP for years" [Mitchell, 1996, p. 242]. To those outside the party, the 
distinctions between the fundamentalist and gradualist positions were not 
important: what the members of the voting public saw was just another example 
of the SNP at war with itself, and the opinion polls reflected their unease, 
heading downward from a high of 32 per cent in January of 1989 to a longer- 
term decline "after the more hardline, non-cooperative approach became instilled 
in SNP campaigning. " [Mitchell, 1996, p. 243] 
Battle lines were drawn between the two camps represented by Sillars, 
Wilson, and hardliner lain Lawson on the one side and the pragmatists led by 
Alex Salmond. When Wilson decided to step down as leader of the SNP in 1990 
he did not inform his deputy, who was an obvious leadership candidate, and it 
was assumed in the contest between Salmond and Margaret Ewing that Ewing 
would win handily, as she was backed by Wilson, Sillars, and Lawson, had a 
reputation as an extremely able parliamentarian, and was well-liked. However, 
Salmond won overwhelmingly, 486 to 186. Ewing lost precisely because of the 
support from the fundamentalists, and in particular, those around Jim Sillars, 
who conducted a factional campaign using negative personal attacks against 
Salmond that Ewing herself would never have employed [Mitchell, 1995, p. 244]. 
The size of Salmond's majority, however, did not ease the divisions within the 
party, although most of his supporters won positions on the executive. Sillars 
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had a great deal of influence, both within the party and without, and the 
fundamentalists continued to exacerbate tensions within the SNP, often founded 
on nothing more than personalities [Mitchell, 1995, p. 245]. 
Despite these difficulties, though, party members thought that the SNP 
would improve its standing as political events in the run-up to the 1992 general 
election pushed the issue of Scottish independence to the forefront. Independent 
MP Dick Douglas crossed over to the SNP in 1990 after being expelled by Labour 
for his aggressive protests against the poll tax, bringing the total number of SNP 
MPS to five, and reinforcing the party's image as leftist, nationalist and 
European. It was increasingly popular among youth voters, with a healthy 
student membership, younger candidates and the support of pop stars such as 
the Proclaimers and Pat Kane giving it "the fizz and self-confidence of its earlier 
surges" [Marr, 1995, p. 213]. 
Most surprisingly, in what Marr describes as the "most dramatic example 
of journo-nationalism, and certainly the most bizarre" [Marr, 1995, p. 213-14], 
the 300,000-plus circulation Scottish Sun came out in favour of independence 
January 23,1992, with the front page of the Rupert Murdoch-owned paper 
carrying the headline "Arise and be a Nation Again". This followed a debate in 
Edinburgh's Usher Hall a week earlier on the issue of home rule in which Alex 
Salmond performed superbly, "easily outwitting Donald Dewar, Malcolm Bruce 
and Ian Lang" [Mitchell, 1996, p. 246]. On January 28, a Scotsman poll jointly 
commissioned with Independent Television News and conducted by ICM 
Research reported that "support for independence, either outside both the UK 
and the EC or inside the EC, had reached 50 per cent, a jump of thirteen points 
on the previous September. Support for the lesser option of devolution had 
crashed to 27 per cent. " [Marr, 1995, p. 212] SNP supporters thought the party 
was sure to gain more seats. 
However, the results proved otherwise. The party lost Govan, prompting 
Jim Sillars to quit the SNP after his ill-advised comment that Scots were "90- 
minute patriots", and Dick Douglas failed in his bid to capture Glasgow 
Garscadden from Donald Dewar. The party did save all its deposits, and 
increased the percentage of its vote to 21.5 per cent. But its election slogan of 
"Free by '93", sprung on a surprised Alex Salmond and his executive by SNP 
convener Alex Neil at the 1991 conference [Mitchell, 1996, p. 245], certainly 
seemed over the top in light of events. As Mitchell states: "Once more the SNP 
had been defeated by its own hype. " [Mitchell, 1996, p. 247] 
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1992 And After - Which Road to Independence? 
There were clear reasons for the SNP's failure to make a breakthrough in the 1992 
election. The most basic was that the SNP was going after the same voters as 
Labour, but, unlike Labour, had been unable to establish itself "as a credible 
party of government" [Brand, Mitchell, and Surridge, 1994, p. 616]. Its base in 
the community was not strong, lacking the local government presence that would 
give its members political experience and a higher public profile. As Brand, 
Mitchell and Surridge note, the SNP did "not have a happy record in local 
government, or even a very extensive one. " [Brand, Mitchell and Surridge, 1994, 
p. 629] The party also did not have the institutional support that Labour had, 
such as trade unions, local authorities, or community groups. In addition, both 
Labour and the SNP emphasized their Scottish identity and the importance of 
economic issues, but since support for independence was found among members 
of both parties, the SNP was fighting for the same voters, handicapped by far 
fewer resources. As a party with a national platform and the money and 
organization to go with it, Labour was better-placed to respond to the challenge 
presented by the SNP [Newell, 1994], which was severely restricted by its lack of 
funds and organization [Lynch, 1996b]. 
However, the main reason for the SNP's poor showing was the confusion 
in its message caused by the divisions within the party. As Lynch explains: 
"both fundamentalist and gradualist viewpoints were represented in the 
campaign teams responsible for the 1992 electoral strategy, which produced 
mixed messages and campaign goals and created the impression that the SNP 
was running a dual campaign. " [Lynch, 1996b, p. 219] The fundamentalist 
message, given added strength by the use of a professional PR agency, coupled 
attacks on Labour with a "full-blown campaign for independence" [Lynch, 
1996b, p. 220], while the gradualist message was one of reassurance whose 
"primary concern was to avoid scaring off existing supporters. " [Lynch, 1996b, 
p. 220] The over-confident claims of the fundamentalists made it easier for the 
SNP's political opponents to denigrate the campaign, sowed confusion among 
the ranks of party workers, and damaged its credibility. 
The main task of the Scottish National Party's leadership since 1992 has 
been to repair this damage by implementing a coherent, well-planned strategy, 
supported by a professional party organization. In this they have been aided by 
the takeover of key positions in the party by gradualists as fundamentalists have 
either left or been voted out of office, although, as Lynch notes, there have still 
been "occasional bouts of dissent by fundamentalists" [Lynch, 1996b, p. 221]. 
The party leadership has established a long-range plan with the objectives of 
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increasing electoral and institutional support, promoting independence while 
undermining the Union, and establishing the SNP as a European social 
democratic party [Lynch, 1996b, p. 223]. 
The results have been mixed. The party had its greatest success on the 
electoral level, winning 33 per cent of the vote and electing two MEPs in the 1994 
European elections, and during the elections for the new unitary authorities in 
1995, won 26 per cent of the vote and 181 seats, taking control of two councils. 
However, before the 1997 election it had not garnered the support of any 
influential interest groups, and its attempts to develop a network of 
organizations backing independence have achieved little, since these groups such 
as Scots Asians for Independence, New Scots For Independence and Pensioners 
for Independence basically just recycle existing SNP members. 
The party's strategy of promoting independence while undermining the 
Union worked much better, with the SNP producing a plethora of documents and 
policy statements on how it would deal with such issues as defence, the economy 
and its own currency after independence, while taking every opportunity to 
criticize the actions of the Tory central government and the weakness of any 
devolution or home rule proposals put forward by Labour and the Liberal- 
Democrats. In addition, the Labour party's move to the right under Tony Blair 
and its abandonment of traditional socialist policies made it possible for the 
SNP to differentiate itself politically from Labour, claiming that it is the only 
party that truly stands for social justice. 
Although the fundamentalist-gradualist tension in the party has become 
more muted, it can still create problems for the SNP, although Salmond has on 
occasion been able to use it to strengthen his hold on the party. In January 1995 
Scotland on Sunday published an interview with him that bore the headline, 
"Salmond backs devolution", which aroused the ire of the fundamentalists, as it 
seemed to indicate that the party was moving away from its commitment to 
independence. Mitchell has described the story as "inaccurate and mischievous" 
[Mitchell, 1996, p. 292], but a closer reading of the article would indicate that the 
reporter was more careless than conniving, and it was the headline that was 
inaccurate. Despite the ensuing controversy generated by the article, Salmond 
was able to get the support of the party's national executive for his stance, 
thereby reinforcing his leadership [Clements, Farquharson and Wark, 1996]. 
However, when Alex Neil, vice-convener of policy, castigated Shadow 
Scottish secretary George Robertson for being akin to World War Two Nazi 
sympathizer Lord Haw-Haw at the party's 1996 annual conference, the SNP's 
image as a mature political organization was damaged. The party went into the 
conference at 29 per cent in the polls, but dropped to 23 per cent shortly after, 
87 
where it consistently stayed before the election, despite Labour's reversal of its 
position on holding a devolution referendum, public anger at the handling of 
budget cuts by the Labour-dominated Glasgow council, and the unpopularity of 
Tony Blair and his New Labour policies in Scotland (revealed in a System Three 
report commissioned by Labour). As Mitchell concludes: "Electoral politics 
proved as frustrating as ever for the SNP at the close of the century. Polling well 
but with an even spread of support, the party awaited the breakthrough that 
never seemed to come. " [Mitchell, 1996, p. 293] 
Two Different Parties - Two Different Roads 
What is striking about the difference between the histories of the nationalist 
parties in Quebec and Scotland is how easily the movements for self-government 
in Scotland have been divided, while those in Quebec have so quickly coalesced, 
especially when you consider their respective histories. Quebec is the remnant of 
a conquered nation, while Scotland has been an independent nation for two- 
thirds of its history, but it is in Quebec where support for sovereignty has 
permeated all levels of society as well as all political parties. As Keating points 
out: "nationalism in its various forms has become a hegemonic set of ideas in 
Quebec. This is not to say that all Quebecois are separatist, far from it, but that 
issues are debated largely within the context of Quebec and appraised by their 
impact on Quebec. All parties are thus forced to play on the nationalist field. " 
[Keating, 1996a, p. 77] This is not the case in Scotland, where, as Arnold Kemp 
says, "the 'magic circle' of those enjoying power and patronage in Scotland is 
deeply committed to the Union, as is the business class and the financial 
community (with only a few exceptions). " [Kemp, 1993, p. 74] Nationalist 
support is largely confined to members of the SNP and the Labour Party, and is 
not found in business, trade union or civic organizations to the same extent that 
it is in Quebec. 
Perhaps the reason the SNP has found it so difficult to be united and 
keep its eyes on the prize, in the words of the evocative slogan from the 
American civil rights movement of the 60s, is the lack of an ethnic dimension to 
its nationalism. Quebec nationalists are bound together by their common 
language and culture, but what is their strength is also their weakness. Although 
modern Quebec nationalists claim that theirs is a pluralistic, non-ethnic 
nationalism, based on a common identity of all Quebec residents as members of a 
distinct society and culture, there has been disturbing evidence otherwise from 
sovereigntist leaders. On the night of the 1995 referendum, Deputy Premier 
Bernard Landry said in a radio interview that non-francophones were voting 
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"according to their grandmother's chromosomes"; Louise Harel, Minister of 
Employment, stated on television that the anglophone and allophone vote was 
"a distorting factor"; and the next day, the PQ's vice-president, Monique 
Simard, said that Parizeau's comments on the ethnic vote were deplorable only 
because "it hurts the sovereignist cause" [Bernier, 1996, p. 3]. It is statements 
like these that seem to belie the assertion that Quebec nationalism is not 
xenophobic or racist, and is based on "a rhetoric of self-affirmation.... the motive 
that counts is the sense of power and accomplishment" [Ignatieff, 1994, p. 123]. 
The leaders of the Scottish National Party have been very careful to avoid 
any suggestion of ethnic nationalism, aware as they are "that attempts to 
differentiate Scots on ethnic grounds could prove divisive within Scotland and 
might stir up ancient hatreds" [Keating, 1996a, p. 181]. Theirs is a nationalism 
that tends to refrain from discussing language and culture, and whose use of 
history seems quite restrained in comparison to Quebec. It is almost entirely 
based on "practical arguments about institutions, accountability and policy. 
This has made it one of the least romantic of nationalist movements. " [Keating, 
1996a, p. 182] It has also lacked the dynamism and confidence that is seen in 
Quebec, where one of the main arguments posited by the Bloc Quebecois for the 
province's independence is that it could handle its economic affairs much better 
if it were free of the Canadian federation. In the past, SNP leaders have 
portrayed Scotland as a poverty-stricken nation that has been exploited and 
taken for granted within the Union; it has been only very recently, and most 
emphatically during the 1997 national election campaign, that they have taken 
the more positive approach. 
Most importantly, for the Scottish National Party, this has meant it has 
had difficulty in getting its message across, because nationalism in Scotland does 
not have the same deep community roots that it does in Quebec. As noted, the 
party does not have the support of trade unions or other social organizations, 
and has had a limited role in local government. The SNP's focus on economic 
issues, forged in the early years of the Scots National League, its influential 
predecessor, has also meant it has focused the party's political communications 
on economics - never an easy concept to get across, and not one guaranteed to 
appeal to the modern SNP's working-class support - rather than issues of 
identity and culture. It is significant that the SNP achieved its best results in the 
late 60s and 70s when it had a strong community base, due to the energetic 
efforts of organizer Ian Macdonald; the constituencies which had the weakest 
organizations fared the worst in elections [Brand, 1978, p. 289]. 
How the different party approaches framed their political 
communications and determined their strategies is discussed in chapter five; how 
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these actually worked in the context of the 1997 national elections in Canada 
and the UK is examined in the case-studies described in chapters six and seven. 
Before that, however, I wish to look at the role of political journalists in the 
nationalist movements of Quebec and Scotland, and in particular, their place 
within the economic, social and political structures of the countries in which they 
are situated. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Political Journalism in Scotland and Quebec: 
Different Cultures, Different Practices 
The significance of the role of journalists in nationalist movements is often 
mentioned in studies of nationalism; however, it is not often examined in depth, 
if examined at all. It has been said that their role is crucial, because it is 
journalists who complete the process of transforming the vision of cultural 
identity into the practical reality of a political movement. The historians and 
academics "fashion the future according to the spirit of the past" [Hutchinson, 
1992, p. 103] by re-discovering ancient myths and legends that define the 
nation's unique identity; then the artists celebrate these in art, poetry, song and 
story, bringing them to the public consciousness; all this leading to a broader 
cultural renaissance promulgated by these intellectuals "to recreate the idea of 
the nation as the animating force in the lives of the people. But it is only when it 
is adopted by journalists and pamphleteers who translate the cultural into more 
concrete economic, social, and political programmes that it becomes a significant 
movement. " [Hutchinson, 1992, p. 104] 
My purpose in this chapter is to examine the significance of the political 
journalist's role in both Scotland and Quebec, and also to place it within the 
economic, social and political culture of these regions and those of the United 
Kingdom and Canada, so as to set the stage for the case-studies of the Scottish 
National Party and the Bloc Quebecois in chapters six and seven. (The focus will 
be on print journalism, as it is throughout my thesis, but because of the 
importance of television in the promotion of Quebec's national identity, 
electronic news gathering will be discussed as well. ) I examine the overall media 
picture in Canada and the UK in this chapter at some length, because although 
both Scotland and Quebec have distinct forms of media practice arising out of 
their particular cultures, their political journalists must work within the economic 
confines and media structures governing newsrooms in Britain and the rest of 
Canada. To understand how they differ, it is necessary to understand what the 
wider norms and practices are. 
When examining the nature of political journalism in Britain and Canada, 
one might think that journalism practice would not differ that much between the 
two countries, or between Quebec and the rest of Canada, or Scotland and the 
UK, given the similarity in their forms of government and their social structure. 
However, culture influences a great deal, including how reporters go about their 
daily business. Canadian newspapers, for example, are much more restrained in 
their coverage; there is no tabloid journalism equivalent to that found in the UK. 
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At the same time, Canadian journalists, reflecting their nation's values [Nevitte, 
1996], are much less deferential in their treatment of political leaders, as we shall 
see. In this they are similar to Scottish political journalists, who show the same 
unwillingness to tug forelocks and the same eagerness to ask "the bastard 
question" as do Canadian reporters. 
There are even stronger differences between Quebec journalists and those 
in the rest of Canada. Quebec political journalism is a distinct society within 
Canadian news-gathering, both in its style and approach. To begin with the most 
striking feature of Quebec journalism, all francophone media are generally 
nationalist. Secondly, because Quebec journalists work in French, their career 
choices are limited, for in order to achieve prominence, they must leave North 
America: working in the United States is not an option. However, this limitation 
has also encouraged a unique cohesiveness and collective solidarity among 
Quebec journalists not found elsewhere in Canada. 
Although culture is a major source of difference in newsroom practice 
between the countries I have studied, journalists everywhere are being affected 
by the economic constraints of increased media competition. The same takeovers 
by multinationals and conglomerates leading to mergers, down-sizing, and 
contracting out that have changed workplaces throughout the world are making it 
increasingly difficult for political journalists to do their job as they would like to: 
but, ironically enough, these economic constraints have tended to reinforce 
national identity in Quebec and Scotland, rather than the opposite, as in the rest 
of Canada. 
The Canadian Media: Fade to Black 
Canada is in the unfortunate position of being "virtually alone in the 
industrialized world in having no legislation to prevent the concentration of 
newspaper ownership or cross-media concentration. " [Barlow and Winter, 1997, 
p. 22] This is due perhaps to the fact that the law which governs mergers and 
acquisitions, the Competition Act, was drafted for the Mulroney government by 
the Competition Policy Task Force of the Business Council on National Issues, 
Canada's major corporate lobby group. As a result, when Conrad Black, CEO of 
Hollinger Inc., decided to take over Southam Inc. newspapers in 1996, thus 
effectively giving him control of 58 of Canada's 105 English-language dailies, the 
Federal Competition Bureau approved the acquisition, without any public 
hearings. The Council of Canadians, a nationalist public interest group, launched 
a court challenge to the decision, but lost. 
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This move by Black, head of the third largest newspaper chain in the 
world - he owns 170 dailies world-wide, including the London Daily Telegraph, 
the Sydney Herald, the Chicago Sun Times, and the Jerusalem Post [Barlow, 1996, p. 
9] - gives him an unprecedented amount of control over Canadian media. He 
now owns 80 percent of the newspapers in the province of Ontario, as well as all 
of those in Saskatchewan, Prince Edward Island and Newfoundland, with his 
papers reaching 2.4 million readers a day, 43 per cent of Canada's total 
newspaper circulation [Taras, 1996, p. 492]. Through Hollinger, Black also has a 
controlling interest in Canada's national news service, Canadian Press (CP), 
which is run as a cooperative, gathering and redistributing news from its member 
newspapers, and providing newsroom copy to 86 dailies across the country. In 
addition, CP's ancillary Broadcast News wire is used by 425 radio, 76 television, 
and 142 cable stations, while its Press News service goes into all of the Canadian 
Broadcasting Corporation's radio and television stations. Black also owns 
Saturday Night , the largest-circulation magazine of current affairs and analysis 
in Canada, as well as part of the Financial Post, an influential business daily. He 
has increased his holdings in Canada since the 1996 takeover of Southam, and in 
1997 had 60 out of 105 Canadian dailies in the Southam-Sterling-Hollinger chain 
[Barlow and Winter, 1997, p. 21]. 
At the same time that ownership of Canadian print media has become 
more concentrated, the budget of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation has 
undergone significant cuts. In 1995-96, the overall budget of the CBC was cut by 
$127 million and its administrative budget by $60 million, resulting in the loss of 
1500 positions. From 1984 to 1996 its funding basis was reduced in real terms 
by 37.5 per cent to $32.19 per capita; by comparison, the British Broadcasting 
Corporation received the equivalent of $60.82 Canadian per head in 1996 [Duke, 
1996, pp. 16-17]. The result of these cuts has been fewer resources directed to 
investigative news, less original programming and more repeats, hiring of younger, 
less experienced staff on short-term contracts, and more dependence on 
freelancers and wire services. The trend is the same in print media; newspapers 
have more "news McNuggets" and fewer in-depth stories, use wire copy instead 
of foreign correspondents, and rely on freelancers and staffers on contract to fill 
the newshole that their depleted newsrooms cannot. 
Although new technologies have eased some of the production difficulties 
of news coverage, they are a mixed blessing for Canadian political journalists. On 
the one hand, being able to file stories directly by telephone with a lap-top has 
made it easier for them to keep up with the flow of news, but on the other hand it 
has meant that there is less time for reflection, and greater pressure for a larger 
number of stories, which can make harried reporters more vulnerable to the 
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blandishments of political party spin doctors. It also means that media outlets 
can technically do more with less, because the editing process for both print and 
television requires fewer people, but again, it places more demands on the smaller 
group of people involved in political coverage. This was especially problematic 
for the television crews covering the Canadian federal election, as we shall see in 
chapter seven, as well as for electronic news-gatherers in Britain, discussed later 
in this chapter. 
Scrums, Meltdowns, and Press Gallery Math 
All these factors - media concentration, budget cut-backs, and new technologies - 
have had dramatic effects on how politics are covered in Canada. The 
Parliamentary Press Gallery in Ottawa is unable to do justice to issues of 
government because, as Mark Bourrie, a freelancer and member of the gallery 
explains: 
The math is against the media. There are 310 members of the 
House of Commons, thousands of political staffers on 
Parliament Hill, a massive civil service and a judiciary that 
needs to be covered. Many Ottawa bureaus are one-or-two- 
member operations. Only two private radio stations in Canada 
have their own reporter on the Hill. Most of the country's 
largest newspapers have no full-time reporters at all, and rely on 
wire services. 
[Bourrie, 19971 
Reporters rarely attend committee meetings, where most of the parliamentary 
work is done, or press conferences, "unless the person holding it is a high- 
powered minister" [Bourrie, 1997], focusing their attention on Question Period. 
However, reporters often don't even bother to walk down the hall to take their 
seats in the House of Commons during Question Period, preferring instead to 
tape it from the televisions in the press gallery newsroom. Their reliance on the 
in-house television is a cause for concern, says Quebec television journalist Pierre 
Mignault. Both the House of Commons and the Quebec National Assembly have 
these cameras, and as a consequence, "Any press-gallery journalist covering these 
capitals, whether for the print or electronic media, could spend an entire career 
sitting at his or her desk zapping from one Parliamentary commission to 
another. " [Mignault, 1996, p. 133] But as Mignault points out, it is employees of 
the government who are doing the broadcasting, and they choose what will be 
seen on the news networks, thereby controlling parliament's image and literally 
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preventing the public from getting the full picture of what goes on in the House of 
Commons. 
The public is also short-changed in another way by developments in 
electronic news-gathering. Modem technology is expensive, and this creates 
difficulties for a country such as Canada, which, although small in population, is 
enormous in terms of geography, spanning six time-zones, and must compete 
with the public expectations of news coverage done by the large American 
networks, "who can afford to be everywhere at once. " [Mignault, 1996, p. 134] 
The result has been the growth of the technique called "melt-down", in which 
electronic media agree to use each other's pictures, interview clips or news 
reports, and to combine them into one report with the voice-over of the 
individual network's reporter. During the 1997 federal election campaign, 
Canadian television networks used a form of melt-down, pooling camera crews 
who provided daily news footage shared among all the stations, with the 
campaign report narrated by the individual political reporters. 
Instead of the press conference, the most commonly-used method of 
questioning government members, both during and outside of election campaigns, 
is that uniquely Canadian journalistic tradition, the "scrum", which began in the 
late 1950s and early 60s when television started to dominate political coverage. 
The word was first used "to describe the chaos in the hallways of Parliament 
during the early Trudeau years" [Levine, 1993, p. ix], although it had existed in a 
more restrained form as far back as the days of Canada's first prime minister, Sir 
John A. Macdonald, when reporters grouped outside his office in the hopes of 
getting a story. The modern version "can be rough and brutal" [Levine, 1993, p. 
ix], similar to a rugby huddle, and is a daily occurrence during the sessions of 
parliament in which hordes of reporters, both print and electronic, gather in the 
House of Commons foyer to quiz the particular hapless minister who is the focus 
of "the story du jour". 
The scrum can be an extremely intimidating process for even the most 
experienced politician, who, surrounded on all sides by cameras, lights, and 
microphones, can barely move, hemmed in by the crush of reporters eager to ask 
the first question. (I witnessed a scrum in the House of Commons in which 
Canada's defence minister Art Eggleton was being rushed by journalists on what 
I was told was a relatively quiet news day: Eggleton, who is 6'1", was 
completely hidden by the crowd of cameras and equipment swarming around 
him. ) The organized anarchy of the scrum is preferred by reporters to the press 
conference, for it more easily provides the television sound-bites and the "tight, 
light, and bright" quotes needed for radio and print, as well as helping to evade 
the control of spin doctors. It is no substitute for investigative reporting, but 
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parliamentary bureaus, under-staffed as they are, and driven by the cost-cutting 
imperatives of Canadian media management, find it difficult to cover the issues 
in any depth. 
The increasing reliance on news services due to cut-backs in staffing has 
had the further effect of contributing to the fragmentation of national unity in 
English-speaking Canada. The "national" news services are based in Toronto 
and Ottawa, and interpret news from what is termed a central Canadian 
perspective. Although the press gallery has close to 350 members, down from 
some 450 in the early 90s, "some two dozen high-profile reporters and 
commentators continue to have substantial influence over the focus and tone of 
political coverage, especially during election campaigns" [Fletcher and Everett, 
1991, p. 1931, predominately from media outlets in the two cities. The Toronto 
Globe and Mail, which describes itself as Canada's national newspaper, exercises 
a great deal of influence, as does the Canadian Press; during the 1988 election, 
access to the Globe and Mail affected "assignment, editorial, and interpretative 
decisions.... The CP wire was easily accessible on computer and was frequently 
consulted to check leads, breaking or developing stories, and opposing comment 
or interpretation. " [Gilsdorf and Bernier, 1991, p. 29] This has the effect of 
"further widening the gulf between the centre and the periphery. An informal 
'pecking order' seems to have merged that privileges the 'national' media to the 
increasing resentment of the 'regional' press. " [Gilsdorf and Bernier, 1991, p. 50] 
Canajan, Eh? Cultural Norms of Canadian Political journalism 
The cultural norms of Canadian political journalism are strikingly different from 
those of Britain (and the U. S. ) in several ways. The most obvious is the 
unwillingness of Canadian political journalists to report on the private lives of 
politicians. Their personal conduct or character flaws only get reported if they 
are seen to be affecting their public duties. Even when there is concern in the 
journalistic corps about the foibles of a politician, "character issues are covered 
in restrained or veiled terms. " [Fletcher, 1996, p. 148] This is especially true of 
francophone journalists: Rene Levesque had been separated from his wife for six 
years before it was reported, and that was by anglophone journalist Peter 
Desbarats in his 1976 biography of the Quebec premier. 
Along with this restraint in political reportage is also a determinedly non- 
partisan approach. Reporters are careful not to identify their own political views 
or to ally themselves too openly with a particular party, to the point that some 
do not vote in order to avoid perceptions of bias [Fletcher, 1996, p. 145]. 
(Quebec reporters have not been so reluctant, for reasons which I will explain in 
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the next section. ) Media outlets are careful to shift reporters among parties and 
candidates during an election campaign so as to maintain an objective distance 
from their sources. This even-handed attitude has been reflected in Canadian 
newspapers, which have nothing equivalent to the partisan press of Britain. 
There is also no tabloid press like that of Britain in Canada. There are 
tabloid-sized newspapers, mostly those of the Sun Media Corporation chain, but 
other than bolder headlines, crisper copy, and more crime news and opinion, they 
are "bound by much the same ethos of social responsibility as their more sober 
competitors. The most popular British tabloids, by contrast, have heretofore 
flouted such an ethos - or, at least, the notion that excess and sensation must be 
curbed by a sense of gentility and fair play. " [Dornan, 1991, p. 167] The news 
stories in Canadian tabloids like the Toronto Sun are "brash, although rarely 
inaccurate" [Carlin, 1998, p. 104]; this is because the owners were committed to 
raising "the quality of their papers while running their businesses more 
efficiently... . Quality in newspapers does not arise spontaneously from below; it 
has to be encouraged and rewarded from above. " [Carlin, 1998, p. 106] The fact 
that the Toronto Sun, the founding paper in the Sun Media group, was started by 
journalists, might have helped ensure those standards of social responsibility 
were kept. 
Although Canadian newspapers are generally more restrained than UK 
ones, Canadian political journalists are less deferential than their British 
counterparts. There is no lobby system in the Canadian House of Commons, and 
it is extremely unlikely that someone using the bullying tactics of a Peter 
Mandelson or Alistair Campbell would be able to browbeat Canadian reporters 
quite so successfully. That does not mean that spin doctors are unable to 
influence the political agenda; only that it is more difficult for them, and that 
Canadian political reporters are much more aggressive and cynical about their 
methods. In fact, the increasing amount of cynicism and negativism in reporting 
as a result of journalists' frustration at attempts by party strategists to control 
the political agenda is seen as a serious problem for Canadian democracy 
[Gilsdorf and Bernier, 1991; Nick Russell, 1996; Fletcher, 1996]. 
Some of these characteristics, it can be argued, make for a better kind of 
political reporting; others do not. Canada's lack of a partisan press and the 
adherence of its papers to stricter rules of objectivity and restraint mean that 
most Canadians can obtain a fairly socially responsible view of the issues in a 
campaign, but there is less diversity of opinion. There is, for example, no left-of- 
centre paper like the Guardian; the Toronto Star is the only daily which has 
supported the New Democratic Party editorially, and that just once during a 
federal election. However, perhaps this is just an accurate reflection of the 
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Canadian voter, who does not attach great loyalty to parties in a political system 
where parties, instead of "representing particular classes, religions, languages or 
other interests... act like brokers, trying to put together new electoral coalitions 
each time the country goes to the polls. " [Frizzell, Pammett, and Westell, 1994, 
p. 3] 
The most striking difference between Canadian and British media is the 
fact that, journalistically, "Canada is suffering from a case of double vision" 
[Siegel, 1996, p. 223], with the French-language and English-language media 
providing widely divergent views of the nation. There have been close to 80 
studies examining this duality of Canadian media coverage since the early 1960s, 
and they have found that anglophone and francophone media differ in style, 
news coverage and interpretation, as well as political subjects and their emphasis 
[Siegel, 1996, pp. 219-223]. Why this is so I will explore in the next section. 
Quebec Journalism from Duplessis to Duceppe 
Objectivity has always been a difficult ideal for journalists to follow, and even 
more so for Canadian journalists covering Quebec politics, both anglophone and 
francophone. Upholding standards of objectivity has been particularly 
problematic for francophone journalists. Although uniformly nationalist, their 
loyalties have been divided between the sovereigntist and federalist camps, and 
they must work in a political atmosphere that is fiercely polarized. They have 
also been subject to strong criticism from some of their anglophone colleagues, 
who may not fully appreciate the constraints under which they operate, and who 
have a different notion of what constitutes objectivity. As former journalist Peter 
Desbarats explains: 
French Canada's strong tradition of opinion-oriented journalism 
had never completely succumbed to the marketable objectivity of 
the rest of North American journalism. Montreal's Le Devoir, 
for example, had remained primarily a journal of opinion, a 
European-style oddity on this continent. In the 1950s, while 
other Quebec newspapers were silent about the abuses of power 
under Quebec's Premier Maurice Duplessis, Le Devoir 
campaigned vigorously for reform. 
[Desbarats, 1990, p. 118] 
Le Devoir's stance against Duplessis was all the more remarkable given le 
chefs dictatorial attitude towards the press. He ensured the subservience of 
newspaper proprietors by the awarding of generous printing contracts, which 
only went to allies of the government. Reporters were not to question the party 
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line: "Duplessis tended to treat journalists like servants assigned to write articles 
as he dictated them. " [Charron, 1991, p. 85] Those who dared to write critical 
articles, such as the legislative correspondents from Le Devoir, were expelled from 
his weekly news conferences. Those who did as they were told "were rewarded 
in kind or with gifts of hard cash. " [Charron, 1991, p. 85] 
What broke Duplessis's stranglehold on the media, and forever changed 
the image Quebecers had of themselves, was television. The federal government 
was in charge of broadcasting, and created a separate French-language network, 
Radio-Canada, in 1952. As Denise Bombardier, journalist and television 
moderator recalls: "Television played an exceptional role in Quebec society in the 
late 1950s. It was a genuine agent of social change, breaking the ideological 
monopoly of the clergy, and it was also a catalyst of the new nationalism, 
presenting the Quebecois with a coherent image of themselves. " [Cited in 
Charron, 1991, p. 84] It became the voice of those who later became the leading 
political figures in the province, among them, Rend Levesque, whose enormously 
popular news programme, Point de Mire, brought the news of the world into the 
living-rooms of Quebec. The focus of the programme was international: Levesque, 
a foreign correspondent for the American Office of War Information and later 
the International Service of the CBC, was not interested in regional politics. The 
strike of Radio-Canada producers in 1958 changed all that. 
The basis of the dispute between the producers and the Ottawa-based 
management was that although they produced 60 per cent of their own 
programming, making Montreal the third-largest TV production centre on the 
continent after New York and Hollywood [Fraser, 1984, p. 201, they were subject 
to the whims of the government's growing bureaucracy as far as their control over 
production and salaries were concerned. They decided to form a union, and 
went on strike, completely shutting down television service in the province for 68 
days. As Levesque said later: 
"Something happened during that strike. 
The whole bloody French network became virtually non- 
existent, and nobody cared. Here Radio-Canada was supposed to 
be so vital a part of the CBC - it was so important to broadcast in 
French. But Ottawa didn't give a damn.... 
I learned then that French was really very secondary in the 
rest of Canada's mind, certainly in Ottawa's. " 
[Cited in Desbarats, 1976, p. 70] 
He became part of the group of writers, artists, academics, popular 
entertainers and journalists who actively supported Quebec independence and 
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gave it credibility. During the 60s Quebec journalists increasingly identified with 
the goals of the Parti Quebecois: they "belonged to the class of people who 
favoured Quebec independence and state intervention" [Charron, 1991, p. 92], 
sharing the same background, education, lifestyle and interests as members of the 
PQ. The commitment of francophone journalists to the cause of independence 
created some difficulties for their anglophone colleagues, who had to admit to 
their own federalist biases. As Peter Desbarats recalls: 
It had become apparent that the news of the day was being 
reported differently by those who assumed that Quebec would be 
an independent country within five or 10 years, and those who 
did not. I continued to aim at fair and accurate journalism but 
could no longer pretend that my own federalist position was 
objective. The difference between my journalism and that of my 
francophone colleagues became clearer day by day: we were 
starting from a different set of assumptions. 
[Desbarats, 1990, p. 119] 
The relationship between journalists and the government became even 
more problematic in the 1970s, particularly during the October Crisis of 1970, 
when members of the Front de Liberation du Quebec kidnapped the British Trade 
Commissioner, James Cross, in Montreal, and Quebec Labour Minister Pierre 
Laporte, who was later murdered. The media became inextricably involved in 
the events during the two months of the crisis, when the federal government 
invoked the War Measures Act, arrested hundreds of suspected FLQ 
sympathizers, and suspended civil liberties while the hunt for the terrorists and 
their victims went on. The FLQ insisted that their demands be publicized in the 
media. "It was through the media that the FLQ made its conditions known to the 
government. It was through them that the government replied. And it was 
through the media that the whole population followed the development of the 
events and made known its own reactions. " [Dagenais, 1992, p. 123] However, 
following the imposition of the War Measures Act, in which several journalists 
were arrested, the media were censored and bitterly criticized by politicians for 
their role during the crisis. The result was "a form of self-censorship in the 
French Quebecois press which some believe still dominates constitutional 
matters. " [Saint-Jean, 1996, p. 27] 
The close identification of francophone journalists with the Parti 
Quebecois created difficulties for them when the PQ became the government in 
1976. They were enthusiastic when the party was first elected, because, as one 
legislative correspondent explained, "everyone thought the government was 
heading toward independence, and it might have been said that journalists, too, 
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were bringing about independence. " [Charron, 1991, p. 93] At the same time, 
however, as professional journalists dedicated to maintaining standards of 
objectivity, they felt obligated to maintain a critical distance. In addition, the PQ 
members of the National Assembly could not understand why their journalistic 
colleagues were not willing to be unconditional allies now that they were in office. 
However, Quebec journalists resolved this by practising "sympathetic 
journalism", in which they felt free to criticize the actions of politicians, but did 
not take up an adversarial approach; they "formed a sort of coalition with the 
forces of sovereignty. "[Charron, 1991, p. 94]. 
This coalition did not last after the loss of the referendum in 1980, when 
nationalism in Quebec went into decline, along with the economy. The idealism 
and passion for social justice that characterized the early stages of the 
sovereigntist movement seemed out-of-place in the neo-conservative world of the 
1980s, and this change of public mood was reflected in journalists, who were no 
longer willing to question the established order in the same way, becoming what 
one cynical journalist described as "bourgeois newsmongers" [Charron, 1991, p. 
95]. Their increased conservatism was due to three factors: one, the economic 
pressures on the media in a world of mergers, down-sizing, and diversification, 
which fragmented advertising markets; two, the ascendance of journalists into 
the ranks of the upper-middle class, and three, the attacks on sovereigntist 
journalists during the referendum campaign, who "were accused of promoting the 
destruction of Canada. These attacks cooled any political fervour journalists 
might have felt "[Saint-Jean, 1996, p. 27]. 
In the 90s the commodification of the news in Quebec has reinforced the 
developments of the 80s, much to the chagrin of those journalists who began 
their careers during the heady days of the 60s and 70s. Armande Saint-Jean, 
who was a journalist and broadcaster for 25 years before becoming an academic, 
says that the abandonment of the doctrine of social responsibility for a business 
mentality has had "three major consequences: the recoil of press attention away 
from serious analysis of social problems; the profession's vulnerability to 
manipulation, disinformation and propaganda initiatives; and a failure to show 
intellectual leadership in the formation of public opinion. " [Saint-Jean, 1996, p. 
28] I would also add a great increase in cynicism, even among the current 
generation of sovereigntist reporters, who initially welcomed the formation of the 
Bloc Quebecois. As one francophone journalist explained (all quotations in this 
chapter are from the research interviews, unless otherwise stated): 
"When I look at them [the Bloc MPs] I say I am not proud of those 
people; I don't want them to represent me, to work for me as 
politicians. ... I don't want them to speak for me, so that's why I 
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am, and it's the same, I think it's the same with other reporters 
because... a sovereigntist movement, a nationalistic movement, 
there's always a part of idealism; and when the PQ got elected in 
1976, you could feel that, you could feel that the world would 
change with them, but now you feel that especially with the Bloc, 
you don't see the world changing for those people, they're just 
petty people that don't have much in their mind; they don't 
show the openness. " 
Perhaps these judgements on the mores of contemporary Quebec 
journalists are too harsh. As Charron notes: 
journalists do not live in an ethereal universe, on the fringes of 
a world whose convulsions they need only observe and describe. 
They too experience the effects of changes in social relationships. 
Like everyone else, journalists participate in a society in constant 
motion, and they report on political and social developments 
from an outlook that is neither neutral nor foreign to their social 
position. 
[Charron, 1991, p. 96] 
Language and Economics - Solidarity and Cultural Isolation 
The culture of Quebec newsrooms has always been different from those of their 
journalism colleagues in the rest of Canada, largely due to the fact that Quebec, 
as a French-speaking enclave in North America, took its editorial models from 
those of Europe, particularly France. The francophone press has long been noted 
for its opinionated reporting style, which relies more on analysis than the "just- 
the-facts-Ma'am" approach of English-language newspapers in Canada. Even 
after most newspapers had adopted what Desbarats describes as the 
"advertiser-supported mass-circulation newspapers of the prevailing North 
American pattern" [Desbarats, 1990, p. 92] in the mid-1960s, the prominent 
Quebec journalists such as Gerard Pelletier and Claude Ryan were editors rather 
than reporters. Although Rene Levesque worked in the medium of television, he 
was more of a commentator than a news anchor, and like Pelletier and Ryan, was 
able to use his prominence as a news analyst to move into politics, "following a 
tradition that has remained much more alive in Quebec than in English-speaking 
Canada. " [Desbarats, 1990, p. 92] 
It was also the linguistic isolation of francophone journalists that 
reinforced their trade union militancy, because, unlike anglophone journalists, 
they could not pick up and go somewhere else in North America if they did not 
like the working conditions in their newsrooms. "The solution for Quebec 
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journalists was therefore to dig in their heels and struggle, getting as much 
support as they could from their colleagues, their unions and their professional 
associations. " [Charron, 1991, p. 91] The first syndicat des journalistes was 
formed at the Ottawa-based Le Droit, in 1922, and in 1936 the first contract 
between a Quebec newspaper and its reporters was signed at L'Action catholique. 
By 1954 the first journalist's union was officially recognized by the Quebec 
Labour Relations Commission. Four years later Quebec journalists participated 
in two important strikes, which, significantly, says Desbarats, "involved issues 
of principle rather than money. " [Desbarats, 1990, p. 87] When the management 
of La Presse refused to give an unpaid leave of absence for a journalist elected as 
leader of the major labour federation in Quebec, the journalists went on strike - 
successfully - for 13 days. The Radio-Canada strike, which made a nationalist 
of Rene Levesque after he was arrested on the picket line, "is now regarded as 
one of the triggers of the Quiet Revolution of the 1960s. " [Desbarats, 1990, p. 881 
With the formation of the Federation professionelle des journalistes du 
Quebec in the 1960s, journalists had an organization through which they could 
carry on their fight for press freedom and media accountability, and in particular 
newsroom control. Quebec journalists were unique in that democratization of the 
newsroom mattered more than issues of money and professional status. They 
urged the government to pass legislation limiting the control of media managers 
and establishing news management committees with representation from 
journalists, the public as well as management. Control over editing and reporting 
of the news was seen as the only way to ensure real freedom of the press by 
activist journalists. The egalitarian outlook of francophone reporters came from 
the progressive social theories they had learned in the province's universities 
during the Quiet Revolution, reinforced by the fact that Quebec's class structure 
was based more on level of education than wealth, as it was in the rest of 
Canada. 
By the 1980s, however, Quebec journalists had been defeated in their 
efforts to have a greater say in newsroom policy, and were weary of the bitter 
labour disputes they had endured while trying to fight the media concentration 
that thwarted their efforts to obtain editorial autonomy. As Florian Sauvageau, 
an academic researcher for the 1981 Royal Commission on Newspapers 
described it, Quebec journalists felt that "the news is only there to gift-wrap the 
advertising" [Desbarats, 1990, p. 93]. They abandoned their role as agents of 
social change, becoming "good employees" in newspapers which, by the 1990s, 
were almost completely owned by large chains such as Quebecor Inc., with only 
Le Devoir in Montreal and Le Fleuve in Rimouski remaining as independents. 
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The province's economic problems, exacerbated by the uncertainty over 
Quebec's future, has tended to reinforce its isolation from the rest of Canada, for 
most media outlets in Quebec, other than Radio-Canada, cannot afford to have 
correspondents in other parts of the country. In addition, with a lower level of 
readership - 77 per cent to English-Canada's 87 percent [Siegel, 1996, p. 117] - 
Qu6bec newspapers are on even shakier financial ground. As a result, Quebec 
newspapers seldom cover events outside the province: the problem is, as one 
reporter put it, "in Quebec people do not have enough money so what you do is 
cover. .. what's the nearest to you, so that is 
Quebec. And it's too bad because the 
press is getting very boring. " The smaller number of dailies in Quebec, 11 to 
English-Canada's 94, means that fewer stories from Quebec are fed into the 
Canadian Press news system, and most of the stories from English Canada for 
CP's French Service are translations and adaptations from copy written by 
anglophone reporters [Siegel, 1996, p. 201]. Thus the rest of Canada remains an 
unknown country to most Quebecers, and the divide between the country's two 
solitudes is as wide as ever. 
We're Canadian, You're Not: A Comparison of Media Characteristics 
Although Canadian and British media are subject to many of the same economic 
forces that have influenced their respective newsrooms in similar ways, there are 
unique features of the Canadian media landscape that affect how political 
journalism is done and how it is perceived. The first and most obvious is the 
diversity of television outlets in Canada compared to that in the United 
Kingdom. In 1997 Britain had four terrestrial channels that were available to 
everyone, plus Channel 5, which was not. Cable television had yet to make much 
of an inroad, with only 3.8 per cent of the 22.2 million households in the UK 
connected in 1994, and another 13.5 per cent with satellite dishes, most of them 
subscribers to Rupert Murdoch's BSkyB channels, which numbered 3.6 million 
[Weymouth, 1996, pp. 68-69]. By 1996, the percentage of cable subscribers had 
increased to 10 per cent, or 2.24 million households in Britain. [Dyja, 1997, p. 46] 
Canada, by contrast, is "the most wired country in the world" [Siegel, 1996, p. 
153], with 81 per cent of Canadian households subscribing to cable. Even those 
Canadians with just basic service have a multiplicity of choice, with more than 
30 channels. 
Canada has a formidable electronic communications system that 
is second to none in the world: 65 telephones for every 100 
people, 5600 broadcasting operations, 46 million radios, 17 
million TV sets, national French-language and English-language 
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broadcasting systems, several provincial television networks, 
cable TV which is available to 90 per cent of the populace, pay- 
TV and numerous specialty channels, three transcontinental 
microwave systems, the world's first network of 
communications satellites, and more fibre optic cable than any 
other country. 
[Siegel, 1996, p. 257] 
Another major difference is that Canada has had, until recently, no national 
press like the UK (although Conrad Black's launch of the National Post in October 
of 1998 may change this). It has been, as Dornan says, largely parochial, 
designed to serve the news needs of the cities in which the newspapers are based. 
As a result, there is no paper with the kind of circulation and reach that British 
newspapers have: the Toronto Star, Canada's biggest daily, has an average 
circulation of close to 520,000, while the second largest, the Globe and Mail, has a 
circulation of approximately 315,000, again, most of it in Toronto. The regional 
focus of Canadian newspapers is partly due to geography, for Canada, the 
biggest nation in the world, has provinces and regions that are several times 
larger than some European countries; and partly due to its smaller population, 
which numbered 31 million in 1997. For these reasons, there is no equivalent to 
British tabloids like the Mirror or the Sun, with readerships in "multiples of 
millions" [Dornan, 1991, p. 1671. 
Canada's press also differs from that in Britain in that it has not been 
threatened by the same type of statutory regulation as proposed by the Calcutt 
Committee, for example, but as Doman explains, this is 
because the circumstances that have prompted the British 
actions simply do not exist in Canada. Bluntly, Canadian 
journalism has not been tarred by the sort of allegations directed 
at the British tabloids. That is to say, it is not decried as 
licentious, sensation mongering, intrusive and vulgar. The 
British measures have been invoked to combat a type of excess 
(or a style of journalism, depending on one's perspective) of 
which Canadian journalism has heretofore been innocent. 
[Doman, 1991, p. 1721 
Why is there no tabloid journalism similar to that of the UK in Canada? 
Weymouth perhaps provides the answer. He suggests five reasons why tabloids 
have been so successful in Britain: the long history of the commercialized press, 
and its strong competition; the power of media proprietors, who can and do use 
their power to influence editorial content; the downgrading of professional 
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journalistic standards; marketing by social class; and education levels 
[Weymouth, 1996, p. 45]. It is the last two factors that are most significant for 
Canada. Education levels are much higher - Canada leads the member nations of 
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development in the percentage 
of its population in postsecondary education [Galt, 2000] - and its culture more 
egalitarian [Nevitte, 1996], so that editors and owners, whatever their political 
persuasion, must market their newspapers in a more socially responsible manner 
if they want to keep their readers. As a consequence, Canada's tabloids attempt 
to focus on "the creation and maintenance of the sense of community" [Fulford, 
1998, p. 24]. 
The British Media: Murdoch and Newszak of the World 
Although British media are also subject to the same competitive forces that have 
led to increased concentration of ownership, the extent of media concentration is 
not as great in Britain as it is in Canada; there is more diversity of ownership, 
perhaps due to the fact that government regulations are stricter. However, media 
barons such as Rupert Murdoch and Conrad Black have had a particularly 
pernicious influence because they are, in effect, absentee owners; as heads of 
global corporations, they have no loyalties to any one country. The newspaper 
price wars which have been ongoing since 1993 are just one example, leading to 
newsroom layoffs - Black, for example, laid off 2,900 people from the Daily 
Telegraph after he acquired it in 1986 [Lewis, 1998] - poorer news coverage, and 
fewer media outlets as other papers, lacking the financial resources of the big 
media conglomerates, are pushed out of the market. The tabloidization of the 
press is another. 
It is true that the British press has always been characterized by 
concentration of ownership, but the trend has accelerated in recent years. In 
1947,52 per cent of daily and Sunday newspapers were owned by five major 
groups; by 1995,87 per cent were owned by the big four, News International, 
Mirror Group, United Newspapers, and Daily Mail and General Trust plc 
[Weymouth, 1996, p. 41]. By 1996, with the addition of Conrad Black's 
Telegraph and Sunday Telegraph, five companies published "96 per cent of all 
national newspapers sold in Britain. " [Franklin, 1997, p. 96] Sections 57 to 62 of 
the Fair Trading Act of 1973 govern press takeovers and allows these to be 
reviewed by the Monopolies Commission, but loopholes in the legislation 
have particularly favoured prospective buyers of newspapers at 
the expense of the public interest requirement of a pluralistic 
press. Thus it has been possible for Rupert Murdoch's News 
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International to acquire five national titles - News of the World, 
Sunday Times, Today, The Times and the Sun - without ever 
having been referred to the Monopolies Commission! 
[Weymouth, 1996, p. 49] 
However, these figures about press ownership only tell part of the story. 
The Broadcasting Act of 1996 loosened the regulations on cross-media 
ownership, allowing media corporations to use the profits from one outlet to 
subsidize a less-profitable one. The result was that, as Franklin states, "Cross- 
media ownership is now so extensive that it makes little sense to talk of a 
newspaper industry; it has become a media industry, of which newspapers 
simply form one part. " [Franklin, 1997, p. 97]. He cites the example of the £3 
billion merger of United Newspapers with the MAI Group in 1996, which brought 
together United Newspaper's Daily Express, Sunday Express, Daily Star, and close 
to 100 regional and local newspapers with MAI's interests in Channel 3 and 
Channel 5. In addition, the group now owns business and advertising 
periodicals, NOP (National Opinion Polls), as well as financial information 
services, making them "substantial media players" [Franklin, 1997, p. 97]. 
The effects on the media have been dramatic - price wars, downsizing, 
casualization of staff, the growing influence of public relations, and an ever- 
increasing demand for news - mainly at the behest of global owners who exercise 
what Anthony Sampson calls "impersonal power" [Sampson, 1996, p. 50]. 
Media barons such as Rupert Murdoch and Conrad Black have "no serious 
policies to put forward for Britain, or any other nation" [Sampson, 1996, p. 50], 
and seemingly no concern for the damage done to civic culture. A case in point is 
the price wars so energetically engaged in by Murdoch and Black as a response to 
the chronic problem of declining circulations. Between 1955 and 1995, circulation 
in national daily newspapers decreased by approximately 2.7 million copies 
[Weymouth, 1996, p. 39]; from 1965 to 1993 sales of national and Sunday 
papers went from 38 million to 29 [Franklin, 1997, p. 15]. Murdoch drastically 
cut the price of The Times in 1993, Black following suit shortly after, with neither 
owner consulting their editors, who had to deal with the effect of the cuts on their 
newsroom operations. The price wars doubled the sales of the Times, but killed 
off Today, and has further weakened the struggling Independent, which had to 
chop 100 positions between 1994 and 1996. 
Increased competition has also led to job losses in the broadcast media, 
with the BBC losing 7000 posts between 1988 and 1994, while half of the staff at 
Central Television have been cut and 135 people have been made redundant at 
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ITN [Franklin, 1997, p. 14]. The response has been to institute "bi-media", in 
which electronic journalists gather news for both radio and television, a cost- 
cutting measure made possible by new technology. Although this has saved 
money, it has not necessarily preserved editorial quality. 
Critics object that journalists working at small cable channels 
who jump into a cab with a portable camera, tripod, lights and 
recording equipment, writing a script en route to the story and 
editing the piece on their return to the studio, will not produce 
work of the same quality as a journalist working with a three- 
person film and sound crew. 
[Franklin, 1997, p. 16] 
Job losses have led to increased competition for the available posts, and 
many journalists are losing the battle for full-time work. More than one-third of 
journalists now work full-time as freelancers, are on contract or a combination of 
both, or have some other "non-staff employment arrangement" [Franklin, 1997, 
pp. 53-541. The life of ä freelancer is uncertain and badly-paid, and does not 
allow for much risk-taking or investigative journalism. As Franklin points out, 
they have to produce to order, and most definitely must publish or perish. At 
the same time that newsroom staff are being casualized, the number of people 
working in public relations has mushroomed; there are some 25,000 public 
relations and press officers compared to the 26,800 members of the National 
Union of Journalists listed in 1994 [Franklin, 1997, p. 191 plus the estimated 
18,000 practising journalists outside the NUJ [Bromley, 1997, p. 1]. With 
newsrooms under pressure to produce more stories for the increased number of 
deadlines necessitated by new technologies, and with fewer people, there is a 
growing reliance on what public relations professionals can provide. The result 
has been that 
while journalists working within media remain largely 
committed, at least in their rhetoric if not always in their news 
gathering and reporting practices, to the ideal of disinterested 
and rational enquiry, observation and reporting, this growing 
army of journalism-competent public-relations specialists and 
freelances increasingly subordinate such professional values to 
the requirements of commercial values or political persuasion. 
[Franklin, 1997, p. 20] 
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Political Reporting in the UK - The Hunters and The Hunted 
The tabloidization of the British press has certainly influenced the coverage of 
parliament and politics in general, both by broadcast and print journalists. As 
BBC political correspondent Nicholas Jones explains: 
However much broadcasters might try to distance themselves 
from such influences, the excesses of the tabloids do colour their 
news judgement and are reflected in their treatment of politics. 
Newspaper exclusives about the salacious or dubious activities of 
politicians tend to get followed up by television and radio, even 
if only obliquely at first. The various sections of the media feed 
off each other. 
[Jones, 1995, p. 11] 
The result is a focus on stories of scandal rather than reports on policy, less 
coverage of the gallery itself, more negative stories, and during elections, fewer 
stories on the campaign [Franklin, 1997, pp. 236-241]. During the 1992 election 
campaign, for example, the Sun and the Mirror headlined election news on nine of 
the 22 days of the campaign, while the Star led with the election on four days 
[Franklin, 1994, p. 153]. During the 1997 campaign, election news made the 
front page of the Mirror six times, and the Sun five, over the 45 days of the 
contest (although one of these stories was about a journalist smoking heroin on 
Major's plane), with the Star headlining the election just once, on the day of the 
vote [Scammell and Harrop, 1997, pp. 162-63]. 
These changes in political coverage are due to the same factors that have 
affected journalists everywhere: deregulation and new technologies that have 
speeded up the pace of deadlines and made the competition for stories much 
more aggressive, resulting in what one senior political correspondent describes as 
"less reporting from the gallery and more naked women. " [Franklin, 1997, p. 242] 
As in Canada, British parliamentary reporters can sit in their offices and watch 
House of Commons proceedings on television. With faxes, e-mail and the 
internet, they can gather the information for their stories, then write and edit 
them without even leaving their desks. It is a closed, somewhat claustrophobic 
world, where access to ministers is restricted by spin doctors, and the quality of 
information given is determined by a correspondent's place in the hierarchy of the 
Lobby, a uniquely British institution established in 1884. 
The Lobby has been described as "a cartel for the provision of political 
information" [Franklin, 1994, p. 86], a system operated according to "quasi- 
masonic rules drawn up in Queen Victoria's time" [Harris, in McNair, 1999, p. 
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153] in which the more than 220 political correspondents at Westminster meet 
twice daily with the prime minister's press secretary for private, off-the-record 
briefings. Although often criticized for its secretiveness, its manipulation of the 
media, and its encouragement of "lazy journalism undertaken by lazy 
journalists" [Kellner, cited in Franklin, 1994, p. 87], it still endures. To their 
credit, in 1990 the correspondents of the Guardian, the Independent and the 
Scotsman withdrew from the lobby in protest, but returned when John Major's 
press secretary allowed journalists to use the phrase "Downing Street sources" 
instead of Bernard Ingham's preferred form, "government sources" [Jones, 1995, 
p. 86] - hardly a blow for press freedom by Canadian standards. (Since 1997, 
the restrictions on anonymity have been loosened, with some briefings attributed 
to Alistair Campbell, Blair's press secretary. ) In addition to the lobby, there is 
also the tradition of the "white Commonwealth", a select group of political 
editors and correspondents who receive fuller briefings on the basis that they are 
considered friendly to the government. In existence since the days of Harold 
Wilson, this inner circle has tended to limit the boundaries of questioning in the 
lobby sessions, as journalists in it are reluctant to antagonize the press secretary 
knowing they can get a fuller briefing later [Jones, 1995, p. 90]. 
Both these traditions, coupled with the demand for political news, mean 
that British political journalists are particularly vulnerable to the stratagems of 
spin doctors. They are accustomed to using tips from government sources as the 
basis for their stories, rather than their own investigation, and to playing a 
deferential role when trying to get information from such sources; they accept the 
status quo, with all its limitations on freedom of information. Thus when a 
minister insists on certain requirements for a television interview, such as who the 
other studio guests will be, or what time the interview will be or the content of the 
questions, these are met. When political spin doctors call just before a deadline 
trying to influence a story, the call is taken, and abusive and aggressive behaviour 
is tolerated. As Nicholas Jones recalls, the behaviour of Labour party spin 
doctor Peter Mandelson shocked even his own publicity staff, who "would 
sometimes stand around open-mouthed, hardly believing that their director could 
ridicule reporters so publicly and still get away with it. " [Jones, 1995, p. 131] The 
BBC finally took action and decided to monitor such calls, after a fax was sent 
to its director general from Alistair Campbell urging that a conference speech by 
Tony Blair be given priority over the O. J. Simpson verdict on the nightly news - 
and BBC news editors acquiesced [Jones, 1995, p. 239]. 
Political journalists in Britain thus approached the eve of the election 
working in an atmosphere of obsequiousness, secrecy and media manipulation, 
driven by a fiercely competitive media industry to produce stories that often 
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were more sensational than substantive. The Scottish political corps, although 
subject to the same competitive economic pressures, took a different approach to 
reporting, an approach which, like that of Quebec political journalists, came from 
its own unique culture. 
Media in Scotland: Paper Lions and Television Tigers 
The media in Scotland, as in Quebec, are distinct in character, and express a 
"sense of nationhood, as opposed to mere regionality" [Meech and Kilborn, 
1992, p. 247], and nowhere is this more evident than in Scottish newspapers. 
Although the five morning newspapers and three Sunday papers produced in 
Scotland in 1997 had to compete with all ten of the UK dailies and nine Sundays 
at the newsagent's, they attracted enormous readerships. The Record, Scotland's 
biggest tabloid, with a readership of 1.8 million, was read by 44 per cent of 
Scottish adults, while the Sun , the Scottish edition of the British tabloid, had 
only a quarter of the readership [Schlesinger, 1998, p. 63]. By contrast, although 
Scotland has nine per cent of the UK population, the Daily Telegraph sold only 
about two per cent of its papers there. Scots also have had much higher levels of 
newspaper readership generally: a 1990 readership survey found that they were 
"20.5 percent more likely to read a daily newspaper and 14.6 percent a Sunday 
paper than were people living elsewhere in the UK. " [Meech and Kilborn, 1992, 
p. 255] 
The main reason that the London-based papers have not thrived in 
Scotland is that they either do not pay attention to Scottish affairs, or when they 
do, are clumsily inconsistent. Many are, as public relations expert Max Clifford 
has said, "English editions with a Scottish wrap-around. " [McCubbin, 1997, p. 
21] The Scottish edition of the Sun is the exception that proves the rule. It came 
out in favour of independence and the nationalist cause in 1992, a move seen as 
more commercially than politically motivated by some media observers [Smith, 
1994; Marr, 1995]. Often pages from the English edition "carrying excoriating 
right-wing editorials and reports have slipped into the version sold in Scotland, 
providing an uncomfortable dichotomy. " [Smith, 1994, p. 1131 Not too 
surprisingly, the paper abandoned its nationalist stance just before the 1997 
election, a move foreshadowed by its adoption of a more Europhobic line in its 
Scottish edition the year before [Brown, 1996], and after the paper had doubled 
its circulation to more than 390,000. 
The mid-market Daily Mail and the Express have established respectable 
readerships of more than a quarter of a million by catering to the Scottish market, 
but even so, their circulations are not much larger than those of the Dundee 
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Courier and the Aberdeen Press and Journal. Scottish newspaper readers are loyal 
to their home town papers, and there is no "national" paper per se, although the 
Glasgow Herald and the Scotsman both lay claim to that title. However, the 
reality is that people in the west of Scotland read the Herald, while those in the 
east read the Scotsman; the two quality broadsheets reach more than 13 per cent 
of Scottish readers, while the five London broadsheets are read by eight per cent 
[Schlesinger, 1998, pp. 62-63]. 
The price wars that have had such a negative effect on the quality of the 
London-based newspapers have in fact had a positive effect in Scotland by 
reinforcing the national identity of Scottish newspapers. Unable to compete on 
price, the Scottish press has "responded to the challenge of growing circulation 
for non-Scottish papers by reasserting their Scottish identity and ability to cover 
Scottish news and features. " [Lynch, 1996b, p. 10] Branding themselves as 
Scottish has been an essential strategy for marketing newspapers in Scotland: the 
Scotsman's masthead displays the national symbol of the thistle, and the slogan, 
"Scotland's national newspaper", while the Record had a bumper-sticker that 
proclaimed, "Real Scots read the Record". 
Such branding was also important in Scottish television, with the major 
television networks using such traditional Scottish symbols as the lion, the thistle 
and the saltire flag to identify themselves to their viewers as quintessentially 
Scottish, which, as Meech points out, is a paradox, "insofar as most of their 
output in fact has its source elsewhere in the UK or abroad. " [Meech, 1996, p. 
72]. Obtaining access to the network is difficult, as well as control over finances 
and creative decision-making. When Gus MacDonald moved from ITV as head 
of factual programming to become chief executive of Scottish Television in 1989, 
he found he was effectively "locked out of the network" because it was "blocked 
off by the old majors which still have a de facto guarantee on these slots. " 
[McNair, 1994, p. 170] STV (now part of the multi-media conglomerate, the 
Scottish Media Group) has been marginally more successful than BBC Scotland in 
providing programmes to the network, with five per cent of its programming 
being shown throughout the UK, while in 1991 the BBC produced approximately 
three per cent [McNair, 1994, pp. 170-71]. BBC Scotland's conflicting role as a 
national-regional outlet has meant that Scots perceive it "as an English 
organization. " [Meech, 1996, p. 77] However, BBC Scotland does excel in the 
area of news and current affairs programming, and "offers the most 
comprehensive service with a strong Scottish news service, teams of reporters 
located across Scotland as well as centrally in Glasgow, with access to British 
and international news and information from the wider BBC network. " [Lynch, 
1996b, p. 9] This is especially true of BBC Radio Scotland, established in 1978 
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when it was expected that Scotland would get its own assembly. Its morning 
news programme, Good Morning Scotland, is extremely influential, the one on 
which Scottish political parties are most keen to get air-time: so much so that it 
has created tensions with press correspondents, who resent it when embargoed 
stories are broadcast on GMS before they can get a crack at them. 
The unique nature of the Scottish media provides significant opportunities 
for the political communications of Scotland's political parties and the 
journalists who cover them, particularly as election campaigns have become more 
focused on national issues such as devolution. The media serve "as a vital 
channel of communication at election time, as a means of agenda-setting and 
political mobilising support. " [Lynch, 1996b, p. 10] The journalists who cover 
politics in Scotland thus have an especially influential role, perhaps more so than 
their colleagues south of the border. They also have a distinctive style of 
reporting, and newsroom practices that are certainly different from those in 
Canada and the UK. 
Political Reporting in Scotland: Wha's Like Us? 
What strikes an outside observer of the Scottish journalism scene most forcibly is 
the lack of rivalry among political journalists. It is, as Brian Groom, former 
deputy editor of Scotland on Sunday has said, a very cosy one, reluctant to 
criticize the Labour party oligarchy, and "so caught up in the national question 
that many journalists find it hard to view objectively. " [Smith, 1994, p. 50] At 
its best it encourages a greater sense of solidarity than exists in the London- 
based media, but at its worst, promotes a "pack journalism" mentality, in which 
a truly independent investigation of political issues is hard to find. 
The smallness of the political press corps is perhaps the reason for this 
state of affairs. One reporter described how his home became an informal press 
centre for Scottish political journalists from other newspapers during the election 
campaign. This state of affairs would be unheard of in Canada or Quebec, as is 
the practice in Scotland of allowing journalists to work for what would be seen in 
Canada as competing media outlets. For example, Iain Macwhirter had a regular 
column in the Scotsman, and now writes for the daily Herald and the Sunday 
Herald while also hosting the television programme Holyrood Live on the BBC; 
Ruth Wishart broadcasts on BBC Radio Scotland's Sunday current affairs 
programme, Eye to Eye, and has a column in the Herald. This would not be 
permitted in Canada, as it would be seen as going over to the competition. For 
the same reason, it is unheard of to "advertise" newspapers on radio and 
television by featuring commentaries from political journalists on what is in the 
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morning press. To have the political editor of the Scotsman discussing the 
headlined stories in other newspapers on Good Morning Scotland sounds strange 
to Canadian ears, although it is common practice in the UK. 
Another practice which differs from that in Canada is the reporting of 
events before they happen; in particular, political speeches or announcements. 
Speeches from Canadian politicians and other public figures are often stamped 
"check before delivery", and even though the contents of a speech may have been 
leaked beforehand, journalists tend to wait until it has actually been given before 
writing a story about it. Not so in Scotland, which can lead to some peculiar 
situations: for example, the Scotsman reported in a story March 7,1997 that 
George Robertson, Labour's then shadow Scottish Secretary of State, was going 
to make a speech on the opening day of the Scottish Labour Party's conference 
requesting the SNP's help in the referendum campaign. Unfortunately, it was 
not reported if he actually ever made those comments in the news stories about 
the conference, either in the Scotsman or the Herald. Did he make that overture to 
the SNP or didn't he? We do not know. At its most ludicrous, this practice 
resulted in the Scottish National Party sending out a four-page news release from 
the SNP's treasury spokesperson, John Swinney, rebutting point-by-point a 
proposed speech by trade secretary Ian Lang - one which Lang never delivered. 
It is fairly obvious how this practice can be used for political manipulation: 
stories can be planted about events that may or may not happen, with the spin 
on them unfiltered by any public reaction. 
The clearest illustration of the difference in the media is how news 
releases from the political parties are used. It is perplexing for a Canadian to 
read the Scotsman and the Herald and find the same quotations, word-for-word, 
from Alex Salmond and other politicians in both papers. This must mean that 
not only do politicians in Scotland speak in perfect sentences, a phenomenon not 
found anywhere else in the western industrialized world, but that they speak in 
these same perfect sentences to rival newspapers. It was only after talking to 
journalist Rennie McOwan that I discovered that printing the comments of 
politicians unedited and unquestioned, and in supposedly competing news 
outlets, was common practice in Scotland. In Canada such releases are seen by 
journalists as a news tip to be followed up with a call to the politician for an 
"authentic" quote, replete with bafflegab and garbled syntax. 
Political journalists in Scotland, like their colleagues in Canada, are less 
deferential towards politicians than their London-based colleagues. They take 
pride in asking the "bastard question" at news conferences, as Tony Blair found 
much to his discomfiture during the 1997 general election campaign, when he had 
to face a barrage of questions about his statement that the proposed parliament 
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for Scotland would have no more power than a parish council. London-based 
political correspondents who attended the conference (one of the relatively few 
held by Blair during the campaign) were shocked by the aggressiveness of the 
Scottish reporters, whom they perceived as, if not disrespectful, at least, 
discourteous: but as one Scottish political journalist recalled, Blair "didn't 
particularly get a rough ride, certainly not in terms of the standard behaviour of 
the Scottish press corps. " 
Along with this more assertive attitude comes a willingness to explore 
some issues in greater depth (something also seen in the Quebec press, and for 
much the same reasons). Again, this comes out of the Scottish media's need to 
establish a national rather than a regional identity. As Smith points out, such 
coverage gives the Scottish press the gravitas it needs to be considered more than 
regional. 
A serious English provincial newspaper, such as the Yorkshire 
Post, would not presume to draft and publish its own proposals 
for the tax-raising powers of a devolved assembly. Yet in 
Scotland, both the Herald and Scotsman have done so. A Fleet 
Street tabloid would not devote five full pages to a thinly-veiled 
denunciation of Scottish independence; the Daily Record did just 
that prior to the 1992 call. 
[Smith, 1994, p. 2] 
However, although the Scottish press wants to be identified as national, it is not 
comfortable with being identified as nationalist, and unlike that of Quebec, has a 
profoundly ambivalent relationship with nationalism. 
Nationalism, News and National Identity 
The source of the Scottish media's ambivalence is straightforward, as Smith 
explains: "Newspapers need a nationalist tone to Scottish politics, in order to 
define Scotland's 'difference' from the rest of the United Kingdom. Yet leader- 
writers, guardians of the papers' very soul, cannot bring themselves to condone 
much of what nationalism might mean to those who vote SNP. " [Smith, 1994, p. 
101] The Scottish National Party provides good copy, but not good policy, as 
far as most political journalists are concerned. The SNP is seen as being a single 
issue party, and when it has provided a wider range of policies, "it raised more 
questions than it answered", according to one correspondent. This has created 
difficulties for the SNP, because they have no consistent editorial support - the 
Sun abandoned them for Labour shortly before the 1997 election - and they are 
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effectively locked out of network television coverage, where their rival parties are 
covered on a UK-wide basis. 
In addition, the SNP's media fortunes were diminished when Scotsman 
Publications was bought by Fred and David Barclay, who appointed Andrew 
Neil editor-in-chief, long known for his "adamant opposition to independence 
and his dismissive views of what he sees as Scotland's 'monotonic' left-of-centre 
consensus" [Schlesinger, 1998, p. 65]. As the man in charge of the editorial 
direction of the Scotsman, Scotland on Sunday and the Edinburgh Evening News , 
as well as the European and Sunday Business, he has been able to promote the 
defence of the Union with considerable vigour. The creation of Scotland's own 
media conglomerate, Scottish Television (now the Scottish Media Group), which 
gave it a concentrated power base and political profile in Scotland, did not help 
the SNP's cause either. Scottish Television gets 80 per cent of its programmes 
and 85 per cent of its advertising from the ITV network, and its executives have 
made it quite clear that they do not want broadcasting to be regulated by the 
Scottish parliament, contrary to the Scottish National Party's campaign to have 
control of broadcasting vested in Edinburgh [Schlesinger, 1998, p. 65]. 
This situation is in striking contrast to that of the Parti Quebecois in the 
1970s when it was first coming to power. Quebec journalists were fully on side 
with the nationalist option, so much so that in the 1973 election the PQ platform 
received more media coverage than that of the party in power. In 1976, the year 
the Parti Quebecois won, Le journal de Montreal, the province's biggest tabloid 
daily, and a supporter of the party, "covered the PQ platform more fully and 
favourably than the programme of the Quebec Liberals, the party of the outgoing 
government. " [Charron, 1991, p. 97] It is a matter of debate as to whether the 
media support enjoyed by the PQ enabled their success, or whether their success 
came from the fact that it was the party that best represented the aspirations of 
Quebecers at that particular time in history, aspirations shared by the political 
journalists of the day. It could be that Scottish political correspondents are 
reluctant to embrace the cause of independence because they, too, reflect the 
views of their fellow Scots, who are happy with devolution now, but 
independence maybe later. 
Journalism in a Fish Bowl 
Election campaigns are the ultimate tests for political journalists as well as 
politicians. Their coverage is 
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journalism in a fish bowl. Reporters face not only deadline 
pressures but exhausting travel schedules, sophisticated 
manipulation by 'spin doctors' and high expectations from 
media critics, voters and their news organizations. There is the 
ever-present risk of 'flak' from parties and candidates, and 
pressure from news managers who expect compelling 
journalism in return for the high and increasing cost of covering 
national elections. 
[Fletcher, 1996, p. 140] 
However, journalists put unrealistic pressures on politicians, expecting them to 
produce news every day, if not several times a day, during campaigns, and 
according to the rules of the media game. Reporters look for the controversial 
comment that will make a good soundbite on the nightly news or a headline story 
in the paper, or for "phrases or images that further a pre-existing story line. " 
[Fletcher, 1996, p. 149] This is true for both Britain and Canada. There are other 
trends in campaign coverage common to both countries as well: the increasing 
negativity of election news; an emphasis on journalistic comment rather than that 
of candidates; a change in focus from policy issues to political strategy; and the 
exclusion of smaller parties [Fletcher, 1996; Franklin, 19971. The last has proved 
especially problematic for the Scottish National Party. 
Political journalists in Quebec and Scotland face unique constraints as a 
result of their position within stateless nations. For Quebec journalists, it is the 
problem of objectivity; for those in Scotland, it is their ambivalent attitude 
towards nationalism. The nationalist parties in both regions have had to struggle 
to develop effective political communication strategies in these difficult political 
environments, with the Scottish National Party and the early Parti Quebecois 
having to overcome the doubt and uncertainty about the workability of 
independence; and the Bloc Quebecois, the polarization and hostility within and 
without the borders of Quebec - no easy task, as we shall see in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Stratagems and Strategists 
The communications strategies of political parties have become all-important in 
modem elections, so much so that instead of being a contest for the hearts and 
minds of voters, election campaigns are now media events [Gilsdorf and Bernier, 
1991, p. 4], with journalists and political strategists struggling to control the 
agenda and how campaign events are to be interpreted. The growth in the 
numbers of party strategists, at least in Canadian political campaigns, has 
resulted in greater party control and less journalistic autonomy, they say, as 
political reporters are overwhelmed by the stratagems of political spin doctors 
[Gilsdorf and Bernier, 1991, p. 49]. The other result has been a shift to what 
Fletcher describes as "the strategic-game perspective" in election reporting, which 
"communicates a cynical view of politics that may actually do politicians and 
citizens a disservice. It overlooks the possibility that politicians shape their 
policies not only for electoral advantage but also according to their own 
assumptions about the public interest. " [Fletcher, 1996, p. 149] 
Does this political dance between politicians and journalists actually 
affect the outcome of election campaigns? There does not seem to be any clear 
evidence that it does [Desbarats, 1990; Crete, 1991; Franklin, 1994; McNair, 
1995], but that does not seem to stop people from believing that it has an effect. 
Gilsdorf and Bernier state firmly that "we believe that journalistic practice 
influences the course of campaigns and the results of the vote" [Gilsdorf and 
Bernier, 1991, p. 5], without providing any support for that argument and 
reporting in their study "that most journalists deny that campaigns have much 
effect or that the media have any influence on election campaigns. " [Gilsdorf and 
Bernier, 1991, p. 22] Despite the lack of proof, "politicians, media consultants, 
and journalists continue to behave as if the news media are influential, and this 
assumption seems to be shared by voters who are always ready to blame the 
media for whatever current problems afflict their political systems. " [Desbarats, 
1990. p. 150] As Denis McQuail so nicely puts it: "The evidence of effectiveness 
is often indirect, coming mainly from the persistent behaviour of campaigners 
themselves. " [McQuail, 1994, p. 350] 
In this chapter I will examine the persistent behaviour of campaigners 
within the Scottish National Party, the Parti Quebecois and the Bloc Quebecois. 
It is essential to understand the development of campaign strategy in the PQ to 
understand that of the Bloc, as the two parties are so intertwined, and never 
more so during the 1997 federal election in Canada. The communication 
strategies of the SNP and the Bloc are almost opposite mirror images of each 
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other in their development, with the SNP's early strategic attempts showing little 
of the consistent professionalism of those displayed by the PQ right from its 
earliest beginnings, headed as it was by the media-savvy Rend Levesque, or by 
the Bloc under Lucien Bouchard. The SNP's increasing professionalization, so 
clearly demonstrated in the 1997 national election in Britain, was a striking 
contrast to the shambles of the BQ's performance in the Canadian federal 
election of that same year, when the leader of the Bloc was forced to call upon 
the old pros in the Parti Quebecois to rescue him after a series of organizational 
blunders at the start of his campaign. 
The Scottish National Party: Early Successes 
It was not until the 1960s and the party presidency of William Wolfe that the 
Scottish National Party acquired the communications skills and strategic 
organization of a modern party. The attempts of John MacCormick, founder of 
the SNP, to use the party as "a propaganda organization dedicated to 
persuading other parties to accept an agreed measure of Home Rule in Scotland" 
[Mackie, 1991, p. 3721 met with failure, and after leaving the SNP in 1942, he 
went on to organize the Scottish National Covenant, the two-million signature 
petition for devolution. But, Mackie notes: "As a cheap and effective means of 
publicity and education, the Covenant proved valuable. It was also valuable in 
showing that mere opinion was of no interest to Westminster, where men dealt in 
power. " [Mackie, 1991, p. 372] 
It was the efforts of Wolfe, as well as organizer Ian Macdonald, that 
modernized the SNP "and created a remarkable publicity machine" [Harvie, 
1994, p. 1731. As an accountant and candidate in West Lothian, where 1,000 
jobs owed their existence to the shale oil industry [Mitchell, 1996, p. 198], Wolfe 
understood the economics of oil and its importance in convincing the Scottish 
public that Scotland could survive financially as an independent nation. In 1963 
he became director of publicity and development, and under his guidance the 
SNP's publicity "soon became the best of any British party" [Harvie, 1994, p. 
1761. It was also during his tenure that the SNP's popular thistle-loop logo was 
created (killed off in 1991 only to be reincarnated five years later), and the party 
was given permission to air political broadcasts on television and radio for the 
first time, before it had even won a seat. 
The commitment to organizing, fund-raising, research and membership 
recruitment made under Wolfe's leadership paid off in the election of Winnie 
Ewing in the Hamilton by-election of 1967. Ewing's election reaped enormous 
publicity for the SNP. "The media now became almost indulgent" [Harvie, 1994, 
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p. 174], with Ewing being given a weekly column in the Daily Record, while the 
Scottish Daily Express had a weekly report on her activities at Westminster and 
most of the major Scottish papers, with the exception of the Glasgow Herald, 
"made sympathetic noises. " [Harvie, 1994, p. 179] Although she lost her seat in 
the general election two-and-a-half years later, her brief stint in parliament did a 
great deal to raise the profile of the SNP. However, her slogan, "Free by '73" 
was "the first in a long line of over-ambitious Nationalist catch-phrases. " 
[Clements, Farquharson and Wark, 1996, p. 50] 
It was the discovery of large stores of oil and gas off the coast of Scotland 
in the 70s that gave the SNP a big advantage in the propaganda struggle for 
independence. No longer could it be argued that Scotland was too poor to 
govern itself, while millions of pounds in Scottish oil revenues were flooding into 
government coffers. Wolfe, who became chairman of the party in 1969, declared 
that oil should be the centrepiece of its publicity [Marr, 1995, p. 132], and with 
the team of economist Donald Bain as researcher, Cambridge graduate Stephen 
Maxwell as head of publicity, and Gordon Wilson, who had been organizer of the 
SNP's pirate Radio Free Scotland, "the SNP so collared the oil issue that, 
between 1972 and 1975, businessmen and journalists wanting information on oil 
policy came to the SNP rather than to government departments, as the SNP was 
factually better briefed. " [Harvie, 1995, p. 1231 Slogans such as "It's Scotland's 
oil" , "Scotland's Oil - To London With Love" and "Rich Scot or Poor Briton? " 
hit home: the SNP won seven seats in the 1974 general election, with five of them 
in the north-east, the area of the country dominated by the oil industry [Harvie, 
1994, p. 188]. Seven months later it won four more seats to send a total of 11 
MPs to Westminster. 
McCrone states that the SNP's success in the 1970s was due to the fact 
that it "was a 'media' party, well suited to an increasingly volatile electorate, 
and one which did not need to make the 'long march' through the political 
undergrowth as the Labour Party had to do at the turn of the century. " 
[McCrone, 1992, pp. 167-68] In one sense this is true: the SNP was a media 
party in that it knew how to use the media, but not in the sense that it had any 
consistent media backing. Scottish members of the Labour Party had the tacit 
support of the influential Watchdog group during the 1970s, which included such 
prominent Scottish journalists as Jimmy Frame, Chris Baur and Neal Ascherson, 
who "gave the politicians a coterie of clever men off whom they could bounce 
ideas" about Home Rule [Marr, 1995, p. 144]. There was no such close 
relationship with journalists for the SNP. While the press were happy to use the 
professional expertise of the party's communications and research department, 
particularly on the oil issue, that respect had been hard-won, and could easily 
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disappear, which William Wolfe knew only too well. As devolution came closer, 
attacks on the SNP increased, with headlined stories linking them to "tartan 
terrorists", virulent nationalism, and political extremism. As Ascherson wrote in 
his Scotsman diary: "Few days go by without a reader's letter or political speech 
which accuses the SNP of either fascism or the intention to use the bomb and the 
Kalashnikov. " [Cited in Marr, 1995, p. 1501 
It was in the context of this negative coverage of the nationalists and the 
growing divisions between gradualists and fundamentalists within the SNP that 
threatened to tear it apart that Wolfe "repeatedly warned his party to avoid an 
aggressive image. 'Reassurance is the essence of what we must project. ' Keep 
calm, stay moderate, he kept telling the SNP, and they would come into their 
inheritance. " [Marr, 1995, p. 151] Unfortunately, his message was ignored, with 
disastrous results for the SNP. It took almost 15 years before party strategists 
realized what a crucial error had been made. 
Mixed Messages, Mediocre Results: The SNP from 1979 to 1992 
The early 1980s were grim years for the Scottish National Party. Torn by 
factionalism and bitter party struggles that led to some highly-publicized 
expulsions (see chapter three), the SNP lost members and funds. Its shrinking 
membership "meant that the party's income dropped by a dramatic amount, 
causing a contraction of the party's headquarters and occasional paralysis to the 
party organization. " [Lynch, 1996a, p. 225] It only managed to survive because 
of a legacy to the party. Half-hearted attempts were made to revive the oil issue, 
but by then it had been hijacked by the other Scottish parties, who also pledged 
that oil revenues would stay in Scotland [Mitchell, 1996, p. 2101. 
Ironically, what was at the heart of the SNP's struggles was a concern 
about its identity and the best strategy for communicating that to the public. The 
party lacked a clear vision of itself, and without it, the SNP ended up being 
defined by its opponents. It was the members of the '79 Group, which included 
Alex Salmond, who were most concerned about the party's image. There was 
general agreement on party policies, which were mostly left-wing, but, as one 
member stated, "the party is not prepared to accept the implications of this and 
admit its actual political character to the outside world" [Cited in Mitchell, 1996, 
p. 2321. The '79 Group wanted the SNP to declare itself as a left-wing, 
republican party, and although it did not succeed in its aims, by 1983 the SNP 
had defined itself as a moderate, left-of-centre party. 
However, the party had not resolved the split between fundamentalists 
and gradualists, and this division led to a confusion in the party's message and 
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strategy that continued right up until the 1992 election. The story of the SNP 
from 1987 to 1992 is one of two steps forward, one step back as the gradualists 
within the party, led by Alex Salmond, deputy leader from 1987-91, then leader, 
and Mike Russell, vice-convener for publicity 1987-92, and later chief executive, 
attempted to exert more control over the party's direction and strategy. It was 
often frustrating for those party strategists who believed a more gradualist and 
focused approach would be less alienating to the voters. As one of them 
explained (all quotations in this chapter are from the research interviews, unless 
otherwise stated): 
"What we did between 1987 and 1992 is we spent about four years 
and nine months on single issue campaigns; poll tax, nuclear 
dumping, you name it, steel, we were there, single issue 
campaigns, and we failed to make any link between them. We 
kept on doing a single issue campaign, then hey, presto, just 
before the election, we decided to concentrate on explaining the 
meaning of independence and we almost told a shocked 
population that within three months Scotland was going to be 
independent - and we wondered why we got a fight. Now our 
opponents were able to ridicule us, to make us look like 
revolutionaries, to make us look like people to be feared. " 
The mixed message sent out by the Scottish National Party during the 1992 
election was a direct result of a split in its campaign strategy between the two 
party factions, which prevented the SNP from getting better results despite a 
much more professionally-organized operation - what Lynch describes as "the 
paradox of professionalization" [Lynch, 1996a, p. 219]. 
The Paradox of Professionalization 
The paradox during the 1992 campaign was that there were two contrary views 
of the Scottish National Party platform being projected by two different 
campaign teams: the first, "a restrained campaign of positive messages about 
change and reassurance to supporters", promoted by the gradualists within the 
party under the leadership of Alex Salmond and operated in-house by staff, and 
the second, "a full-blown campaign for national independence" promulgated by 
the fundamentalists, headed by deputy leader Jim Sillars [Lynch, 1996a, p. 220] 
and run by a professional public relations firm. The major problem with the 
fundamentalist approach was that it seemed absurd within the context of the 
times; the SNP had only five MPs and its opinion poll ratings were hovering just 
above 20 per cent. The fundamentalist message was given extra punch by the 
fact that it was the one being supported by the services of an Edinburgh-based 
public relations firm, which had offered to help the party during the campaign on 
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an expenses-only basis. Billboards proclaiming "Nobody ever celebrated 
devolution day" and party election broadcasts that anticipated celebrating 
"independence day" overshadowed the more moderate and reassuring messages 
that the party gradualists were trying to promote. Instead of creating a unified 
message for the party, the agency over-emphasized the aggressive "Free by '93" 
position of the fundamentalists, "and created a confusion by amplifying a mixed 
message" [Lynch, 1996a, p. 221]. 
The results were as the party gradualists had feared: the SNP had even 
fewer MPs at the end of the campaign, just three, "which showed how ill-judged 
it had been to fight the election as 'the independence election. "' [Lynch, 1996a, p. 
220] Angered and disappointed by what had happened, the gradualists in the 
leadership vowed "Never again" and immediately following the election began 
work on a new, more coherent strategy that would guide the party's political 
communications for the next five years. 
The Five-Year Plan 
After the 1992 election the shift towards a gradualist strategy was hastened by 
the resignations of some of the fundamentalist office-bearers in the Scottish 
National Party, and the determined efforts of those who felt the SNP's campaign 
had been "just wrong. It was an alarming election campaign; it was illogical, it 
was irrational, it over-claimed about our performance; it was madness", 
according to one party member and former candidate, who decided to run for 
senior office in the party so that he could direct the SNP's strategy and make 
sure that such mistakes would be avoided in future campaigns. The party 
leadership embarked on a serious analysis of its strategic operations, with the 
result that it formulated a five-year plan to carry the SNP through the European 
and local elections in 1994 and the next general election, with specific targets and 
goals, strictly adhered to. The message was to be one of reassurance and 
moderation, outlining the social and economic benefits of independence, and, 
most importantly, was to be based on a respect for the will of the Scottish 
people; if they chose to reject the message there would be no comments about 
too many Scots being "90-minute patriots" as Jim Sillars remarked after his 
defeat in Govan in 1992. 
Key to the successful implementation of this strategy was the 
development of professional fund-raising techniques using a direct mail campaign 
called Challenge of the Nineties, again, as is the pattern with the SNP, using in- 
house staff along with appointees who had professional expertise in the area but 
who were also party loyalists [Lynch, 1996a]. This move was prompted by the 
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fact that the party had only been able to spend £120,000 on the 1992 election, 
compared to the £2 million spent by the Tories and the approximately £1 million 
spent by Labour. The money raised was used to hire more staff at the party's 
Edinburgh headquarters in order to provide the kind of professional and 
administrative support for political candidates and office-bearers that had 
previously been lacking. 
The most significant of these was the hiring of a chief executive in 
December of 1994 to strengthen the party's central organization. The role of the 
chief executive was fourfold: first, as manager, to organize the resources of the 
party and develop its operations; second, to act as liaison between the office- 
bearers and staff; third, to act as spokesperson, spin-doctor and media 
strategist; and lastly, and perhaps most crucially, given the strong grass-roots 
basis of the SNP, help the party make the transition from being largely volunteer- 
run to having professional staff. The person chosen for the position was well- 
qualified to take on these tasks, having been a former office-bearer and 
parliamentary candidate, with several years of experience as a film and 
television producer and head of a media consultancy. 
The importance of this appointment to the over-all success of the party's 
media strategy cannot be underestimated. Before his arrival, the stresses and 
strains on the members of the SNP executive trying to fulfil the media relations 
role were extremely demanding, particularly during moments of crisis, as one 
party executive member recalled. An executive with a demanding job and young 
family, as well as his responsibilities for the SNP's strategic planning and its 
publicity, he found handling the spin-doctor role without any backup during one 
media incident almost overwhelming. Alex Salmond had given an interview to 
Scotland on Sunday in January of 1995 in which he discussed constitutional issues 
and stated that he was receptive to devolution as a means of gaining 
independence for Scotland. The story, headlined "Salmond backs devolution" 
began generating controversy as soon as the paper hit the streets. 
"And then he [Salmond] phones me about 7: 45 am Sunday 
morning that he had been phoned by a journalist. He was in 
Peterhead; I was in Glasgow; so I ran out and bought a paper and 
read it over on the phone to him, and we decided what to do. I 
think if my employers had been watching over the next four 
days they would have sacked me, because I had sat the whole of 
that Sunday -I just said to my wife, 'Just go away for the week' -I 
sat on the phone all day talking to journalists, reassuring party 
activists, sorting out opponents within the executive who were 
uneasy about things, directing the issue for the convener, giving 
him the support that he needs at times. That was my life 
parcelled out for the whole of that Sunday. For the rest of the 
week as the story entrenched and got difficult I would do the 
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same thing at work - phoning journalists, you know. The 
temperature would go up further when someone from the party 
executive would attack what Alec had said; the temperature 
would go up further when Alec attacked that person, so again it 
went on for days. Now if that happened just now with the state 
of my life, with work, politics, the constituency and all the rest of 
it, I just couldn't manage, I would collapse. " 
Having a chief executive in place meant that the party now had someone 
full-time at headquarters who could handle such crises, as when Roseanna 
Cunningham was selected as the SNP candidate for the 1995 Perth and Kinross 
by-election. Her selection was allegedly criticized by party president Winnie 
Ewing, because of a relationship Cunningham had in 1977 with Donald Bain, 
who had been married to Ewing's daughter-in-law, Margaret. In Canada this 
kind of situation would have never have been a matter of public controversy, 
given the cultural constraints against discussing the personal lives of politicians 
by Canadian journalists. As Margaret Ewing herself said: "Press interest in 
events almost 20 years old is foolish and prurient" [Dinwoodie, 1995]. This time 
when the controversy made the news, the chief executive put in 16 to 17-hour 
days co-ordinating the media response which in the end "generated good 
publicity because there was a sense of sympathy for Roseanna in the public .... It 
had a happy ending which we managed. " 
It also enabled the party to develop pro-active media strategies for her 
during the by-election, in which Cunningham faced strong opposition from the 
Tories in the formerly Conservative-held seat. The Conservatives had timed the 
by-election to coincide with VE Day, which they planned to use for Union flag- 
waving combined with an attack on Scottish nationalism, which they linked to 
that of Nazi Germany. In anticipation of this strategy, the SNP's 
communications office prepared a story about Cunningham's father, a World 
War Two veteran, complete with photo of him in uniform and details of his war 
record, timed to appear in the press on VE Day, thus scuppering the Tory plan. 
As Lynch states: "What could have been a difficult event for the SNP was 
therefore carefully managed and turned to the party's advantage. " [Lynch, 
1996a, p. 230] 
A Dedicated Team 
The most important achievement of the chief executive, however, has been the 
creation of an extremely effective communications team, which employs all the 
modern strategies of political communications such as agenda-setting, story 
placement, photo-ops, pseudo-events and spin-doctoring to get the SNP's 
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message across [Lynch, 1996a]. For example, when prominent Labour Party 
member and Edinburgh councillor George Kerevan decided to join the SNP in the 
summer of 1996, the communications office arranged for an exclusive in Scotland 
on Sunday, giving the paper an essay written by Kerevan about why he made his 
decision. However, in order not to antagonize the other media outlets, the SNP 
communications office sent out its news release on the Kerevan defection at one 
minute after midnight, as soon as the early edition of Scotland on Sunday had hit 
the streets. On another occasion when a Herald reporter discovered in recently- 
released Scottish Records Office documents that the police had been spying on 
the SNP during the early 50s, the press office lined up an interview and photo 
session with Dr. Robert McIntyre, party leader at that time, for comment and 
illustration to go with the reporter's story. 
Although the party has been good at projecting a positive message, it has 
not been so good at responding to negative campaigning from its opponents, 
particularly during the 1992 election [Lynch, 1996a]. This has not just been due 
to a lack of resources, which is a factor, but also to a philosophical reluctance of 
party media managers to use such techniques. As the communications director 
said: "Maybe we just don't have that sort of killer instinct.... we're maybe not, if 
you like, culturally attuned to that kind of campaigning. We're much happier 
really when we're campaigning for independence and the great things 
independence will deliver. " The chief executive was also not keen to use Peter 
Mandelson-style methods of bullying reporters, but expressed some ambivalence 
about his stance: 
"I actually think I am at my most effective if I only ring up an 
editor to say 'Well done' or to shout at them once a month. I 
don't think ringing a journalist or an editor five times a day is 
sensible policy, but perhaps we should be doing that at a lower 
level, perhaps as an organization. Perhaps we don't do that 
nearly enough. " 
This is not to say that he does not use such tactics on occasion: one reporter 
recalled an incident in which the chief executive had got wind of a story he was 
doing but was mistaken as to what was in it, and "went into maximum rebuttal 
mode-phoning the editor even before I had even filed the story-but you know I 
kind of enjoyed the argy-bargy shouting match", although it was, he said, "a 
rather unpleasant example of the rebuttal technique". 
The creation of "a hierarchy of media managers" at Scottish National 
Party headquarters [Lynch, 1996a, p. 229] was a crucial development for the 
SNP, because unlike the other parties in Scotland, it had not been guaranteed 
automatic UK-wide press coverage. Seen as a regional party with little influence 
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by the London-based media, it did not have the media pull of a national leader 
or the resources of a national party organization to promote its message. Yet in 
spite of these handicaps, the SNP generally managed to out-perform its political 
rivals on a comparative basis. As one senior strategist said: 
"The strength of what we've got is a dedicated team.... We can 
play outside our league. If we were a football team we would be 
one of the best prospective small teams in Scotland because we 
have all the virtues of Scottish small teams. We're fighters, we 
score goals. We've got all the lack of virtues of small Scottish 
teams too, which is we sometimes get defeated by our own ends. 
It's the old Scottish psychosis. " 
This is not just the view of those within the Scottish National Party; it is one 
shared by the members of the Scottish political press. 
Punching Above Their Weight 
It is not common to encounter almost complete agreement on a topic amongst 
members of the press. However, when discussing the Scottish National Party's 
media relations, there is a unanimity of opinion as to the effectiveness of the 
party's political communications. As one political journalist who had experience 
of both Westminster and Scottish politics described them: 
"Given their relative size compared to the two major UK 
parties and their relative lack of finance by comparison to the 
two parties in Scotland - the Tories have huge amounts of 
money to spend - the SNP is extremely effective. You know the 
old business phrase of Britain punching above their weight in 
national politics, well, I think the SNP punch above their weight 
in Scottish politics. " 
Another editor stated flatly that the SNP 
"has the strongest press operation in Scottish politics, and that's 
on a number of levels. At a very basic level... they respond very 
well to events. You know if something flashes up on Ceefax 
you can guarantee that an hour later there will be an SNP press 
release giving the SNP's particular take on this event, whether 
it's a sport victory or an earthquake in Azerbeijan; you know 
there's an SNP line on it somewhere and it comes through 
promptly; it's well-written; it's well-presented; just in terms of 
the real world of press releases it looks professional, it looks 
authoritative. " 
This view was echoed by a political correspondent, who described the SNP as 
having "by far the best operation in Scotland", which he attributed to the skill of 
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the chief executive's dealing with the press, and the party's communications and 
research office. The media relations of the chief executive were "far better, more 
relaxed, less confrontational, less aggressive" than those of the other parties, and 
in the SNP's ability to quickly provide background information on issues 
"nobody comes close to touching them .... that puts them out in a league of their 
own". 
About the only complaint was that the SNP occasionally went over the 
top in its pursuit of the news and issued too many news releases (a failing 
admitted to by both the chief executive and the leader of the party, who 
confessed that sometimes his staff thought he was "daft" for wanting to issue so 
many), but the criticism was muted. One editor said that although he used less 
than one per cent of the SNP news releases, he insisted on getting them because it 
was "like an all-day seminar on what the SNP thinks... and it can be very 
illuminating". As another editor pointed out, although the SNP were sometimes 
over-eager it was because they had to be, to compensate for the fact that they 
were competing in a four-party system in which "they're fighting for attention 
and fighting to keep their profile". 
However, agreement on their effectiveness did not mean agreement with 
the SNP's nationalist message. All were sceptical of the party's programme and 
distrustful of what they saw as the SNP's "independence-will-solve-everything" 
approach to policy issues, remaining unconvinced by the party's efforts to 
document their case for independence. As one reporter put it: 
"They have laid waste to forests producing over the last few years 
something like the best part of 30 written policy reports, position 
papers and I know why they're doing that... You almost get to the 
point of saying, well this is going too far, but I can see why they 
want to do it. Just don't ask me to take it too seriously. " 
The SNP is a long way from receiving the kind of enthusiastic support which the 
Parti Quebecois received from francophone reporters in Quebec during the 1960s 
and 70s. 
Getting Results 
The decision of the Scottish National Party's leadership to develop a more 
focused, long-range plan for election campaigning and to strengthen its central 
organization and resources paid off, particularly during the European elections in 
June of 1994, when it gained close to 33 per cent of the vote and elected two 
MEPs. Instead of casting the election as the independence election, as had been 
done in the past, 
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the representational arguments of Scotland in Europe played 
second fiddle to the increase in VAT on fuel, the rise in national 
insurance contributions and the persistence of poverty and social 
problems in Scotland. These themes were used to demonstrate 
the cost for every taxpayer of remaining in the Union with 
England, in contrast to the benefits of independent membership 
in the European Union. 
[Lynch, 1994, p. 53] 
This communications approach, combined with a targeting of constituencies 
where the SNP stood a good chance of winning or coming in second, gave it the 
electoral credibility it needed to set the stage for the national elections to be held 
within three years. Having two MEPs also helped the SNP gain more publicity, 
with one of them being the party's deputy leader, Allan Macartney, and the 
other, SNP president Winnie Ewing, whose high-profile activism in the European 
parliament had won her the unofficial title of "Madame Ecosse". 
The party also did well in the regional elections held the month before, 
winning approximately 27 per cent of the vote, and for the first time, coming 
second to the Labour Party in terms of seats as well as votes, and gaining control 
of Tayside and Grampian councils. Although the percentage of votes was 
smaller than in the elections for MEPs, the results were more significant, as the 
European elections had a much smaller voter turn-out and were "seen by voters 
as elections of secondary importance. " [Denver, 1994, p. 67] 
The biggest test of the party's new strategy was during the Monklands 
East by-election at the end of June, in which there was a 26.9 per cent increase in 
the SNP vote, only 1,640 ballots behind Labour in the constituency that had 
belonged to John Smith, the late Labour Party leader [Pringle, 1994]. The party's 
candidate, Kay Ullrich, won 44.9 per cent of the vote against Helen Liddell, 
former general secretary of the Labour party in Scotland, in an electoral contest 
marked by "accusations of religious sectarianism" [Brown et al, 1999, p. 29]. 
This result was all the more significant given that the party had serious 
organizational problems at the beginning of the two-week campaign which 
required emergency intervention from Scottish National Party headquarters. 
Thus, by the time of the run-up to the 1997 election, the Scottish National 
Party was better-prepared than it had ever been before, with a strong 
communications team and central organization, more than £500,000 in campaign 
funds, and a clear and well-co-ordinated message. The contrast between 1992 
and 1997 was dramatic. As a senior strategist explained: 
"In 1992 the SNP was a very hard, isolated, absolutist force, and 
by its nature very difficult for people to support. By 1997 we'd 
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constructed a message which was much more inclusive, much 
broader, much more reassuring, but no less principled in what 
we believed in as a party .... The result was that the exercise in 
motivation that we did during the election campaign was much 
more successful and much more effective. " 
The Parti Quebecois in the Age of Television 
The independence movement in Quebec, unlike that in Scotland, has often been 
inspired by the leadership of charismatic, populist men, who have forcefully and 
eloquently given voice to nationalist aspirations. One of the most influential was 
Rene Levesque, founder of the Parti Quebecois. It has been said that the Scottish 
National Party of the 1960s and 70s, "was, in a crucial sense, a modern party. 
That is, it was able to take advantage of the media, notably television, at the key 
moment in its formation" [Brown, McCrone and Paterson, 1996, p. 140], and this 
was certainly true for the Parti Quebecois under Levesque, whose background in 
television journalism gave him a unique understanding of the medium and how it 
could be used. "The Levesque wheeze explaining world events within a cloud of 
cigarette smoke and chalk dust before a blackboard in the TV studio became a 
familiar performance in homes where newspaper reading traditionally started at 
the sports pages and finished at the comics. " [Desbarats, 1976, p. 67] This gift 
for explaining complex issues in a way the general public could understand, 
honed during his years as the host of Point de Mire, proved to be a formidable 
political asset. When Levesque first entered politics, his reputation as a TV 
anchor attracted the crowds, but it was this ability "that made him a political 
star in his first campaign. " [Desbarats, 1976, p. 73] 
His background in journalism also garnered him a very favourable press 
from his former Press Gallery colleagues during the 60s who still saw him as one 
of their own - as did Levesque on occasion, much to the irritation of his fellow 
Liberal Party cabinet members. 
There was virtually no critical reporting of Levesque. French- 
language journalists continually made allowances for him, 
rarely taking his remarks out of context and carefully avoiding 
the temptation to crucify him on a single careless phrase. 
English-language journalists didn't always attempt to be so 
sympathetic. 
[Desbarats, 1976, pp. 73-74] 
That division among the francophone and anglophone media increased as 
Ldvesque's nationalist views became more apparent and he moved towards 
supporting Quebec independence, founding the Parti Quebecois in 1968. During 
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the first election he fought as leader of the PQ in 1970, the party "ran a positive, 
almost therapeutically affirmative campaign, with a slogan of 'Oui! "' [Fraser, 
1994, p. 54], a dramatic contrast to the negative campaign of the government 
party, the conservative Union Nationale, which engineered the "coups de La 
Brinks", an extremely effective form of propaganda. When just a few days 
before the election, eight Brinks trucks full of securities worth millions were 
photographed leaving Montreal at dawn, the justice minister said that the 
millions were being moved out of the province because of the political instability 
caused by the separatist threat, and described Levesque as "the Fidel Castro of 
Quebec" [Fraser, 1994, p. 54]. Brinks officials later confirmed that this was just 
usual procedure for the firm, but the effect could not be undone, despite 
Levesque's valiant attempts to convince nervous Quebecers that they were "the 
first citizens of a normal nation, as good as any other" [Desbarats, 1976, p. 179]. 
The Liberals won, led by Robert Bourassa, whose background in government 
finance and image as a young, progressive businessman was what Quebec voters 
wanted, according to opinion research commissioned by the party [Fraser, 1984, 
p. 52]. 
In the 1973 provincial election, the PQ executive, against L6vesque's 
wishes, decided that the party should produce a model budget for the first year 
of independence as a means of reassuring the wary voter. Unfortunately the 
budget, which contained errors, was based on over-optimistic expectations of 
growth, which "provided the Liberals with one heaven-sent opportunity" [Fraser, 
1984, p. 59]. By 1976, however, the PQ knew better, focusing its campaign on 
down-to-earth issues such as free drugs for pensioners, reform of health and 
safety laws, strict rules for election finances, and changes to the unpopular 
language law, Bill 22. L6vesque also softened the party's stand on how it would 
achieve independence, saying that the PQ would hold a referendum first before it 
began negotiations. 
It was this strategy of reassurance and moderation that helped them win 
the election in 1976. The televising of the National Assembly, begun in 1977, 
frustrated the opposition Liberals, whose leader, Claude Ryan, did not 
understand the demands of the new medium. The PQ did, with government 
members "more telegenic, better prepared, better organized for the new rules of 
the game" [Fraser, 1984, p. 170]. It was during the referendum campaign in 
1980, however, that the Parti Quebecois most brilliantly exploited television. 
Under the direction of House Leader Claude Charron, the performance of PQ 
members in the televised National Assembly debates on the referendum was as 
carefully choreographed as a Broadway musical. As journalist Graham Fraser 
described it: 
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Men who had not written or researched a speech in years 
painstakingly practised delivering them to their wives in 
basement rec rooms to get the timing and delivery 
perfect.... Levesque went through his own speech, scribbling 
changes, mouthing the phrases to judge the effect, altering and 
improving to the last minute. Charron.... coached, co-ordinated, 
and marshalled the speakers, controlling the flow of debate and 
stressing first one theme and then another. As PQ members 
spoke, Levesque would slip out of his seat to be out of camera 
range, so as not to be a distraction; Charron would pace the floor, 
just outside the camera's vision, looking for all the world like a 
hockey coach or a TV floor director, greeting members coming 
into the Assembly before their speeches with a slap on the 
shoulder or a hug, watching the delivery carefully, and flashing 
his fingers in a countdown to show how much of the allotted 
time remained. As each speaker finished, the members would 
gather around him, applauding and shaking his hand. Posed, 
planned - but effective. 
[Fraser, 1984, p. 219] 
The effectiveness was limited, however: although it was generally agreed that the 
PQ won the debate in the National Assembly, it did not win over the voters, who 
defeated the referendum 60 per cent to 40. The problem, the PQ leadership 
realized, was that Quebec voters had been frightened by the prospect of change, 
and for the 1981 provincial election, they designed a strategy based on 
reassurance. Again, the party used the televised hearings of the National 
Assembly to get its message across in the run-up to the election: first, with the 
constitutional standing committee hearings, in which the federal government's 
Charter of Rights was repeatedly attacked; and secondly, the hearings on Hydro- 
Quebec's $55.5-billion development plan, which highlighted Quebec's 
technological expertise. The campaign itself was, as Fraser notes, "a textbook 
example of a well-organized, well-structured, well-marketed campaign. 
Carpentier [Michel Carpentier, Levesque's executive assistant] and the other 
strategists had learned from the referendum defeat: this time, there was to be no 
challenge to the electorate, no sense of risk, no defensiveness. " [Fraser, 1984, p. 
2071 Against most of the predictions, the PQ won. 
That was the last victory of the Parti Quebecois until 1994. In 1981 
Levesque suffered a humiliating defeat when prime minister Pierre Trudeau and 
the other nine Canadian provinces engineered an agreement on constitutional 
reform that isolated Quebec during the famous "night of the long knives". Soon 
after the constitutional accord, Levesque "became the target of a strange 
anonymous whispering campaign" [Fraser, 1984, p. 319] concerning his private 
life, unusual for Canada and particularly Quebec, where the personal 
peccadilloes of politicians are usually off-limits for the media. As Graham Fraser 
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recalls, over a period of a year, reporters at newspaper and radio stations began 
receiving calls saying that Levesque's marriage was in trouble, citing various 
reasons, which, on investigation, were found to be untrue. The worst one was 
that Levesque's father-in-law had laid charges against him for corrupting a minor 
- his wife's younger sister. There were no such charges; his wife did not have a 
younger sister. It was not until Levesque's wife publicly protested the repeated 
questioning from journalists who were trying to check the accuracy of the stories 
that the calls just as mysteriously stopped. The premier's staff believed, quite 
rightly, that he and his wife "were victims of an insidious black propaganda 
campaign - all the more effective because of Levesque's reputation as a 
womanizer. " [Fraser, 1984, p. 3201 It was a peculiar and rather ugly episode in 
Quebec politics. 
In June of 1985 Levesque retired, and in December of that year the Parti 
Quebecois was soundly defeated by the Liberals. Three years later Levesque was 
dead of a heart attack. It was not until the 1990s that the independence 
movement in Quebec had as popular and powerful a leader, in the person of 
Lucien Bouchard, who "combined the class of Trudeau, the common touch of 
Rene Levesque and the fire of Real Caouette, the passionate populist who led the 
Creditiste party in the 1960s and '70s. There had rarely been a mix more 
potent. " [Martin, 1997, p. 254] 
Lucien Bouchard and The Dance of The Seven Veils 
From his early days as a young student, Lucien Bouchard demonstrated talent in 
journalism, first writing for the college paper in Jonquiere, and then as a stringer 
for La Presse, distinguishing himself as "an extremely active and efficient 
correspondent, sending La Presse far more stories than it could possibly handle. " 
[Martin, 1997, p. 43] At Laval University he was as devoted to his duties as 
editor of the student paper as he was to the study of law. Despite the brevity of 
his journalism career, it evidently gave him the skills to manipulate the media, 
which he could play "like a symphony orchestra" [Martin, 1997, p. 310], and 
often did. Central to Bouchard's view of political communications strategy was 
his absolute control, "overseeing even minor press releases as environment 
minister or with the Bloc. Virtually everything came under his purview. " [Martin, 
1997, p. 313] This often led to conflicts with journalists and Bloc MPs alike. 
For the first three years of the Bloc's existence, it was an endless struggle 
for the party to get any coverage at all of its activities in the House of Commons. 
Without official party status, it was almost impossible for them to get any 
questions in during the all-important Question Period, and when they did, it 
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would usually be late in the day when the reporters had gone. The staff of Bloc 
strategist Jean Lapierre got around this by letting them know when a Bloc MP 
was going to ask a question, so there would be someone there to cover it. The 
group of MPs were also struggling with each other; the tension generated by their 
difficulties as a minority group in parliament led to personality conflicts which 
often threatened to break out into open warfare [Cornellier, 1995]. But despite 
these, the polls showed that "the Bloc and their leader were winning the battle 
for public opinion. " [Cornellier, 1995, p. 45] However, the party needed a 
structure and a clearly-stated purpose. A new manifesto was drawn up 
emphasizing that the Bloc must explain Quebec's point of view to the rest of 
Canada, stating that "One of the missions of the Bloc Quebecois is to expose 
federal disinformation by speaking directly to English Canada. " [Cornellier, 
1995, p. 52] 
It was the provincial Parti Quebecois that came to the rescue with an 
organization plan when the members of the Bloc finally agreed in 1991 to become 
a formal political party rather than just a coalition. PQ strategists offered to 
help and put together an executive structure for the party, including commissions 
on legal affairs, policy, and communications. By January of 1992 a 
communications strategy had been drawn up "that would allow the Bloc to 
clarify its position on the political map" [Cornellier, 1995, p. 56], with the long- 
term goal of electing 60 MPs and the short-term one of setting up a small office 
team including a press agent for Bouchard. There was some distrust generated 
by power struggles between the two party organizations, but during the 
referendum campaign against the Charlottetown Accord (which proposed some 
complex and contradictory constitutional reforms), the Bloc and the PQ 
established a cooperative relationship that continues to the present day. PQ 
leader Jacques Parizeau called on Bouchard to help him in the referendum 
campaign; in return he would do the same for him in the up-coming federal 
election. "The PQ leader would tour the major centres, covered by the national 
press, and Bouchard would tour the regions. It was clear that the opposite 
would be true during the federal elections. " [Comnellier, 1995, p. 65] Bouchard's 
dynamic performance helped defeat the Accord, a victory for sovereigntist forces 
in Quebec, who felt it "was not Meech-plus, but Meech-less" [Martin, 1997, p. 
2361, and raised the profile of the Bloc as well as strengthening its organization. 
When the 1993 federal election was called, the PQ machine was there to 
help, and provided professional expertise in advertising and polling, exchanging 
frequent memos. It also co-operated on the BQ's "massive direct mail campaign" 
[Cornellier, 1995, p. 78]. The Bloc, like the Scottish National Party, was 
handicapped by its lack of access to television advertising, and could only 
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purchase five minutes of air time for election broadcasting (under federal 
regulations, television stations had to provide 390 minutes of paid air time for 
election advertising divided among the parties by a broadcasting arbitrator). 
However, it made the most of what time it had, running ads run during La Petite 
Vie, one of Quebec's most popular shows, and in addition, advertised on buses 
and billboards, and turned out large numbers of balcony and lawn signs. The 
party's media strategy focused on the people who had voted "No" during the 
Charlottetown referendum - francophones between 18 and 49 with some post 
secondary education - because they made up 40 per cent of Bloc supporters 
[Cornellier, 1995, p. 79]. The party's slogan, "On se donne le vrai pouvoir" (We 
will have the real power) was one that would appeal to this young and well- 
educated group. 
Bouchard had to carry the burden of the campaign, as the other Bloc 
candidates were so little known. A poll taken half-way through revealed that 
only a third of francophone Quebec voters knew who the Bloc candidates were 
in their constituency [Cornellier, 1995, p. 80]. Fortunately, he was up to the task, 
handling the stresses of scrums, meeting with the Toronto press, and most 
importantly, learning how to use television, although he deplored the fact that 
leaders "are asked to reduce to ten seconds our thinking on anything and 
everything. " [Martin, 1997, p. 240] As always, coverage of the Bloc and its 
leader was polarized between French and English Canada. "From one media 
perspective, Bouchard was trying to break up the country. From another, he was 
on the noble road towards creating one. From such divergent starting points, it 
was small wonder journalists saw the news differently. " [Martin, 1997, p. 247] 
Where Bouchard shone was in the television debates among the five 
leaders of Canada's major political parties, held first in English and then in 
French on subsequent nights and broadcast by the CBC. He was helped by a pre- 
debate strategy designed to prevent expectations of his performance being too 
high, with party spin-doctors suggesting to reporters on the campaign trail and 
political pundits that Bouchard was up against some tough competition in jean 
Chretien and prime minister Kim Campbell. The Bloc "did not need a knockout 
to succeed... its only goal was to get its message across. " [Cornellier, 1995, p. 82] 
Bouchard followed the line promoted by his communications experts, and 
confessed that he was worried about the debates with such "very tough and 
clever challengers" [Cornellier, p. 82]. The strategy worked as planned, and the 
party's insistence on having Bloc supporters among the analysts in the post- 
debate broadcasts also helped. 
During the campaign BQ staff frequently surveyed voters throughout the 
province as to their views, and found that the party's appeal was based not just 
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on Bouchard and a support for sovereignty, but "also a hostility to the old 
parties, a profound disillusionment that has led people to try something else. " 
[Cornellier, 1995, p. 83] Bouchard attempted to cater to this disillusioned 
federalist sector in Quebec, but this occasionally led to a confused message, as he 
pledged to both fight for sovereignty in parliament as well as use it to forward 
Quebec interests on the federal level. Support for the Bloc continued to grow 
throughout the campaign, with polls repeatedly showing the party garnering 
enough votes to become the official opposition, which it did October 25, winning 
54 seats with 49.5 per cent of the vote in Quebec. 
Within five days of the party being elected, Bouchard began revving up 
the Bloc's parliamentary machine, which in its discipline and concentration of 
power on the leader was unique in Ottawa. He was not a believer in delegating 
tasks, particularly the role of party spokesperson. As Manon Cornellier, a 
francophone parliamentary press gallery reporter for Canadian Press observed at 
the time: 
Few MPs have had a chance to make an impact. Bouchard is at 
the centre of everything. He maintains a high profile in the 
House, dominating not only question period, as one would 
expect from the leader of the opposition, but also contact with 
the media. On a day when Bouchard gives a scrum, it is very 
rare for another Bloc MP to do so as well. 
[Corrtellier, 1995, p. 90] 
MPs were not allowed to talk to reporters without first getting permission from 
the press office. This irritated them as well as journalists, as one francophone 
parliamentary reporter recalled: 
"They had a lot of problems with media relations. It started under 
Bouchard; they were very controlling.... What they would do for 
instance would be to control every call made by MPs to reporters. 
For instance, I would call a MP at his office either in his riding or 
from here, and his secretary would tell me, 'Oh, he has to go 
through communications', so we would need their approval. 
And also after Question Period, we went to see people for 
communication and ask them, 'Can we see so-and-so because we 
want to talk about him', and of course they would ask us, 'What 
is the subject? ', and sometimes even we would tell them the 
subject and they would say, 'Oh no, we have already talked about 
that'; they were very controlling to the point that there was a 
little of a revolt by the caucus. " 
Bouchard's main concern was that the Bloc present an image of responsibility 
and decorum; he was "so afraid of gaffes" [Cornellier, 1995, p. 92] that Bloc 
members were not allowed to make attacks on other MPs, indulge in insults, or 
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come to parliament unprepared. The goal was to score points in the media by 
concentrating on Question Period, the most-covered event in the House of 
Commons, and in this Bouchard succeeded. At least two hours a day were spent 
in preparation, and Bouchard led dress rehearsals for the MPs in which he 
advised them "on what to say and how to say it. " [Martin, 1997, p. 264] The 
results were soon apparent. 
From the time parliament began sitting in mid-January 1994, the 
Bloc proved a skilful player of this media game. It was 
surprisingly dynamic. Its questions were sharp, its tone spirited 
but polite. On top of what was happening, Bouchard's team kept 
after the government. The media had copy every day. 
[Cornellier, 1995, p. 100] 
The Bloc did not just focus on matters concerning Quebec. The party won 
plaudits for its defence of Canadian culture after the government consented to 
the sale of Ginn Publishing Canada to an American firm. The deal contradicted 
the government's own policy of disallowing such sales if there were potential 
Canadian buyers. Bouchard "put himself and the Bloc through exhaustive 
preparation on the issue" [Martin, 1997, p. 264], and questioned the 
Conservatives about it day after day, surprising the anglophone journalists, and 
making "the Ginn affair" a front-page story. By defending Canadian 
nationalism, Bouchard and his advisors believed they would win support for 
Quebec nationalism as well. Globe and Mail columnist Giles Gherson expressed a 
common view of the BQ's performance when he wrote: "Parliament Hill veterans 
hate to say it, but they do anyway: they're impressed with the Bloc Quebecois. " 
[Cited in Cornellier, 1995, p. 101] 
Although masterful in the House of Commons, Bouchard's varying 
positions on national unity issues often got him into trouble, and the journalists 
began to notice. As Lysiane Gagnon wrote in La Presse: "The man is playing so 
many different and contradictory roles that one wonders how he manages to 
remember who he is when he gets up in the morning. " [Cited in Martin, 1997, p. 
265] His characteristic practice of giving one interpretation of an event and then 
back-tracking with a convoluted explanation was exercised to the full after his 
brush with death when he contracted necrotizing fasciitis, or flesh-eating disease. 
While fighting for his life, he had scribbled a note to his doctors saying "Que l'on 
continue, merci" ("Carry on, thank you"). Some people saw the message as a 
political one, urging the sovereigntist movement to continue; Bouchard's own 
staff thought it was just a straightforward instruction to his doctors, and put out 
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a statement to that effect. Bouchard gave an interview to a Radio-Canada 
reporter saying that his words had a political connotation for Quebec's future 
without him. When Bouchard realized the confusion caused by the contradiction 
between his statement and his staff's, he tried "to make it appear it was a 
message of both medical and political significance. " [Martin, 1997, p. 272] 
Bouchard's media machinations before his dramatic return to the House 
of Commons resulted in even more controversy. 
Bouchard redefined the term 'exclusive interview'. He gave 
about a dozen of them. To get one of these soul-baring 
exclusives, news organizations had to pass certain criteria. The 
stories had to run on the front page and they would follow in 
appropriate sequence. Exclusives given to more favoured outlets 
had to come first.... The story soon became not the Bouchard 
comeback but the tawdry fashion in which he was apparently 
exploiting it. 
[Martin, 1997, p. 273] 
To its credit, La Presse, Montreal's largest-circulation broadsheet, refused to take 
part in what the paper's political columnist Chantal Hebert described as "the 
dance of the seven veils", and did not interview Bouchard. His stage-managing 
of the coverage may have been expected - the event was truly a God-given gift for 
a politician - but his actions seemed just a little too calculating. 
Bouchard used the media again as a means of undermining his former ally 
Jacques Parizeau, announcing a major change, or "virage" for sovereigntist 
strategy in a speech at a Bloc convention without consulting him. Parizeau 
received his copy of the speech at the same time as the press, as Bouchard's call 
for a "virage", a word chosen by him and his advisers to get headlines, was 
bound to anger the Quebec premier. Bouchard wanted the upcoming referendum 
to be used to give Quebec a partnership with Canada similar to that of nations in 
the European Union, and he wanted it delayed in order to do so. 
But that was not a decision for Bouchard, leader of a federal party - 
federal party leaders do not, as a general rule of politics in Canada, get involved 
in provincial campaigns - and Parizeau had already said the referendum would 
be held within the year, and that he was opposed to "Maastricht-style 
solutions. " [Martin, 1997, p. 277] The press leapt all over the story, particularly 
the conflict between the two men over the timing of the referendum, which 
continued as Parizeau defended his role as the premier, and Bouchard threatened 
not to campaign in the referendum if his ideas were not accepted. 
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Bouchard also began negotiations with Mario Dumont, the leader of the 
Action democratique du Quebec, a minority nationalist party, to join in the 
referendum campaign. Parizeau was forced to come on side, and in June, the 
leaders of the three parties signed an agreement outlining the terms of the 
referendum and the negotiations with the federal government that would follow a 
successful "Yes" vote. If no agreement was reached with Ottawa within a year, 
Quebec would declare independence. (These terms proved to be a contentious 
issue during the 1997 federal election campaign for the Bloc Quebecois, as we 
shall see in chapter seven. ) The significance of the event was not appreciated by 
either the politicians or the press in Ottawa. 
As the referendum campaign began, Bouchard was relegated to Ottawa, 
while Parizeau, never known for his ability to connect with the people, led the 
charge in Quebec. He was reluctant to follow Bouchard's strategy of 
emphasizing economic partnership with the rest of Canada, and this, along with 
his personal unpopularity, seriously threatened the sovereigntist campaign. 
Influential figures within the Parti Quebecois urged him to give more 
responsibility to Bouchard. His back against the wall, Parizeau agreed, 
appointing Bouchard chief negotiator for the sovereigntists with the federal 
government. What this effectively meant, however, was that Bouchard was now 
in charge, and would determine the referendum strategy (including political 
communications). 
His earlier statements that this was to be a civil campaign were soon 
forgotten. Bouchard bitterly attacked those he saw as being disloyal to 
sovereignty. "Anyone who wasn't a sovereignist fell under his sword..... Now he 
heaped scorn on all those who laboured inside the federal system. " [Martin, 
1997, p. 294] It was a long list, including former Conservative colleagues Jean 
Charest and Brian Mulroney, Daniel Johnson, leader of the Quebec Liberals, the 
premiers of New Brunswick and Ontario, and most particularly Jean Chretien, 
whom he described as "a traitor. The little guy from Shawinigan, whose family 
had lived on Quebec soil for 300 years, was anti-Quebec. It was a form of 
intolerance rarely witnessed in modern Canadian politics. " [Martin, 1997, p. 
296] Bouchard also emphasized Quebec's historical grievances, listing off the 
defeat at the Battle of the Plains of Abraham, the crushing of the 1837 rebellion, 
the hanging of Louis Riel, the conflicts over conscription in World One and Two, 
and the night of the long knives, "making all these events sound like they took 
place last summer. " [Martin, 1997, p. 284] It was the politics of resentment, not 
the self-affirmation that had seemed to characterize Quebec since the Quiet 
Revolution. 
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Bouchard did not rely entirely on negativism. He was keen to reassure 
Quebecers that there would be nothing but positive consequences if they chose 
sovereignty. At a rally in Montreal he said that "A Yes had magical meaning 
because with a wave of a wand it will change the whole situation. The day after 
sovereignty there will be no more federalists, no more sovereignists. There will 
only be Quebeckers. " [Cited in Martin, 1997, p. 294] Sovereignty would bring 
economic benefits, not hardships, and there would be no more conflicts with the 
rest of Canada which would then "be able to design and shape the kind of 
country they want. " [Cited in Martin, 1997, p. 294] However, Bouchard was not 
clear on the details as to how this would be achieved, and refused to release 
studies commissioned by Parizeau on the probable effects of sovereignty. It is 
difficult to determine if Bouchard was deliberately misleading the Quebec people, 
as some commentators have suggested, but certainly they were confused. A poll 
revealed that almost one-third believed that they would still continue to elect 
MPs to Ottawa after voting in favour of sovereignty [Martin, 1997, p. 298] and 
almost half believed they could keep their Canadian passports. 
The federal government's strategy was essentially passive, and was based 
on an assumption that the sovereigntists could not win. There was no provision 
for any change of strategy if it looked as if they would, and so when polls 
showed the "Yes" side pulling ahead two weeks before the vote, they were 
unprepared. Most importantly, their campaign lacked heart. As Ed Broadbent, 
former leader of the New Democratic Party in Canada observed: 
During the campaign, most prominent federalists sounded like 
bank managers threatening to foreclose on the mortgage of a 
house that was perceived to be losing its value anyway .... But 
people are not cash registers. Men and women do indeed vote 
partly with their pocket books in mind, but they also have hearts, 
values, and aspirations.... The federal campaign had no soul. 
[Broadbent, 1996a, p. 277] 
Bouchard's strength was that he appealed to the desire of Quebecers to build a 
better society, and when he told them that they could do it by having their own 
government, many chose to believe him. In the 1980 referendum the federal 
government had been able to portray itself as the guarantor of social benefits, but 
in 1995 it could no longer do so. The federalist campaign was essentially 
negative, warning Quebecers of what they could lose if they voted "Yes", but this 
was no match for Bouchard's "potent fusion of nationalism and social 
democracy. " [Broadbent, 1996a, p. 276] He was also helped by a sympathetic 
press that was unwilling to examine his statements critically. 
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As the polls for the "No" side continued to worsen, prime minister jean 
Chretien opened "a small box of news" [Martin, 1997, p. 299] at a major rally in 
Verdun, promising to recognize Quebec as a distinct society, give it a 
constitutional veto and control over labour-market training. These were old 
promises, ones contained in a package sent to Quebec householders, but the 
media reported them as if they were new, and the polls began to improve. Then 
Bouchard made some fatal errors in what had been, up until then, a nearly- 
flawless campaign. 
The first was his use of a front page taken from a Quebec newspaper 
published the day after Rend Levesque's constitutional defeat in 1981 which 
showed a photo of Pierre Trudeau and Chretien laughing, next to a headline 
saying "Levesque Betrayed by His Allies". Displaying a blown-up copy of the 
page, Bouchard accused Chretien on a national television broadcast of trying to 
trick the Quebec people. The only problem was, the photo was not from the 
constitutional conference, but from another event. To add insult to injury, 
Chretien had, in the interests of fairness, given Bouchard the air-time so he could 
respond to his address to the nation before the crucial vote, although he was not 
obligated to do so [Martin, 1997, p. 300]. The front page of the newspaper was 
employed again as a central prop at the final, major rally of the sovereigntist 
campaign, displayed on two giant video screens, in which Bouchard and 
Parizeau attacked Chretien as well as Trudeau -a tactic that back-fired, as 
Trudeau was still a popular figure in Quebec. 
The final mistake of the sovereigntists was not to hold any big event 
during the final days of the referendum campaign, in contrast to the federalists, 
who organized the rally in Montreal attended by an estimated 100,000 people, 
many of whom had travelled from other parts of Canada to attend. Coverage of 
the event by Quebec media was muted: the province's all-news network reported 
the crowd to be only 35,000 [Erin Research, 1995]. Bouchard described the rally 
as a "disgraceful act" [Martin, 1997, p. 305], a statement that did not help the 
Bloc's relationship with the rest of Canada. The lack of a final push proved 
costly to the sovereigntists; they lost the referendum. However, the fact that the 
vote was so close was seen as a victory of sorts, although Parizeau resigned as 
premier 24 hours afterwards: his comment that money and the ethnic vote were 
what lost it was seen as too extreme. Three months later Lucien Bouchard took 
his place as leader of the Parti Quebecois, and in February of 1996, became 
premier of Quebec. 
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After Bouchard: The Same Person Talking 
Bouchard's departure created a vacuum within the Bloc Quebecois. What was 
needed was a popular leader who could maintain the Bloc's high profile and 
build on the momentum established by Bouchard in the 1993 election and the 
1995 referendum. But the very nature of Bouchard's leadership made that 
impossible. Power had been concentrated in the hands of a very few individuals 
within the party organization and only two others Bloc MPs had anything close 
to Bouchard's media presence: Michel Gauthier and Gilles Duceppe, significantly, 
the next two leaders of the Bloc. The lack of other voices proved to be a major 
weakness in the party; as there was no opportunity for new talent to emerge, and 
it showed. As political communications specialist Denis Moniere observed 
during the Bloc's early days in the House of Commons: 
The message is more effective when it's diversified. The more 
people you have with stature, a profile, credibility, the better the 
message carries. If you always have the same person talking, 
people get tired and don't listen as much. Having different faces 
allows the message to penetrate more deeply. 
[Cited in Cornellier, 1995, p. 92] 
Although Gauthier had been an aggressive questioner in the House, his lack of 
fluency in English meant he was largely unknown outside of Quebec. The manner 
in which he was made party leader did not help raise his profile within the 
province, either; chosen by a group of fewer than 160 people within the party 
"acting as a 'conclave' electing a new pope, Gauthier was lacking the kind of 
legitimacy provided by democratic ways of selecting leaders. " [Bernard, 1997, p. 
136] This made it difficult for him to heal the divisions within the party, 
worsened by the referendum loss and concern about its future role. In addition, 
despite his best efforts, he was unable to communicate the Bloc's message to the 
rest of Canada, or even within Quebec. Although he performed well in the House 
of Commons, his low-key style did not gain him much media attention, so much 
so that a Groupe Leger & Leger poll done for Le Journal de Montreal and the Globe 
and Mail in November of 1996 "found that more Quebeckers were familiar with 
Reform Party Leader Preston Manning than with Mr. Gauthier. " [Mcllroy, 1996b] 
When support for the Bloc dropped from more than 50 per cent down to 40 per 
cent, almost tied with the federal Liberals, rumblings of dissension over his 
leadership were heard within the party. On December 2, he announced his 
resignation, saying that 
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"The media treatment of me, as a person, was difficult. How I 
wasn't well known, how I wasn't popular. How I didn't have 
much to say... It is easier to take when you have a personal 
ambition to be the leader. That was never my ambition, so my 
tolerance level was lower. " 
[Mcllroy, 1996b] 
That was not the case with his successor, Gilles Duceppe, who, unlike 
Gauthier, was well-known throughout Canada as well as in his home province, 
and had a reputation for eloquence in the Commons. The leadership campaign in 
which he was elected was supposed to revive the Bloc's fortunes, but for a 
variety of reasons (described in chapter seven), did not, and its timing, so close 
to the federal election, proved to be a big problem for the Bloc's campaign 
organization and ultimately the campaign itself. 
Leadership and Organization: The Bloc versus the SNP 
As we have seen in this chapter, the Scottish National Party, the PQ and the Bloc 
have used some of the same political strategies in making the case for 
independence. Certainly they have tried to reassure wary voters on the economic 
issues, and down-played the negative consequences of separation. But where 
they differ - and this is of crucial significance for modern political parties - is in 
the role of leadership and organization. 
Research done by Canadian political scientist Neil Nevitte indicates that 
the future belongs to non-institutional political movements with open, non- 
hierarchical structures. His analysis of the changes in social values revealed by 
the World Values Surveys conducted in 1981 and 1990 shows that Scotland and 
Quebec are part of a larger, world-wide pattern, in which institutional authority 
is being eroded and replaced by citizen participation at the grassroots level. 
Declining voter participation and public cynicism about politicians and the 
political process are not signs of disinterest in democracy, he says, but a rejection 
of the hierarchical nature of traditional party politics. As he explains, 
"democracy is not so much 'in crisis' as in a state of transition. All that is in 
crisis is 'old politics' - the traditional notion that democracies work best when 
publics are passive, disengaged, and relatively uninformed. " [Nevitte, 1996, p. 
751 What this means for political parties is that to be successful, they must be 
able to involve citizens at the community level, and their support must be built 
from the ground up. A top-down approach without wide participation from a 
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broadly-based, activist membership will not appeal to the increasingly educated 
and informed voter of today. 
Quebec's nationalist parties, from Duplessis to Bouchard, have often 
relied on strong, charismatic leaders to get the message across, but they have also 
had very strong organizations, which enabled them to win members and support. 
The SNP, on the other hand, has traditionally had less of a focus on its leader, 
but has had strong organization only intermittently - and when it did have good 
organization at the community level, performed much better at the polls. Its 
current success in getting its message across has come from its tightly-knit 
communications and research team, led by its chief executive in co-operation 
with the leader of the party, who has had a strong media presence. 
However, the SNP's good political communications and its leader's high 
media profile could not take the place of deep-seated roots in the community, as 
we shall see in chapter six. In the Quebec case, charismatic leaders such as Rend 
Levesque and Lucien Bouchard have undoubtedly helped to advance the 
nationalist cause, but without the widespread support for nationalism that has 
permeated all areas of Quebec society, from the church and universities to trade 
unions, business and journalism, the Parti Quebecois and the Bloc Quebecois 
would not have been able to garner the thousands of members, the millions of 
dollars in funds, and the votes they needed to win elections - and keep winning 
them. In 1997 the Scottish National Party had a clear, focused message, a 
professional political communications strategy, and an experienced campaign 
team, but it had just 15,000 members, no endorsements from any major trade 
union or Scottish civic organization, limited funds, and soon after the campaign 
started, lost its only editorial support. The consequences of this for the SNP in 
the 1997 election are discussed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
The Scottish National Party: Standing Still In A Hurricane 
In chapter five we saw how the Parti Quebecois, the Bloc Quebecois and the 
Scottish National Party developed their political communications strategies. 
This chapter looks at how the SNP organized its political communications for the 
1997 general election, how effective their communications were in the context of a 
national campaign, and the reactions of the party strategists and Scottish 
political journalists to what happened. 
On the eve of the 1997 election campaign, the Scottish National Party had 
reason to believe that in this election they would improve their standing in the 
polls and more than double their seats. Although party strategists did not 
expect a major breakthrough, they were hoping to get anywhere from seven to 10 
seats, up from the four they currently held and the three won at the last general 
election in 1992. In fact, Alex Salmond was so sure of this that in one of the 
more unique pseudo-events of the campaign, he placed a £500 bet with a London 
bookie that the SNP would win between seven and 40 seats, with the proceeds to 
go to The Big Issue, a magazine which raises funds for the homeless. 
There were ample grounds for this optimism. The party was better- 
prepared than it had ever been before in its history, with more than £550,000 in 
its campaign fund, a well-integrated election team led by its chief executive, a 
focused and clear strategy, and all the technology of a modern party, including 
specialised constituency software and call centres for telephone canvassing. The 
polls had been consistently more than 20 per cent, on occasion reaching 27 
percent; and support for independence was steadily at 30 per cent; the party 
had the backing of a large-circulation daily, the Scottish Sun; and the SNP's 
communications office was able to place stories about the party in the media on 
a regular basis. 
However, the May 1 results, although an improvement on the 1992 
election, were something of a let-down. What the nationalists had not counted 
on, along with many political pundits, was the extent of the Labour Party's 
electoral onslaught. Certainly very few could have predicted the complete wipe- 
out of the Tories in Scotland. Given the overwhelming support for Labour, the 
fact that the SNP was able to double its seats and increased its share of the 
popular vote was seen as a victory of sorts by party strategists. As one of them 
said, "You're doing pretty well if you manage to stand still in the face of a 
hurricane. " Compared to the results for the Bloc Quebecois in the Canadian 
federal election, particularly in light of the Bloc's gaffe-prone campaign, however, 
the SNP's performance would seem a disappointment, but Scotland is not 
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Quebec, and as we have seen, there were unique cultural, political and historical 
forces which determined the different outcomes in each territory. In hindsight, 
there were some things that SNP strategists and the political journalists who 
reported their campaign thought they could have done differently - specifically, 
put more heart into it and less head - but there were factors in the campaign that 
would have made it difficult for the SNP to do that. Here then is an account of 
how the SNP managed to stand still in the face of the political hurricane of 1997. 
How The Campaign Was Organized: For The Reporters 
As Holli Semetko points out in her study of election coverage in Britain done for 
the Canadian Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing, the 
UK is unique among Western democracies in the amount of election news 
presented in its media [Semetko, 1991, p. 261. She argues that this is partly due 
to the legislation governing election broadcasting; another factor is the increasing 
demand for material generated by the expansion of media outlets, and the 
technological advances which make it possible to produce more news, more 
quickly. 
However, despite the many changes in newsroom practice and production 
in recent years, the format of general elections in Britain and in Scotland have 
remained essentially the same, as outlined by Semetko. The campaign begins 
with a flurry of manifesto publishing (for which UK voters are expected to pay, 
unlike in Canada) and platform declaring, and quickly settles into a daily routine 
of morning press conferences, afternoon "walkabouts", and evening speeches. 
The 1997 election followed the traditional pattern, with two notable exceptions. 
The first was the extreme length of the campaign, which ran to almost seven 
weeks, March 17 to May 1, rather than the usual three or four. The second was 
Labour's refusal to meet with the press on a regular basis. This was most notable 
in Scotland, where Labour often cancelled press conferences at the last moment 
or re-scheduled them to locations away from the central belt, making it difficult 
for them to be scrutinised by political journalists at the major Scottish dailies. 
Even when reporters made the effort to follow Tony Blair to Aberdeen during the 
election campaign, they were not permitted to ask him any questions. As the 
Herald's Scottish political correspondent Robbie Dinwoodie described: 
Faced with accusations that Labour was refusing to answer valid 
questions about gaps or uncertainties in the detail and funding of 
its policies, Mr Blair contrived to fly into Aberdeen and out again 
without once making himself available for queries from 
newspaper journalists who had converged on the Granite City 
from all over Scotland. 
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Pupils and teachers at Dyce Academy were given time with him, 
some broadcasters were granted brief audiences, and he tarried 
awhile with staff as he formally opened a youth centre... 
But no press conference, however brief, was scheduled, and the 
opportunity for snatched questions between set-piece tableaux for 
the cameras was virtually eliminated as the presidential-style 
phalanx around the leader rushed around making up for a half- 
hour flight delay.... 
If newspaper reporters hoped to catch the leader on his arrival, 
they were obliged to stand outside, behind a barrier, in the rain. 
True to form, after a 20-minute drenching, they watched Mr. 
Blair emerge from his limousine and stride magisterially past 
them without a word for them. 
[Dinwoodie, 1997b] 
This was done as a deliberate strategy by Labour, according to one reporter, 
because "their main campaign in Scotland was on avoiding errors rather than 
positively getting good coverage. " (All quotations in this chapter are from the 
research interviews, unless otherwise stated. ) The one advantage for this 
particular reporter, whose newspaper had very few resources for the election 
campaign, was that it made it easier for him to do the daily round of party press 
conferences. This tactic of restricting press access to Blair was part of Labour's 
"'banana-skin avoidance machine" [Bartle, Crewe, and Gosschalk, 1998, p. xix], 
in which the "emphasis was on discipline, repetition and getting across key 
messages rather than on answering questions from the media or challenges from 
other parties. " [Butler and Kavanagh, 1997, p. 226] In this Labour was not that 
much different from the other political parties both nation-wide and in Scotland; 
they were just much better at it, having honed their campaign strategy in the two 
years before the election in daily meetings on how to manage the media [Butler 
and Kavanagh, 1997, p. 232]. What was different in Scotland, as we shall see, 
was the response of Scottish political correspondents to this tactic; they were not 
as willing to accept that "Labour was not in the business of providing 
'interesting' copy for the media. " [Butler and Kavanagh, 1997, p. 226] 
The three major broadsheets - the Herald, the Scotsman, and Scotland on 
Sunday - approached their campaign coverage quite differently. Scotland on 
Sunday chose to focus on what its political editor termed six "weathervane 
constituencies" which "would provide a sign as to which way the political wind 
was blowing... if you understood what happens in those six you understand what 
happens in the whole election. " The paper also deliberately kept its coverage 
tight, and the editor felt that it benefited from having "the smallest amount of 
coverage of most of our competitors.... The wrong thing you can do in my opinion 
is have a scatter-gun approach where you just write about everything. " Readers, 
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especially those of Sunday papers, he thought, needed to have the news 
condensed down to the basics, and so the paper brought in "humour and 
snippets", and a diary-style feature each week. The main task of the paper, as 
he saw it, was to establish the political agenda for the coming week, to be what 
he called "the first real draft of history", and each Wednesday the editorial staff 
would try to determine what the focus would be and design the news stories and 
features around it, "so that by Saturday we would set the agenda for the 
campaign. " 
The Scotsman's approach was more journeyman-like and thorough, with a 
large team of reporters working on the general election in both England and 
Scotland. Interestingly enough, according to the paper's political editor, although 
there were journalists assigned full-time to Tony Blair and John Major, reporters 
were "with the Scottish leaders most of the time" (emphasis mine). It would 
seem more appropriate that a newspaper called the Scotsman would focus on 
having full-time coverage of the Scottish leaders rather than of the national ones, 
but, as the editor himself pointed out, one of the difficulties the paper faced 
during the campaign was in trying to get the balance right between the UK 
election coverage "with the almost separate election happening north of the 
Border. If I was being critical, I would say that there were times when we did not 
get the balance right but you must remember that instant decisions are being 
made under pressure. " 
In addition to the reporters following the leaders, the Scotsman had three 
staff at Westminster, their economics correspondent in London as well as their 
London reporter for the coverage in England, while in Scotland, the editor said, 
the paper "had a large number of people out and about", including district 
correspondents, as well as "columnists and commentators who all got involved 
not only in reporting, sketching and analysing but in advising the Editor on what 
we covered and how. Behind the scenes there were large numbers on the news 
desk and sub-editors, also involved in what was a huge operation for the paper. " 
In contrast to the Scotsman, the Herald's campaign coverage was a shoe- 
string operation, with basically one person assigned to cover everything with 
additional people brought in as events demanded, and this in spite of the fact 
that the Herald did write features on every one of Scotland's 72 constituencies. 
As the journalist who had the main responsibility for the paper's political 
coverage recalled: "There was no great planning that really went into it. I just 
worked like a dog, and tried as far as possible to co-ordinate with my London 
colleagues and basically told the news desk when I literally could not be in three 
places at once. " Up to 10 reporters were involved in covering the campaign 
overall, but there was just three or four doing the daily grind of the election news 
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in Scotland, and often just the one journalist covering all the daily party press 
conferences. This lack of resources is found in most Scottish papers, particularly 
at election time. However, according to one of the reporters I spoke to, this has 
had the effect of creating "a degree of camaraderie, if you like, between rival 
political journalists", peculiar to Scotland. 
By and large the Scottish journalists covering the campaign tended to 
have less experience than their Quebec counterparts. None had covered the 1992 
election in Scotland, for example, and only one had done any political reporting 
before then, and that was at Westminster. However, one political journalist saw 
this as an advantage, in that none of them brought any pre-conceptions to the 
political situation in Scotland, and were not, in his words, "burdened by the 
spectre of '79" or "responsible for the easy ride the devolution parties got in the 
'92 election". To be fair, also, Scottish journalists have not needed the same 
amount of experience and certainly not the same amount of constitutional 
sophistication as Quebec political reporters, where the independence issue has 
been a central concern in politics for more than 30 years. The best Quebec 
political journalists must have, as a minimum job requirement, an understanding 
of the basics of both domestic and international constitutional law, as well as an 
ability to express themselves in both French and English. When Scottish political 
reporters have to wrestle with the complexities of regional government or debate 
questions of national identity, they will most likely acquire the same kind of 
political sophistication. 
How the Campaign Was Organized: For The Party 
The Scottish National Party's organization for the 1997 election was based on a 
completely different assumption from that of 1992 as to what was required for a 
successful campaign. In the past the party had concentrated on winning the most 
votes, and had focused its fund-raising and organizing efforts in the four to six 
weeks of the campaign. This time, the party's energy went into providing 
support for winnable seats, and building up its funds and establishing its 
campaign team at headquarters long before the election was to be called. As one 
party strategist explained: 
"I think our prospects, the seeds of our prospects, are sowed 
much earlier than what happens in the three weeks of an 
election campaign. In a sense all my political organizational 
instincts tell me that all an election campaign is about 
motivation, and the strength of your campaign is really 
constructed by what you have done in the preceding years. " 
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As a result, as early as the spring of 1996 the party had eight call centres 
canvassing in targeted constituencies, and specialised election computer software 
in operation throughout Scotland. The party was also working on drafting 
detailed policies, complete with cost analyses. In October of 1996 the SNP's 
Director of Organization, Allison Hunter, went to the U. S. for two weeks to 
study the presidential, congressional and state election campaigns as part of the 
Voluntary Visitor Program of the U. S. Information Agency. While there she met 
with both Democrat and Republican party organisers, looking at how they 
managed everything from fund-raising to media relations and constituency 
organization [SNP, 1996c]. 
By February of 1997, the SNP had brought in more than £500,000 through 
the co-ordination of its various fund raising programs and the introduction of 
new fund raising techniques begun in 1991. A membership drive was begun to 
increase the SNP's numbers, which were at a rather modest 15,000. (To give a 
Canadian comparison, in 1997 the western-based Reform Party had 
approximately 24,000 members in British Columbia, whose population then was 
close to four million. ) A 12-member general election planning unit had been in 
place for several months, an outgrowth of the election planning unit established 
after the 1992 election which had been meeting regularly three to four times a year 
to plan the party's strategy. There was a record number of 20 election staff at 
the Edinburgh headquarters, in addition to the seven constituency staff. This 
was supplemented by a Leader's Unit of three people, whose responsibility was 
to handle all the arrangements for the party leader during the campaign, a first 
for the SNP, as well as by an Overseas Media Unit of three people fluent in 
German, French and Spanish to arrange interviews for the international press. 
Among the staff at headquarters were some new positions that proved to be key 
to the SNP's continued success in its media relations during the campaign; in 
particular, that of Andrew Wilson, senior research officer and a former Scottish 
Office economist, whose knowledge of government finance helped the SNP break 
the story that became the centrepiece of its election strategy. Alex Bell, a former 
broadcaster, performed a new role for the party as an assistant to the chief 
executive on the making of the SNP's party election broadcasts, as well as being 
in charge of photo opportunities and what the head of communications referred 
to as "stunts". 
The typical day for the SNP's communications staff of five was a long 
one after the campaign officially began in mid-March, beginning at half-past six 
in the morning and going until 10 pm or later. The first task of the day was the 
preparation of a media coverage summary running to no more than two pages, 
which was given to senior staff at their main meeting each morning at 8 am. This 
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would be followed by the daily press conference, and then a photo-call. The rest 
of the day was, as the communications director described it, "a run of 
continually putting out news stories, responding, rebutting attacks, attacking 
opponents", while the overnight communication to the candidates was put 
together. These daily briefings, usually sent by fax or e-mail to all the 
candidates, made the SNP's campaign much more cohesive than it had been in 
the past, by ensuring that everyone was "on message" and aware of what was 
happening. The additional resources given to the campaign also meant that the 
party was able for the first time to provide detailed rebuttals to the media, 
whereas in the past, according to the communications director, "they wouldn't 
have even bothered to think of expecting it. " 
The extraordinary length of the campaign, however, put great strain on 
those resources - the eventual cost to the SNP was £600,000, compared to the 
£120,000 the party spent in 1992 - and although the SNP's superior organization 
this time around enabled the party to keep focused for the duration, it created 
problems as to how it got its message across. 
The Run-Up To The Campaign 
The 1997 British election was one that seemed to go on forever, its 45 days of 
active campaigning preceded by several months of political foreplay culminating 
in a pre-election campaign that began in early January. By the time John Major 
finally called the election March 17, almost all the main themes of the election 
campaign in Scotland had been established: devolution, and the role of the 
Scottish National Party and the Conservatives within it; the debunking of 
Scotland's image as a "subsidy junkie"; the SNP's struggle for broadcasting 
access; and the increasingly presidential style of UK election contests. 
The question of leadership was highlighted when a System Three report 
on the views of Scottish floating voters prepared for the Scottish Labour Party 
was leaked to the Scottish media in December of 1996 when Tony Blair made a 
visit to Scotland. (According to the SNP, the report arrived in a plain brown 
paper envelope at the home of Allison Hunter three weeks before Blair's arrival, 
and one day before it was allegedly stolen from the car of Labour's assistant 
Scottish general secretary Tommy Sheppard. ) The focus groups consulted in 
September of that year perceived Blair to be too middle-class and right-wing, as 
well as false and untrustworthy. By contrast, the floating voters felt that Alex 
Salmond was "the only leader with obvious Scottish connections, and it is 
accepted without question that he understands the Scottish psyche. " [System 
Three, 19961 However, understanding the Scottish psyche was not necessarily 
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enough, as journalist Kenny Farquharson pointed out in an article on Salmond's 
leadership. The SNP leader's greatest strength - his ability as an economist - was 
also his weakness, in that his enthusiasm for number-crunching was not one 
shared by the general public. 
As a former economist he is masterly in his command of the 
dry debates about oil revenues, tax takes and unidentified 
expenditures central to the nationalists' case .... The question is 
whether he has the mettle to inspire the self-belief that 
Nationalists feel is a pre-requisite of an SNP surge. 
[Farquharson, 1997a] 
It was a legitimate concern; one that was later mentioned by both SNP strategists 
and political reporters as a factor in the effectiveness of the party's election 
message. 
The System Three report also highlighted the importance of devolution, 
which was central to the campaign in Scotland and a key element in the support 
for the Labour Party. As the report explained: 
The devolution issue had greater significance than might be 
apparent in looking at the percentage of Scots who want to see 
this happen. The whole debate has taken on a symbolic role. For 
some this discussion is about the very soul of the Scottish 
nation. Others see it more prosaically as a symbol of 
commitment to meeting the needs of the Scottish people. 
[System Three, 1996] 
The SNP was vulnerable on this issue because it refused to say where it stood. 
Despite repeated questioning, Alex Salmond had not disclosed the party's 
intentions concerning the referendum on devolution, and it was the strict policy 
of all those in the party hierarchy not to reveal what the SNP planned to do if 
Labour won, and the referendum was held. News releases from party 
headquarters referred to "Blair's rigged referendum" and called for a question on 
independence to be placed on the ballot. However, pressure began to build on 
the party leadership to change its stance as the election drew closer, particularly 
when James Mitchell, then a senior lecturer in politics at Strathclyde University, 
and who was said to be "held in high esteem by the SNP", urged the party to 
make a commitment to a "Yes" vote [MacMahon, 1997a]. When the Scotsman 
reported January 22 that the nationalists were beginning to re-consider this 
policy, the SNP issued a news release rebutting what leader Alex Salmond 
termed "an entirely fabricated story" [SNP, 1997c]. However, just eight days 
152 
later in a speech to the Scottish European Association in Brussels, he seemed to 
indicate that the party would be willing to back devolution. "I am not conceding 
our platform of Scottish independence, but we won't obstruct devolution", 
Salmond said [Ritchie and Dinwoodie, 1997]. It could be argued that this was 
just a re-affirmation of the party's oft-stated policy that it would "not obstruct 
steps towards a legislative assembly", but the timing was certainly auspicious. It 
did not, however, change the vocabulary of the party's debate; SNP news 
releases continued to label the devolution referendum as "Blair's rigged 
referendum" ad nauseam. 
In the same speech Salmond also made the first of many references to the 
admission by William Waldegrave, chief secretary to the treasury, that Scotland 
had contributed a surplus of £26.7 billion to British government revenues since 
1979. Waldegrave's figures came in the form of a written parliamentary answer 
to questions raised by Alex Salmond in the House of Commons and drafted by 
Andrew Wilson, the former Scottish Office economist now on the SNP staff 
[Young, 1997]. This £27 billion subsidy to London, as numerous SNP press 
releases described it, became a recurring theme in the party's election publicity, 
and was widely perceived as one of their biggest propaganda coups, for it 
seemed to contradict the oft-stated view that Scotland could not survive 
economically outwith the Union because it was "a haven for subsidy junkies" 
[Young, 1997]. 
The Scottish National Party received another propaganda coup in early 
February when Conservative health minister Stephen Dorrell, in his subsidiary 
role as government spokesman on constitutional affairs, told the Scotsman in an 
interview that a future Tory government would abolish or alter the Scottish 
parliament if it was felt necessary. This was in direct contradiction to the 
position taken by Secretary of State Michael Forsyth, who had often warned 
against a devolved assembly, saying that once it was created, it could not be 
undone. "The idea that you could make this particular omelette and somehow 
the Tories could turn the omelette back into eggs is pure fantasy", he had said as 
early as 1996 [Penman, 1997a]. Dorrell was technically correct, of course: there 
was no constitutional barrier to abolishing the parliament if the government so 
wished. However, his words seemed to bolster the SNP's argument against 
devolution, for as the lead editorial in the Scotsman pointed out the day after, 
"Dorrell's foolishness amounts to a real question: what is a devolved parliament 
worth if it can be dissolved at Westminster's whim? " [Scotsman, 1997a] It also 
added to the perception that the Conservatives were essentially an anti-Scottish 
party, out of touch with the hopes and aspirations of the Scottish people. 
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While the controversy over Dorrell's remarks continued, the SNP scored 
another victory in its skirmish with the Labour Party and the Radio Authority 
over its party political broadcasts. For the first time in its history the party was 
able to send its message UK-wide, going out on Virgin Radio, Talk Radio and 
Classic FM, which were unable to restrict their programs to specific regions. 
Although Labour had opposed the allocation of time on the three commercial 
stations because the SNP's broadcast would be heard on the entire network and 
not just confined to Scotland, it was unsuccessful. The two-and-a-half minute 
message focused, of course, on the £27 billion London subsidy and, as the SNP 
release announcing the broadcast said, "the news that Scotland has bankrolled 
the Tory government's anti-Scottish policies since 1979. " [SNP, 1997d] 
Alex Salmond also performed well in a Scotsman/ICM poll on Scottish 
party leaders conducted the week of February 11 to 14, rated as the toughest of 
the four in Scotland and the one most likely to understand the nation's problems. 
In addition, he received the highest score for having lots of personality, but even 
so, the SNP at 26 per cent in the polls was still trailing far behind Labour, at 41 
per cent [MacMahon, 1997b]. (Michael Forsyth, was rated as the most arrogant, 
the least trustworthy, the most insincere and the least understanding of 
Scotland's problems and its people. ) 
The first allegations of municipal corruption were aired in early February 
as well, when Glasgow City Council leader Robert Gould accused his Labour 
colleagues on council of promising votes in return for the opportunity to go on 
council-paid trips abroad, in what came to be known as the "junkets for votes" 
scandal. The SNP responded by calling for local governments to be elected by 
proportional representation, thus ensuring a stronger opposition on councils that 
could effectively block what it described as Labour's "one party states" in 
Scotland [SNP, 1997e]. The issue of local government sleaze was one that came 
back to haunt Labour after the election, but during the campaign, was kept 
muted by the party. 
In the first week of March, Labour received a poll shock: it was down six 
percentage points, from 52 to 46, but tellingly enough, no one party was the 
beneficiary. It later turned out to be a rogue poll in a consistent pattern of 
Labour's increasing popularity as the election in Scotland continued. However, 
as Malcolm Dickson noted in his analysis of the poll, the SNP's standing at 26 
per cent revealed a fairly strong base of support which could eventually threaten 
Labour. 
If, as now appears more likely than ever, Mr Blair does enter No. 
10 Downing Street, then he must prove he is capable of 
delivering change in Scotland. If he fails, either because of 
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problems nationally or in the setting up of a Scottish parliament, 
then he does risk a long-term shift of votes to the SNP. 
[Dickson, 1997a] 
Alex Salmond certainly seemed to think that this was a possibility. In an 
interview with The Big Issue (which featured a cover photo of him looking 
soulfully towards the heavens while ripping open his shirt to reveal a tartan 
superman outfit beneath his pin-striped suit) he stated that the inevitability of an 
SNP majority in the first election to a Scottish assembly was "one reason why I 
seriously doubt there's any real intention on the part of the Labour leadership to 
fulfil their commitment. " [Trotter, 1997] 
Despite this intransigence on the part of the SNP leader, George 
Robertson, Shadow Secretary of State, was prepared to invite SNP members to 
work with Labour on winning the devolution referendum following the election in 
his speech to the Scottish Labour Party conference March 8. This gesture was 
prompted by the information gained from Labour's own polling that SNP 
supporters would be vital to the success of the referendum vote, and therefore it 
was important not to alienate them at this stage [MacMahon, 1997c]. Robertson 
did not help matters, however, when he said at the launch of Labour's 
"Covenant with Scotland" March 13 (with the powerfully symbolic backdrop of 
the Wallace Monument behind him) that the new Scottish parliament would most 
likely not be able to use its tax-varying powers until 2002, the most likely date 
for the next general election. His announcement only added to the confusion and 
cynicism about the depth of Labour's commitment to the parliament, and irked 
party supporters who only found out about this apparent change of policy when 
they heard it on television [MacMahon, 1997d]. 
The SNP had been aware for some years that reassuring the business 
community about the effects of independence on the Scottish economy was 
crucial to its acceptance in Scotland, and during the run-up to the campaign the 
party launched two initiatives geared toward that community. On February 25 
the party published a policy document "Delivering a Competitive Advantage for 
Scottish Business" which outlined the SNP's proposals for business taxation, 
designed, as SNP deputy treasury spokesperson Fergus Ewing said, to make 
Scotland "the lion economy" of Europe through a scheme of tax cuts [SNP, 
1997f]. Of course, since the proposals were predicated on Scotland being 
independent, and the assumption that there would be £12.5 billion in North Sea 
oil revenues over the next five years, it was hard to prove or disprove how sound 
these proposals were. 
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The party followed this up on March 12 with the launch of the SNP- 
sponsored group, Business for Independence, chaired by David McCarthy, 
retired director of Unilever's Marine Harvest, "the world's biggest salmon 
farming company" [SNP, 1997i], and joined by Dennis MacLeod, former chair of 
Caledonian Mining, an international gold mining company. McCarthy, originally 
from England, and MacLeod, a Scots-born Canadian, hoped to convince Scottish 
businessmen of "the commercial case for going it alone" [Stokes, 1997] through a 
direct mailing of 10,000 copies of its strategy document, "Making Scotland 
World Class -a Business Case for Independence" to members of the business 
community. Perhaps the degree of their success can be judged by the fact that 
McCarthy and Macleod, along with three other prominent business figures in 
Scotland, set up a new campaigning group for the SNP, Business for Scotland, a 
year later, but this time with enough money to fund seminars, conferences, 
briefings and regular supplements in the trade magazine Scottish Business Insider 
[Ritchie, 1998]. 
The first rumblings of conflict over the SNP's access to the television 
broadcasting networks during the election began in early March when John Major 
and Tony Blair initiated discussions about arrangements for a television debate 
with executives of the BBC and ITV. Mike Russell, the SNP's chief executive and 
the party's campaign director for the general election, wrote to the broadcasters 
warning that the SNP would begin legal proceedings against them if Salmond was 
excluded from the debate [SNP, 1997g]. This was followed by an announcement 
on March 7 by Russell that the party leadership had decided to appoint a senior 
counsel to examine the party's legal options not only in terms of participation in 
any debate, but also in the case of what Russell termed as the "blatantly unfair" 
live coverage that BBC Scotland was giving to the Scottish Labour conference in 
Inverness [SNP, 1997h]. Despite the SNP's aggressive approach to this issue, 
they were ultimately unsuccessful, and this turned out be one of several set-backs 
the party experienced in terms of its ability to get its message across in the media 
during the election. 
The Campaign Itself: The Sun Loses Heart 
On Monday, March 17, john Major finally announced the date of the election. 
The following day, the English edition of the Sun showed a smiling picture of 
Tony Blair with the headline in what is known in newspaper parlance as Second 
Coming type: "The Sun Backs Blair". By contrast, the Scottish edition showed a 
smiling Major and Salmond and a worried-looking Blair next to a map of 
Scotland emblazoned with a saltire, and the headline "Battle Nations". The next 
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day showed quite a different picture: on Wednesday the Scottish Sun again 
displayed the saltire, but this time with the headline: "Brave hearts must 
wait ... it's time for brave heads", with the sub-head, "Why The Scottish Sun Is 
Backing Blair". In the first week of the campaign, the SNP had lost the editorial 
support of the one paper that had ever consistently backed it, and this after five- 
and-a-half years. As is the pattern for Scotland, the change in the newspaper's 
policy was imposed from above, for market reasons, not because there had been 
a change of heart in the newsroom staff, who were said to support independence 
and had succumbed under considerable pressure during "a strained 24 hours 
between Glasgow and London" [Dinwoodie and Langdon, 1997]. As Brian 
Wilson, Labour MP and party spin-doctor commented in the West Highland Free 
Press (which he founded), "What the press lord giveth, the press lord taketh 
away" [Scotland on Sunday, 1997]. 
The SNP interpreted the Sun's stance as being the result of Tony Blair's 
deal-making with Rupert Murdoch. In a news release issued the night before the 
Scottish Sun published its change of heart, SNP chief executive Mike Russell said: 
The editorial independence of the Scottish Sun is the latest 
victim of Blair's dictatorial approach to Scotland. Whatever 
bargain he has struck, and whatever he had been prepared to 
offer for it, part of the price has been the silencing of the free and 
independent voice of the Scottish Sun. 
[SNP, 1997j] 
However, Blair stated in an interview with the New Statesman later that week 
that Labour had "never traded policies with Rupert Murdoch in return for the 
support of his papers", but at the same time said that the party would not use 
legislation to restrict his media acquisitions [Penman, 1997b]. 
It is difficult to ascertain if the Sun's change of editorial policy had any 
affect on the success of the SNP's campaign; however, in the System Three poll 
the week after, conducted the Thursday and Friday following the paper's volte 
face, the SNP's rating fell to 20 per cent, its lowest in five years, and a drop of 
six percentage points. This was even lower than its standing in the 1992 election, 
and contrary to the pattern of recent years, when it had consistently polled at or 
above 25 per cent. Malcolm Dickson's analysis for the Herald rejected the view 
that the loss of the Sun's editorial support was the cause of the SNP's poor 
showing. The drop in SNP support had occurred not in the paper's key 
readership groups of young people and men but rather, among older readers, who 
tended to be traditional Labour supporters. For these voters, "the apparent 
irresistible move towards a Labour government may be too much of a 
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temptation" now that Labour, at 52 per cent, looked certain to form the 
government [Dickson, 1997b]. In his analysis of the ICM poll results earlier in the 
week, John Curtice expressed doubt that the Sun's desertion to Labour could 
adversely affect the SNP, citing a British Election Panel Study that indicated 
newspapers have only "a marginal influence on their readers" [Curtice, 1997]. 
The SNP suffered a further setback when it lost its court case against 
Scottish Television and Grampian over the exclusion of Alex Salmond from the 
proposed television debates among Blair, Major and Paddy Ashdown, leader of 
the Liberal Democrats. Negotiations with the BBC and ITV began after Major 
agreed to talks with the networks, but the SNP immediately began plans for legal 
action when it learned that Salmond was not being considered as a participant. 
On March 26 the party applied for a court order preventing Scottish and 
Grampian from broadcasting any political debate among the leaders before May 
1 that did not include him on an equal basis. The SNP's argument was that by 
excluding Salmond the television networks were in violation of their duty of 
impartiality in matters of political controversy [McKain, 1997]. The Court of 
Session judge, Lord Eassie, ruled against them March 28, the same day that 
Labour pulled out of the negotiations with the BBC and ITV, citing differences 
over the time allocated among the three leaders, the number of debates, and their 
length [Parker, Dalton, Penman, 1997]. In his judgement Eassie stated that 
broadcasters should be the ones to decide how to fulfil their duty of impartiality 
during the election, and this should be based on their total coverage, not just one 
programme. In addition, he said, the debate was hypothetical, because no 
details had been set nor a broadcaster chosen to show it (as events later in the 
day certainly proved). The SNP put a brave face on the ruling, saying that it had 
established a legal precedent for fairer coverage. 
The final blow for the SNP during that week, although not as serious, was 
the decision by the maker of "Independence" whisky to drop the SNP logo from 
its bottles because it was losing business from pub owners who did not like giving 
publicity to the party. Joseph Senior, director of the Edinburgh-based 
Independence Scotland Ltd. and a strong nationalist, had launched the label in 
1991 with the slogan "Rise now and be a nation again" printed over a saltire and 
the SNP's looped thistle logo, but sales were poor, and part of the problem, 
Senior said, was that many who first bought the whisky did so in anticipation of 
drinking it when Scotland won independence [Morrison and McNeil, 1997]. 
The SNP was also handicapped in its media coverage by the amount of 
column inches devoted to Tory sleaze in Scotland, in particular, the story of Sir 
Michael Hirst, forced to resign as a result of what Iain Macwhirter rightly 
described as "one of the most cynical and underhand exercises in political 
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faction-fighting in modern Scottish history" [Macwhirter, 1997a], and the more 
tragic story of Eastwood MP Allan Stewart, who stepped down after his affair 
with another patient at a rehabilitation clinic hit the headlines. Stewart, a 
popular MP in what was often said to be the safest Tory seat in Scotland, 
suffered a nervous breakdown following the public revelations about the 
relationship and the struggle with alcoholism that led to his attending the clinic. 
Hirst, the Tory party chairman in Scotland, had his eye on Stewart's 
constituency, and when he declared his interest in being the candidate for 
Eastwood after Stewart's resignation, Scottish journalists began receiving 
damning reports about his alleged homosexual affairs, leaked to them by senior 
members of the Conservative party in Scotland. However, there was no 
evidence, just rumours, but under threat of exposure, Hirst resigned, saying in his 
letter to the prime minister that it was because of a "past indiscretion" which 
could have made his position "untenable" [Cochrane, 1997a]. What made this 
episode all the more squalid was that it was clear that the Tories had tried to use 
the press to bring Hirst down. From a Canadian cultural perspective it is 
difficult to understand why these two men had to suffer the kind of press 
coverage that they did. As Scotsman columnist Ian Bell said: "Their faults, if 
faults they were, were personal ones, their tragedies private. Yet still they were 
crucified. " [Bell, 1997a] 
The reporting of the Tory scandals in Scotland - along with others in 
England involving Conservative MPs - overshadowed coverage of other issues 
and events in the campaign, particularly for the SNP, who had enough of a 
struggle keeping to centre stage in a national campaign. Alex Salmond described 
the frustration of party workers in his election diary column for the Herald: 
Saturday also brings news of Michael Hirst's resignation, and 
further evidence of our media's confused priorities. Within 
minutes of the announcement, our phones are ringing and 
pagers bleeping, with the media frantically seeking SNP's 
response. It leaves us wondering why, over the previous 
fortnight on the campaign trail, as we discussed real issues in 
packed halls and community centres, almost no journalists 
bothered to turn up. 
[Salmond, 1997a] 
Coverage was especially crucial for the party at this time, because it had scored 
another propaganda coup in its ongoing campaign to combat the economic 
arguments against Scottish independence. On the final day of parliament, March 
21, the SNP received the last of its answers from William Waldegrave, in which 
he conceded that the SNP's initial calculations on Scotland's share of the 
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national debt - which had been widely criticized by the party's opponents - were 
actually correct. Not only that, the new analysis based on a 17.9 per cent share 
of the debt showed that Scotland had paid closer to £31 billion more than it had 
received in public spending since 1979, rather than the SNP's original figure of 
£27 billion. (Of course, this was based on the assumption that Scotland would 
have received 90 per cent of all the oil and gas revenues if it had been 
independent from that year. ) In addition, the Treasury analysis, based on the 
increase in current oil and gas revenues, gave a further projected surplus of £12.5 
billion during the next five years. The SNP's claims, released in a Herald 
exclusive March 27 [Dinwoodie, 1997c], were predictably attacked as fantasy, a 
pipe dream, and fundamentally flawed, but with the authority of the Treasury's 
own analysis behind them, they were difficult to dismiss. Even Jim Stevens, 
member of New Labour and an economist with the Fraser of Allander Institute, 
conceded "that the SNP are right. The evidence produced by The Scottish Office 
and The Treasury suggests they are right. " (Stevens did, however, disagree with 
the SNP's future projection [MacMahon, 1997e]. ) It was, as the Herald editorial 
said, a breakthrough: "With these figures out in the open, even unionists should 
concede that, so far as we can tell by looking backwards, an independent 
Scotland would be, at worst, an economy with UK-style problems. It would be 
no basket case. " [Herald, 1997a] 
"Sovereignty Rests With Me As An English MP" 
The SNP's fortunes seemed to improve during the third week of the election, 
rising to 26 per cent in the Herald's System Three poll at the start of their formal 
campaign launch April 2, recovering the six points it had earlier lost. But the 
Scotsman's ICM poll showed them falling to 22 per cent, and Labour's continuing 
strength presented some strategic problems for the party. Alex Salmond tried to 
argue that with the Tories destined for defeat, the SNP were better-placed than 
ever before to win the election. "With the overhang of fear of a fifth Tory term 
lifted, Scots are free in this election to vote positively for what they want, instead 
of voting negatively against what they don't want. " [SNP, 1997m] Perhaps they 
were, but that did not necessarily mean that they would, or that they wanted the 
SNP, and Salmond's statement seemed more wishful thinking than realistic 
possibility. 
The next day Tony Blair flew into Scotland for the launch of the Scottish 
version of the Labour Party manifesto, and made his first and biggest blunder of 
the campaign according to the press, one that columnist Alan Cochrane described 
as "the virtual manna from heaven that a hitherto stagnant SNP campaign sorely 
160 
needed. " [Cochrane, 1997b] In an interview with Scotsman political editor John 
Penman, the Labour leader was asked how he would deal with the possible 
resentment arising from the fact that even after the Scottish parliament was 
established, Scottish MPs would still be able to vote on strictly English policy 
matters, while English MPs would not be able to vote on Scottish ones - the West 
Lothian Question made famous by Linlithgow MP Tam Dalyell. Blair replied 
that he didn't believe this would be a problem, for if voters complained about 
this unfairness, "I will say to them, we are going to devolve these matters to a 
Scottish parliament but as far as, you know, we are concerned, the sovereignty 
rests with me as an English MP and that's the way it will stay. " In addition, 
when asked about the Scottish parliament's tax-raising powers, he said, "a 
Scottish parliament once the power is given it's like a... the smallest English parish 
council, it's got the right to exercise it. " [Penman, 1997c] 
Blair had basically confirmed what Alex Salmond and the SNP had been 
saying all along: that the proposed parliament would be essentially powerless, 
have little authority, and that real control of Scotland would still be at 
Westminster. Even before the first edition of the Scotsman hit the streets in the 
early hours of Friday, April 4, the journalists on the campaign trail with Blair 
were preparing stories about what the London Evening Standard headlined as 
"Blair's First Clanger", and by 7 am it was the second item on Radio Four's 
Today programme. By 8 am Blair was being questioned on Good Morning Scotland 
about his statements, but not before Alex Salmond was able to attack him: "With 
these devastating remarks, Tony Blair has shown his contempt and derision for 
Scotland and Scotland's people, and even for his own party members here. " 
[Penman and MacMahon, 1997] Later that morning at the press conference held 
at the Labour Party's media centre in Glasgow to introduce its manifesto, 
Scottish journalists kept up the questions about constitutional issues, refusing to 
be side-tracked and shocking the London-based journalists present, who had 
never seen Blair so aggressively challenged. The Scottish journalists, not bound 
by the same strictures as their Westminster counterparts, did not understand 
what all the fuss was about: they "thought only that there had been some tough 
but fair questions at a largely good-humoured one hour session. " [Penman and 
MacMahon, 1997] 
Although Blair's comments were thought to be a mistake, this may not 
have been the case. As James Mitchell explains: 
The fact that Blair had said it in an interview with a Scottish 
newspaper suggests that it was deliberate. The underlying 
thinking was that Labour needed to prevent the Conservatives 
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from successfully playing the English card more than it needed 
to fear the SNP. Labour needed to demonstrate its British 
patriotism especially with Conservative taunts that its 
devolution policy would rip the country apart and its European 
policy would destroy British sovereignty. 
[Mitchell, 1997, p. 137] 
In this Blair was using a tactic somewhat similar to that employed by Canadian 
prime minister jean Chretien in the Canadian federal election; making a statement 
guaranteed to antagonize nationalists in order to thwart the Conservatives and 
reinforce his party's patriotic credentials. 
However, the SNP believed, as did many commentators, that what was 
perceived as Blair's gaffe would be a boost to their campaign, because it 
reinforced doubts about the Labour Party's commitment to devolution. Its timing 
was especially fortunate, coming just before the launch of the SNP's election 
manifesto April 7. The slogan, "You cannot trust Blair on Scotland" was said for 
the first of many times during the campaign by Alex Salmond at the news 
conference releasing the manifesto, and became the cornerstone of the SNP's 
campaign strategy. The manifesto featured a "fully costed budget for the first 
four years of independence" [SNP, 1997s] and details of the SNP's policies on 
everything from business, employment, taxation, and the economy to the 
European Union, defence, international relations and world poverty. The 
Scotsman devoted a full page to the document, listing the SNP's promises on the 
economy, law, constitution, schools, European Union, health, arts, defence, 
transport, family and environment, followed by a brief analysis and response 
from other political parties. Most of them were strongly critical of the SNP's 
proposals, except for those from the Scottish Green Party, who praised the 
SNP's environmental pledges with faint damns by saying that "while still short 
of its own policies, the SNP was at least miles ahead of both the Tories and 
Labour" [Booth et al, 19971. This in-depth coverage, written by a team of seven 
reporters, was in marked contrast to that provided by the Herald, which just did 
a short precis of the party's promises, with no scrutiny of their implications. 
However, the paper's political correspondent did point out that the SNP's 
manifesto was unique in that it began "with a statement of claimed facts about 
Scotland which set out to challenge the myths of political opponents" 
[Dinwoodie, 1997d], but the Herald made no attempt to challenge these. 
Despite the political controversy about Blair's supposed "gallus gaffe", 
[Dickson, 1997c] which prompted fierce criticism of the Labour Party leader not 
only from Alex Salmond but also John Major, who said that Blair's plans for a 
Scottish parliament would let the "genie of separatism" out of the bottle 
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[MacMahon et al, 1997], Scottish voters remained unmoved. The Herald's 
System Three poll the week following showed support for Labour holding steady 
at above 50 per cent, while the SNP fell to 23, down from 26 per cent the week 
before. The good news for the SNP was that according to an NOP poll, support 
for independence was at 35 per cent, just one per cent less than that for 
devolution, and 28 per cent of Scots gave the SNP as their second electoral 
choice, which only 14 per cent gave to Labour [Dickson, 1997c]. 
On the image front, the party was having a bit more success, as well as 
some fun. When the Labour Party's election broadcast featured Fitz the British 
bulldog as its national symbol, the SNP responded with a photo opportunity of 
its own Scottish canine representatives, a Scottish terrier and two West Highland 
terriers, but not before criticizing Blair for adopting Tory symbols as well as 
policies [Mitchell, 1997, p. 1381. George Reid, SNP candidate in Ochil, declared 
that "New Labour's bulldog will be no match for the SNP's determined and 
highly-motivated Scottish terriers! " [SNP, 1997p] The party's most imaginative 
contribution to the party election broadcast genre was its five-minute party 
election broadcast (PEB) directed and narrated by Scottish actor and film-maker 
David Hayman, whose soft-focus shots of joyous ceilidh dancers and the 
emotionally-powerful closing image of a child reaching upwards as the voice-over 
stated the SNP slogan, "Yes we can" was "high quality, classy propaganda" 
[MacMahon, 1997g]. 
It was also propaganda worth fighting for: once again the SNP was 
battling for access to broadcasting networks, this time for Channel 4 and Channel 
5, which Mike Russell, the party's chief executive, said were demonstrating 
"absurd prejudice" by refusing to show the PEB because they could not limit it to 
Scotland only [SNP, 1997o]. The SNP took their case to the Independent 
Television Commission, which ruled in their favour, so that on April 23 bemused 
viewers in Bexley were able to see the SNP's call to rise and be a nation again 
[Wilson, 1997]. Most significantly, though, as part of the party's ongoing struggle 
to gain air time, the SNP commissioned research from an independent media 
monitoring group to track its election coverage, and the results were striking. The 
Broadcasting Monitoring Company found that 80 per cent of the election 
coverage in Scotland came from the networks, and of that, the SNP was in just 
14 per cent of campaign news items, compared to 68 per cent for the 
Conservatives, 60 per cent for Labour, and 64 per cent for the Liberal Democrats. 
Acting on this information, the SNP sent letters to the networks directing their 
attention to the fact that they were in breach of the legal requirements to provide 
balanced coverage [Breen, 1997]. 
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Although Alex Salmond had said that with the Hayman election 
broadcast the SNP's campaign, was moving "from the head to the heart" and 
away from "hammering home the economic case for independence", [Salmond, 
1997b] the battle over the £27 billion raged on, becoming the subject of a vitriolic 
attack by Michel Forsyth, who described the SNP's figures as "a cruel deceit" 
[Rougvie and Booth, 1997], and its claim to 90 per cent of North Sea oil revenues 
as highly dubious. The response of the SNP's treasury spokesman John Swinney 
was to describe Forsyth as "a failing politician, peddling smears that are 
inaccurate and incredible" [Rougvie and Booth, 1997], while Salmond accused 
Forsyth of using the civil service and public funds for Tory propaganda, and 
compared him to "the joker out of the Batman movies" [Booth, 1997]. 
Meanwhile Labour activist and economist Jim Stevens said that the SNP's budget 
was "about as useful as a chocolate fireguard" [Rougvie and Booth, 1997]. This 
was followed three days later by a four-page news release from Swinney 
rebutting Conservative criticism of the SNP budget in mind-numbing detail, listing 
19 points from the £27 billion to Scotland's share of unidentified spending. The 
tone of the release showed that the SNP no longer had many doubts about 
negative campaigning: in it Swinney described Trade Secretary Ian Lang as 
"another failing Tory politician", who "has nothing to offer Scotland but bogus 
fears and smears", and "another anti-Scottish Tory left bereft of any credibility. " 
[SNP, 1997n] In fact, of the 104 news releases that the SNP issued between 
March 17 and May 1,41 per cent were "negative attacks upon its political rivals, 
particularly the Labour party" [Fisher, 1997, p. 59]. 
The pressure on the SNP to state its position on the proposed devolution 
referendum continued, when on April 10 Nigel Smith, organizer of Partnership for 
a Parliament, designed to be the precursor of the post-election "Yes, Yes" 
campaign, urged the party to consider joining his group. Funded by £130,000 
worth of donations from businesses and trade unions, it would be ready to start 
campaigning as soon as possible after the election, and, said Smith, was set up 
so that the SNP "can play a proper and fully engaged part. " [MacMahon, 1997f] 
However, the party refused to commit itself on its participation, saying that it 
viewed that the referendum as it stood - with no question on independence - "as 
a cul-de-sac to delay and obstruct change" [MacMahon, 1997f]. According to 
Peter MacMahon of the Scotsman, although the SNP had rejected Smith's appeal, 
privately it was discussing the matter, and this seemed to be borne out by 
comments made on April 15 by Roseanna Cunningham that the SNP "was not 
likely to put stumbling blocks in the way of devolution", and by Alex Salmond 
that support for any Labour Party policy "would depend on whether it was in 
the best interests of the people of Scotland" [MacMahon and Wilson, 1997]. 
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As the campaign moved into its final two weeks, the SNP's support 
remained static, hovering at around 23 to 24 per cent, although there were a large 
number of undecided voters - some 25 per cent. However, there were basic flaws 
in the SNP's campaign that explained its inability to make a breakthrough, as 
Scotsman columnist Ian Bell pointed out. First, the SNP tactic of attacking Tony 
Blair as someone who couldn't be trusted was irrelevant, because the main 
concern of Scots voters was defeating the Tories. Secondly, the argument over 
the £27 billion risked "boring the electorate into insensibility with ever more 
abstruse calculations. Ultimately, nationalism is a variety of patriotism.... It is 
not a conclusion drawn from a balance sheet. " [Bell, 1997b] Finally, it was clear 
that the leadership of the SNP believed that Labour was going to win, since they 
were telling people that they could safely vote SNP and still defeat the 
Conservatives. As the parties came to the final push of the campaign, the 
outcome was not that difficult to discern. 
All Over Bar The Shouting 
The Scotsman's columnists may have been complaining about the barrage of 
micro-economic material emanating from the SNP press office during the 
campaign, but that did not stop the paper from devoting a full page to the 
party's fiscal claims on April 18. An article by John Hall, senior research 
economist at the Institute for Fiscal Studies with the headline, "SNP's oil-fuelled 
budget slips up on the arithmetic" stated in the second paragraph, 
"Independence will mean higher taxes, higher borrowing or lower spending -a 
bleaker picture than the one painted by the Nationalist manifesto. " [Hall, 1997] 
Unfortunately this was not what he said, according to the disclaimer the 
Scotsman published the next day in a small (albeit bolded) column headlined 
"SNP budget", which basically negated the whole thrust of the article. In the 
disclaimer, Hall asked the paper to make it clear that the second paragraph 
should read "independence might" have the aforesaid consequences, and that he 
did not suggest that there were mistakes in the SNP budget arithmetic. The 
Scotsman concluded the disclaimer by apologising "for any other impression 
given. " [Scotsman, 1997b] To get the facts so completely wrong in a major 
election opinion piece was bad enough, but to print the correction in a manner 
almost guaranteed to obscure it was even worse; this was not political journalism 
at its best. 
The next day the SNP had the biggest poll boost of the campaign: The 
Sunday Times NOP poll showed them at 28 per cent. Most significantly, when 
asked which party they would support in a Scottish parliament, 38 per cent of 
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those surveyed chose the SNP, compared to 39 per cent for Labour. This was 
good news indeed, as it was the highest poll rating the SNP had ever 
experienced. It was also the first indication that the voting patterns for the 
Scottish parliament - now seen as a definite possibility with the strengthening of 
Labour's lead over the Tories - would be quite different from those for 
Westminster. The news provided a convenient backdrop for the release of the 
party's latest manifesto, "The Scotland We Seek", whose upbeat message 
delivered in emotive language was designed to appeal "to the heart side of the 
campaign... an appeal to self-respect, an appeal to Scottish confidence and 
Scottish pride", as Alex Salmond told Magnus Linklater on the BBC Scotland's 
Eye to Eye programme [Herald, 1997b]. The SNP's strong belief that Scotland 
was capable of running its own affairs would be the party's message of the 
campaign's final days, he said. 
Internally, the party was in the strange position of hoping that Labour, 
their traditional enemy, would continue in the lead so that Scottish voters would 
be rid of "the overhang of fear" and risk voting for the SNP, secure in the 
knowledge that doing so would not let the Tories win again. As Kenny 
Farquharson noted in Scotland on Sunday the day of a major rally for the SNP 
faithful in Glasgow, this view was certainly a change from previous years, when 
the party slogan was "Labour can't win". Now party strategists believed that 
the SNP could make significant gains if the current trends held, but that was a big 
if, and they were not certain of the result. As one strategist told Farquharson: 
"We are walking a ridge right now, and nobody knows if we're going to be 
knocked down the slope or go on to a higher peak. " [Farquharson, 1997b] 
On April 21, the SNP released a transcript of an interview done by 
Labour campaign co-ordinator Brian Wilson on RTE (Irish State Radio) which 
became the second constitutional bombshell of the election campaign. In it 
Wilson stated that a devolved assembly would not be able to hold a referendum 
on Scottish independence, as that was "a matter for the UK parliament" [SNP, 
1997q]. The response by Labour was swift: the party's general secretary Jack 
McConnell stated that the Scottish parliament would "have clearly-defined 
powers. There will be no question of extending these powers unilaterally. We are 
offering devolution, not separation. " [Dinwoodie, 1997d] He also confirmed that 
the system of proportional representation had been designed to stop the SNP 
from gaining control of the new parliament, a view originally expressed by 
Shadow Secretary of State George Robertson two years before. Robertson re- 
affirmed McConnell's stance in a speech to the Scottish Trades Union Congress 
later that day, saying that "There is no way that the Scottish parliament could, 
or should, be able to turn itself into an independent state. " The SNP's response 
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was, once again, that Labour was an anti-Scottish party that couldn't be trusted 
on the constitution [MacMahon and Scott, 1997]. 
There were some more positive developments for the SNP as the 
campaign progressed. The party's policy of giving votes to 16-year-olds seemed 
like a good idea after it won mock elections at Edinburgh's Royal High, Glasgow 
Academy, St. Machar Academy in Aberdeen and Inverness Royal Academy, as 
well as BBC's Newsround general election, taking 40 per cent of the vote among 
the school children who participated. The political pundits were divided as to 
whether the results had any significance for the future: although an 
Scotsman/ICM poll the week before had shown support for the SNP at the same 
level as Labour in the 18-34-year-old age group, the SNP had similarly high 
percentages of poll support in the early 1970s among youth, who had not 
remained loyal to the party as they grew older [Luckhurst, 1997]. However, 
Peter Snow of Newsnight said that he always found the Newsround results a good 
indication of what was to come. "We may well be getting a first impression of 
the likely patterns of voting in the 21st century, " he said [Dalton and Penman, 
1997]. 
The SNP also gained two converts from Labour in Glasgow - activist 
Stuart MacLennan and councillor Yvonne Anderson, who said they were 
unhappy with Labour's move to the right, and intended to vote SNP. Their 
defection became the subject of controversy when Jack McConnell stated that 
Anderson was the subject of an internal disciplinary inquiry because of her poor 
performance on council, and accused MacLennan of disruptive behaviour [Smith, 
1997]. McConnell's claim about Anderson was disputed by the SNP, who 
pointed out that her name had not been on the list of those councillors being 
investigated when it had first been released two weeks previously, and that her 
absence from council meetings had been due to serious illness [SNP, 1997r]. 
MacLennan had been embroiled in the controversy over the nomination of Labour 
candidate Mohammed Sarwar in Govan as an organizer for Mike Watson, the 
opposing nominee who lost by one vote in a re-run of the selection contest held 
amid "accusations of racism, duplicity and vote-rigging" [Wring, 1997, p. 68]. 
His support for Watson may not have been politically correct, but it did not 
necessarily constitute disruptive behaviour, either. Labour's conflicting 
statements and negative approach did not do much for its credibility on the 
issue. 
As always, the SNP could rely on Sean Connery to give it much-needed 
publicity, but this could be a mixed blessing. When Connery did the voice-over 
for the party's last political broadcast before the election (which was transmitted 
on all five UK terrestrial channels), Alex Salmond had to defend the film star 
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against the criticism that he was not entitled to speak on Scottish affairs because 
he did not live in Scotland. As well as doing the party broadcast, Connery also 
gave an interview to the Scottish Sun, in which he declared that devolution was 
"the next step" to independence, and that his dream was to read the Declaration 
of Arbroath at the opening of the Scottish parliament. He even promised to buy 
a house in Scotland once it became independent [Scott, 1997]. 
There was more good news with the release of an ICM poll April 27 that 
showed the SNP's Alisdair Morgan would defeat Ian Lang in his seat of 
Galloway and Upper Nithsdale by 11 per cent. This poll was particularly 
credible as ICM was the firm used by the Tories for their own internal polling, 
and employed a methodology that tended to favour the Conservatives by 
assuming that a significant percentage of the "don't knows" would go to that 
party. This was followed by the appearance of some positive support in the 
media for the SNP's oft-repeated claim that Scotland's economy was strong 
enough to go it alone, with an article in the Herald by Professor Hervey Gibson, 
former head of Economics at Scottish Enterprise, who argued that Scotland's 
economy was as dynamic and resilient as those of other small nations [Gibson, 
1997], and a letter to the Herald from 10 well-known academics in the fields of 
economics and business at universities in Scotland, Ireland, Germany and 
England who stated that "the Scottish economy is quite capable of supporting a 
successful independent future for Scotland should the electorate so decide. " 
[Simpson et al, 1997] 
But none of these events had the desired effect: two days before the 
election, the SNP was at 21 per cent in the Scotsman/ICM poll, exactly where it 
had been a week earlier, and the same as it had been in 1992. Party officials 
were obviously not hedging their bets. Nicola Sturgeon, the SNP's candidate in 
Glasgow Govan, urged voters to support the SNP in marginal seats, even if it 
meant the Conservatives might win [Dalton, 1997]. When asked how many seats 
he expected the party to garner, Alex Salmond said, "a barrowload", and when 
asked to define that number, he explained: "A barrowload is an interesting term 
in Scotland. It means a lot. " [Scott, 1997b] 
It had been a long and mean-spirited campaign, marked by an 
unprecedented amount of sleaze and negativism, one that seemed to turn voters 
off, at least from viewing it on television. The audience for BBC1's Nine O'Clock 
News, which was extended to 45 minutes for the campaign, fell below four million 
nine times, while ITN's News At Ten kept to an average weekly audience of 5.7 
million [Herald, 1997d]. The drop in numbers was even more dramatic when 
David Dimbleby interviewed Alex Salmond and Daffyd Wigley of Plaid Cymru, 
with the 15 million viewers who watched EastEnders plummeting to just over two 
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million when the interview began. As campaign media analyst Stuart Cosgrove 
observed: "Miraculously, 13 million people disappeared within minutes when 
soap opera ended and constitutional discussion began. It was the greatest 
escape since Houdini. " [Cosgrove, 1997] 
These dramatic drops in audience numbers occurred despite concerted 
efforts by the BBC to reformulate their political programming in a way that 
would appeal to modem British voters, who, like those in Canada, shared "the 
zeitgeist of today's less deferential society" [Blumler and Gurevitch, 1998, p. 
193]. The BBC's own research had shown that the public was becoming 
increasingly alienated from the political process and found political coverage to 
be "a big turn-off" [Blumler and Gurevitch, 1998, p. 180]. The response was 
"Populism ä la BBC" [Blumler and Gurevitch, 1998, p. 180], in which the BBC 
strove to make its political broadcasts more accessible and participatory by 
using straightforward language with a minimum of jargon and insider terms, 
getting reporters out of the studio and on site where the issues were happening, 
and employing more "streeters" and vox pops in which only "real people 
appeared", as one social affairs correspondent described them [Blumler and 
Gurevitch, 1998, p. 188]. The BBC's move towards greater participation was 
also reflected in the practices of the other television and radio networks, who 
employed a wide variety of interactive formats, including phone-ins, studio 
panels and audience forums in which the public could question politicians, albeit 
through a moderator [Blumler and Gurevitch, 1998, p. 189]. However, these 
laudable attempts to democratize the reporting of the campaign could not 
"compensate for the exposure of viewers to the 30-round heavyweight boxing 
match that was staged nightly at the top of the news" [Blumler and Gurevitch, 
1998, p. 193], and which had them switching off in record numbers. 
The Conservative Party's advertising certainly alienated the members of 
the Scotsman's Focus Group, made up of 10 floating voters in the marginal 
Inverness East, Nairn and Lochaber constituency, who found the party's negative 
approach typical of the whole campaign, and not one they liked [Ross, 1997]. 
The Church of Scotland's Church and Nation Committee were so concerned by 
the amount of derogatory advertising in the election that they issued a report 
strongly criticizing its use, saying that by "encouraging an atmosphere of 
suspicion and fear it is positively harmful to the democratic process. " [Duncan, 
1997] 
The SNP's advertising did not follow the Tory pattern of "knocking 
copy" to the same extent but it did not inspire, and this was a big missed 
opportunity, according to Johnathan d'Aguilar, creative director of a Glasgow 
advertising agency [d'Aguilar, 1997]. What the SNP campaign needed was some 
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emotional spark to bring it alive, and this rarely happened, despite frequent 
statements from Alex Salmond (the latest just two days before the election) that 
the campaign was now moving from head to heart. As the Herald concluded in 
its lead editorial April 30: 
Possibly the best campaign has been fought by the SNP (though 
that is damning with faint praise) and certainly there have been 
no gaffes, no blunders. Alex Salmond is leading a modern, lean, 
well-organised, and well-briefed party and he has eschewed the 
vain glorious posturing which disfigured his campaign five 
years ago. But this is a party which should have the fervour of a 
movement; it is [a] party which is asking Scots to take an 
immense and heady, if ultimately rewarding, risk, but the 
opportunity is presented not as a matter of vision, of destiny, but 
of the details of micro-economic policy. 
[Herald, 1997c] 
The Results 
When the votes had been counted the morning of May 2, the Scottish National 
Party had obtained something less than a barrowload of seats, and less than the 
seven to 40 Alex Salmond had bet the party would win in his wager with The Big 
Issue. True, the party had doubled the number of its MPs to six, knocking off 
Conservative cabinet minister Ian Lang in Galloway and Upper Nithsdale, and it 
had held onto its seat in Perth and Kinross, won in a by-election in 1995, the first 
time the party had ever done so. But it had only increased its percentage of the 
vote by . 06, from 21.5 in 1992 to 22.1 in 1997, and its vote declined in the four 
cities of Aberdeen, Dundee, Edinburgh, and Glasgow. 
The SNP's Research Department put a positive spin on the results, 
saying that the election "established the SNP as Scotland's second force" [SNP 
Research Department, 1997, p. 1], which statistically speaking was the case: 
although the Liberal Democrats had 10 seats, this was won with 13.1 per cent of 
the vote, and the Lib Dems came second in only one seat, while the SNP was 
second in 44, up from 10 in the 1992 election. Also, the SNP was the only other 
main party besides Labour to increase its vote, albeit by a fraction, and its 
percentage of the vote was the second-highest it had ever achieved in a general 
election, only bested by the 30.4 per cent it gained in October of 1974. In 
addition, Alex Salmond trebled his majority in Banff and Buchan, while Andrew 
Welsh's majority went from 954 in 1992 to 10,189, and this in a seat that was 
seen as a marginal for the SNP. The party had again kept all of its deposits, as it 
had in 1992, which represented considerable progress from the disastrous year of 
1983 when the SNP lost 52 of them. Most significantly, the party was able to 
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improve on its ability to convert votes into seats, a difficult task in the first-past- 
the-post system, where the SNP had to gather almost five times as many votes as 
Labour to win a seat. Labour, with 45.6 per cent of the vote, won 78 per cent of 
the seats, 56 out of 72, taking an average of 22,917 votes per seat, while the SNP 
had an average of 103,590 votes per seat [SNP Research Department, 1997, pp. 
5-6]. Because their vote was so evenly spread across Scotland, the SNP 
"received a poor reward for their overall performance, winning only six seats 
when strict proportionality would have given them 16" [Denver, 1997, p. 20]. 
What had happened was that the SNP had been hindered by the Labour 
landslide, but helped by the Tory collapse, as had Plaid Cymru and the Liberal 
Democrats [Mitchell, 1997, p. 145]. The two new seats they had won since the 
1992 election were the result of a swing from Conservative to SNP in Perth and 
Angus [Denver, 1997, p. 211. The ironic feature of the Conservative defeat, 
Denver found, was that "the stronger their position the greater were their 
losses. .. they lost support most heavily in the relatively few remaining 
constituencies in which they still had a substantial vote. " [Denver, 1997, p. 23] 
The result was that in the traditionally Tory seats of North Tayside and 
Galloway and Upper Nithsdale there was a swing of 8.4 per cent and 9.5 per 
cent respectively from the Conservatives to the SNP. Labour's increased share of 
the vote mainly hurt the SNP and the Liberal Democrats, according to Denver, 
while the Lib Dems "disproportionately benefited" from the Conservative losses 
[Denver, 1997, p. 241. 
An interesting characteristic of the SNP's support is that it was not 
confined to any particular social or economic group. There was a slight 
correlation between the SNP vote and the percentage of manual and agricultural 
workers, but this was more a reflection of the party's strength in the rural areas 
of north-east Scotland as the SNP tended to attract the same kind of support in 
all kinds of constituencies. However, this broad support presented a problem for 
the party, Denver explained, "because under the electoral system it is 
geographical concentrations of votes (which are linked to social concentrations) 
which win seats" [Denver, 1997, p. 27]. 
Analysis of opinion polls during the election period and before provides 
some information that helps to explain the results, particularly for the 
Conservatives. A poll taken in February 1997 showed that 73 per cent of those 
surveyed believed it to be "an English party with little relevance to Scotland", 
including 28 per cent of Tories [McCrone, 1997, p. 158]. Of the three major polls 
in Scotland - ICM, System Three, and NOP - ICM was the most accurate, with its 
final poll two days before the election only one percentage point off the final 
result. The poll showed "that Labour was by far the most popular party among 
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all ages, and all social classes", and that the highest support for the Tories, 24 
per cent, was in the 65 and over group. Labour even managed to do twice as 
well as the SNP among those aged 18 to 29 - 48 to 23 per cent. 
However positive the election results were for Labour and disappointing 
for the SNP, they were not good for democracy, according to the Electoral Reform 
Society, an organization which promotes proportional representation. It pointed 
to the turnout - the lowest since 1935 with 71.3 per cent of eligible voters casting 
ballots - and the distortions of the first-past-the-post system, most dramatically 
illustrated in Scotland, where Labour won 77.8 per cent of the seats with 45.6 
per cent of the votes, and the SNP obtained 8.3 per cent with 22. Even more 
striking, the Conservatives had 17.5 per cent of the vote, but gained no seats, 
while the Liberal Democrats took 13.9 per cent of the seats with 13 per cent of 
the vote [Sinclair, 1997]. 
Post-election analysis in the media conceded that the SNP had fought the 
good fight but that in the end it had been defeated in an election that was more 
about beating the Tories than anything else. "Living to oppose Labour, the 
Nationalists became mere bystanders as Tony Blair's troops stormed the 
citadels", wrote Ian Bell in the Scotsman [Bell, 1997c]. The fact that the SNP held 
its own despite the Labour deluge "was quite remarkable given tactical voting 
and the similarities between the electorates of the two parties", said Peter Lynch 
in the Herald. Lynch, like Bell, did not think that the constitutional issue was 
important. "Frankly, this was always a very British election campaign, 
dominated by the issue of electing a Government. " [Lynch, 1997] Perhaps, but 
Scotland's political climate - so different from the rest of the UK because of its 
four-party battle, its distinctive media, and its particular constitutional issue - 
had yielded some unique results. Significantly, all the parties backing 
constitutional change gained seats, while the only party that opposed it, the 
Tories, lost every single one they had. This would seem to indicate that the 
constitutional issue was more important to the Scottish public than the pundits 
realized. Certainly the SNP seemed to feel that the election demonstrated that, 
as their commentary on the results concluded. 
The election confirms that the SNP's support is neither 
transient, nor based on protest. Our support comes from a 
growing core who demand constitutional change and 
independence for Scotland. Doubling our representation at 
Westminster, and increasing our share of the vote in the face of 
a landslide shift to Labour confirms the SNP as the second force 
in Scottish politics - and the power behind the drive for 
constitutional change. 
[SNP Research Department, 1997, p. 7] 
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What The SNP Strategists Said 
The outcome of the election for the SNP was not unexpected by its party 
strategists, although the scale of the Labour victory and the Tory defeat in 
Scotland was something of a surprise. Certainly there was some 
disappointment, but as one strategist said: 
"I don't think anybody thought that this was going to be the big 
breakthrough election. It was going to be an election of some 
advance. The issue was just how far that advance would go. I 
think realistically we were talking about six or seven seats 
thereabouts, and there's no doubt we were disappointed not to 
win some seats, for example, Inverness, but I think in retrospect 
we took the view that on the night, our major opponent in 
Scotland had their best night ever, and just to be able to advance 
at all in the face of that was quite an achievement in itself. " 
Generally the expectation had been that the SNP would have received closer to 
the 25 per cent mark in the vote, and with it, one or two extra seats. This 
lowering of expectations and emphasis on steady progress had been the whole 
point of the SNP's five-year plan. As one senior party executive member 
explained: 
"It was a couple of percentage points lower in the national vote 
than I would have expected, and realistically, at most two 
parliamentary seats locked short of what I thought we could win, 
and if I were really being truthful with myself, probably it would 
be one short. And certainly the Labour landslide I did not expect. 
That's what counts for the failure to win the two extra 
parliamentary seats, and the very modest increase in our share of 
the vote. But the situation with the Tories - not the fact that they 
lost two seats to the SNP - didn't surprise me at all. The fact they 
lost everything did surprise me, which was the other side of the 
Labour landslide coin. " 
This realistic attitude towards the election results made it easier for the SNP to 
better manage expectations than it had in 1992, so that even though the outcome 
was not that spectacular, the party was "able to point to a real achievement 
towards progress. " 
When asked what the reasons were for the SNP's inability to make a 
breakthrough, the response was straightforward: the media's blanket coverage of 
Labour, which in turn, was prompted by the desire to get the Tories out of 
government. As one of the SNP media strategists said: 
"In the last two or three days of the campaign the Westminster 
dimension tended to dominate, and we tended to be swamped 
almost literally by wall-to-wall coverage of Tony Blair and New 
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Labour, and all of the tabloids, all of the broadsheets, I just think 
they swung behind Blair in a big way; in the last four days 
really. .. you had the Sun and the Record devoting four, five, 
six pages just to Labour in the last few days of the campaign. I 
think what that probably did, I think it probably depressed some 
of our electorate, some of our voters in central Scotland.... 
because the coverage was wall-to-wall. It was all of course on the 
Westminster dimension, the need to get rid of the Tories. That's 
what May the first was all about. " 
It was true that there was a major switch to Labour in Scottish 
newspapers, and not in just the Murdoch papers, the Sun and the Scottish News 
of the World. The Scotsman changed its support from Liberal Democrat to Labour; 
Scotland on Sunday also backed Labour, as did the Sunday Mail, while the Herald, 
the Scottish Daily Mail, and the Aberdeen Press and Journal were neutral. The 
Sunday Post, the Dundee Courier and the Express remained Conservative. This 
new editorial support for Labour was in addition to that provided by the Daily 
Record, which, with its circulation then close to 730,000, had the biggest 
readership of Scotland's dailies [Scammell and Harrop, 1998, p. 174]. However, 
it is doubtful that the press support of Labour depressed the SNP vote. As 
Negrine asks, "do people choose newspapers because they reflect their own 
politics or do they buy newspapers and then their politics? " [Negrine, 1994, p. 
177] Curtice and Semetko's detailed analysis of press influence in the 1992 
election suggests the former rather than the latter: "many electors still appear to 
view newspaper reports (and watch television news) through a partisan filter 
that enables them to ignore politically uncongenial messages. " [Curtice and 
Semetko, 1994, p. 561 McKie puts it more bluntly: 
A newspaper pitch is unlikely to move many voters unless it 
chimes with their own experience, plays on doubts already 
haunting them, celebrates successes they agree are worth 
celebrating. This time, the mood of the voters swayed the 
tabloids, and not the other way round. 
[McKie, 1998, p. 129] 
A senior office-bearer who was also a candidate said that he thought 
"the media were part of this mood within the country that had 
made up its mind and that in many ways were just going 
through the motions of the election campaign. What we 
increasingly found as time went on was the kind of romance of 
the Scottish media with the Labour Party was just all- 
consuming. You could hardly move through either the 
broadsheets or the tabloids without confronting the softest 
coverage you'd ever find of the Labour Party. " 
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Again, there is evidence for this view. Nationally, the Conservatives also 
questioned the lack of journalistic scrutiny of Labour's policies, complaining that 
"the media allowed it to bluff its way out of trouble". Labour was seen as the 
government in waiting, and was dealt with accordingly in the press [Butler and 
Kavanagh, 1997, p. 232]. However, the benefit for the SNP in the media's focus 
on Labour was that the party was not scrutinised in the way it had been in 1992. 
"We did not have a tough election campaign. It was hard work, 
but it was not critically examining, because effectively the 
journalists were willing us to succeed where it mattered to them, 
which was in getting the Tory MPs out, and they weren't much 
interested in our strategic challenge to the Labour Party, because 
they were doing everything in their power to get the Labour 
party in. So the Scottish media were pretty soft on reflection, and 
certainly not as critically examining as they had been in 1992, 
when they were bitterly sceptical about the political message we 
put forward. " 
It was not just that the journalists were not interested in the SNP's strategic 
challenge to Labour; they simply did not believe it, as I discuss later in the 
chapter. 
As far as strengths and weaknesses of the SNP's campaign, SNP 
strategists were agreed that the party's improved organization and resources 
were a definite plus; the fact that the SNP was so well-prepared meant that there 
were no real surprises in the campaign. Said one strategist: "We went through an 
election campaign that was sober; it was well-organized, it was very effective, it 
had its punch; but it really didn't depart from the script as to what was likely to 
happen. " However, although there was agreement as to the importance of the 
SNP's economic message and its centrality to the success of the campaign, there 
was also some concern that it had been over-played, to the detriment of the 
emotional aspects of the SNP's independence vision. A party strategist who 
helped draft the party's economic message said: 
"We were very good at putting across the detailed substantial 
economic message. We weren't terribly good at lifting people's 
hearts and their sights, and that sparkle - in a sense it's an 
interesting contrast with the history of the SNP. If we are 
criticized for anything as a party in the past it has been that we've 
been too dependent on the emotion and the rhetoric, and 
deficient on the detail and the substance, and effectively in the 
1997 election we swung the other way, and we got a real dose of 
detail and the substance, but we were deficient in the emotion 
and the passion and the fire. " 
He personally took responsibility for the failure "to concentrate on that aspect of 
the campaign", but added that given the interests of the party leadership, most 
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of whom had a strong background and interest in economics, it was difficult to 
say whether it could have been handled differently. This was most likely true. 
As Mitchell notes: "Absent from the SNP's 1997 campaign were Jim Sillars and 
his fiery oratory. In his place were SNP economists. Accounting and statistics 
shored up the SNP vote across Scotland, but failed to ignite its campaign. " 
[Mitchell, 1997, p. 144] 
Labour's domination of the political agenda made it difficult for the SNP 
to get coverage, particularly towards the end of the campaign when the media 
were focused on the drama of Major's struggle to hang on while Blair looked 
certain to sweep into power. Coupled with the weakness of their message at that 
stage - which was to tell voters that they could now safely vote for the SNP 
because there was no risk of another Tory win - and its lack of emotional 
inspiration, the party could not compete with the excitement of the Labour-Tory 
conflict in what was, after all, a Westminster election. 
Despite the frustrations of trying to get their message across in these 
circumstances, SNP strategists were ambivalent in their criticisms of the Scottish 
media. On the one hand they were unhappy with the coverage that was biased 
so heavily toward Labour, but were relieved that they were not subject to closer 
scrutiny as a result of that, and were pleased that the SNP was beginning to be 
taken seriously as a political force, although this placed more demands on the 
party. As the SNP's communications director said: "the media treated us with 
probably more respect than it had done in previous elections. They actually took 
all what we had to say seriously, which was a good thing, but of course, that 
means everything you have got to say had to make absolute sense. " Their biggest 
problem was with the London-based media, and particularly the networks. 
Although they were pleased with the fact that they got more network coverage 
than they ever had before, it was still not representative of the SNP's share of the 
vote. Here the party was the beneficiary of increased regional programming in 
Scotland, with the BBC alone running 12 editions of Campaign Scotland, three 
Words with Wark programmes, four Election Calls with each of the Scottish party 
leaders, as well as extensive analysis and reports on Good Morning Scotland, 
News Afternoon and Newsdrive [Harrison, 1997, p. 147]. 
Pairing Alex Salmond with Daffyd Wigley for programmes such as 
Question Time proved useful, but the party found it extremely difficult to get into 
the daily news bulletins, especially the all-important evening news programmes, 
according to the communications director. "These were the ones that showed the 
most resistance to covering the SNP, so whilst we got more of that kind of 
coverage than ever before, it still wasn't anything... like on a par with what the 
other parties got, nothing like it. " However, Salmond was quite successful in 
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getting on radio and television news: he was quoted 61 times on BBC1, ITV, 
Channel 4 and Radio 4, while George Robertson was quoted 27 times, Michael 
Forsyth 24, and Jim Wallace 23 [Harrison, 1997, p. 144]. 
A senior office-bearer who was also a candidate said that he found the 
Scottish broadcasting media were "pretty fair, pretty neutral; there was no really 
critical insight in the broadcasters to our message. I certainly felt that at no stage 
was our message under threat from the media. " He was scathing in his criticism, 
however, of the London-based media, whom, he said, he held "in utter 
contempt" for their lack of knowledge about Scottish affairs. "I increasingly got 
frustrated by the amount of time that one had to spend re-educating, or 
educating for the first time the UK media about issues which are supposedly, in 
the former prime minister's words, further directed to the integrity of the 
nation... they had absolutely no idea what Scottish politics was about. " He 
found their coverage "naive", and "part of a very, very laissez-faire attitude 
towards the Labour Party". He contrasted this with a programme he did on 
Radio Scotland, where he was questioned for an hour on SNP policy by 
academics, professionals and other specialists. 
"It was one of the very few interviews I took part in during the 
election that I felt somebody had got to the nitty-gritty, was 
actually testing out the real core offering to the public: now, how 
does this work out? How does it stack up? What will it mean? 
And you know, increasingly that was not evident at all during 
the election campaign... that kind of interviewing was very rare. " 
What The Political Journalists Said 
If the SNP felt that the election coverage was unfairly weighted towards the 
Labour Party, and that the Scottish media had been soft on Labour and to a 
certain extent, themselves, the Scottish political journalists did not seem to be 
aware of it, for it was never mentioned in their interviews. They did, however, 
agree with the view of the SNP strategists that the 1997 election was all about 
getting rid of the Tories, which makes it somewhat surprising that they were so 
taken aback by the extent of the Tory losses in Scotland, especially since they 
were aware that the Progressive Conservatives in Canada went from 169 seats to 
two in the 1993 Canadian federal election. None of them were prepared for the 
Tory wipe-out, or the size of the Labour landslide; one of them did think the SNP 
might have done better, but, as he said, "they were up against what seemed to 
be, with hindsight, an unstoppable Labour bandwagon. " A political editor said 
he thought that until the last Scotsman/ICM poll of the campaign showing the 
party's support static at 21 per cent the SNP "had convinced themselves that 
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they were about to make a major breakthrough. The poll told them that it was 
not happening. " However, there was no evidence of such a belief in any of the 
interviews with the SNP, nor was it corroborated by any other Scottish political 
correspondents or SNP members I talked to. As another political editor said: 
"This election was always about the Tories getting trounced and 
a New Labour government coming in and introducing a new 
element in the Scottish constitutional debate. That's what this 
election was always going to be about, it was never going to be 
the independence election, and that was recognized, so the SNP 
strategy was how do... we play this so we end up in the best 
position afterwards. " 
When analysing why the SNP did not make much headway, one political 
correspondent explained that it was due to the fact that Labour had an almost 
flawless campaign. 
"I think the defining moment for the SNP was that Labour 
didn't falter. I am in no doubt that if in the final fortnight of the 
campaign Blair had begun to look seriously vulnerable, or 
Labour's late campaign had had any serious errors or gaffes, the 
beneficiaries of that north of the border would undoubtedly have 
been the SNP. But the truth is that Labour didn't; Labour were 
pretty relentless; under Mandelson they did run an excellent 
campaign. They didn't really put a foot wrong; [there were] a 
couple of wobbles but they really did well, and I just feel the 
longer it looked like Labour were definitely going to win, the 
more potentially wavering SNP supporters, potential supporters 
nevertheless, wanted to back a winner. And I think there is a 
psychological thing about being on the side of the winner, and 
Blair looked like a winner. And in the light of that, with 
hindsight, it was very, very difficult for the SNP to crack that 
very solid campaign that Labour mounted. I don't think there 
was anything obvious they could have done that they didn't do. 
I don't think there [were] any errors that they made. I think they 
set up everything right to maximise their chances, but actually 
achieving that would have depended on Labour faltering, and it 
didn't. " 
Another problem for the SNP was the campaign's extraordinary length, which 
greatly handicapped the party's election strategy, according to one political 
editor. 
"The fact that it was such a long campaign... it was, you know, 
weeks and weeks and weeks and it ran into months, and that did 
not suit the kind of campaign the SNP wanted to run. The SNP 
wanted to run a campaign which in its closing stages was a real 
Braveheart campaign. This was the original plan as it was 
described to me, but because the campaign was so long they felt 
they couldn't go too early with a Braveheart-type of appeal to 
most people because that is hard to sustain over a long period of 
time. If they went with that then people would tire of it. It had 
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to be a kind of big hit over a short period of time at the end of the 
campaign, so the length of the campaign meant that for too long 
they were forced to... fall back on just one or two bits of 
campaigning strategy, and basically they flogged them to death 
for weeks and weeks and weeks. The things they had were good 
things but... the question was, were they good enough to sustain 
interest in the party and gain momentum for the party over a 
long period of time. " 
The political journalists were all agreed on the strengths of the SNP 
campaign: it was well-organized, professional, and had, one editor said, "the 
best media/PR/spin operation in Scottish politics", as well as an extremely 
capable leader. For this editor, "The main strength of the campaign can be 
summed up in two words: Alex Salmond. Though he has his detractors, 
Salmond is a formidable campaigner. " However, the journalists' views on the 
weaknesses of the party's campaign were more complex and reflected their 
scepticism as to the validity of the SNP's claims for independence. One political 
journalist stated that the main weakness was simply that the SNP was a single 
issue party, and although "they tried very hard to present a range of policies on 
different issues... there were times when that was counter-productive. For 
example, when they produced a 'defence policy', it raised more questions than it 
answered. " The second major weakness was that the SNP was fighting for 
attention in a national election in which "Labour managed successfully to make it 
them vs the Tories and this was a very difficult argument for the SNP to 
counter. " 
Another political correspondent was somewhat amused by the SNP's 
attempts to counter that argument, particularly in light of its stance on Labour in 
previous campaigns. 
"They tried to argue... 'Well, now that Blair is pretty safe and a 
shoo-in in England, you don't have to have the fear about letting 
the Tories back in so vote for us, vote for who you really want to 
vote for. ' It became clear that people didn't do that.... It was an 
interesting try, but it was of course completely contradictory, 
because for years the SNP have been saying a Labour vote's a 
wasted vote. The Tories get in; no matter what you vote you get 
the government you don't want, vote for us. Now they were 
really saying, well, you're going to get the government you want 
anyway, so you're free to vote for us [Laughter].... So they were 
arguing precisely the opposite; and it was a fair try, but it was 
pretty easy to attack on that basis. " 
One editor saw the SNP's apparent unwillingness to attack Labour as a 
weakness. 
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"The SNP campaign, if you compare it with previous SNP 
campaigns... was very easy on the Labour Party; there must have 
been something of conscious effort, a conscious decision not to 
go for the jugular.... There was no real attempt to portray the 
Labour Party as they had done in the past as somehow selling out 
Scotland, unworthy of the Scots, of betraying Scots interests, this 
kind of thing. " 
He believed it was part of the SNP's overall strategy to ensure that they came out 
of the election in a good position: there was no point in their trying to defeat 
Labour, especially since the SNP stood to gain seats if Tory votes went to Labour 
- which of course they did. 
On the strengths and weaknesses of their own coverage of the campaign, 
the Scottish political journalists did not have too much to say, which was not 
that surprising. Critical self-analysis is not something that journalists do well, 
given the constraints of time and their own work culture, which rewards the 
critiquing of other institutions, but not their own [Desbarats, 1990, pp. 104-107; 
Bromley, 1997, p. 9]. The political editor of a Sunday paper said that the major 
weakness of their coverage was the lack of dramatic incidents during the 
campaign, caused by its long, drawn-out nature, which meant that 
"there was less fast and furious action which needed 
explaining.... a more dynamic, close-fought, eventful campaign 
would have suited us better because there would have been 
more for us to explain... too much was self-evident. There wasn't 
enough for us to detail the story behind it, which is what Sunday 
papers do best.... Also... we didn't grab any exclusives which shed 
dramatic new light in the campaign or changed the course of 
how the campaign was fought... apparently it wasn't that kind of 
campaign. " 
A political correspondent said that his newspaper's major weakness in its 
coverage was its poor organization and its unwillingness to commit more 
resources to election news gathering. (The two problems are of course inter- 
related, in that a newspaper management which was strongly committed to good 
election coverage would have made sure that the newsroom organization and 
resources were in place for the campaign. ) He also felt that his paper could have 
exercised more scepticism concerning devolution. 
For another political editor, the only flaw in his newspaper's coverage 
was that sometimes it had difficulties balancing coverage of the UK election and 
the campaign in Scotland, but generally, he thought "we did manage to cover the 
mixture of the UK and Scottish issues pretty well, though we could always have 
used more space in the paper to give even more in-depth coverage. " He was 
particularly pleased with his paper's role in questioning Tony Blair on the 
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constitutional issue and its examination of the SNP's financial case for 
independence. "We can also take some pride in the fact that it was our paper 
which gave Tony Blair the most difficult time in the Labour campaign.... It is the 
job of papers to ask difficult questions and raise issues. Blair, through very good 
media management and because of Tory disarray, got a very easy time during the 
campaign. But not when he came to Scotland. " However, in light of Mitchell's 
assessment that Tony Blair's "parish council" remarks were made as part of a 
calculated political strategy to foil the Tories, Scottish journalists may not have 
scored such a coup. 
Conclusion 
Overall, Scottish political journalists admired the SNP's campaigning skills, and 
thought the discovery of the £27 billion subsidy figure through the questions 
directed to the Treasury Secretary was a definite propaganda victory for the 
party, although it was also definitely over-played. However, they did not accept 
the SNP's financial arguments, and were highly sceptical of the SNP's "overhang 
of fear" voting strategy. To be fair, though, the Scottish press took a much more 
critical attitude towards Blair than did the London-based media. The SNP 
obviously did not see it that way, although they certainly took advantage of 
Blair's answers to the probing questions of a Scottish reporter on what the 
proposed Scottish assembly could do. As always, the relationship between the 
SNP and the Scottish press was a confused one: 
Nationalists who tingle with joy when a newspaper espouses a 
cause or argument which they share, will shriek in dismay when 
they stand condemned as the nuisance, not-to-be-taken seriously 
section of Scottish public life. It is a relationship of extremes. 
The happy couple - press and party - are walking up the aisle one 
day, only to turf each other from the honeymoon bed the next. it 
is not too cynical to suggest that this tempestuous love-me- 
or-leave-me routine reflects some of the truth of Scottish 
politics, and much of the media's attitude to the "Scottish issue". 
[Smith, 1994, p. 101] 
The difficulty for the Scottish National Party was explained by what their 
organizational director, Allison Hunter, said she learned on her trip to the United 
States to study elections there: all campaigns are local [SNP, 1997b]. Certainly 
that was the case with the Labour and Tory campaigns in the rest of the UK: the 
Tories suffered because of lack of organization on the ground [Denver and 
Hands, 1998, p. 85] and its declining membership [Geddes and Tonge, 1997, p. 
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196], while Labour was bolstered by a young, growing activist membership that 
provided a strong canvassing team for the party [Geddes and Tonge, 1997, p. 
199]. The SNP was a local party fighting in a national contest: asking Scottish 
voters to elect nationalists to Westminster made about as much sense as 
television viewers in Bexley watching their Braveheart party election broadcast. 
The SNP, as a uniquely Scottish party, could never logically hope to succeed by 
fighting elections to Westminster, no matter how good its political 
communications. The party's underlying message - you can vote for us because 
Labour is going to win - was inherently contradictory, as it had to be, given that 
Scotland had no legislature, and the only way to get it was by voting Labour. 
The SNP's best chance for success would come when it was able to play on its 
home turf, and establish a local base from which it could later fight national 
contests, as the Parti Queb6cois and the Bloc Qu6becois have done in Quebec. 
Despite a very poorly-organized campaign during the 1997 federal election in 
Canada, the Bloc was saved by a local community base that formed the bedrock 
of its support and which could not be destroyed, no matter how incompetent it 
seemed to be - as I describe in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
The Bloc Quebecois: There For You - But In The Wrong Place 
Chapter six examined the political communications of the Scottish National 
Party during the British national election of 1997, and in particular, the factors 
that hindered the SNP's electoral performance despite the party's well-organized 
and professional communications strategy. In this chapter, we will be looking at 
the political communications of the Bloc Quebecois in the 1997 Canadian federal 
election, in which, by comparison with the SNP, the Bloc seemed to do just about 
everything wrong, but still achieved positive results. 
The 1997 federal election in Canada did not begin well for the ruling 
Liberal Party. Unlike John Major, Prime Minister Jean Chretien thought he had a 
better chance of second-term victory if he called the election early. Not too 
surprisingly, when he announced the election call Sunday, April 27, just three- 
and-a-half years after going to the polls in 1993, journalists asked him why he 
had done so. Surprisingly, however, he could not give a clear reason, as the 
Globe and Mail's Ottawa bureau chief Edward Greenspon reported. 
"Why now? " he asked rhetorically. "It's because it's the fourth 
year of the mandate. We had four budgets. Because the success 
of our... against the deficit. The Canadians have to make a choice 
- to finish the job and invest in health care, children, jobs for 
tomorrow. Because for me, it's very important that we go to the 
people. We're campaigning. Not me as much as my other 
opponents - they have been campaigning since weeks. And we 
did not want to have an election that will last like Americans, six 
months. " 
And on it went, making little sense at all. 
[Greenspon, 1997, p. 23] 
This inauspicious start was an indicator of how the election would be for 
all of the five Canadian federal parties, whose campaigns were dogged by gaffes 
and/or setbacks which led to disappointing results. However, of all the 
campaigns, that of the Bloc Quebecois was the worst. Led by an inexperienced 
leader, with an amateur election team that had never organized a federal 
campaign before, let alone for someone at the level of Opposition Leader, the 
Bloc floundered badly during the first week of the contest, and spent the rest of 
the election frantically playing catch-up. It only managed to do as well as it did 
because of some political gifts which helped to strengthen the sovereigntist vote, 
first from the prime minister himself, and second, from the anti-Quebec Reform 
Party, and because of these, was able to convince Quebec voters that the Bloc 
was their best representative in Ottawa. 
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Originally the focus of the 1997 election was on jobs and health care, 
issues that polls had shown were most important to Canadians throughout the 
country. But L'Affaire Parizeau - the revelation that the former Quebec premier 
had been prepared to issue a unilateral declaration of independence if the 1995 
referendum had been successful - changed all that, much to the delight of the 
Ottawa media, who "had never been terribly comfortable with the jobs issue, 
which required some economic grounding and a policy orientation. National 
unity was sexier and, given its heavy reliance on rhetoric, far easier to deal with. " 
[Greenspon, 1997, p. 29] Thanks to the political journalists, the Quebec issue 
became the central theme of the campaign. 
How The Campaign Was Organized: The New Rules 
The conduct of the 1997 campaign was markedly different from those of 
previous federal elections due to changes in the procedures governing the 
campaign, as well as to electoral boundaries and the number of seats. Some of 
these were a result of the research contained in the 23 volumes of the Royal 
Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing published in 1992, "the 
most impressive examination ever conducted of electoral reform issues in this 
country, and one of the best contributions of that kind in the world" [Massicotte, 
1997, p. 171], in particular, extensions to the franchise and more restrictions on 
becoming a candidate. The vote was now given to judges and Canadians living 
abroad, as well as to persons with mental disabilities and prisoners with terms 
of less than two years, and voting registration for homeless people was made 
easier. Most importantly for average Canadian voters, however, was that no 
longer would they have to suffer "administrative disenfranchisement" resulting 
from the failure of door-to-door enumeration to get them on the voters' list; they 
could now register on polling day as long as they were able to provide 
satisfactory identification. 
The biggest change was to voting hours, which had long been a source of 
regional alienation, because, in the past, "Canadians would cast ballots between 
9 a. m. and 8 p. m. local time. Westerners would utter a string of expletives when, 
seconds after their polls closed, TV anchors smugly announced a majority 
government had already been declared based on results from central Canada. " 
[Feschuk, 1997] Hours were staggered to accommodate Canada's six time zones, 
so that voters across Canada would find out the election results at roughly the 
same time. Polls were also open an hour longer, and a permanent voter's list was 
created from an enumeration done just before the election, to be-up-dated with 
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information from provincial and federal government records such as those for 
income tax, citizenship, or driver's licences. 
There were also more Members of Parliament to vote for this time around, 
301, up from 295, with four of the new MPs from Ontario, and two from British 
Columbia. In addition, all but 31 of the constituency boundaries were changed, 
some quite drastically, with old constituencies removed, and completely new 
ones created, in the first major re-drawing of electoral boundaries since the 
1960s. This was done in order to equalize the population of constituencies, no 
easy task in a country as geographically varied as Canada, where immigration 
and migration can rapidly change the pattern of settlement. 
These changes were meant to make voting easier and fairer for Canadian 
citizens and were broadly welcomed, even if initially they made the process more 
confusing as people adjusted to them. There were other changes whose benefits 
were not quite so clear. The election period was shortened from a minimum of 47 
days to 36, which, one reporter predicted, meant that "Political leaders will have 
less time to recover from a blunder and will be obliged to travel across the 
country at a more frantic pace if they wish to wage a national campaign. " 
[Feschuk, 1997] This certainly proved true for the Bloc in the first case, and the 
New Democratic Party in the second. It also made it difficult to discuss more 
complex issues such as jobs and health care, and easier for reporters to focus on 
more emotive issues such as national unity. 
The most contentious of the changes concerned advertising and polling. 
As in previous elections, political party advertising was banned until 28 days 
before the election, and 48 hours before polls opened, but since the campaign was 
shorter, the advertising began eight days after it started, rather than the 19 days 
of previous campaigns. In addition, as a result of a court ruling in the province of 
Alberta, restrictions on third-party advertising were removed (although, as 
Massicotte notes, such restrictions were supported by the Canadian public, and 
"an almost unanimous House of Commons" when originally legislated). As well, 
the internet and the World Wide Web were not subject to any controls, so that 
Canadian political parties could continue to advertise themselves on the web 
even as votes were being cast. The black-out on publication of opinion polls 
three days before the election was the subject of ongoing legal wrangling, with 
Thomson Newspapers initiating judicial proceedings to have the ban declared 
unconstitutional. This motion was rejected at both the lower and Appeal Court 
level in Ontario, but although the Supreme Court of Canada granted leave to 
appeal the decision, it refused to suspend the blackout while the case was 
waiting to be heard. This was the subject of much complaint in Canadian 
newspapers, some of whom had "the elegance of pointing out in those comments 
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they were party to the judicial proceedings against the ban" [Massicotte, 1997, 
p. 191]. 
These changes in procedures and regulations were mirrored by changes in 
how the election was covered by political journalists, some of them necessitated 
by the heavy costs of having to cover five different parties in the $100-million 
campaign, and others by new developments in Canadian broadcasting. 
How The Campaign Was Organized: For The Reporters 
The lessons learned from the 1993 election campaign influenced the way the 1997 
election was covered by the Canadian media. Although there were the same five 
parties in 1993 as there were in 1997 - the Progressive Conservatives, the 
Liberals, the New Democratic Party, the Bloc Quebecois and Reform - the media 
then had essentially organized their coverage around the three "old-line" parties, 
the Conservatives, Liberals, and NDP, based on the assumption that the Bloc 
and Reform were regional fringe parties and not worthy of the same attention. 
The results of that election, in which the supposedly marginal Reform and Bloc 
battled each other for the role of Canada's Official Opposition, demonstrated 
that a new strategy would be required for any future elections, one in which all 
five parties and their leaders would be given as much scrutiny as time - and 
constrained media budgets - would allow. Providing this kind of coverage 
presented particular difficulties in a country where most leaders toured the 
country by plane, the one exception being the Bloc, where the political entourage 
travelled mainly by bus (but even that mode of transport created problems for 
the hapless Bloc leader, as we shall see later). 
The practice in previous elections had been for each of the networks to 
have its own five-person television crew made up of a reporter, producer, editor, 
camera operators and sound technician, on each of the leaders' planes. At an 
average cost of $15,000 per person, that was not cheap, but as Doman notes, "in 
the past, there were only three major parties and the networks had more money 
to spend. In this election, there were five leaders to cover and not a lot of money 
to spare" [Doman, 1997, p. 164]. The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation came 
up with the solution to share resources, putting a team of five people, a pool 
producer, editor, sound technician and two camera operators on each of the 
planes, who would then feed coverage of each leader's tour to the five networks, 
the English-language CBC, CTV, and CanWest Global, and the French-language 
Radio-Canada and TVA. The networks would have their own journalists on the 
planes, but they did not stay on them throughout the whole election, as had been 
done previously. In addition, senior political journalists were assigned to 
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particular areas of the country, reflecting the increasingly regional emphasis of the 
campaign, and instead of following the leaders, "They would stay put, and the 
leaders would come to them. " [Doman, 1997, p. 164] 
There were pluses and minuses to this approach. On the one hand, it did 
save considerable amounts of money, but, with just one television crew on each 
plane responsible for filing three network feeds of up to 10 minutes a day to all 
the networks as well as filming "stand-ups" for five television reporters, "the 
demands on the pool crew were harrowing" [Doman, 1997, p. 165]. The 
pressures on available airtime also meant that the networks often used "melt- 
downs", in which pool footage from the five campaigns was combined into one 
news story with a voice-over from the television studio anchor. Another 
drawback was that having the same footage did not allow for alternative 
interpretations of events during the campaign, despite the fact that there were 
different voices describing what was happening. Television viewers watching 
the nightly news saw the same images over and over again on each of the 
networks, with similar explanations, but given by different journalists; the result 
was more confusing than enlightening. 
Two other innovations in broadcast election coverage were the morning 
news conferences on CBC Newsworld, the 24-hour news network, offered 
Monday to Friday, and the unlimited, unedited reportage provided by the Cable 
Public Affairs Channel. The news conferences, which provided 15 minutes of 
free air time to the political parties, were designed "to provide the parties with a 
morning soapbox from which to address the electorate and react to campaign 
developments" [Doman, 1997, p. 163]. Unfortunately, not all of them took the 
opportunity, perhaps because, as Doman explains, they were cautious about this 
new form of electioneering; but it did give them a means of speaking directly to 
voters. The biggest complaint about the news conferences, interestingly enough, 
came from print journalists, who "grumbled about being used as props for 
network coverage. " [Doman, 1997, p. 164] 
The Cable Public Affairs Channel, funded by Canada's cable companies 
as part of their requirement to provide community programming, provided all- 
day long coverage of politics, live and unedited, simultaneously translated. 
"Uncut, unfiltered and unmistakable", as CPAC's own advertising said, it was 
nirvana for political aficionados, who could watch everything from news 
conferences and party caucus sessions to all-candidates' meetings and election 
rallies, as well as all the minutiae of life on the campaign trail. It was "the 
television channel of record in 1997" [Doman, 1997, p. 153], and as such gave 
viewers the alternative view and the behind-the-scenes look at the election 
process and the media coverage of it which the other broadcasting outlets could 
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not. What had been designed as cheap way to provide community programming 
ended up being a fascinating - although admittedly, sometimes tedious - 
examination of the Canadian election. 
Although television, as always, was the main medium of political 
communication during the election, it was the newspapers that set the agenda, 
and in fact, changed the direction of the campaign. After Le Soleil broke the 
story about Jacques Parizeau's intention to make a unilateral declaration of 
independence following the referendum of 1995, and the Globe and Mail printed 
the front page headline "Unity Becomes Campaign Focus" [Greenspon, 1997, p. 
29] the election agenda moved away from the economic and social issues of most 
concern to Canadian citizens and towards that of national unity. 
How The Campaign Was Organized: For The Party 
The organization of the Bloc Quebecois campaign was a striking contrast to that 
of the Scottish National Party. Ad hoc, disorganised, and seemingly pointless, 
the Bloc had nothing like the five-year strategic plan of the SNP, with its regular 
check-points on an organizational grid. Even after professional campaign staff 
were brought in from the provincial Parti Quebecois, the Bloc's strategy still 
operated on the basis of examining what the issues of the day - or "lines" - were 
in the major newspapers and electronic media, and adjusting the day's message 
accordingly. It was a case of "checking the lines" versus checking the grid, with 
little of the smooth competence of the SNP's election planning. 
The Bloc basically had two campaigns: the first, run for the initial 10 
days by what one political journalist referred to as "well-meaning amateurs" 
who had never organized an election campaign before; and the second, organized 
by the communications professionals based at the Parti Quebecois headquarters 
in Montreal for the last four weeks. (All quotations in this chapter are from the 
research interviews, unless otherwise stated. ) The Bloc also had two different 
messages: one designed to appeal to "soft sovereigntists", those who voted for 
the party because of its social democratic policies rather than its commitment to 
sovereignty; and the other, directed at the hard-core supporters of the 
sovereigntist project. 
Given that the Bloc could have just as easily obtained the services of the 
PQ's skilled marketing and communications staff from the beginning of the 
campaign, it is unfortunate that BQ leader Gilles Duceppe did not take 
advantage of their expertise right from the start. The Parti Quebecois had 
pioneered sophisticated techniques of political marketing based on modern social 
science methods promoted by the political scientists, sociologists, psychologists 
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and communications specialists who were members of the party [Charron, 1991, 
p. 115], techniques which had been honed in PQ campaigns since the 1980s. 
Certainly there was no shortage of money, with $5-million earmarked for the 
1997 campaign, as in 1993 [Howard, 1997]. But, according to one political 
journalist, Duceppe, still bruised from a divisive leadership campaign, wanted to 
"prove that he could run things and that his people could run things, but the 
problem was his people had never run things. " 
After the Parti Quebecois came to the aid of the Bloc campaign, with 
Bob Dufour, currently director-general of the PQ and former director-general of 
the Bloc, appointed as campaign manager, the organization improved. A team of 
five professional staff, including one specifically to handle the press, were put on 
the bus with Duceppe, supported by some 40 people working full-time on the 
campaign at party headquarters doing organization, fund-raising, advertising, 
communications and strategic planning. The daily schedule for the leader was 
revised to reduce the pressure on the inexperienced Duceppe, so that instead of 
four or five activities a day, there were just two, and efforts were made to keep 
him away from scrums as much as possible. 
But the basic problem remained. Gilles Duceppe had only been leader of 
the party for six weeks before the election was called: certainly not enough time 
to develop the kind of detailed strategic planning needed for a federal election, or 
the communication skills required to handle the intense media scrutiny that he 
should have expected as leader of the Official Opposition in a national 
campaign. 
The Run-Up To The Campaign 
The fact that Duceppe did not have enough time to prepare for the election was 
the result of the Bloc's ill-fated leadership race, held in the hopes that it would 
revive the Bloc's fortunes, which had started to decline during the autumn of 
1996. Under the direction of Michel Gauthier, the affable but uncharismatic 
leader who had been chosen by a small group within the party after the 
departure of Lucien Bouchard, the BQ was rent by divisions resulting from the 
1995 referendum and Bouchard's approach to public spending in Qu6bec. 
Duceppe and other members of the Bloc Quebecois caucus became 
increasingly worried about the future of the party under Gauthier, as polls 
showed their party falling in public support from a high of 53 per cent in March 
of 1996,18 per cent more than the Liberals, [Bernard, 1997, p. 136], to being 
almost neck-and-neck with the Liberal party at approximately 40 per cent of 
decided voters in October [Mcllroy, 1996b]. Pressure began to mount for 
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Gauthier to resign, with the most outspoken critics being constitutional lawyer 
and eventual leadership candidate Daniel Turp, and Real Menard, who 
suggested in a Canadian Press story that "in the interest of the party", Gauthier 
"had to think about the decision he was to take. " [Bernard, 1997, p. 135] 
Duceppe's role in this may not have been entirely innocent, either: it was widely 
rumoured that he had been behind the attempts to oust Gauthier. On December 
2, just 10 months after he became leader, Gauthier announced he would resign, 
but not until the leadership convention in March. The belief of Bloc strategists 
that a leadership race would raise the profile of the party and focus attention on 
its policies over-rode any concern that it might not allow enough time to get ready 
for a possible spring election, or that it would project the image of a divided 
party so close to when the election was due to be called. 
At first it seemed as if the leadership campaign was achieving its aim; 
surveys showed that the Bloc was once again riding high in the polls, at 49 per 
cent, a full 16 points ahead of the Liberals [Bernard, 1997, p. 137]. However, the 
execution of the selection process and the conduct of the actual convention on 
March 15 proved to be a harbinger of the election campaign to come. In contrast 
to the method used to elect Gauthier, in which only a small number participated, 
this time all of the registered party members, 113,000, were to be polled by mail. 
Unfortunately, only 45 per cent bothered to return their ballots, which created an 
impression of party apathy. The debates among the candidates which were 
supposed to be "confrontations", were actually, as one political journalist 
recalled, "boring; like good sovereigntists they all got up and said the same 
thing. " This reached almost comical proportions, as Bernard describes it: 
"Indeed, when one of the six candidates, Yves Duhaime, spoke of 'renewal', the 
other five replied by saying that the caucus members had done a marvellous job 
in the House of Commons and deserved the praise of their party. " [Bernard, 
1997, p. 137] However, although the candidates did their best to present a 
picture of unity within the party, they could not hide the fact that there were 
major disputes on policy issues, and that the two leading candidates, Duhaime 
and Duceppe, were openly hostile to each other. The convention itself did little 
to inspire excitement. 
From the standpoint of the television viewer, that convention 
looked like a disaster. The hall in which it was held seemed, at 
best, half full. The mood of the convention was very dull, and 
the whole thing was amateurish. One of the speakers (Yves 
Duhaime) was even interrupted by a bigot bearing a Quebec flag 
where each fleur-de-lis had been replaced by a swastika (this 
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person had not only been able to get into the convention hall, he 
had been able to come near to the platform and to jump behind 
Yves Duhaime! ). 
[Bernard, 1997, p. 137] 
This television image was certainly a strong contrast to that created by the well- 
orchestrated performance of the Parti Quebecois in the National Assembly during 
the debates on the referendum in 1980. 
In addition, although having the vote done by mail might have been more 
democratic, it did not provide the same kind of drama as the usual leadership 
contest. The process was also handicapped by the fact that there was some 
mistrust of the postal ballot process among BQ members because the system was 
so easily open to abuse, as anyone could fill them in [Bernard, 1997, p. 138]. 
When the count was finally made, Duceppe was the first choice of 48 per cent of 
the members, and second choice of another five per cent, with the remaining 47 
per cent of the votes going to Duhaime, who received 33.9 per cent, or Rodrigue 
Biron, 13.3 per cent. It was not a resounding victory, and the fighting began 
almost as soon as the results were announced. Duhaime refused to join Duceppe 
and the other candidates on stage at the close of the convention, and openly 
questioned Duceppe's ability to lead the party. Bloc MP Nic Leblanc announced 
he would quit the party to sit as an independent rather than accept Duceppe as 
leader, a move that jeopardized the BQ's official-opposition status, as it left the 
party tied with Reform at 50 seats. The most damaging response came from 
Andre Neron, former aide to Michel Gauthier, who flatly stated in a Radio- 
Canada interview that Duceppe's victory was "the worst thing that could 
happen for the Bloc". Neron went on to accuse Lucien Bouchard and his allies of 
helping to arrange Duceppe's win and conspiring "to dump Gauthier because 
Duceppe is more willing to take marching orders from Bouchard than Gauthier 
was" [Bauch, 1997b]. Far from being a display of sovereigntist solidarity, "the 
convention showed a spectacle of dissension" [Bernard, 1997, p. 1381. 
The divisions within the party were not helped by Duceppe's decision to 
deny Gauthier the position of House Leader, a mean-spirited gesture that 
antagonized party members and political journalists alike, so much so that the 
francophone reporters in the House of Commons felt sorry for Gauthier, and 
abandoned their usual professional objectivity to comfort him. As one of them 
described the event: 
"Duceppe rejected it in a very rude manner, and in the scrum, 
the Monday [after the convention] Gauthier was there... and we 
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were asking him, 'What happened with you? [Gauthier said] 'Oh, 
I, I, Duceppe told me I wasn't chosen as parliamentary leader. 
We said, 'Are you... disappointed? ' He said, 'Yes, I'm 
disappointed', and the drama is there right in front of the TV 
cameras, and us as the reporters, the French reporters, were 
going, 'Poor guy'... it's not human; the cameras shut up and we go 
on the side and start talking to him without our tape recorders, 
saying, 'Poor you'; but that's... unique; you don't see that with 
politicians; and suddenly you see a camera from CPAC... they 
come here and want to be on the record with him and we say to 
CPAC, 'Stop; go away'; reporters are saying that; it shows that for 
us it was like a big human event; it was really bad. So Duceppe 
has a bad reputation. " 
This negative perception of the Bloc leader, added to the history of conflicts with 
the BQ's communications office over its earlier attempts to control access to Bloc 
MPs, did not create a favourable atmosphere for the party's media relations 
during the soon-to-be called election. It also did not do much to convince party 
members or political journalists that Duceppe could unite the fractious Bloc. The 
fact that he was generally seen as Bouchard's man, his "surrogate in Ottawa" 
[Martin, 1997, p. 314], was a source of conflict with those in the party who 
supported the hard-line sovereigntist and social democratic views of former PQ 
leader Jacques Parizeau, and rejected Bouchard's softer position of sovereignty- 
association and more conservative attitude towards budget cuts and deficit 
control. As former cabinet ministers in the PQ government, defeated leadership 
candidates Duhaime and Biron "had posed a serious threat to Mr. Bouchard's 
iron-fisted control over the separatist movement" [Seguin and Unland, 1997]. 
With Duceppe as leader of the Bloc, Bouchard had "a man who marched to his 
drumbeat. " [Martin, 1997, p. 314] 
Bouchard's close identification with Duceppe and the Bloc campaign 
caused serious problems for the fledgling leader, who, in his stubborn 
determination to be his own man, chose his own equally inexperienced people for 
his campaign team, with disastrous results. Secondly, although Bouchard was an 
extremely popular figure in Quebec, his moves to balance the provincial budget 
through massive cuts to education, health and social service spending were not, 
and Quebec voters did not necessarily accept Duceppe's argument that this was 
the result of the federal government's own cuts in social spending transfers to the 
provinces. Thirdly, Bouchard's prominent role also made it difficult for Duceppe 
to come up with good enough reasons for supporting the Bloc, when the real 
power of the sovereigntist movement was seen as based in the provincial 
government with Bouchard and the Parti Quebecois, and the only role left for the 
Bloc was to be, as one anglophone reporter put it, "a heckler for the government 
in Ottawa and the cheerleader for the government in Quebec City". 
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The most significant aspect of Bouchard's involvement, however, was, 
that it violated the unwritten rule of Canadian politics, which is, said one 
anglophone journalist, 
"that politicians at one level stay out of politics on the other 
level... provincial politicians don't get involved in federal politics 
on a public partisan level... they may comment on the election 
campaign but they have always preserved or try to preserve at 
least a facade of neutrality.... In this campaign Bouchard not only 
endorsed the Bloc and urged his people to go out and support the 
Bloc, but he laid himself on the line to a certain extent by 
campaigning, by making a number of campaign appearances on 
behalf of the Bloc with Duceppe and other people during the 
election campaign. So this was unprecedented, and it 
represented a certain amount of risk on Bouchard's part; the fact 
that he was identifying himself with the Bloc means he was 
going to be associated with the results of the campaign. " 
This rule was obviously one Quebec voters also accepted, according to a 
Sondagem poll carried out for the sovereigntist paper Le Devoir in early April, 
which revealed that 63 per cent of the more than 1,000 surveyed preferred that 
Bouchard not get involved in the campaign [McKenzie, 1997]. 
The increase in poll support generated by the leadership race was soon 
dissipated. A poll done for both the English and French-language networks of 
the CBC and La Presse five weeks later put the Bloc two points behind the 
Liberals, who were at 37 per cent, while two other surveys showed them to be 
ahead of the Liberal Party, but by only five or six per cent. In addition, the CBC 
poll showed the support for sovereignty at 35 per cent, down 10 per cent from 
the previous year, and a dramatic decline from the 49.6 per cent who voted 
"Yes" during the 1995 referendum. The timing could not have been worse, for the 
discouraging results of the CBC poll were broadcast the evening of the Bloc's 
campaign launch April 28 at Duceppe's nomination meeting in Montreal -a 
meeting at which Lucien Bouchard and Gilles Duceppe were supposed to 
demonstrate the strength and solidarity of the sovereigntist movement. However, 
the negative poll results cast a pall over the crowd of 400 at the meeting, and 
Bouchard's dynamic performance stole the show from Duceppe at what was 
supposed to be his forum -a foretaste of what was to come. 
The Campaign Itself: "It Was The Wrong Place" 
There was more bad news for the Bloc the next day. The results of two 
provincial by-elections held the day of the campaign launch showed a worrisome 
trend, with the Parti Quebecois losing one seat and a considerable share of the 
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vote in the other, with voter turnout dropping from 81 per cent in 1994 to 48 per 
cent [Gazette, 1997a]. A tense and nervous Duceppe could only blame the 
federal government for "shovelling its problems into the province's backyard" 
[Bernard, 1997, p. 139] by cutting transfer payments, which in turn had forced 
Bouchard to initiate his deeply unpopular programme of budget cuts. That 
argument had worked in the past for the sovereigntists, but apparently, no 
longer; another finding of the CBC survey was that "only a minority of the 
Quebec respondents blamed the federal government for the cuts in the most 
sensitive sector, that of health. " [Bernard, 1997, p. 139] It was a difficult start to 
what turned out to be the most disastrous day of his campaign, and one that set 
the tone for the rest of the election. 
The Bloc's campaign slogan - "Le Bloc est lä pour toi parole de 
Quebecois" (The Bloc is there for you a Quebecer keeps his word) - was meant to 
reinforce the Bloc's main campaign theme that the Liberals and Tories could not 
be trusted to defend the interests of Quebec in Ottawa. The events of the first 
week of the campaign, however, seemed to demonstrate that although the Bloc 
was there for you, it was in the wrong place -a metaphor, perhaps for the Bloc's 
ambivalent position as a federal party whose aim was to break up the Canadian 
federation. 
What happened on April 29 was this. The first stop of the day was at a 
cheese factory in Sorel, and Duceppe, along with all the accompanying journalists 
and Bloc campaign aides, donned the obligatory plastic hair-net required by 
health regulations, which resembled a shower-cap and did nothing to enhance his 
dignity. Unfortunately for Duceppe, this cheese factory was the wrong place. In 
1996 the Bloc had led a very successful public relations campaign against the 
federal government's proposed legislation banning raw-milk-cheese, a profitable 
gourmet product for several small cheese factories in Quebec. Their campaign 
culminated in a cheese-tasting in the foyer of the House of Commons for 
journalists and politicians at which even Health Minister David Dingwall was 
seen attending and nibbling on some cheese. As a result the planned legislation 
was dropped, and since then sales of the raw-milk- cheese in Quebec had 
increased by 30 per cent [Richer, 1997]. 
But the cheese factory in Sorel used only pasteurized milk, and the owner 
told the visiting journalists that "he personally had reservations about the norms 
permitted by Agriculture Canada in the raw-milk cheese industry" [Authier, 
1997d]. As the press aide to Duceppe parachuted into his campaign after the 
first week by the PQ explained: "It was the wrong place. If they had gone to the 
right place with the right person saying 'Yes, the Bloc helped me a lot' - and we 
had people like that who were ready to do that - but it happened [we had] ... an 
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organization problem. " The reporters were bored: they had no story, so they 
focused on the hair-net. A Canadian Press photographer took a close-up photo 
of Duceppe in the silly-looking headgear, and Le journal de Montreal, Quebec's 
highest-circulation daily, put the picture on the top corner of the front page with 
the caption, "Une dröle campagne" (A funny campaign), and the cascade of 
ridicule began - the worst perhaps being Serge Chapleau's cartoon on the editorial 
page of La Presse the following day showing a solemn Duceppe in the now- 
famous "cheese hat" saying, "Tomorrow I visit a condom factory" - which 
prompted reporters to begin referring to it as the "condom hat" [Dornan, 1997, 
p. 159]. 
The reason for this reaction cannot just be attributed to the usual 
mischievousness of jaded political journalists on the campaign trail. It is 
significant that it was Le journal de Montreal, founded by long-time sovereigntist 
publisher Pierre Peladeau, that made the cheese hat story. It is not unusual, after 
all, for politicians to wear funny-looking hats; in fact, it is almost an 
occupational hazard for them. As one anglophone reporter said, "I've seen 500 
politicians walk through a factory with something dumb on their heads". But the 
nature of the coverage showed that francophone journalists were no longer willing 
to report the Bloc with the same kind of sympathetic journalism that the PQ had 
enjoyed. The media's willingness to make fun of Duceppe was, as one veteran 
anglophone journalist said, "a bad omen... the campaign never really recovered 
from that". 
The campaign continued to flounder. The second event of the day of the 
cheese hat was a visit to a well-known veterinary college in Ste-Hyacinthe, a 
Quebec agricultural centre. Unfortunately, few of the veterinary students were 
available as they were writing exams, "so Duceppe saw more horses and cows 
than students, and we counted them", one of the journalists on the leader's tour 
recalled. It was only then that reporters were told Duceppe would be discussing 
the Bloc's agricultural programme. When Duceppe complained that Quebec 
received far less in agricultural subsidies from the federal government than the 
western provinces, "opponents were quick to contrast his criticism of the federal 
government policy and the sorry plight of all those Manitoba farmers who were, 
at the very same time, hit by a terrible flood" [Bernard, 1997, p. 141]. 
The next day was no better. The first scheduled visit to a pet-food 
factory was cancelled "for unclear reasons" [Bauch, 1997d], and a hastily-called 
press conference at the party's Montreal headquarters was held instead. After 
lunch with a women's group, attended by barely a dozen people, "the Bloc road 
show arrived late for a scheduled tour of an explosives plant" [Bauch, 1997d], 
so Duceppe and local candidate Daniel Turp shook hands with the workers as 
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they left the factory at the end of their shift. This led to another embarrassing 
television image for the Bloc leader, as one of the workers refused to shake 
Duceppe's hand, saying, "I'm not going to give my hand to a guy who wants to 
destroy the country" [Bauch, 1997d]. 
There was more bad news for the beleaguered leader: the province's 
biggest trade union organization, the Quebec Federation of Labour, was 
considering withdrawing its support from the Bloc. Clement Godbout, head of 
the 480,000-member QFL, said at a May Day rally attended by 700 people that 
if the QFL supported the Bloc, it would indicate that they agreed with 
Bouchard's budget-cutting policies, as the Bloc and the PQ were one and the 
same. The Bloc had not taken a strong enough stand against such policies, and, 
he said, "I think it's very important that the union movement send a message. " 
[Norris, 1997] The federation's governing general council sent the message at its 
May 9 meeting when it accepted the recommendation that the QFL discontinue 
its support for the Bloc. 
Even the sovereigntist newspaper Le Devoir was critical of the Bloc's 
approach. Columnist Michel Venne, while attacking the prime minister's 
approach to national unity, saying that the Liberal Party "offers no significant 
reform, relying instead on Canada's success on the scale of global misery... and on 
administrative accords with provinces in order to show that the country is not a 
prison, " wrote that the challenge for the Bloc was to abandon its "crybaby 
rhetoric and instead present stimulating reasons on why sovereignty would make 
sense" [Gazette, 1997a]. 
A gaffe a day keeps a journalist happy, as one francophone reporter 
wrote of the Bloc campaign [Richer, 1997], and in the first week the journalists 
were very happy indeed. On May 2 the bus full of political journalists got lost on 
the way to meet Duceppe at Kingsey Falls and arrived 45 minutes late. This in 
itself would have not been a story, but what happened was that when the bus 
arrived, before journalists could ask a single question, a fuming Duceppe fired the 
bus-driver and launched into a tirade against his organization. The bus driver, 
angry at being fired, "told any reporter who would listen, and there were many, 
that it was the Bloc's fault he'd got lost; after all, wasn't it they who had 
provided the map? 'If the Bloc isn't able to get an agenda right, imagine what 
they'd be like in government! ' he said. " [Heinrich, 1997] It was too good to resist, 
and the picture of the hapless driver at the wheel trying to find the leader became 
another one of the dominant images of the campaign, along with the cheese hat. 
Something had to be done, and it was. The day after, Duceppe fired his 
press attache and his media bus co-ordinator, who were replaced with PQ 
cabinet minister staff, and a PQ campaign organizer from Lucien Bouchard's 
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office "was given more authority on the Duceppe team" [Siblin, 1997b]. On 
Sunday, Duceppe replaced his campaign manager, MP Michel Daviault, with Bob 
Dufour, director-general of the Parti Quebecois. As well as being an old friend of 
Duceppe's, Dufour had been director-general of the Bloc and the party's chief 
campaign organizer in the 1993 election. He had a long history with the PQ, 
having worked as a party organizer during the 1970s and 80s, and was a key 
figure in Duceppe's election in 1990 as the first member of the Bloc to be elected 
to the House of Commons. Under Dufour's direction, the campaign gained new 
energy and a more coherent strategy, with a focus on what made the Bloc unique: 
not its social democratic policies, which were similar to those of the New 
Democratic Party, but the goal of Quebec independence. The 35-page booklet 
which summarized the Bloc's platform, Plate forme electorale. Document synthese. 
Bloc Quebecois, had made only one mention of the party's main objective, perhaps 
in the belief "that such a tactic can bring new votes. " [Bernard, 1997, p. 143] 
However, Dufour did not share that view. As far as he was concerned, from 
now on the Bloc "had to focus on the project making Quebec a sovereign 
country. " [Bernard, 1997, p. 143] 
The new campaign team acted quickly to relieve the stresses on the leader 
by reducing the number of campaign events, recalled one strategist, who had 
worked in every PQ election since 1980. "We slowed down the beat of activities 
in one day.... In the first days there was something like four activities a day and 
there was something like 50 journalists with cameras and everything else; the 
pressure was much too strong on someone who had never been a leader of a 
party. " Another strategy was to bolster Duceppe's confidence, which had been 
badly shaken by the media's reactions to the gaffes of the previous week. One 
aide, a former journalist who had spent several years as press attache to Quebec 
federal cabinet ministers before working for the PQ and the Bloc, found that 
some of the journalists on the campaign felt so sorry for Duceppe that they tried 
to help. 
"I recall when I arrived, some of them told me, because some of 
them I know very well, and they told me he's too serious, and 
he's stressed and the message doesn't go through.... I told him, 
'Listen, you know your stuff, you know the content, so why don't 
you relax, and when you do your speech the people we have in 
front of you are BQ people, are partisan people, so don't try to 
convince them, make them laugh, make them laugh and make 
them believe that you will win, ' and he changed totally his 
speech, and he made jokes and he was totally different. And at 
the end the journalists were saying, what happened, and that 
evening he had good coverage because they realized Gilles 
Duceppe had a good sense of humour.... " 
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Duceppe's relief was almost palpable: the relaxed and newly-energized leader 
gave a dynamic performance, "hitting some passionate notes and cracking jokes" 
[Siblin, 1997a] as he attacked the prime minister for his elitist fund-raising 
techniques and neglect of the unemployed. The campaign was beginning to 
recover, it seemed. When the Liberals attacked Lucien Bouchard for sending a 
letter to PQ members asking them to give to the Bloc's $3.2-million election fund- 
raising drive, saying that it showed "how desperate the Bloc's campaign must 
be" [Authier, 1997e], the PQ calmly denied that the premier had done anything 
wrong, and that was the end of the controversy. It looked as if the "long 
martyrdom" [Bernard, 1997, p. 140] of the campaign was over, and the Bloc at 
last had an effective strategy and a team capable of carrying it out. But once 
again, Duceppe was to be over-shadowed by another prominent figure in the 
sovereigntist movement, Jacques Parizeau. 
L'affaire Parizeau 
When Parizeau indicated in a newspaper interview May 5 that he was eager to 
campaign for the Bloc in the federal election, Duceppe welcomed his 
participation, describing the former PQ leader as "an elder statesman" [Siblin, 
1997c]. He deflected criticism that Parizeau's comments about "money and the 
ethnic vote" on the night of the referendum showed him to be intolerant of 
minorities by saying that Parizeau had been married to a woman who came from 
Poland. But, however receptive Duceppe seemed to be to Parizeau's involvement 
in the campaign, it presented both an opportunity and a threat to the Bloc leader. 
Parizeau was useful in that he was enormously popular with the hard-line 
independantistes, whose activist energy was needed to do the work of the 
campaign and give it a boost, but his uncompromising stance on independence 
could also scare off the "soft sovereigntist" voters, those who were willing to 
support the PQ and the Bloc but not necessarily their goal of independence. As 
it happened, Parizeau turned out to be more of a threat to the Bloc campaign, 
and in fact, almost derailed it completely. 
Bob Dufour had not yet stepped into his position as campaign director 
when the Parizeau bombshell hit. In a story published May 7, journalist Michel 
Vastel of Le Soled revealed that Parizeau had apparently planned to unilaterally 
declare independence shortly after the referendum if the sovereigntist forces had 
won, despite the fact that he had signed an agreement with Lucien Bouchard and 
Mario Dumont of Action democratique du Quebec that negotiations with Canada 
would take place first. An excerpt from his book, Pour un Quebec Souverain, 
scheduled to be released May 12, described what Parizeau referred to as "le 
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grand jeu" (or great wager): his scheme to ensure international endorsement of 
Quebec's sovereignty by having the Quebec National Assembly approve a 
unilateral declaration of independence within a week of the vote, which would 
have then been used as a lever to persuade France and afterwards, the United 
States, to recognize Quebec's independence. In the book Parizeau confirmed 
that in the days before the vote, he had dispatched former PQ 
cabinet minister Jacques-Yvan Morin to Paris as his emissary to 
arrange details of a quick French recognition of Quebec's 
impending independence; that the National Assembly would 
have been convened within 48 hours of the vote; and that an 
emergency reserve of $17 billion, almost half of it from Quebec's 
pension fund, had been set aside to prop up the Canadian dollar 
in case financial markets panicked after a Yes vote. 
[Bauch, 1997f] 
Although it was certainly not news that Parizeau had always been a reluctant 
player in the sovereignty-association game, preferring outright independence, the 
fact that it seemed he had deliberately plotted in secret to instigate a fast-track 
route to Quebec's independence was a major shock to both Bouchard and 
Duceppe, who said they knew nothing about what their colleague had planned. 
The disclosure put both of them in an extremely difficult position, for, as one 
anglophone reporter explained, Parizeau "revealed every one of his allies to be 
either duplicitous along with him, or frozen out of the real decisions of... a 
movement in which they had claimed to be full partners. " It was also exactly the 
kind of news that would frighten away the soft sovereigntists who would vote 
for the Bloc and the PQ as long as there was no real danger of separation. 
For the next 48 hours Bouchard and Duceppe made desperate attempts 
at damage control, disassociating themselves as much as possible from their 
sovereigntist partner, along with "almost all the articulate political class", both 
federalist and separatist [Johnson, 1997a). The media reaction, both francophone 
and anglophone, was equally fierce. Bouchard's close friend and former Bloc MP 
Jean Lapierre, host of one of Montreal's most popular morning talk-shows, 
lampooned the Bloc's campaign slogan, "Parole de Quebecois" (A Quebecer 
keeps his word), and said that Parizeau's broken promise to Quebecers and his 
sovereigntist allies that he would negotiate in good faith with Canada was a 
disaster for the BQ campaign [Scott, 1997]. Duceppe said he would not 
campaign on the same platform with Parizeau, while Bouchard said in the 
National Assembly that he had not known about the plan, and as the designated 
chief negotiator, he would never have permitted the contravention of the signed 
agreement [Seguin and Fraser, 1997]. 
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Parizeau was unavailable for comment the day the story broke. On the 
day after, May 8, he released a statement which, depending on your point of 
view, was "an extraordinarily weasel-worded document" (this, from an 
anglophone political journalist) or an explanation that put the "few controversial 
sentences" that Parizeau had written "in their context", so that they "were 
shown to refer to one simple hypothesis which had been discarded. " [Bernard, 
1997, p. 141] Parizeau blamed the journalist who had written the initial story, 
Michel Vastel, accusing him of "more than a falsehood... a lie", and he 
"challenged anyone to find a sentence in which he said he intended an immediate 
unilateral declaration of independence" [Fraser, 1997b]. That was enough to 
bring him back into the sovereigntist fold. As the headline in La Presse so aptly 
put it: "Au Bloc, Parizeau passe de vilain ä heros en un jour" ("To the Bloc, 
Parizeau goes from villain to hero in a day") [Gagnon, 1997]. 
For Duceppe, the transformation occurred in less than a day. The 
morning of May 8 the Bloc leader said in a radio interview of Parizeau's plans 
for a UDI, "c'est de la fabulation" ("it's make-believe"). By the afternoon, when 
his aides had told him about Parizeau's statement, "he proclaimed himself 
perfectly satisfied with the ex-premier's complicated clarification" [Siblin, 
1997f]. The sudden change raised more questions for Duceppe from the 
journalists: why, for example, hadn't he contacted Parizeau himself to find out 
what was going on? Why had Parizeau left his sovereigntist allies to deal with 
the controversy alone? Lastly, why did Duceppe go "from supportive to 
disapproving to attacking and back to supportive within 24 hours? " [Siblin, 
1997f] There were no concrete answers, and Duceppe said he was not worried 
that he would be appearing in his first television leadership debate the same day 
that Parizeau would be officially launching his controversial book. 
Although the worst of it was over, L'affaire Parizeau had exposed the deep 
rifts within the sovereigntist movement, particularly the conflict between 
Bouchard and Parizeau's vision of how Quebec independence could and should 
be achieved. Parizeau's more revolutionary - and admittedly realistic - view that 
the rest of Canada would not want to negotiate its break-up was irreconcilable 
with Bouchard's plans for a partnership, in which hard-line sovereigntists did 
not put much faith. Mistrustful of Bouchard's sovereigntist intentions, they were 
also wary of Gilles Duceppe, whose arguments for sovereignty lacked the force 
and precision displayed by the former PQ leader. The extent of Parizeau's 
popularity was clearly demonstrated at his book launch May 12, when 500 
people crowded into the lobby of the Bibliotheque Nationale while 100 more 
waited outside. Bouchard was conspicuous by his absence at what one reporter 
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described as "a separatist love-in" [Bauch, 1997g]. The contrast between 
Parizeau and Duceppe could have not been more striking. 
The Television Debates: A Lost Opportunity 
As a result of L'affaire Parizeau, national unity had become the focus of the 
campaign, and the other federal parties were quick to exploit the opportunity. 
Jean Chretien attacked jean Charest, leader of the Progressive Conservatives, for 
opposing the federal government's move to have the Supreme Court rule on the 
legality of Quebec making a unilateral declaration of independence. Charest, in 
turn, criticized the Liberals for their hard-line strategy, known as "Plan B", 
saying it showed they were planning for the break-up of the country, just like the 
separatists, and lambasted the Reform Party for being willing to negotiate such a 
break-up. The Reform Party leader, Preston Manning, portrayed both parties as 
incapable of dealing with the national unity issue, and described Chretien as 
unwilling and unable to provide leadership on Quebec. As the Globe and Mail 
noted in its May 9 story headlined "Unity becomes campaign focus": "The 
spectre of Canada's breakup now looms over the federal election campaign, with 
the politicians who want to lead a united Canada fighting over its potential 
disintegration" [Delacourt and Greenspon, 1997]. 
The argument was intensified by intergovernmental affairs minister 
Stephane Dion when, in what was described as "an extraordinary half-hour 
interview" [Wells, 1997b] for a Radio-Canada television programme May 11, he 
outlined the details of the government's Plan B: Ottawa would not negotiate 
with Quebec on independence unless it was satisfied with the referendum 
question wording, the conduct of the campaign, and what constituted a winning 
majority. This last issue was of critical concern, for sovereigntists had long said 
that "50 plus one" was enough to achieve victory in a vote on independence. As 
it turned out, it was to be the most influential question of the French-language 
television debate held two days later - largely because, for reasons of fate, it 
went un-asked. 
The television debates were crucial for Duceppe, the French-language 
debate in particular, as they provided him with his best opportunity for 
reinvigorating the faltering Bloc campaign. Watched by more than 50 per cent of 
eligible Canadian voters [LeDuc, 1997, p. 212], and broadcast on both the CBC 
and the private CTV network, televised leaders' debates had been a fixture of 
Canadian elections since 1984, which was also the year they were first broadcast 
in both French and English. The debates were important in that they attracted 
large audiences - more than 3.37-million in 1993, for example [Evenson, 1997] - 
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but over the years, as the format changed to accommodate Canada's multi-party 
system, they tended to have less of a dramatic effect on the outcome of the 
federal elections. Their chief value was to political parties with new, unknown 
leaders such as Duceppe, Charest, or the NDP's Alexa McDonough, who could 
use the debates "to establish a positive image with the public rather than to 
attempt to dispel or reinforce an existing one" [LeDuc, 1997, p. 214]. The Bloc 
organization was obviously very much aware of this, for Duceppe was cloistered 
in a hotel for three days before the debate with his team, aided by Yves Dupre, 
director of the influential Montreal communications firm, BDDS, whose task it 
was to polish the leader's image, and Pierre-Paul Roy, an advisor from 
Bouchard's office, who developed sound-bites that could be used to attack the 
other leaders, while Eric Meunier, Duceppe's cabinet chief, prepared background 
files on the comments made by the other leaders about Quebec issues [Gagnon, 
1997c]. 
However, all this careful preparation came to naught, as once again, 
Duceppe was sabotaged by events outwith his control. Although he had not 
expected much of the English-language debate May 12, at one point saying it 
"was a dress rehearsal for the only one that mattered" [Mcllroy and Thanh Ha, 
1997], the way it was conducted made it even more difficult for him to 
participate. The moderator, the CBC's Ann Medina, announced "that she 
intended to intervene as little as possible.... With five participants, this 
announcement all but guaranteed that it would be an unruly and undisciplined 
affair" [LeDuc, 1997, p. 215], and it was. The debate was dominated by 
Chretien and Charest, with Manning and McDonough shouting over each other to 
be heard, and after a half hour of this, Duceppe seemed to give up and only 
joined the debate to plead for a separate Quebec [Wills, 1997b]. The consensus 
of viewers and pundits alike was that it had been Charest's night. Forceful, 
energetic, and confident, the Conservative leader attracted the only applause 
from the studio audience when he declared "that if there's one commitment to my 
children, it's that I'm going to pass on to them the country I received from my 
parents. I am determined to make that happen. "' [Doman, 1997, p. 159] 
The French-language debate was where Duceppe had to make a good 
impression; he was operating on his home turf, speaking to a francophone 
audience, and it was essential that he convince Quebec voters that the Bloc really 
was there for them. At first it looked as if the this debate would go better for 
him. Although its structure was the same as that of the English-language one the 
night before, the moderator, TVA's Claire Lamarche, kept tighter control of the 
proceedings, preventing aggressive interruptions and allowing more participation 
by Manning and McDonough. The focus was on Duceppe, and he seemed to rise 
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to the occasion: certainly his performance was more vigorous and he was 
obviously eager to challenge the federalist Chretien and Charest on the national 
unity issue. But the opportunity never came. Two hours into the debate, just 
when journalist Jean-Francois Lepine was preparing to ask the prime minister the 
question: "Mr. Chretien, if the YES won by a proportion of 50.6 per cent the next 
time, would you accept the popular verdict? " Claire Lamarche fell ill and 
collapsed. (Duceppe was the only leader of the five who went to her aid, a fact 
little noticed by the media. ) After she had been taken to hospital by ambulance 
about 10 minutes later, the debate was suspended, and with it, "an unequivocal 
answer to the unity issue's most volatile question. The question hung in the air 
over the entire country. " [Doman, 1997, p. 160] 
Lamarche's treatment by the media also became a subject of public 
controversy. At the moment of her collapse, the television cameras did not move 
away from Lepine to focus on her, but when she was carried out of the building 
on a stretcher, they did, much to her obvious discomfort. 
The distress of this public figure at such a public moment 
suddenly became a private matter. To their credit, most 
Canadians concurred. Though Ms. Lamarche had been on 
television screens across the country only moments before, 
television had no business shoving cameras in her face simply 
because she had been taken ill. 
[Dornan, 1997, p. 161] 
The sudden end to the debate may have helped Chretien, who was perceived as 
being rescued from "having to take a position on one of the most difficult 
questions of the sovereignty debate" [LeDuc, 1997, p. 217], but it certainly did 
not help Duceppe. A continuation of the debate was held Sunday, May 18, but 
at only 45 minutes long, and with the discussion centred on such well-worn 
constitutional issues as the Meech Lake agreement, the Charlottetown Accord, 
and Quebec's "distinct society", it did not cover any new ground and seemed 
anti-climactic. 
It also did not make any difference to the attitudes of viewers as to who 
had performed the best. It was not Duceppe. More than half of the respondents 
nation-wide to a post-election survey who had seen at least one of the debates 
chose Charest as the "winner", and this increased to two-thirds among 
francophone viewers, while only four per cent of Quebec respondents chose 
Duceppe. These findings were supported by an Environics poll conducted 
immediately following the debates, which showed the Conservatives had gained 
five per cent in the popular vote nationally. Most worrisome for the 
sovereigntists, the same poll revealed that the Tories had made big gains in 
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Quebec, mostly at the expense of the Bloc, who were trailing the Conservatives 
by nine points at 27 per cent [LeDuc, 1997, p. 219]. Bloc activists were beginning 
to panic, and more prominent figures in the Parti Quebecois, including the 
television artist and producer, Lise Payette, got involved in the campaign "in the 
hope of reversing the down-hill slide of the Bloc Quebecois. " [Bernard, 1997, p. 
144] 
Qui dit vrai 
One subtext in the dialogue between political journalists and Canadian 
politicians in the 1997 election was the issue of truth. Always a somewhat 
ambiguous concept for those in politics, or, as former NDP leader Ed Broadbent 
so nicely described it, "a second order commitment" [Broadbent, 1996, p. 271], 
truth - or its lack of it - was a concern for the academics and journalists who 
observed "a campaign characterized by cranky citizens telling reporters, 
politicians and phone-in radio shows that they don't believe their ballots will 
matter. " [Thanh Ha, 1997] The difficulties this could create for Canadian 
democracy were obvious. 
The issue of truth-telling by politicians had initially been highlighted by 
the publication of a book, Le Syndrome de Pinocchio: Essai dur le niensonge en 
politique by La Presse reporter Andre Pratte, which analyzed the extent of lying in 
modern political life and the danger it posed for civil society. Pratte saw the 
obfuscation of politicians as "a gangrene infecting the entire system" [Thanh Ha, 
19971, and in his daily election column, "Qui dit vrai", did his best to cure the 
malady by identifying the deceptions and falsehoods promulgated by the 
candidates. There was plenty of them, with Chrdtien's stated reasons for the 
election and Parizeau's denial of his plans for a UDI being the most blatant 
examples. Gilles Duceppe was not immune to the disease - his statement during 
the English-language debate that Quebec had more investment than any other 
Canadian province was disproved in a Pratte column - but more often than not, 
he seemed to get in trouble for telling the truth. 
The first controversy was when he told members of the Canadian Jewish 
Congress in Montreal that if in an independent Quebec a federalist party came to 
power, nothing could stop it from proposing a referendum to rejoin Canada. 
"This is democracy. We can't decide for the next generation, " he said [Bryden, 
1997]. A report of his comments was headlined "Neverendum referendum", and 
Duceppe was ridiculed by both federalist and sovereigntist leaders, and PQ 
Government House leader Pierre Belanger quickly re-asserted the official 
sovereigntist line that once a referendum was held and Quebec became 
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independent, there would be no turning back [Seguin, 1997b]. To Andre Pratte, 
the reaction to Duceppe's remarks was another instance of the Pinocchio 
Syndrome. "He tells the truth. So he gets clobbered, " Pratte said of the Bloc 
leader's remarks [Thanh Ha, 1997]. 
His most contentious comments were those on the subject of the possible 
partition of Quebec following a referendum, prompted by a journalist's query as 
to what a sovereign Quebec would "do with the Cree people if they want to stay 
in Canada after a Yes vote". Duceppe said that an independent Quebec would 
negotiate with the First Nations people, and if the negotiations failed, would 
never use force, but would go to an international tribunal to "know what are the 
rights of natives around the world, not only in Quebec. There can't be one law 
for Quebec and another for the rest of the world. " [Riga, 1997a] The next day, 
May 22, Lucien Bouchard made it quite clear that there would be no negotiation 
with the Cree over partition of their homeland in the north of the province. "The 
territory of Quebec is endowed with a fundamental characteristic, which is its 
integrity, " he told reporters. "Legally, we are told by studies that we have a 
territory to which we have impeccable title. " Contradicted by the PQ leader, 
Duceppe could only say that he had been misunderstood [Thompson and Riga, 
1997]. As columnist William Johnson described him: "Duceppe, still 
fundamentally an innocent, blurts out his embarrassing truths that his mentors 
then rush to contradict. " [Johnson, 1997b] 
However, as one anglophone political journalist explained, perhaps 
Duceppe's difficulties arose because he did not tell the truth well enough. 
"At least as important as all the trivia and static like the hair-net 
and the bus-driver was Duceppe's almost touching willingness to 
answer questions that sovereigntists have been wise not to 
answer for a long time. How do you arbitrate the rights of the 
natives in northern Quebec as against the rights of all other 
Quebecers in the event of a secession? Boy, you don't want to 
touch that question; he gave it his best shot and inevitably stirred 
up controversy with the movement .... Duceppe's problem was that he kind of only half-answered these questions. He offered an 
opening gambit ... in what would have been a long debate over, 
you know, fundamental questions, but he clearly hadn't thought 
them through; and so to the extent the choice was between 
shutting up or thinking hard as to what a really valid answer 
would be he didn't do either. He barged in and found himself 
having to back out amid emergency damage control by his staff. " 
Certainly that view was echoed by Duceppe's own communications specialist, 
Yves Dupre, who, on May 23, just 10 days before the end of the campaign, gave 
an interview to La Presse saying that the Bloc leader was partly to blame for the 
negative performance of his party. There were obviously some things outside his 
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control such as the logistical errors of the first days of the campaign, Dupre said, 
but the ambiguity of Duceppe's responses to such questions as the integrity of 
Quebec territory and whether the next referendum would be the last 
understandably led to some contradictions [Lessard, 1997c]. 
The response of the anxious Bloc strategists was to sideline Duceppe and 
highlight Bouchard and Parizeau, who were seen as much more effective 
campaigners. Certainly, they were able to bring in the crowds of sovereigntist 
supporters in a way that Duceppe could not, but even with their participation, 
the Bloc seemed to be in free-fall, with "L'effet Charest" (the Charest Effect) 
stealing votes from the party's soft-sovereigntist supporters. At 31 per cent in 
the polls May 23, it was only one per cent ahead of the Conservatives, and four 
points behind the Liberals. Party strategists feared the worst; the last week of 
the campaign was, as the headline in La Presse said, "Une semaine pour sauver 
les meubles" (A week to save the furniture) [Marissal, 1997b]. 
Chretien and Reform to The Rescue 
The Bloc's furniture did get saved during the final days of the election, not 
because of its own actions, but, ironically, because of those of the Reform Party 
and Jean Chretien, the BQ's ideological enemies. It was Reform's "secret ad" on 
national unity - not even the party's own candidates knew about it [Ellis and 
Archer, 1997] - first aired on Canadian television May 22 that gave the Bloc 
campaign the impetus it needed, for its hostile, anti-Quebec message frightened 
soft sovereigntists and federalists alike. Reform strategists had wanted to make 
national unity a key campaign issue, because they saw it "as a so-called wedge 
issue, one which separated them from all the other parties" [Greenspon, 1997, p. 
30]. Their television commercial certainly did that. 
It began with grainy black and white pictures of Chretien and Charest. 
The voice-over then stated: "The last time, these men almost lost our country and 
will do it again with distinct society when these men (pictures of Bouchard and 
Duceppe were shown) hold their next referendum. " The commercial switched to 
colour with a background of soothing music. The voice-over continued: "Preston 
Manning and the Reform Party believe there is a better way to keep our country 
together: equality of all provinces; a real plan to deal with any future votes on 
separation and a real vote for all Canadians. Not just Quebec politicians. " The 
final image on the screen showed black-and-white photos of Charest, Chrdtien, 
Duceppe and Bouchard with the international symbol for "Stop", a red slash in a 
circle, across their faces. The fact that it lumped together federalist leaders 
Charest and Chretien with sovereigntists Bouchard and Duceppe was 
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particularly offensive, as was the omission of any anglophone leaders from 
Quebec, such as Brian Mulroney. The ad represented a new low in Canadian 
politics, and immediately became the subject of fierce criticism. 
Charest accused Manning of "bigotry"; Alexa McDonough warned that 
the Reform leader's policies would lead Canada "straight into a civil war"; and 
Chrt tien accused him "of running the most divisive campaign in Canadian 
history" [Ellis and Archer, 1997, p. 127]. Roger Bilodeau, vice-president of the 
Federration des Communautes Francophones et Acadiennes du Canada, the 
national organization for francophones, said that Manning was "fostering 
hatred" and his position on national unity meant "nothing less than splitting up 
the country" [Wills, 1997c]. For his part, Duceppe said that the Reform leader's 
exploitation of anti-Quebec feeling just showed how futile the national unity 
debate was: "He's surfing on a stream right now that shows the whole debate 
between Quebec and the rest of Canada cannot be resolved. " [Clark, 1997a] The 
Reform Party chose not to broadcast the ad in Quebec, but that did not prevent 
it from having an impact in the province, for its content "made many French- 
speaking Quebecers feel that they were not wanted in Canada" [Bernard, 1997, 
p. 1441. Duceppe blamed Chretien and Charest, saying it was their attitude 
toward francophone Quebecers "that was fuelling the Quebec bashing" [Bernard, 
1997, p. 144]. The Reform ad had a dramatic effect on the polls, according to 
Bloc strategists, and certainly, on May 23, the percentage of support for the Bloc 
began to climb, while that for the Liberals and the Conservatives began to fall 
[Pratte, 1997b]. 
However, what proved to be the defining moment for the Bloc's campaign 
came from the prime minister. In a television interview taped on May 25 for the 
French-language all-news network, jean Chretien said that he would not recognize 
a majority vote of 50 plus one in a referendum on Quebec sovereignty. It was 
significant that the prime minister chose this particular venue for his statement, 
guaranteeing the maximum coverage for a francophone audience. The timing was 
also interesting: Chretien had said much the same thing before during the 
referendum of 1995, and again in 1996. However, he had not been that willing to 
talk about it during the early days of the election, and had been able to avoid 
answering the question during the French-language television debates, but now, he 
"appeared to be going out of his way to make sure the matter was raised. " 
(Greenspon, 1997, p. 34) The reason he did so, Conservative party strategists 
believed, was to block Charest, whose popularity in Quebec was a bigger threat 
to the Liberals than the Bloc. Chrt tien, they thought, "was trying to polarize the 
vote within Quebec, to squeeze out Charest by driving soft nationalists back to 
the Bloc Quebecois while federalists rallied around the Liberal flag" [Greenspon, 
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1997, p. 341. The prime minister's stratagem worked, and to the benefit of the 
Bloc, whose campaign was newly energized. "Pour le Bloc qudbecois, en qüete 
d'un moyen de prendre un envol pour le blitz de la derniere semaine de 
Campagne, les propos de M. Chretien ont eu 1'effet d'un electrochoc, " ("For the 
Bloc Quebecois, in quest of a way of taking flight for the blitz of the last week of 
the campaign, the words of Chretien had the effect of an electric shock") 
reported Chantal Hebert, Ottawa Bureau Chief for La Presse [Hebert, 1997c]. 
When Gilles Duceppe described the prime minister's comments as an 
"assault against Quebec" [Hebert, 1997c], he was drawing on the same fears that 
had prompted Quebecers to vote for the Bloc after the failure of the Meech Lake 
Accord. As pollster Jean-Marc Leger explained, each time Quebecers felt 
threatened, whether it be by the government's move to ask the Supreme Court to 
rule on the legality of a referendum on sovereignty or discussion of the possibility 
of partitioning Quebec's territory, the percentage of support for the Bloc went up. 
This was not because they were in favour of the Bloc, but rather, against the 
federal system and the Chretien government [Ouimet, 1997]. Having an 
identifiable enemy united the factions within the sovereigntist movement. As one 
anglophone reporter recalled: "It almost had a placebo effect in terms of healing 
their campaign.... they cheered up noticeably in the two or three days after... they 
sprinted to the finish with a lot more gusto than they had run in the first four 
weeks of the campaign. " 
Duceppe's delivery became more dynamic and confident, and when 
gaffes and setbacks occurred - as they still did to the end of the campaign - he 
was able to handle them with greater ease. He delighted a rally of 350 with his 
humorous descriptions of federalist leaders using matrushkas, the wooden 
Russian dolls that contain identical, smaller versions inside, especially when he 
said that the smallest and the prettiest was Jean Charest, but "when you look 
inside, there's nothing there" [Clark, 1997b]. When Bloc MP Suzanne Tremblay 
implied that Charest was not an authentic Quebecer because the name on his 
birth certificate was John, not Jean as he called himself - Charest, like Duceppe, 
had a mother of British origin - Duceppe disassociated himself from her remarks, 
but also immediately asked her for an explanation, and later told reporters that 
regardless of origin, everyone who lives in Quebec is a Quebecer [Seguin, 1997d]. 
Before the change in the Bloc's fortunes, there had been speculation that 
the party's new television and radio ads scheduled for broadcast during the final 
week of the election would feature "the rescue team of sovereigntist leaders" - 
Bouchard, Parizeau, Yves Duhaime and Michel Gauthier - rather than Duceppe, 
given his performance throughout the campaign [Riga, 1997c]. But instead they 
focused exclusively on the leader, showing him in a relaxed pose, walking down a 
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street in his neighbourhood, and emphasized that he was "un homme franc, 
fidele ä ce quartier qu'il represente, fidele ä la souverainete. Aujourd'hui, Gilles 
Duceppe vous demande de rester fideles ä vos convictions et de voter pour le 
Quebec. De voter pour le Bloc quebecois. " ("a frank man, faithful to this area 
that he represents, faithful to sovereignty. Today, Gilles Duceppe asks you to 
remain faithful to your convictions and vote for Quebec. Vote for the Bloc 
Quebecois. ") They were in marked contrast to those of the Liberals, which 
featured Jean Chretien - despite his personal unpopularity in the province - and 
his team of Quebec cabinet ministers, focusing on their actions to balance the 
budget while preserving social programmes [Authier, 1997f]. The Liberals also 
translated their newspaper ads into 11 languages in order to win the votes of 
Quebec's ethnic minorities, who were reluctant to support the sovereigntist party 
[Block, 1997]. 
It was clear that both parties saw Jean Charest as the man to beat: the 
Liberals in their slogan, "Bloquer? Parler? ou agir? " portraying the Conservative 
leader as someone whose ability as an orator was not matched by his 
organization, and the Bloc, in its picture of Duceppe as a man who knew his 
community and was faithful to it and his sovereigntist ideals, underlining 
Charest's supposed lack of commitment to the province of his birth (the view 
unfortunately evidenced in Suzanne Tremblay's remarks). However, the 
impression of the Conservative campaign's strength was an illusion, as Charest 
lacked the organization to take advantage of his strong showing in the debates 
and on the election trail. Both the Liberals and the Bloc were in the ascendant, 
and in the last days of the campaign, the Bloc was rising faster, according to the 
polls [Bernard, 1997, p. 1451: even the prime minister's seat was threatened. 
The Results 
The morning of June 3 Canadians woke to find that they had what English- 
speaking pundits called "a pizza parliament" and French-speaking ones, "le 
parlement des pots casses". There were now five parties with official status in 
the 301-seat House of Commons, up from three in the last parliament, and the 
ruling Liberals had won a bare majority with 155 seats, 101 of these from the 
province of Ontario; the Reform party had replaced the Bloc as the Official 
Opposition, with 60 seats mainly concentrated in Alberta and British Columbia; 
the Bloc Quebecois won 44 seats, down from the 50 it had at the dissolution of 
parliament, and 10 fewer than it had won in 1993; the New Democratic Party 
went from nine seats to 21, making a historic breakthrough in the Atlantic 
provinces, where it gained eight new seats; while the Progressive Conservatives 
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were in last place with 20. The voter turn-out nation-wide, at 67 per cent, was 
the lowest in 44 years, much lower than the post-war norm of 75 per cent, and a 
significant drop from the 70 per cent of the 1993 election. 
The results in Quebec were equally complex. The Bloc, with 44 seats, 
won more than all the other parties put together, at 37.86 per cent of the popular 
vote, but the Liberals, victims of the first-past-the-post system, came first in only 
26 constituencies, with 36.68 per cent, little more than one per cent behind the 
Bloc. The Conservatives had just five seats, up four from 1993, with 22.17 per 
cent of the vote, while the NDP, never a significant player in Quebec politics, had 
less than two per cent, and Reform, a minuscule 0.29 per cent; neither party won 
seats. Voter turn-out in Quebec was the highest in Canada, at 70.5 per cent, but 
down significantly from 1993, when it was 77.1 per cent. 
The Bloc's support, like that of the Scottish National Party, tended to 
come from young, working-class males. The Bloc, in fact, had the youngest 
supporters of Canadian political parties, with 40 per cent of its voters under 35 
years of age, and it also had the biggest percentage with just secondary school 
education or lower. In addition, Bloc supporters had the lowest income levels of 
any political party, but despite this, were not "particularly dissatisfied with their 
standard of living", and were more likely to be "idealistic young men" rather 
than "the disgruntled older men" of the Reform Party, whose supporters were 
also predominantly male and poorly-educated, but who were older and 
economically better-off than average [Pammett, 1997, p. 245]. 
The results were disappointing for the Liberals. Despite pouring 
considerable time, effort and resources into the Quebec campaign, they only 
increased their percentage of the vote by three per cent, gaining seven seats. This 
was not the breakthrough election that would return them "to their historical 
norm of garnering four fifths of Quebec's seats" [Clarkson, 1997, p. 60], and they 
lost by more than 15 per cent in 47 of the 49 seats where they were defeated 
[Clarkson, 1997, p. 60]. Jean Chretien had a tough fight to maintain his own seat 
in the constituency of Ste-Maurice, where Bloc challenger Yves Duhaime was less 
than 1,000 votes behind him, and at one point during election night, pulled ahead 
of the prime minister. Part of the problem was Chretien's unpopularity, which 
the Liberal strategists countered by emphasizing the party's strong team of 
francophone candidates. 
The other problem was that, of course, the Liberals were also fighting a 
national campaign, so that even what appeared to be advantages - its allowance 
of 118 minutes of paid political advertising versus the Bloc's 43 - were not. The 
Bloc, as a regional party, could use its allotment on cheaper, local advertising, 
while the Liberals had to spend their money on the more expensive national 
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networks. The same national constraints hindered the Conservatives, but at least 
they were not handicapped by their leader; he was their greatest asset, and 
although the final results showed only small gains for the Tories in Quebec, they 
influenced the outcome for the other parties. The four new seats for the party 
were taken from the Bloc, and in five other new constituencies where the Liberals 
won seats from the Bloc, it was due to an increase in the Conservative vote 
[Bernard, 1997, p. 145]. Unfortunately, Charest was not able to build on the 
momentum from the television debates, because he and his strategists had 
mistakenly pinned their hopes on winning seats in Ontario, which had a popular 
provincial Conservative government, and "there was little organizational 
capacity to mobilize whatever support the party had" [Clarkson, 1997, p. 871. 
The results for the Bloc were, as Bernard says, "an indisputable set-back" 
[Bernard, 1997, p. 135] when compared with the 1993 election, in which the 
party won 49.3 per cent of the popular vote and 54 seats. At just under 38 per 
cent of the popular vote, the Bloc had fallen below the 40 per cent considered to 
be "its cruising speed" [Bernard, 1993, p. 85], and had lost a quarter of its 
support, as well as its status as Official Opposition. True, it had elected a larger 
percentage of its candidates than any other party - 59 per cent to the 51 per cent 
of the Liberals - but that was due to the fact that it ran a regional campaign. In 
addition, of the 44 seats the Bloc had won, only 11 of them were clear majorities, 
compared to 41 out of 54 in 1993; the other 33 were won because of a split in the 
vote for the two federalist parties, the Liberals and the Conservatives [Bauch, 
1997i]. It is perhaps too easy to blame this set-back on the leadership of Gilles 
Duceppe, for as Bernard indicates, the final results were very close to what the 
polls were saying at the beginning of the campaign, when the Bloc and the 
Liberals were within a few percentage points of each other in Quebec [Bernard, 
1997, pp. 145-46] The real decline in the Bloc's support started at the same time 
as the first effects of the budget cuts imposed by the Parti Quebecois government 
under Lucien Bouchard began to be felt in the province. The hostility expressed 
by Clement Godbout of the Quebec Federation of Labour towards the PQ's 
policy of budget cuts in social services was a strong indicator of grassroots 
opinion. 
It is also questionable to assume that the Bloc could have maintained the 
same high level of support that it had in 1993, which came out of specific 
political circumstances - the failure of the Meech Lake Accord and the 
Charlottetown referendum - and when Lucien Bouchard was its leader, unsullied 
by the fiscal brutalities of deficit-cutting. The Bloc was not that unhappy to be 
relieved of its role as Her Majesty's Loyal Opposition, even though before polling 
day Bouchard had attacked Chretien and Manning as "the couple from hell" and 
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warned Quebec voters that having Manning as the leader of the opposition 
would be "the worst thing that could happen"[Thompson, 1997c]. It had always 
been difficult and contradictory for the Bloc to perform this role; now its MPs 
would be free to concentrate on matters only concerning Quebec, and its 
independence. As Gilles Duceppe said later: "The Bloc has a very clear mandate 
to defend Quebecers' interests. We will no longer have to represent any group's 
interests outside Quebec. There will be other parties outside Quebec to put 
forward their concerns. "[LaSalle, 1997] Although the utility of the Bloc being in 
Ottawa had been questioned by such prominent Quebec figures as Clement 
Godbout, 42 per cent of voters surveyed as to whether the BQ was "still useful" 
agreed that it was. "To most sovereigntists, the Bloc Quebecois presence in the 
Canadian House of Commons is a 'must': it is required in order to help the Parti 
Quebecois in its endeavours. " [Bernard, 1997, p. 146] 
The replacement of the Bloc by Reform was perhaps not that great a 
change, in the sense that one regional party had replaced another. With all of its 
seats now in western Canada, having lost the only one it had in Ontario because 
its belligerent stance on Quebec was too extreme for the moderate voters of that 
province [Marzolini, 1997, p. 202, Pammett, 1997, p. 241], Reform clearly could 
not claim national status. As Pammett explains: "Reform may try to act more 
like a national party than the Bloc, but they have yet to prove themselves to be 
one. " [Pammett, 1997, p. 247] The negativity of the party's advertising did not 
do much for national unity, or for Canadian voters, who elected to opt out of the 
democratic process in greater numbers than ever before, a worrying trend, says 
former journalist Anthony Westell: 
It is conventional wisdom among political operatives that 
negative advertising 'works', even when people say they do not 
like it. However, this judgement appears to ignore the fact that it 
may produce an increasingly small pool of others to 'work on'. 
Champions of popular participation in Canadian public life have 
reason to be concerned with the conduct of the campaign of 1997. 
[Westell, 1997, p. 9] 
What The Bloc Strategists Said 
Bloc Quebecois strategists, like their counterparts in the Scottish National Party, 
were not too surprised by the election night outcome. They had not expected to 
repeat what had happened in 1993. "We knew we couldn't do that twice, " said 
one veteran campaign advisor, "but the press didn't.... the result was not too far 
from what we thought it should be in the circumstances.... the Bloc didn't have 
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this quality of being new anymore, as it was in 1993. " They were also not 
disappointed by the Bloc's loss of its official opposition role, he said. 
"In terms of results finally, it's not a disaster; far from that, and 
the Bloc is not the official opposition, but the Bloc never wanted 
to be the official opposition. Nobody believed in 1993 that could 
be possible. It happened like that. So this year we knew there 
were very slight chances that we could keep that, but we didn't 
want that anyway. " 
In fact, a year-and-a-half before the election, the party leadership had estimated 
that the Bloc would win anywhere from 40 to 55 seats in the next federal contest, 
so the final total was not that far off their expectations, although at the low end. 
What was a surprise was that the sovereigntist vote had dropped below 40 
percent, although just slightly - for the first time in 20 years [Gagnon, 1997f]. 
The party leadership and most of its strategists agreed that the defining 
moments for the Bloc campaign were the Reform Party's ad and the prime 
minister's statement that he would not accept a majority vote of 50 plus one in a 
referendum on Quebec, which, the leader said, "gave us the opportunity to come 
back with the sovereignty message. " He also attributed the Bloc's success to the 
fact that it was a grassroots party, and as a result, had a much better 
organization than the Conservatives at the local constituency level. This is why, 
perhaps, the Bloc's last series of ads, focusing on Gilles Duceppe in his own 
neighbourhood were so successful, giving him some extra percentage points in the 
popular vote in the last few days of the election, according to the campaign's 
communications specialist. He felt that, compared to the other parties, the Bloc's 
advertising "really had... something striking", and in the last week particularly, 
had a definite effect in terms of intention to vote. 
"Everybody thought we would pull Mr. Duceppe out of the 
advertising. We did exactly the contrary; we made a 30-second 
commercial of him only walking the street in his riding and 
with a voice-over of himself admitting that he could seem like 
somebody who was unexperienced, but he knew the people blah 
blah blah.... and this I guess made the difference for the last 
stretch; he gained a few points specifically because of that. " 
The actual conduct of the campaign was a more difficult subject. The 
leader himself admitted that the disastrous first week of the campaign "was 
very, very, very painful", and "the fact is being elected only what, a month before 
- it didn't give me the chance to get prepared to act the role; secondly, to face the 
consequences of the leadership race. So it was tough. " The part of his role that 
he had the most problems with on the election trail were the continual scrums. 
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As the communications specialist, a veteran of both provincial and federal 
elections, recalled: 
"There is obviously in an electoral campaign official press 
conferences, but there are scrums, all the time, especially if you 
travel. This time we were travelling in one bus; the journalists 
were in another bus. In other cases with Mr. Parizeau [during 
provincial campaigns] he was in the same bus; he almost went 
out of his mind, because it means you have scrums all the time, 
which makes no sense. So we stopped that and this year - not 
only us, all the parties separate the press from the politicians so 
that there can be moments of peace and quiet, and not be in a 
scrum all the time. But every time you set a foot on the ground 
you've got 45 microphones in there anyway, and this is very, in 
terms of strategy, specifically with Mr. Duceppe, who did not 
have very much experience as a leader at least, this was very 
difficult because you did not know what he was going to say, but 
he was going to say something because he's got 45 microphones 
there, and you can't keep them away, and you can't refuse, so it's 
very tough.... we didn't have that problem with Mr. Bouchard in 
the first Bloc campaign, at all.... We had continuous scrums, but 
he was a more experienced politician; so he'd get out of them 
very well; he'd do it very well, while for Mr. Duceppe it proved 
to be a danger, and in fact proved to be every day there was 
something new we had to correct, or change, or modify or cancel 
or whatever. " 
Comparing Duceppe in his first Bloc campaign to Bouchard in his is not 
particularly fair: Bouchard, after all, had been a Conservative party cabinet 
minister and the ambassador to France before he took up his role as leader of the 
Bloc, which gave him plenty of experience in dealing with the intense scrutiny of 
the media, whereas Duceppe had only three days of media relations training 
before the 1997 election. Bouchard was just as incompetent during his first 
election campaign in 1988, if not more so, and according to those who were there, 
"was so ill at ease on the hustings that he didn't want to shake hands with 
constituents" [Martin, 1997, p. 138]. 
Even those campaign aides who had experience dealing with the media 
found the demands of the press corps were sometimes almost overwhelming in 
this election. The leader's press attache, brought in after the first week, described 
one such incident during the campaign: 
"I recall days they wanted scrums and scrums and scrums, and at 
one point we were giving like four scrums a day, just like what 
we were doing during the day was not enough, and they always 
wanted more. They always wanted more, and I know at one 
point the Conservatives were not doing that, and they were 
saying, 'We're doing that; we're having one just once a day, and 
that's it'; but with us they were asking more and more.... I recall 
the day when Gilles Duceppe in the morning did something like 
five radio interviews, and the journalists on the bus were all 
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there; they could listen to what he was saying; so lunch-time I 
said, 'No scrums today; the scrum will be later if we do one 
because he did so many media interviews in the morning'; I said, 
'I mean, that's enough. ' And they were yelling at me, and they 
were so angry because they didn't have their little scrum and 
they had to take what Gilles was saying from the media 
interviews. They were very demanding on that, very, very, very 
demanding. A little bit too much; too much. " 
Everyone agreed that the initial organization of the Bloc's campaign had been 
poor; what they found hard to deal with was the media's continuing emphasis on 
gaffes and mistakes throughout the campaign. Said one senior strategist: "The 
campaign didn't start very well in terms of organization... and the journalists 
decided they were going in that direction, and so they had fun with that for a 
long while, up until the end in fact. " The leader was particularly irked that when 
he was greeting factory workers outside a plant gate in Montreal, of all the 
people he met, "only one man refused to shake hands with me; went into his car, 
and the other journalists asked him to come back to tape him live refusing to 
shake hands with me; that was the scenario....! just can't believe that. " The 
"fuss" about the cheese-hat was baffling to him. "I just can't believe we have that 
kind of journalism, " he said, "very inspired by CNN and I don't think it goes to 
the substance; it's only the image. " When Bloc MP Suzanne Tremblay made her 
comments about "John" Charest, the press attache knew what to expect: "I said, 
that's it, that's the news, and in fact [laughter] it was the news, and I said, too 
bad, because we had good things to say, and we had good lines... but that little 
thing [made] everything derail. " 
There was also the issue of censorship by Radio-Canada to contend with, 
resulting from a decision by the French-language 24-hour news service, le reseau de 
l'inforniation (RDI), not to broadcast a speech by Duceppe at a Bloc rally in 
Jonquiere May 19. The initial agreement with the broadcaster was that RDI was 
going to air both Duceppe's speech and that of Lucien Bouchard, who was to 
speak first, but the broadcast was cut after Bouchard's speech. The party 
decided to make a formal complaint to the Canadian Radio-Television 
Telecommunications Commission following a report in Le Devoir that Claude 
Saint-Laurent, a general manager at Radio-Canada, had ordered that Duceppe's 
speech not be televised. RDI's response was that the decision to cut the 
broadcast was made because the producer thought the speeches would run too 
late [Fraser, 1997d], and later offered to televise the Bloc live the next time they 
had a big meeting, but, as the Bloc's press attache explained, "the damage had 
been done, because it was a very good speech". 
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Another source of frustration to Bloc strategists - as well as to the 
Canadian public and some of the journalists themselves - was the trivialization 
of the issues. One of the senior aides compared the journalists to vultures who 
prey on dying animals. Once they sensed the campaign was in difficulty, all they 
wanted to do was attack, 
"and after that it was very difficult, except for the last week, to get 
them out of that mood. So all they were looking for is how can 
we get another story, either something that has to do with their 
campaign that's not functioning, or something that he said that 
he shouldn't say, and they weren't... listening whatsoever to what 
he was saying and the releases that were coming out. The Bloc 
had a huge programme; nobody heard about it. The press did 
not want to hear about that. For them... since he could not be in 
power they believed the programme was no good, worth 
nothing. " 
Sometimes the only strategies that seemed to work were those that relied 
on their entertainment value. The most successful was when Duceppe came up 
with the idea of using "les poupees-gigognes" or matrushkas, the little nested 
wooden Russian dolls, to explain the constitution. As one of the press aides 
recalled, 
"I said, 'Okay, there's a speech tonight and we've got to have 
something, we've got to make them laugh, let's find something; 
and we wanted to talk about the constitution... and Gilles said, 
'Well, let's use [matrushkas]... and it took us maybe an hour to 
script it; there was nothing new in the speech per se, but only... a 
different image; and I was looking at the journalists and they 
were laughing and laughing and laughing, saying'Ha, ha, ha; 
it's good'.... Unfortunately when you're doing a campaign it's not 
really the content; it's more the way you're giving out your 
lines; and that evening Gilles was making everybody [laugh] 
.... But the day after and in the evening news 
it was everywhere, 
everywhere, just because he used five little dolls to explain the 
history of the constitution, and it worked beautifully. " 
Similarly, towards the end of the campaign, Duceppe received positive publicity 
when he appeared on Politiquement direct on MusiquePlus, a cable television 
station devoted to pop music, wearing a slightly smarter version of the famous 
hair-bonnet. It might have been because he was the only federal leader to accept 
an invitation to participate in the programme, but despite the skepticism of his 
staff as to whether this was a good move or not, his willingness to make fun of 
himself scored him some points in the political public relations game. 
It was, a former Bloc candidate and political advisor wrote in an analysis 
of the results, a media campaign based on image. 
216 
The Bloc Quebecois had nevertheless perfected an electoral 
platform longer and more detailed than that of the 
Conservatives and in which the large themes had unfolded 
gradually during the campaign. Far from delighting in 
negativism, the Bloc sought to present to the electorate a 
constructive critique of the ChrEtien regime and concrete 
solutions to the problems of Quebec. But very little of this had 
filtered through the media coverage, despite numerous 
communiques and plentiful statements. [Translation mine] 
The view of the political journalists, of course, was somewhat different, as I 
discuss in the next section. 
What The Political journalists Said 
There may have been numerous press releases and statements, but unfortunately 
the Bloc did not make them available to all the media outlets, and this created 
some antagonism. Unlike the Scottish National Party, which has made concerted 
efforts to reach out to all media, whether sympathetic or hostile to the 
independence cause, the Bloc refused appearances on English-language television 
programs and contacts with federalist newspapers, whether francophone or 
anglophone. A francophone editor of one of the major French-language papers 
said that other than the reporters in the newspaper's Ottawa Bureau, 
"we don't have any relationship with anybody in the Bloc, 
period. We never had any contact with anybody in the Bloc 
during the campaign, never. Nobody ever sent us any texts 
[news releases] or tried to convince us otherwise of the pros [of 
the Bloc's position], and it shows that their machine was not that 
efficient.... some 60 per cent of our readers voted 'Yes' in the 
referendum and so there are some people that they would have 
liked to reach, and we're fair enough with people to do a good 
job; our information policy is to be objective... we would have 
published any kind of open text they would have submitted to 
us; we would have written fair articles about what Duceppe 
would have said. " 
The incompetence of the campaign organization was another source of irritation, 
because its lack of direction made it difficult for journalists to do their job. As 
this editor explained, the Bloc "had some system, but the only people who knew 
it were people who were with the Duceppe leader campaign.... The way in which 
they controlled the visits they made, the messages they tried to get across every 
day, was very erratic. " 
The frustration of dealing with this was best described by Globe and Mail 
reporter Karen Unland, who, as one of the political journalists on the leader's 
bus, followed Duceppe on the campaign trail. In her Election notebook column 
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headlined "Pointless wanderings with the Bloc", Unland illustrated why 
reporters were inclined to be so negative. On this day, less than a week before 
the end of the campaign, the reporters had travelled for a half-hour to a nearly 
empty gymnasium to view a mosaic protesting war toys which had been created 
by a local woman. 
The question on everyone's mind was not: "Why are war toys 
bad? " or "What will the Bloc Quebecois do about war toys? " 
The question on everyone's mind was: "What the heck are we 
doing here? " There was no news, no crowd and precious few 
photo opportunities. It was what is referred to technically as a big 
waste of time. 
It is difficult to fathom just how terrible Mr. Duceppe's campaign 
has been at giving him an even chance to generate positive 
coverage. He meets few throngs of supporters and makes few 
speeches.... 
It seems the only new things the news media have had to say 
about Mr. Duceppe lately have centred on his gaffes or the latest 
friendly fire from separatist allies. 
On the day of the visit to the gym, reporters were relieved to 
hear that Quebec Federation of Labour leader Clement Godbout 
had questioned the purpose of the Bloc. 
This was not because the journalists had anything against the 
Bloc or separatism. It was because they needed a story and 
another knife in Mr. Duceppe's back was a much stronger angle 
than the war-toy petition. 
In the fiercely competitive - and expensive - world of campaign journalism, it is 
not a good idea to waste journalists' time. Newspapers like La Presse, for 
example, spent close to $300,000 on covering the election, employing a team of 
more than 20 journalists and columnists, as well as extra photographers, graphic 
artists, and illustrators [Masson, 1997), and national newspapers such as the 
Globe and Mail would have spent even more. 
The reasons for the Bloc's problems with its media relations were more 
complex than just the party's lack of campaign organization. They were the 
result of a fundamental weakness, as one veteran francophone journalist 
explained: 
In politics as in much else, media relations is a packaging that 
can hardly hide the fact of an empty box.... There is only so much 
media relations can do for a party. Bottom line: they can make 
the right people available at the right time and try to explain the 
message to their best capacity .... The picture of Gilles Duceppe 
with a hairnet on his head became a defining moment because it 
illustrated the apparent purposelessness that had seized the Bloc. 
If Duceppe had been perceived as leading a vibrant party and as a 
strong leader, that picture would have gone away in no time. 
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Even if the Bloc had another leader, it would not have made much difference, 
because the "core problem of the party was that it did not work seriously at 
giving itself a post-referendum raison d'etre.... the sovereigntist leadership seemed 
content to assume that 'Yes' voters from the referendum were basically captive 
votes that required no efforts on their part to keep. " This view was echoed by an 
anglophone political journalist. "I got the strong impression that only part of 
their problem had to do with their organization or bad communications strategy 
as such. The problem had to do with their lack of anything to communicate. " 
The other issue that always has to be examined when discussing coverage 
of a sovereigntist political party in Quebec is the polarization between the views 
of francophone and anglophone journalists. As one anglophone journalist said, 
news media outside of Quebec are "almost gleefully hostile towards the Quebec 
sovereigntist movement", while criticizing the Quebec media for separatist bias. 
However, another anglophone journalist who had been covering Quebec politics 
for more than 35 years explained, francophone journalists are under more 
pressure to be fair because they have to represent the views of both sovereigntists 
and federalists, and there is a problem with that situation because 
"it absolves English-speaking journalists from that responsibility 
to be fair ... I think that there's a sense on the part of the English- 
speaking public and to a certain extent, English-speaking 
journalists that we're not supposed to be fair towards separatists; 
after all they're traitors, quote unquote, they're out to destroy the 
country. " 
The hypocrisy of those members of the anglophone media who do attack 
francophone journalists for bias was most trenchantly explained by a veteran 
francophone reporter: 
In French, both sovereignty and federalism are assumed to be 
valid options that deserve fair treatment. In English, federalism 
is assumed to be good and sovereignty evil. 99.9 per cent of 
English-speaking [reporters] are openly federalists. What kind of 
society would Quebec be if the same was said of French-speaking 
journalists? At the very least, it would be a society whose media 
is completely divorced from it. From that angle, I let you judge 
where fairness and objectivity is mostly found. 
It is significant that in the 1997 election the Bloc was hammered almost equally 
by both the English and French-language media, and it was the francophone 
press that initially published the photo of Gilles Duceppe in the "cheese-hat" 
and broke the story of L'affaire Parizeau; the ridicule and condemnation of the 
party could not be blamed on anglophone anti-sovereigntist bias. 
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What helped the Bloc most was that the Reform Party, and later, the 
Liberals, exploited the national unity issue for their own purposes, and the media 
followed their lead, although Canadian voters were more concerned about 
unemployment [Pammett, 1997, p. 235]. Some journalists protested the 
emphasis on "The election issue that never was" [Valpy, 1997], but their voices 
were few in number. As Globe and Mail columnist Michael Valpy wrote: 
The news media, having fabricated national unity as Canada's 
major election issue, appear puzzled by Canadians' insistence on 
being more interested in other things. Like employment, their 
children's future and the country's general quality of life. It is 
astonishing, in a word, to realize just how capable the media are 
of manufacturing something out of thin air - egged on by some 
clever political strategists and one-note academics and 
ancillary commentators. 
The result was a divisive campaign in which the real issues never got discussed in 
any depth, as Terrance Wills noted [1997d]: 
Canada has 1.5 million jobless; youth unemployment at a 
withering 17 percent; record bankruptcies; more than one 
million children living in poverty; hospitals being closed; 
welfare cuts; more homeless beggars while bank profits soar - 
and our political leaders spent the best part of five weeks 
throwing mud at each other over the national-unity question. 
Canadian voters were alienated. Close to 30 per cent said they could not 
identify an important issue in the campaign, or did not know of one, and that, 
combined with the decline in the percentage of those voting was "worrisome for 
the health of Canadian democracy" [Pammett, 1997, p. 236]. When the Cable 
Public Affairs Channel interviewed Canadians after the election, the general 
response was that there had been not enough discussion of matters such as 
health care, education, social security, and jobs. "What voters wanted, it 
seemed, was a debate between the parties about the state of the nation, its social 
and economic well-being, " says Doman. "For the most part they felt they were 
denied it. " [Doman, 1997, p. 153] What made it worse was that far from 
resolving the national unity question, the campaign had exacerbated the tensions, 
and the media was at least partly responsible, Doman concludes. 
It was as though the politicians managed to sidestep the issues, 
and the media let them get away with it. When the campaign 
dynamic turned to name calling over Quebec, again the media 
failed to call things to heel. In the eyes of the public, the sin of 
the networks and newspapers in this campaign was not that they 
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highjacked the proceedings, but that they should have. By not 
doing so, by hewing to the politicians' agenda, they became 
blameworthy. 
[Doman, 1997, p. 154] 
Conclusion 
If the criticisms of the media were anything to go by, the Bloc Qut be cois should 
not have done as well as it did in the 1997 election, for to them the party did 
almost everything wrong. It did not seem to have a coherent strategy, or at least 
one discernible to outside observers. Its message was inconsistent, changing from 
the Bloc as Quebec's voice in Ottawa, to the Bloc as the force for sovereignty, 
and then back again. The campaign organization was poor, and even after the 
importation of professional help from the Parti Quebecois, lacked focus and 
purpose. Its leader was ineffective, someone who, as one reporter described him, 
seemed "to project his insecurities on audiences rather than erase them", and 
who was not experienced enough to handle the pressures of the intense media 
scrutiny that attends a leader in a federal election. Its support was divided 
between followers of the hard-line sovereigntist Jacques Parizeau and those of the 
more accommodating Lucien Bouchard, which confused its message, and it didn't 
help that both men overshadowed the fledgling leader, understandably adding to 
his insecurities. Also, in a country dominated by federalist media, the journalists 
began the campaign with a certain amount of hostility towards the Bloc because 
it is sovereigntist, and because of the party's past history of heavy-handed 
dealings with the House of Commons press corps - not a good group for a 
political party to antagonize. Add to this the Bloc's incompetent organization, 
which irritated reporters hard-pressed for news stories because so many of the 
election events were, in Karen Unland's phrase, "a big waste of time", and it was 
a wonder that the Bloc managed to get any good coverage. 
But in the end it didn't seem to matter. What did, most unfortunately, 
was the cynical political manipulation of the prime minister, when he stated that 
50 plus one would not be a big enough majority to sanction Quebec 
independence. The effect of the Liberal leader's action - both during the election 
and after - cannot be underestimated. As Clarkson wrote: 
The party with its ascribed role as historic national conciliator, 
the bridge between the two founding peoples, showed that in the 
crunch that it preferred to have separatists rather than rival 
federalists elected in Quebec and preferred the possibility of 
having Gilles Duceppe as leader of the Opposition than jean 
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Charest, even though the latter's support had been crucial in 
saving the last referendum and his contribution would be 
essential once again in the next. 
[Clarkson, 1997, p. 50] 
The basic problem for the Bloc at the start of the campaign had been its lack of 
raison d'etre post-Bouchard. Were they a social democratic party or an 
independence party? The resulting lack of focus in its policies led in turn to the 
confusion and lack of direction in its poorly-planned campaign, which 
exacerbated the bad relations the Bloc had with the media, dating back to its 
first days in the House of Commons, which did not help the party's efforts at 
damage control when things went wrong - as they so often did during this 
exceptionally ill-fated campaign. Jean Chretien's "carefully staged intervention" 
[Clarkson, 1997, p. 501 gave the BQ a focus and purpose, by demonstrating that 
the Liberals could not be trusted to represent the interests of Quebecers in the 
House of Commons: only the Bloc could do that. 
However, the most significant factor in the Bloc's last-minute rally was 
the deep-rooted, community base of sovereigntist support in Quebec, which gave 
the Bloc's message a fundamental resilience even despite its poor campaign 
communications. With 113,000 members in the Bloc Quebecois, plus several 
thousand more in the provincial Parti Quebecois, the sovereigntist movement had 
considerable strength which could be effectively mobilized as needs be - and the 
Bloc's final outcome in the election was a result of its being able to rally its 
supporters to the cause after Reform's anti-Quebec ad and the prime minister's 
rejection of 50 plus one aroused the old fears that the Rest of Canada was anti- 
Quebec. Quebec's struggle to assert its national identity has had a long history 
within the Canadian federation, and it would take much more than one badly- 
managed political communications plan to seriously damage the credibility of the 
sovereigntist project within that province. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
Conclusion 
The study of political communication and its effects is a thorny one, involving as 
it does the complex inter-relationships amongst media, politicians, and the 
public. Trying to make sense of these relationships has been the task of this 
titiesis. Academics, like most people, tend to examine subjects through the lens of 
their own experience, and the lens chosen for this study are those of political 
journalists, the symbol-operators, in Nairn's words [Nairn, 1997, p. 3], members 
of the class of cultural specialists such as teachers, writers, politicians, and 
academics. 
At times the examination has seemed rather prolix for this former 
journalist, involving as it did lengthy discussions of the differing nationalisms of 
Canada and Britain, Scotland and Quebec, along with historical accounts of the 
PQ, the Bloc Quebecois, and the Scottish National Party, as well as analyses of 
the role of political journalism in both countries and their contested regions, and 
most importantly, the role of political communications in determining the 
electoral outcomes of these two parties during the national elections of 1997. 
Scotland and Quebec: Civic versus Ethnic Nationalism 
In Scotland and Qu6bec we have independence movements in what McCrone 
describes as a stateless nation - that is, a nation without a formal state - 
McCrone, 1998, p. 176). However, there is a crucial difference, as I described in 
chapter three, for the danger of racism lurks in Quebec's sovereignty project, 
while Scotland's push for independence is based more on a desire for grown-up 
govenunent. 
The question of racism is a complex one in relation to the Parti Quebecois 
and the Bloc Quebecois, for although both political parties condemn it, and have 
repeatedly stated their commitment to cultural tolerance and diversity, there are 
numerous instances where leading members of both parties have expressed views 
that can only be interpreted as racist (described in chapter three). Jacques 
Parizeau, still a very influential figure in the sovereignty movement, has never 
recanted or apologized for his remarks the night of the 1995 referendum loss that 
it was due to "money and the ethnic vote", and in fact, on a speaking tour a year 
later, identified the campaigning by Italian, Greek and Jewish organizations as the 
reason for its defeat. To his credit, Gilles Duceppe, the current Bloc leader, has 
consistently disavowed Parizeau's comments concerning the ethnic vote, but his 
voice is not the dominant one in Quebec [Authier, 1997h]. Significantly, Lucien 
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Bouchard, who is widely perceived as the most prominent leader in the 
sovereignty movement, refused to condemn Parizeau's remarks, describing him as 
"a great democrat" [Robinson, 1997]. 
During the referendum campaign itself, Bouchard was accused of racism 
when he asked why it was that Quebec had such a low birth-rate. "We're one of 
the white races that has the fewest children. That's really something. That 
suggests we haven't resolved our family problem", he is reported to have said 
[Martin, 1997, p. 292]. His comments predictably aroused great controversy, 
with women's groups, ethnic organizations, prime minister Chretien and other 
prominent Quebecers criticizing Bouchard for making racist and sexist remarks, 
but he denied both charges. However, it has long been a tenet of ethnic 
nationalism that "by bearing and rearing children, women maintain the racial 
purity of the stock, and transmit its culture" [McCrone, 1998, p. 1211, and 
Bouchard's words certainly seemed to reflect this view. It is true that the 
declining number of births in Quebec has long been a concern of the political elites 
on both sides of the sovereignty debate, for it was the provincial Liberals who 
enacted legislation that paid Quebec women to have children in an effort to 
improve the province's birth-rate, and in 1991, increased the amount to $500 for 
the first child; $1,000 for the second; and $7,000 for the third [Maroney, 1992] - 
but these funds were for all Quebec mothers, and not just those of "the white 
races". 
Gellner, in his discussion of the five transition stages of nationalism, 
describes ethnic cleansing as stage four, in which nations based on ethnicity must 
ensure "that everyone, or very nearly everyone, within the political unit be of the 
same culture, and that all those of the same culture be within the same political 
unit. " [Gellner, 1997, p. 451 Nations can do this either violently or peacefully, he 
explains. The lucky ones do it through the process of oblivion as identified by 
Ernest Renan: "the members of the nation, and hence of the state, have simply 
forgotten their diversity of cultural origin. " [Gellner, 1997, p. 45] Quebec seems to 
be one of the lucky nations, for it has chosen to forget how culturally diverse it 
has been since the days of the United Empire Loyalists. Where it has problems 
now is in dealing with the reality of its cultural diversity today, and although 
sovereigntist leaders speak of territorial or civic nationalism, there is still an 
under-current of intolerance that surfaces during moments of political crisis. 
It is this element of racism that accounts for so much of the hostility to the 
sovereigntist project in Canada's anglophone media. Anglophone journalists 
could possibly be persuaded that there is a valid case for Quebec sovereignty on 
the basis of its cultural distinctiveness, but not when this argument is founded on 
such concepts of racial purity as expressed in the phrases un Quebecois pure lame 
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and de vieiUe souche, or in the comments made by Deputy Premier Bernard Landry 
that non-francophones voted in the 1995 referendum "according to their 
grandmother's chromosomes". There is little or no suggestion of such racism in 
Scottish nationalism, despite politically-motivated claims to the contrary. It is a 
civic nationalism, based on inclusion and the desire for self-government and 
political autonomy, and as such, its message would seem, one would think, to be 
more socially acceptable to Scotland's journalists. It is true that in past centuries 
Scotland has benefited from its "civil society", as Lindsay Paterson describes it, 
enjoying the freedom of autonomy within the protective structure of the larger 
British state. But, as Nairn explains, the growth of nationalism in modern 
Scotland has come out of a longing for full government, and is more than "simply 
a wish for exit from the United Kingdom: it was, in effect, the desire to escape 
from 'civil society' and resume business as political society. " [Nairn, 1997, p. 
881. 
The Role of Journalists in Nationalist Movements 
It is often said that journalists have an important role in the promulgation of 
national identity. As Nairn explains, they are part of the middle-class 
intelligentsia that forms the basis of nationalist movements. 
All comparative studies of nationality have underlined the 
crucial place of such professional strata in generating the identity 
shifts behind nationalism: it is teachers, clerics, lawyers, 
journalists and loose screws who cause the trouble, far more 
than landlords, bankers, manufacturers or trade unionists. 
[Nairn, 1997, p. 188] 
However, there is a basic contradiction here, for if there is such a limited case for 
media effects, how then can we say that journalists influence the nation-building 
process? What is it that political journalists do that promotes nationalism? 
And which comes first: the change in attitudes towards national identity, which 
the journalists then report on, or the reports of the journalists, which in turn 
change attitudes, in some unidentifiable way? Or could it be that the two march 
together, step-by-step, and that journalists, like other citizens, have their 
consciousness changed by the political and social forces of their time? Looking 
at the two different cases of Scotland and Quebec, I think that journalists follow 
as much as lead in this process of social change. 
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In Quebec, as I have shown in chapter four, francophone journalists were 
on side with the independence movement from the very beginning. During the 
1966 provincial election, for example, for example, the francophone press was 
highly critical of the Liberals, while the fledgling separatist party, 
Reassemblement pour l'Independence Nationale (RIN), precursor to the Parti 
Quebecois, received only positive coverage [Siegel, 1996, p. 220]. This was a 
result of two factors, the first being the long-standing tradition of journalists as 
intellectual leaders in Quebec. As Lysiane Gagnon has said: 
French Canada's first great journalists were, first and foremost, 
politicians and debaters. This was, of course, a result of the fact 
that politics was, from the outset, the one field above all others 
in which outstanding French Canadians could assert themselves, 
since industry and commerce had been monopolized by the 
English since the conquest. 
[Cited in Siegel, 1996, p. 219] 
The second was the major social changes that occurred during la revolution 
tranquille, in which the traditional bearers of cultural values in Quebec - the 
church, the family and the educational system - were supplanted by the mass 
media and what Siegel calls "the global youth revolution" [Siegel, 1996, p. 230]. 
The reporters in the 1960s were themselves part of that youth revolution, and 
along with the new class of teachers now operating in a state-run education 
system rather than one administered by the church, became a major influence in 
Quebec's burgeoning separatist movement. As Siegel notes, "it is no accident 
that former teachers and journalists have played central roles in the PQ 
leadership. " [Siegel, 1996, p. 230] 
The picture has been much different in Scotland, where there is no such 
tradition of editorial leadership in the newsroom, and most political journalists 
have never shared the commitment to independence now expressed not only by 
Scottish National Party supporters but also those of Labour and the Scottish 
Liberal Democrats. In fact, if anything, such support would have hindered their 
careers, for it has long been a job requirement for political editors in Scotland that 
they be Unionist. The Herald's Scottish political editor Murray Ritchie explains 
why: 
But what of the Scottish media which remains defiantly and 
unanimously Unionist? It does seem odd - not to say anti- 
democratic - that the second political force in Scotland in terms 
of votes, suffers a complete lack of editorial sympathy while 
the political Establishment of Tories and New Labour/Lib Dem 
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pact partners, bask in the full constitutional endorsement of the 
press. 
The roots of this perversity are deep in Scotland. Some of us 
are old enough to remember the Bulletin newspaper which 
flirted with nationalism in the 1950s. Its fate was to be closed 
while reportedly profitable and its editor fired. The lesson was 
not lost on succeeding generations of Scottish editors. 
[Ritchie, 1998] 
The tradition in Scotland has been instead that rather than coming from the 
newsroom, support for nationalism comes from management, but strictly as a 
marketing tool [Kerr, 1978; Smith, 1994; Marr, 1995; Mitchell, 1996). The first 
instance of this, of course, was when Lord Beaverbrook (himself a Canadian) 
published a letter on the front page of the Daily Express pledging his support for 
Scottish Home Rule on July 14,1932 in the hopes of defeating the Daily Record in 
the ongoing circulation battle between the two newspapers. Sixty years later the 
Scottish Sun declared its support for Scottish nationalism, for precisely the same 
reason, and when Rupert Murdoch decided that he was going to back Blair in the 
1997 election, the independence cause was dumped within 24 hours. 
Scottish journalists have also not had the same influence on nationalist 
thought as have other symbol-operators in Scotland - artists, academics, 
intellectuals - because of their cultural approach to objectivity. Unlike the 
Quebecois journalists of the 1960s and 70s, they cannot openly identify with a 
cause, but, like anglophone Canadian journalists, are expected to sublimate their 
own political beliefs as a professional requirement. In the 19th and early 20th 
centuries, when the press was more partisan, [Dornan, 1991; Levine, 1993] 
journalists could take a more activist role; their inclusion as key figures in the 
dissemination of nationalist ideas was valid. But in 20th century journalism, 
with its tradition of non-partisan objectivity, the situation is different. In 
Quebec, where objectivity is defined as giving equal weight to discussions of both 
federalism and sovereignty as valid options, nationalism could be taken seriously 
- but not so in Scotland. As Smith points out, not all members of the 
intelligentsia want to be involved in promulgating nationalist ideas: "Many are 
concerned with their own career prospects. " [Smith, 1991, p. 120] 
The reluctance of Scottish journalists to take the independence option 
seriously is understandable, given the unfavourable political climate and the 
career difficulties that doing so would create for them, but still, it is worrisome 
that independence, which regularly receives poll support of more than 30 per 
cent, has not been examined more thoroughly up until very recently. Political 
journalists in Quebec have seen it as their responsibility to examine both 
federalism and sovereignty equally, despite the hostility that this generates from 
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their anglophone media colleagues in the Rest of Canada, because this reflects the 
views of Quebecers. Scottish journalists, at least up until now, have not seen the 
necessity of exploring the independence option in depth, although with the 
arrival of devolution and the Scottish parliament, this has changed, but the 
scrutiny is still coming from a strong anti-nationalist and Unionist perspective. 
During the 1999 Scottish parliamentary elections the SNP, now perceived 
as a serious rival for Labour, was subjected to a much more critical examination 
of its policies, which party strategists had not expected. The coverage, "which 
ranged from the sceptical to the outright hostile" [Jones, 1999, p. 5], did not 
demonstrate the same kind of commitment to fairness and balance found in 
present-day Quebec journalism. As Iain Macwhirter said: "The SNP was never 
going to get an easy ride from the overwhelmingly Labour-supporting Scottish 
print media - though the ferocity of the assault... took even seasoned hacks by 
surprise. " [Macwhirter, 1999] Nationalism is here to stay, and political 
journalists in Scotland, like their counterparts in Quebec, will have to learn how 
to deal with the consequences of this new political reality, and that requires 
critical scrutiny of both the unionist and independence options. This may be 
difficult, but not impossible; as Negrine says, "The task of interpretation cannot 
be abdicated by journalists though it may be one that they cannot sometimes 
undertake, perhaps for professional reasons or reasons of competence. " [Negrine, 
1996, p. 211 
The Effectiveness of Political Communications 
One question that needs to be answered in judging the effectiveness - or the 
relevance - of the political communications of the Scottish National Party and the 
Bloc Quebecois: how successful were they in achieving their goals? My answer 
to this question may seem surprising, but I believe that the Scottish National 
Party was not, while the Bloc Quebecois was, due, however, to political and 
social forces outwith the control of both parties. 
To explain: despite having what was universally described by Scottish 
political journalists as an extremely well-run and effective political 
communications strategy, the SNP only managed to increase its share of the 
popular vote by half a per cent, and although it doubled its seats to six, it still 
did not achieve its long sought-after breakthrough in the central belt. However, 
this was because of three factors about which they could do nothing. First, they 
continued to be heavily penalised by the first-past-the post electoral system 
because their vote was evenly spread throughout Scotland. Secondly, they were 
handicapped by the fact that they were a secessionist party fighting for seats in 
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what Nairn describes as "easily the most dense, refractory and metropole- 
centred power system in Europe" [Nairn, 1998, p. 217]. The inherent 
contradiction in trying to win seats for the parliament you want to be rid of is 
extremely difficult to overcome. Thirdly, and particular to this general election, 
they were hampered by the political reality that if Scottish voters wanted 
devolution, there was only one party they could vote for, which was Labour. 
Under these circumstances, it would have been extremely difficult for the SNP to 
make any significant gains. 
By contrast, for the Bloc, political events worked in their favour, despite 
their disastrous political communications. Although their percentage of the 
popular vote was down, falling below 40 per cent for the first time, they won 
more seats in Quebec than all the other parties combined. In addition, their loss 
of official opposition status was a help rather than a hindrance to the 
sovereigntist cause, especially with the anti-Quebec Reform Party now taking 
that role. Prime Minister Chretien's eagerness to undermine the Conservative 
campaign, even at the expense of national unity, was an even more significant 
factor in their last-minute surge. The Bloc, unlike the SNP, benefited from the 
first-past-the-post system in Canada, because their votes were concentrated in 
the francophone-dominated constituencies in the rural areas of Quebec, while the 
Liberal party's gains were in the heavily-populated but anglophone-dominated 
Montreal region. 
However, what the Bloc had to draw on, which the SNP did not, was a 
strong, community base of support which has been in place for more than 30 
years, backed by the Parti Quebecois, the provincial wing of the sovereigntist 
movement, and its driving force of Lucien Bouchard's leadership. Canada is one 
of the most de-centralized federations in the world, second only to Switzerland, 
and the province of Quebec, like the other Canadian provinces, has long enjoyed 
a degree of autonomy that the new Scottish parliament does not even begin to 
match. This, combined with Quebec's distinct society and the cultural solidarity 
reinforced by its francophone identity, means that Quebecers are more willing to 
give their votes to the parties that they believe will defend their unique place in 
the Canadian confederation, and will renegotiate that place if they feel their 
interests are not being served. As Charron states: "Images and marketing can do 
nothing to change the deepest convictions of the people; at best they allow 
political parties to adapt and take some advantage of them - and that is already 
plenty. " [Charron, 1991, p. 137] 
In conclusion, there are many factors that contribute to the success of a 
political party's message, particularly a nationalist party's message, and to think 
that its political communication is the only one is simplistic. Leadership, good 
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organization, the quality of candidates and the cogency of a party's particular 
political ideology as well as economic and social forces are among the many 
determinants, along with the transitory nature of party loyalties in modern 
politics. Even with the benefit of mass communications to get the message 
across, the effects of urbanization and geographical and social mobility in 
modern society can make it difficult to establish party loyalties [Newman, 1992, 
p. 9]. Good communications are an important part of any political campaign, 
but they have to be developed within the context of an overall strategy and 
political philosophy. However, even with the best of communications, the 
message of the party may not accepted by the general public or the political 
journalists who are transmitting that message, for reasons completely outwith the 
party's control. 
That certainly seemed to be the case for the SNP and Bloc in the 
Canadian and British national elections of 1997. What became clear when 
analyzing the performance of the two parties during these elections was that 
political communications are not as important as deep-rooted social, political 
and cultural forces in the outcomes of election campaigns. That was why the 
SNP failed to make a breakthrough in not only the 1997 election but also the 
1999 elections for the Scottish parliament, and the reason for the continued 
electoral success of the Bloc in the 1997 federal election and the PQ in the 1998 
provincial election. 
Both parties have had to battle a hostile or indifferent press during their 
campaigns, but significantly for the Bloc and the PQ, within Quebec they 
enjoyed, if not always a supportive press, one that was willing to take them 
seriously. Those who argue the case for media influence on political outcomes 
would say that the francophone media's less-hostile coverage enabled the relative 
electoral success of the PQ and the Bloc; this writer does not share that view. 
The key difference is that the journalists in Quebec had the same social, cultural 
and political values of their nationalist political colleagues, which arose out of a 
shared sense of national identity. This is not the case in Scotland, and will not 
be until the SNP has established the same deep roots in the Scottish community 
that the sovereigntists in Quebec have - and that is also a matter of political 
organization as well as identity. 
Simply put, getting the message across is not enough to ensure electoral 
success. If the voters are not ready to accept the message of a nationalist party, 
for whatever combination of historical, cultural or economic reasons - the party 
will not gain support, no matter how well-delivered that message may be. The 
political expression of Quebec nationalism has been a force in that province since 
the 1900s, and nationalism long before that, strengthened by Quebec's position 
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as a distinct society within Canada. Its cultural and linguistic isolation has 
reinforced the solidarity of Quebec nationalists throughout its history, and given 
it a distinct public sphere. Nationalism is hegemonic in Quebec, but it is not in 
Scotland, where the nationalist movement has been much more divided and 
therefore less effective. It has little or no presence in civic institutions, unlike 
Quebec, where sovereigntist supporters are found in business, unions, 
professional organizations and the media. As a result, the SNP has a weak 
community base, and only 15,000 members, compared to the Bloc's 113,000. 
These same political, cultural and social factors that have influenced the 
development of nationalism in the two regions have also influenced the role of 
their journalists in promulgating nationalism. In Quebec, journalists were on side 
with the sovereigntist cause during the 60s and 70s, but that is because they 
shared the same education, lifestyle, background and social-democratic ideals as 
those in the independence movement, and the norms in francophone journalism 
encouraged the expression of opinion and political analysis. In Scotland, where 
objectivity means being anti-nationalist, political journalists have not had the 
same freedom to report on nationalism as in Quebec, where journalists see 
balanced reporting as covering both federalism and sovereignty, and nationalism 
has been used mainly as a marketing tool to establish a particular brand identity 
for Scottish media, in order to give them a unique selling-point against their 
London-based competition. 
Future research into the two solitudes of Canadian reporting on Quebec, 
as well as on francophone issues outwith Quebec - which have been largely 
neglected by the Canadian media - and the disjunction between the Scottish 
media's coverage of the new parliament and the public's perception of its 
workings, will add more to our understanding of the complex relationship 
between nationalist movements, the political parties that represent them, and 
journalists, a relationship that has often been assumed, but all too infrequently 
analyzed. 
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Appendix 
List of Interviewees 
A. Scotland 
1. Mike Russell, Chief Executive of the SNP, Tuesday, July 9,1996 
2. John Swinney, SNP Vice-Convener of Publicity, Saturday, July 13,1996 
3. Kevin Pringle, SNP Director of Communications and Research, Tuesday, 
July 23,1996 
4. Alex Salmond, Leader of the SNP, Friday, November 1,1996 
5. Peter MacMahon, Scottish Political Editor, the Scotsman, Tuesday, November 
19,1996 
6. Kenny Farquharson, Scottish Political Editor, Scotland on Sunday, 
Wednesday, December 4,1996 
7. Robbie Dinwoodie, Scottish Political Correspondent, the Herald, Friday, 
December 13,1996 
8. Kevin Pringle, Thursday, August 14,1997 
9. Kenny Farquharson, Friday, August 15,1997 
10. Robbie Dinwoodie, Monday, August 18,1997 
11. Peter MacMahon, Monday, September 22,1997 (via e-mail) 
12. John Swinney, Friday, October 10,1997 
B. Canada 
1. Alain Dubuc, Editorial Page Editor, La Presse, Tuesday, June 17,1997 
2. Chantal Hebert, Ottawa bureau chief for La Presse, Wednesday, June 18,1997 
(via e-mail) 
3. Paul Wells, Ottawa bureau, Montreal Gazette, Thursday, June 19,1997 
4. Don Macpherson, Quebec Affairs columnist, Montreal Gazette, Thursday, June 
26,1997 
5. Gilles Duceppe, Leader of the Bloc, Tuesday, October 27,1997 
6. Francine Amyot, executive assistant to Duceppe, Tuesday, October 27,1997 
7. Jules Richer, Ottawa bureau, La Presse Canadienne, Friday, October 31,1997 
8. Yves Dupre, president, BDDS, Monday, November 3,1997 
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